Understanding bias in scientific practice

Philosophy of Science 63 (3):97 (1996)
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Abstract

Methodological objectivism is a conception of bias which obscures the contingent and limited nature of methodological principles behind the guise of fixed a priori standards. I suggest as an alternative a more flexible view of the operation of bias which I call the attribution model. The attribution model makes explicit the working principles of both parties to an actual charge of bias. It enables those involved to identify the issues in dispute between them, and is the basis for an approach to handling charges of bias within the process of discussion and negotiation which characterizes normal scientific decision-making

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References found in this work

On Mental Entities.Willard V. Quine - 1976 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), The ways of paradox, and other essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
How Experiments End.Peter Galison - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):411-414.

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