Philosophical Essays: Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It

Princeton University Press (2009)
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Abstract

The origins of these essays -- Introduction -- Presupposition -- A projection problem for speaker presupposition -- Language and linguistic competence -- Linguistics and psychology -- Semantics and psychology -- Semantics and semantic competence -- The necessity argument -- Truth, meaning, and understanding -- Truth and meaning in perspective -- Semantics and pragmatics -- Naming and asserting -- The gap between meaning and assertion : why what we literally say often differs from what our words literally mean -- Drawing the line between meaning and implicaturem and relating both to assertion -- Descriptions -- Incomplete definite descriptions -- Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction -- Why incomplete descriptions don't refute Russell's theory of descriptions -- Meaning and use : lessons for legal interpretation -- Interpreting legal texts : what is and what is not special about the law.

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Scott Soames
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Propositions as Cognitive Acts.Scott Soames - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1369-1383.
An invariantist theory of 'might' might be right.David Braun - 2012 - Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (6):461-489.

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