Realism v Equilibrism about Philosophy

Syzetesis 1 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Abstract: According to the realist about philosophy, the goal of philosophy is to come to know the truth about philosophical questions; according to what Helen Beebee calls equilibrism, by contrast, the goal is rather to place one’s commitments in a coherent system. In this paper, I present a critique of equilibrism in the form Beebee defends it, paying particular attention to her suggestion that various meta-philosophical remarks made by David Lewis may be recruited to defend equilibrism. At the end of the paper, I point out that a realist about philosophy may also be a pluralist about philosophical culture, thus undermining one main motivation for equilibrism.

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Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Epistemology of disagreement : the good news.David Christensen - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
How is this Paper Philosophy?Kristie Dotson - 2012 - Comparative Philosophy 3 (1):3-29.

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