Abstract

In a recently published article, R. N. McLaughlin argues for what he calls an “open form” of bill of rights, in preference to the standard closed form. Such an open form would consist of a directive to the courts “to invalidate laws which offend fundamental morals by depriving citizens of basic rights, or by forcing them to deprive others of basic rights.” A standard form consists, of course, of a list of rights which are not to be violated. His reason for making this proposal is that he does not think the standard form is capable of keeping pace with the changing moral codes which such a bill is supposed to reflect, whereas the open form would by its very nature do so. I should like, in what follows, to argue that the open form presents a number of serious problems which the standard form does not, and that a standard form is in the end to be preferred, both because it does not present these new problems and because it need not be as inflexible in the face of changing moral standards as McLaughlin thinks.