Rethinking synesthesia

Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Synesthetes are people who report having perceptual experiences that are very unusual, such as ?seeing? sounds as colors or ?smelling? colors as odors. It is commonly assumed these days that such synesthetic experiences must be instances of misperceptions. Against this widespread assumption, I will highlight that there is reason to think that at least some synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and not as illusions or hallucinations. On this view, which I will back up by conceptual arguments and empirical data, synesthesia does sometimes enable the individual to truly pick up on worldly features. In failing to take this possibility on board, the participants in this debate have thus unduly restricted the scope of dialectical options. Finally, the reassessment of synesthetic experiences that I defend in this paper will turn out to have important ramifications not just for synesthesia research, but also for perception theories more generally

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,317

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-22

Downloads
167 (#139,334)

6 months
8 (#551,658)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Sollberger
University of Lausanne