Abstract

“For those who wish to solve problems,” suggests Aristotle, “it is helpful to state the problems well” ; and, evidently, he accepts his own recommendation as a fairly deep methodological precept. In addition to setting out the appearances and canvassing the credible opinions attending to any particular domain of inquiry, Aristotle regards as an indispensable precursor to philosophical progress careful attention to the proper formulation of any problems to be addressed. About this much he seems perfectly right. A philosopher concerned with “the problem of consciousness” would do well to reflect at the beginning of the day on the problem to be tackled and the methods to be employed. Is it analysis? If so, is the analysis presumed to be intensional? Essence-specifying? Must the outcome respect naturalized constraints? And what, precisely, are those constraints? Without at least that much reflection at the beginning of an inquiry, success at the other end is likely to remain elusive at best.