“Thinking from the perspective of women’s lives makes strange what had appeared familiar, which is the beginning of any scientific inquiry.” Seeing as strange what had appeared familiar is the beginning of any inquiry, I think. I do not question my drinking water until it smells of chlorine. I do not ask why I was given the correct amount of change; I do not ask why I am treated with respect. In philosophical inquiry, I do not ask “What is a (...) cat?” but “What is Being?” Similarly, in the political realm, one does not question a social order which works well. Here the question arises, “Works well for whom?” Well, for those who aren’t troubled by it, those who do not question it, those for whom it does not seem strange. (shrink)

It is suggested that a connection between neurogenesis and brain part size is unsurprising. It is argued that neurogenesis cannot, however, be the only factor contributing to brain size. Highly individual post-natal experience radically shapes individual brains, leading to dramatic increases in brain size. The role of comparatively coarse statistical techniques in addressing these subtle biological issues is questioned.

"Making Sense of Nonsense: Trivial Remarks on the Nature of Language" is an inquiry into the nature and significance of nonsense for philosophers and other human beings. Philosophers have been accused of indulging in nonsense. Wittgenstein complains that philosophers take language on holiday. If an utterance is nonsense in virtue of being on holiday, we might expect meaningful utterances to be meaningful in virtue of their being at work, at home. When we look at language at home, we find that, (...) despite the tribute philosophers of language ordinarily pay to the a priori, meaning is a most contingent and subjective family of phenomena. On the rough ground of everyday discourse, we find language stamped with the desires and agendas of certain groups of mammals. Language shows us its rough edges when we clear away the unarticulated presuppositions smuggled in by dominant philosophical methodology. There are a number of strategies for attaining an unclouded vantage point on language. One is to imagine oneself into the position of someone to whom our language and way of life is unfamiliar. Another is to actually occupy a point of view from which the language and way of life we take for granted begins to seem strange. ;The theory of meaning that emerges from the kind of attention to language here described can be stated thus: meaning is grounded in concernful engagement with the world. Or, to put it another way: we talk about what we care about. As a result, language can serve as a deep reserve of human history. What it tells us about ourselves is not always pleasant. As the language reveals the concerns and agendas of speakers, it reveals the imbalances and abuses of power among those speakers. Insofar as language constructs the worlds we inhabit, the injustices and prejudices we find in language are mirror images of reality as we know it. The good news is the liberatory potential of our realization of the extent to which meaning, and hence reality, are "man-made." This potential is realized in the work of many radical lesbian feminist philosophers. (shrink)

Recent calls have been made to move professional standards to a more principles-based perspective, supposing that emphasizing broad principles would eliminate the legalistic focus that rules may encourage, and accountants’ behavior would be more ethical and uniformly so. However, this supposition has yet to be empirically tested. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (Code) provides guidance in both forms: principles and rules. This experiment examines how the form of the Code affects independence judgments in a client acceptance context. We also (...) examine the potential for levels of moral development to influence the effectiveness of the Code.We find that subjects are more likely to consider their independence impaired, and are more likely to reject a questionable audit engagement, when rules-based (principles-based) reasoners are provided with Code rules (principles). Given the popularity of the view that rules-based standards are undesirable, these findings have significant implications for the profession as principles-based ethical standards are discussed. (shrink)

How should the concept of evidence be understood? And how does the concept of evidence apply to the controversy about creationism as well as to work in evolutionary biology about natural selection and common ancestry? In this rich and wide-ranging book, Elliott Sober investigates general questions about probability and evidence and shows how the answers he develops to those questions apply to the specifics of evolutionary biology. Drawing on a set of fascinating examples, he analyzes whether claims about intelligent (...) design are untestable; whether they are discredited by the fact that many adaptations are imperfect; how evidence bears on whether present species trace back to common ancestors; how hypotheses about natural selection can be tested, and many other issues. His book will interest all readers who want to understand philosophical questions about evidence and evolution, as they arise both in Darwin's work and in contemporary biological research. (shrink)

The role of values in scientific research has become an important topic of discussion in both scholarly and popular debates. Pundits across the political spectrum worry that research on topics like climate change, evolutionary theory, vaccine safety, and genetically modified foods has become overly politicized. At the same time, it is clear that values play an important role in science by limiting unethical forms of research and by deciding what areas of research have the greatest relevance for society. Deciding how (...) to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate influences of values in scientific research is a matter of vital importance.Recently, philosophers of science have written a great deal on this topic, but most of their work has been directed toward a scholarly audience. This book makes the contemporary philosophical literature on science and values accessible to a wide readership. It examines case studies from a variety of research areas, including climate science, anthropology, chemical risk assessment, ecology, neurobiology, biomedical research, and agriculture. These cases show that values have necessary roles to play in identifying research topics, choosing research questions, determining the aims of inquiry, responding to uncertainty, and deciding how to communicate information. Kevin Elliott focuses not just on describing roles for values but also on determining when their influences are actually appropriate. He emphasizes several conditions for incorporating values in a legitimate fashion, and highlights multiple strategies for fostering engagement between stakeholders so that value influences can be subjected to careful and critical scrutiny. (shrink)

The Nature of Selection is a straightforward, self-contained introduction to philosophical and biological problems in evolutionary theory. It presents a powerful analysis of the evolutionary concepts of natural selection, fitness, and adaptation and clarifies controversial issues concerning altruism, group selection, and the idea that organisms are survival machines built for the good of the genes that inhabit them. "Sober's is the answering philosophical voice, the voice of a first-rate philosopher and a knowledgeable student of contemporary evolutionary theory. His book merits (...) broad attention among both communities. It should also inspire others to continue the conversation."-Philip Kitcher, Nature "Elliott Sober has made extraordinarily important contributions to our understanding of biological problems in evolutionary biology and causality. The Nature of Selection is a major contribution to understanding epistemological problems in evolutionary theory. I predict that it will have a long lasting place in the literature."-Richard C. Lewontin. (shrink)

Reconstructing the Past seeks to clarify and help resolve the vexing methodological issues that arise when biologists try to answer such questions as whether human beings are more closely related to chimps than they are to gorillas. It explores the case for considering the philosophical idea of simplicity/parsimony as a useful principle for evaluating taxonomic theories of evolutionary relationships. For the past two decades, evolutionists have been vigorously debating the appropriate methods that should be used in systematics, the field that (...) aims at reconstructing phylogenetic relationships among species. This debate over phylogenetic inference, Elliott Sober observes, raises broader questions of hypothesis testing and theory evaluation that run head on into long standing issues concerning simplicity/parsimony in the philosophy of science. Sober treats the problem of phylogenetic inference as a detailed case study in which the philosophical idea of simplicity/parsimony can be tested as a principle of theory evaluation. Bringing together philosophy and biology, as well as statistics, Sober builds a general framework for understanding the circumstances in which parsimony makes sense as a tool of phylogenetic inference. Along the way he provides a detailed critique of parsimony in the biological literature, exploring the strengths and limitations of both statistical and nonstatistical cladistic arguments. (shrink)

School choice positions parents as consumers who select schools that maximize their preferences. This account has been shaped by rational choice theory. In this essay, Terri Wilson contrasts a rational choice framework of preferences with John Dewey's understanding of interest. To illustrate this contrast, she draws on an example of one parent's school decision-making process. Dewey's concept of interest offers an alternative conceptual vocabulary attentive to the complex, value-laden, and evolving process of choosing a school. Her analysis considers how (...) schools might not just appeal to the preexisting preferences of families, but might instead actively shape those interests to democratic ends. (shrink)

Ockham's razor, the principle of parsimony, states that simpler theories are better than theories that are more complex. It has a history dating back to Aristotle and it plays an important role in current physics, biology, and psychology. The razor also gets used outside of science - in everyday life and in philosophy. This book evaluates the principle and discusses its many applications. Fascinating examples from different domains provide a rich basis for contemplating the principle's promises and perils. It is (...) obvious that simpler theories are beautiful and easy to understand; the hard problem is to figure out why the simplicity of a theory should be relevant to saying what the world is like. In this book, the ABCs of probability theory are succinctly developed and put to work to describe two 'parsimony paradigms' within which this problem can be solved. (shrink)

Ethical leadership matters in the context of organizational change due to the need for followers to trust the integrity of their leaders. Yet, there have been no studies investigating ethical leadership and organizational change. To fill this gap, we introduce a model of the moderating role of involvement in change. Organizational change and involvement in change are proposed as context-level moderators in the relationships of ethical leadership and work-related attitudes and performance. We employ a sample of 199 supervisor–subordinate pairs from (...) a wide variety of organizations. Results support a three-way interaction (ethical leadership, organizational change, and involvement in change) for performance and OCBs. Our results have important implications for organizational change since ethical leadership appears to complement follower involvement when change is happening. (shrink)

The authors demonstrate that unselfish behavior is in fact an important feature of both biological and human nature. Their book provides a panoramic view of altruism throughout the animal kingdom--from self-sacrificing parasites to the human capacity for selflessness--even as it explains the evolutionary sense of such behavior.

I explain the shutdown problem: the problem of designing artificial agents that (1) shut down when a shutdown button is pressed, (2) don’t try to prevent or cause the pressing of the shutdown button, and (3) otherwise pursue goals competently. I prove three theorems that make the difficulty precise. These theorems show that agents satisfying some innocuous-seeming conditions will often try to prevent or cause the pressing of the shutdown button, even in cases where it’s costly to do so. And (...) patience trades off against shutdownability: the more patient an agent, the greater the costs that agent is willing to incur to manipulate the shutdown button. I end by noting that these theorems can guide our search for solutions. (shrink)

Over the last 30 years the effects of economic globalisation have transformed education and its relationship to work and everyday working lives. Market reform and the appropriation of ‘learning’ to fuel the knowledge economy produced a lifelong learning educational order, complemented by social inclusion to manage residual and resistant populations. In the process education was decentred, learning spaces were diversified within an education market that served the world of work. Educators were remaindered by a rising tide of coaches, counsellors, learning (...) managers and mentors who ‘facilitate’ rather than ‘teach’. In this groundbreaking book the author contextualises these changes as a way of re-reading our times and its educational effects. The chapters examine the interface of policy and practice and map the shifting relations between educational work and social organisations of learning by developing three key themes: _Liquid learning_: drawing on Bauman’s characterisation of ‘liquid modernity’, the concept of liquid leaning details the cultural conditions that confront educators and those who seek to use education as a social instrument to address economic, social, cultural, environmental and political development _Making spaces of orientation_: designing and realising strategies to address the challenges of "liquid modernity" _Educational work_: considering the specialist expertise that educators as an occupational group bring to the challenges of liquid learning. The case examples that make up the main body of this book show how spaces of orientation are made and how they can be designed to support learning for living in interdependence. Each of these cases is informed by substantial empirical research and fine-grained analyses are used to define the nature of educational work, the resources that are mobilised in constructing contexts for learning, and its contribution to the art of politics that makes spaces of orientation. As the author demonstrates, educators have expertise that is critical in the contemporary globalised world and its politics. (shrink)

I explain and motivate the shutdown problem: the problem of creating artificial agents that (1) shut down when a shutdown button is pressed, (2) don’t try to prevent or cause the pressing of the shutdown button, and (3) otherwise pursue goals competently. I then propose a solution: train agents to have incomplete preferences. Specifically, I propose that we train agents to lack a preference between every pair of different-length trajectories. I suggest a way to train such agents using reinforcement learning: (...) we give the agent lower reward for repeatedly choosing same-length trajectories. (shrink)

Person-affecting views state that (in cases where all else is equal) we’re permitted but not required to create people who would enjoy good lives. In this paper, I present an argument against every possible variety of person-affecting view. The argument is a dilemma over trilemmas. Narrow person-affecting views imply a trilemma in a case that I call ‘Expanded Non-Identity.’ Wide person-affecting views imply a trilemma in a case that I call ‘Two-Shot Non-Identity.’ One plausible practical upshot of my argument is (...) as follows: we individuals and our governments should be doing more to reduce the risk of human extinction this century. (shrink)

Traditionally, the term ‘diaspora’ (from the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible) referred to the dispersion of the Jewish people from ancient Israel. It had a pejorative connotation, associated...

Changes and additions in the new edition reflect the ways in which the subject has broadened and deepened on several fronts; more than half of the-chapters are ...

Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life acceptance and (...) an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. (shrink)

Recent efforts to argue that nonepistemic values have a legitimate role to play in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses typically either reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values or incorporate nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic uncertainty. Given that scientific representations can legitimately be evaluated not only based on their fit with the world but also with respect to their fit with the needs of their users, we show in two case studies that nonepistemic (...) values can play a legitimate role as factors that override epistemic considerations in assessing scientific representations for practical purposes. (shrink)

Critical-set views avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by subtracting some constant from the welfare score of each life in a population. These views are thus sensitive to facts about biographical identity: identity between lives. In this paper, I argue that questions of biographical identity give us reason to reject critical-set views and embrace the total view. I end with a practical implication. If we shift our credences towards the total view, we should also shift our efforts towards ensuring that humanity survives (...) for the long term. (shrink)

The end of the nineteenth century is remembered as a time when psychology freed itself from philosophy and carved out an autonomous subject matter for itself. In fact, this time of emancipation was also a time of exile: while the psychologists were leaving, philosophers were slamming the door behind them. Frege is celebrated for having demonstrated the irrelevance of psychological considerations to philosophy. Some of Frege’s reasons for distinguishing psychological questions from philosophical ones were sound, but one of Frege’s most (...) influential arguments, which was elaborated upon and advocated by the positivists, vastly overestimated the gap separating the two disciplines. (shrink)

Attempts to show that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by attending to how well it answers certain kinds of questions.

According to Critical-Level Views in population axiology, an extra life improves a population only if that life’s welfare exceeds some fixed ‘critical level.’ An extra life at the critical level leaves the new population equally good as the original. According to Critical-Range Views, an extra life improves a population only if that life’s welfare exceeds some fixed ‘critical range.’ An extra life within the critical range leaves the new population incommensurable with the original. -/- In this paper, I sharpen some (...) old objections to these views and offer some new ones. Critical-Level Views cannot avoid certain Repugnant and Sadistic Conclusions. Critical-Range Views imply that lives featuring no good or bad components whatsoever can nevertheless swallow up and neutralise goodness or badness. Both classes of view entail that certain small changes in welfare correspond to worryingly large differences in contributive value. -/- I then offer a view that retains much of the appeal of Critical-Level and Critical-Range Views while avoiding the above pitfalls. On the Imprecise Exchange Rates View, the quantity of some good required to outweigh a given unit of some bad is imprecise. This imprecision is the source of incommensurability between lives and populations. (shrink)

When two causally independent processes each have a quantity that increases monotonically (either deterministically or in probabilistic expectation), the two quantities will be correlated, thus providing a counterexample to Reichenbach's principle of the common cause. Several philosophers have denied this, but I argue that their efforts to save the principle are unsuccessful. Still, one salvage attempt does suggest a weaker principle that avoids the initial counterexample. However, even this weakened principle is mistaken, as can be seen by exploring the concepts (...) of homology and homoplasy used in evolutionary biology. I argue that the kernel of truth in the principle of the common cause is to be found by separating metaphysical and epistemological issues; as far as the epistemology is concerned, the Likelihood Principle is central. (shrink)

Could low-level exposure to polluting chemicals be analogous to exercise -- a beneficial source of stress that strengthens the body? Some scientists studying the phenomenon of hormesis claim that that this may be the case.s A Little Pollution Good For You? critically examines the current evidence for hormesis.

Ethics and the Community of Inquiry gets to the heart of democratic education and how best to achieve it. The book radically reshapes our understanding of education by offering a framework from which to integrate curriculum, teaching and learning and to place deliberative democracy at the centre of education reform. It makes a significant contribution to current debates on educational theory and practice, in particular to pedagogical and professional practice, and ethics education.

Several evolutionary biologists have used a parsimony argument to argue that the single gene is the unit of selection. Since all evolution by natural selection can be represented in terms of selection coefficients attaching to single genes, it is, they say, "more parsimonious" to think that all selection is selection for or against single genes. We examine the limitations of this genic point of view, and then relate our criticisms to a broader view of the role of causal concepts and (...) the dangers of reification in science. (shrink)

This Element analyzes the various forms that design arguments for the existence of God can take, but the main focus is on two such arguments. The first concerns the complex adaptive features that organisms have. Creationists who advance this argument contend that evolution by natural selection cannot be the right explanation. The second design argument - the argument from fine-tuning - begins with the fact that life could not exist in our universe if the constants found in the laws of (...) physics had values that differed more than a little from their actual values. Since probability is the main analytical tool used, the book provides a primer on probability theory. (shrink)

Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexicality, (...) problems of the same kind remain. (shrink)

Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems purport to demonstrate that no population axiology can satisfy each of a small number of intuitively compelling adequacy conditions. However, it has recently been pointed out that each theorem depends on a dubious assumption: Finite Fine-Grainedness. This assumption states that there exists a finite sequence of slight welfare differences between any two welfare levels. Denying Finite Fine-Grainedness makes room for a lexical population axiology which satisfies all of the compelling adequacy conditions in each theorem. Therefore, Arrhenius’s theorems (...) fail to prove that there is no satisfactory population axiology. In this paper, I argue that Arrhenius’s theorems can be repurposed. Since all of our population-affecting actions have a non-zero probability of bringing about more than one distinct population, it is population prospect axiologies that are of practical relevance, and amended versions of Arrhenius’s theorems demonstrate that there is no satisfactory population prospect axiology. These impossibility theorems do not depend on Finite Fine-Grainedness, so lexical views do not escape them. (shrink)

To evaluate Hume's thesis that causal claims are always empirical, I consider three kinds of causal statement: ?e1 caused e2 ?, ?e1 promoted e2 ?, and ?e1 would promote e2 ?. Restricting my attention to cases in which ?e1 occurred? and ?e2 occurred? are both empirical, I argue that Hume was right about the first two, but wrong about the third. Standard causal models of natural selection that have this third form are a priori mathematical truths. Some are obvious, others (...) less so. Empirical work on natural selection takes the form of defending causal claims of the first two types. I provide biological examples that illustrate differences among these three kinds of causal claim. (shrink)

The properties, theoretical magnitudes, and natural kinds which science seeks to characterize, and not the sense or meanings which parts of speech may possess, are the subject of this paper. Many philosophers (e.g., Putnam [1971] and Achinstein [1974]) have agreed that two predicates of different meaning may pick out the same property, but they usually hold that that logically equivalent predicates must pick out the same properties. I propose to deny this thesis. My argument is by way of an example (...) and by appeal to a principle. The principle connects propertyhood with causal efficacy. The example situation I will describe in what follows is intended to show that the property of being a closed straight-sided figure having three sides is not the same property as that of being a closed straight-sided figure having three angles (a triangle). (shrink)

The Fourth Edition of this long-established text retains all the key features of the previous editions, covering the basic topics of a solid first course in ...

This paper defends two theses about probabilistic reasoning. First, although modus ponens has a probabilistic analog, modus tollens does not – the fact that a hypothesis says that an observation is very improbable does not entail that the hypothesis is improbable. Second, the evidence relation is essentially comparative; with respect to hypotheses that confer probabilities on observation statements but do not entail them, an observation O may favor one hypothesis H1 over another hypothesis H2 , but O cannot be said (...) to confirm or disconfirm H1 without such relativization. These points have serious consequences for the Intelligent Design movement. Even if evolutionary theory entailed that various complex adaptations are very improbable, that would neither disconfirm the theory nor support the hypothesis of intelligent design. For either of these conclusions to follow, an additional question must be answered: With respect to the adaptive features that evolutionary theory allegedly says are very improbable, what is their probability of arising if they were produced by intelligent design? This crucial question has not been addressed by the ID movement. (shrink)

The aim of this commentary is to identify and assess two central myths promulgated by America’s Christian right. For the purposes of this piece, the “Christian right” is defined as a group of socially conservative, politically active organizations within fundamentalist Christianity who share the objective of implementing conservative changes to American culture and law. The movement generally rejects any modern method of Biblical interpretation and many of its adherents place far less emphasis on the Gospels than on Pauline doctrine. Its (...) adherents are generally anti-intellectual, and hostile to science, pluralism, tolerance, and the separation of church and state. Amongst its central aims are downsizing the government, and "restoring" America as a Christian nation by imposing religion through the mechanisms of the state.1 Much of the movement's ideological strength has come from its expertise in circulating and reaffirming two powerful myths central to its image. These are: (1) That the Christian right have a monopoly on moral realism, (2) That they have a monopoly on respect for the “sanctity of life,” and The Christian right’s pundits present this set of abstract concepts – moral “values” and “sanctity of life” – as core values. Over and over again they have successfully framed complex issues as oppositions between these core values and their opponent’s position. This has worked partly because, instead of engaging in an analysis of these concepts, they equate them with a set of public policies that are assumed to meet the conditions that define them. Thus it would appear that if you do not support their policies, you cannot support moral values at all, nor can you respect the sanctity of life. A closer examination of the fallacious reasoning underpinning these two core values is long overdue. (shrink)