Abstract

It is often claimed that Schelling has no one theory and that his work consists of many different systems. Indeed, this is one reason why many think that Schelling's thought has failed to gain much influence in the English-speaking world. It is possible, however, that Schelling's writings would receive more attention if various works were considered as dealing primarily with specific themes. For example, it may be helpful to consider The Ages of the World as primarily about time, Of Human Freedom as essentially about freedom in connection with the problem of evil, and the Philosophy of Art as centring on the nature of art. My interest here lies with Schelling's concept of the will-an area that may have consequences not only for the History of Philosophy, but also for the Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action and for Moral Philosophy. I will focus on The System of Transcendental Idealism since Schelling discusses will in more depth in this work than in any other of his writings. Moreover, to my knowledge, his account of the will has received relatively little specific attention. My aim is simply to construct in some detail the theory of the will that Schelling holds in The System of Transcendental Idealism; it is not my aim to analyze the theory historically or to delineate ways in which Schelling's theory may have consequences for other accounts of the will, for this would require more space than I have here. Indeed, due to the complexity of Schelling's thought, conflicting interpretations of his work and the fact that The System of Transcendental Idealism is not directly presented as a theory of the will, the goal of this paper to present Schelling's theory of the will is certainly of sufficient importance and of sufficient difficulty to be of interest in its own right. Moreover, once Schelling's thought in the System has been explained in terms of a theory of the will, the paper may serve as a foundation for further, more integrative enterprises.