How perspective-based aggregation undermines the Pareto principle

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (2):182-205 (2020)
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Abstract

The Pareto principle is a normative principle about preferences that advocates concordance with unanimous preference. However, people have perspectives not just preferences. Evaluating preferences...

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