Knowledge and assumptions

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Philosophical Studies 156 (1):131-140 (2011)
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Abstract

When epistemologists talk about knowledge, the discussions traditionally include only a small class of other epistemic notions: belief, justification, probability, truth. In this paper, we propose that epistemologists should include an additional epistemic notion into the mix, namely the notion of assuming or taking for granted.

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10.1007/s11098-011-9797-z

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Author Profiles

Brett Sherman
University of South Carolina
Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.
Open knowledge and changing the subject.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1047-1071.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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