Abstract: According to the realist about philosophy, the goal of philosophy is to come to know the truth about philosophical questions; according to what Helen Beebee calls equilibrism, by contrast, the goal is rather to place one’s commitments in a coherent system. In this paper, I present a critique of equilibrism in the form Beebee defends it, paying particular attention to her suggestion that various meta-philosophical remarks made by David Lewis may be recruited to defend equilibrism. At the end of (...) the paper, I point out that a realist about philosophy may also be a pluralist about philosophical culture, thus undermining one main motivation for equilibrism. (shrink)

Many metaethicists agree that as ordinary people experience morality as a realm of objective truths, we have a prima facie reason to believe that it actually is such a realm. Recently, worries have been raised about the validity of the extant psychological research on this argument’s empirical hypothesis. Our aim is to advance this research, taking these worries into account. First, we propose a new experimental design for measuring folk intuitions about moral objectivity that may serve as an inspiration for (...) future studies. Then we report and discuss the results of a survey that was based on this design. In our study, most of our participants denied the existence of objective truths about most or all moral issues. In particular, many of them had the intuition that whether moral sentences are true depends both on their own moral beliefs and on the dominant moral beliefs within their culture. This finding suggests that the realist presumptive argument may have to be rejected and that instead anti-realism may have a presumption in its favor. (shrink)

One of the most interesting forms of antirealism developed in recent years is the irrealism of Nelson Goodman. According to that position, the widely held belief that there is one real world and one way the world is, and that the aim of our inquiry is to provide a true description of that world, is mistaken. We should not envisage our cognitive activity as involving recognition and description of the unique structure of the world, but rather as engaged in construction (...) of various world versions. It should also be admitted that in this process we, in some important and nontrivial sense, make worlds corresponding to those versions. That is to say, this version of irrealism combines a constructionalist account of our knowledge with radical ontological pluralism. Such a view certainly leads to a relativism of some sort, but Goodman thinks that this is not the relativism of “anything goes” type, since construction and acceptance of world versions is constrained by some standards of rightness. (shrink)

One of the most important “folk” anti-realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to (...) reject it as incoherent. There are two significant exceptions in the contemporary literature: relativists often hold it up as something of a coup for their view that it can make straightforward sense of faultless disagreement; and the author of this paper has argued (Wright 2006) that making judicious intuitionistic revisions to classical logic can provide resources that suffice to stabilise the notion. The present paper argues that neither relativism nor intuitionism in fact provides a satisfactory account and indicates how an alethic pluralist framework enables us to do better. (shrink)

Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that claims beliefs do not exist. He argues we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real. By arguing for the antirealist view as a revision of our common-sense view about the nature of mind, Poslajko makes the case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with philosophical questions about belief.

On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful examination, (...) the strongest Dummettian arguments for anti-realism of this sort fail to secure intuitionistic logic as the single, correct logic for anti-realist discourses. Instead, antirealists are placed in a situation where they fail to be justified in asserting monism (that intuitionistic logic is the unique correct logic). Thus, antirealists seem forced either to accept pluralism (i.e. one or more intermediate logic is at least as `correct’ as intuitionistic logic–an option I take to be unattractive from the anti-realist perspective), or they must be anti-realists about the realism/anti-realism debate (and, in particular, must refuse to assert the instance of excluded middle equivalent to logical monism or logical pluralism). (shrink)

This paper develops lines of criticism directed at two currently popular versions of anti-realism: the putnam-rorty-kuhn version that is centered on an acceptance theory of truth, and the van fraassen version that is centered on empiricist strictures over warranted beliefs. the paper continues by elaborating and extending a stance, called "the natural ontological attitude", that is neither realist nor anti-realist.

Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is presently the most influential and well-developed alternative to scientific realism. In this paper I argue that a reasonable condition on the distinction between belief and agnosticism prevents van Fraassen from claiming that we can be agnostic about what a theory says about unobservable entities while simultaneously accepting that theory. The upshot is that we must find some other way to do justice both to the argument for constructive empiricism and to van Fraassen's cogent criticisms of (...) scientific realism. I suggest that a highly attractive alternative is founded upon semantic anti-realism, and that empiricists should develop this alternative. (shrink)

Thomas Scanlon and Derek Parfit have recently defended a meta-ethical view that is supposed to satisfy realistic intuitions about morality, without the metaphysical implications that many find hard to accept in other realist views. Both philosophers argue that truths in the normative domain do not have ontological implications, while truths in the scientific domain presuppose a metaphysical reality. What distinguishes Scanlon and Parfit’s approach from other realistic meta-ethical theories is that they maintain that normative entities exist in a way that (...) is different from (some) non-normative entities. Moreover, they think that this view about the way normative entities exist helps to answer the metaphysical worries that are often thought to plague non-naturalism. To make sense of this idea, I develop their view as a version of alethic pluralism: the position that there is more than one truth property. I argue, however, that when their view is developed in this way it fails to satisfy realistic intuitions about morality. This shows that on a plausible and initially promising reading of what it takes for a normative entity to exist in a way that is different from non-normative entities, Parfit’s and Scanlon’s non-metaphysical moral realism fails to be more realistic than contemporary versions of anti-realism. (shrink)

This article examines whether it is possible to uphold one form of deflationism towards metaphysics, ontological pluralism, whilst maintaining metaphysical realism. The focus therefore is on one prominent deflationist who fits the definition of an ontological pluralist, Eli Hirsch, and his self-ascription as a realist. The article argues that ontological pluralism is not amenable to the ascription of realism under some basic intuitions as to what a “realist” position is committed to. These basic intuitions include a commitment to (...) more than a stuff-ontology, and a view that realism carries with it more than a rejection of idealism. This issue is more than merely terminological. The ascription of realism is an important classification in order to understand what sorts of entities can be the truthmakers within a given theory. “Realism” is thus an important term to understand the nature of the entities that a given theory accepts into its ontology. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that contemporary truth pluralists have undersold the connection between their views and the semantic realism/anti-realism debate. I argue that pluralist theories of truth are essentially a combination of accepting both realist and anti-realist intuitions, and that we should take this lesson to heart. I show how we can categorize pluralist views by how realist or anti-realist they are, and introduce two notions to do so: methodological fundamentality and theoretical fundamentality. I show how (...) viewing the pluralist literature in this way reveals the core principles behind rival pluralist accounts and cuts across another influential way to divide up the truth pluralist literature. I conclude by introducing a new version of truth pluralism: methodological pluralism about truth. Methodological pluralism about truth stays methodologically neutral between its realist and anti-realist poles, and thus better accounts for both of its key theoretical motivations. (shrink)

Abstract Street has argued that the meta-ethical realist is faced with a dilemma. Either evolutionary forces have had a distorting influenced on our ability to track moral properties or evolutionary forces influenced our beliefs in the direction of tracking moral properties. Street argues that if the realist accepts the first horn of the dilemma, the realist must accept implausible skepticism regarding moral beliefs. If the realist accepts the second horn of the dilemma, the realist owes an explanation of the fitness (...) producing nature of moral beliefs. As Street establishes the dialectic, the anti-realist’s explanation is better. I will argue that Street’s first horn is question begging then I will grasp the second horn of the dilemma and argue that only the realist can explain the role of moral beliefs in our evolutionary history. My argument will take the form of a dilemma. For our evaluative judgments to be fitness conducive, they must be responsive to the right sort of external world properties. The non-reductive realist can provide such a set of properties. On the first horn of the dilemma, the anti-realist cannot. The realist, unlike the anti-realist, can explain why our evaluative judgments are fitness conducive. The realist has won the explanatory battle. On the second horn of the dilemma, the anti-realist can provide a set of non-normative external world properties that our evaluative attitudes are responsive to. In doing so, the anti-realist has provided the heretofore-missing component of the reductive realist’s project. Again, the realist has won. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that one can be justified in believing, of some theory about unobservable entities, that the entities it posits are real and accurately described by the theory, in the same sense as one can be justified in believing that the theory’s empirical predictions are accurate, and that so to believe is what it means for a scientist to “accept” that theory, because the goal of science is to describe reality, even its unobservable features. The first part (...) is an epistemic claim, whereas the second concerns the rational reconstruction of scientific practice. Together they suggest that evidence justifying scientific acceptance of a theory justifies belief that the unobservable entities it posits are real and as the theory purports them to be. Anti-realism denies ; it holds that claims about unobservables are either unjustified or justified in a different sense from predictions of observations. It also denies ; it maintains that in her scientific work, as rationally reconstructed, a scientist who accepts a claim about unobservables believes that it yields accurate predictions of observables, not that it describes unobservables. (shrink)

Religious pluralism (as a disputed philosophical theory about the undisputed empirical fact of religious pluralism) has evoked lively debate. I make three observations. First, there is a striking similarity between postmodern and earlier modern responses to religious difference insofar as each represents an a priori refusal to let religious believers disagree with each other cognitively. Second, the rejection of theo-logical exclusivism by religious pluralism presumes that its account of religious difference is true, while that of theo-logical exclusivism (...) is false. Third, religious pluralism (pace Hick) does not follow from the premises of Kantian anti-realism. I suggest that religious pluralism is motivated by the terrible history and contemporary specter of religiously sanctioned violence. I argue that we should look directly at the content of religious belief in order to break the link between religious truth claims and religiously sanctioned violence and domination. (shrink)

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents (...) a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against readings of Hertz that overly assimilate him into the thought of late 20th century anti-realists and pluralists. Firstly, as is well-known, various images of the same objects are possible according to Hertz. However, I will argue that this envisaged pluralism concerns the situation before all the evidence is considered i. e. before we can decide whether the images are correct and appropriate. Hertz believes in final and decisive battles of the kind he (...) participated in while doing experiments in electrodynamics. Secondly, I will argue that the concept of representation is still quite appropriately applied to important aspects of images, namely when it comes to fundamental physical equations. In this context Hertz explicitly allows that “characteristics of our image, which claim to represent observable relations of things, do really and correctly correspond to them” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 9). A final consideration is Hertz’s consistent appeal to the concept of the hypothesis. I will argue that his use of the concept does not indicate that he contributed to an increasing hypothetization of science, if this trend is understood in a strong sense, i. e. as the belief that the correctness of scientific theories cannot be established for principled reasons. As mentioned, when it comes to experimental evidence Hertz believes in decisive battles. (shrink)

Political realists claim that politics should be regulated by a distinctive political normativity, one that does not rely on external, pre-political moral standards. It is in this sense that they distinguish political realism from ‘political moralism’, regarded as an approach that understands political theory as applied ethics. Importantly, realists’ anti-moralism is not motivated by the conviction that moral considerations do not play any role in the political realm. Rather, the target is the externalism of the normative resources on which (...) moralist theories typically ground their conceptions of legitimacy. In contrast to moralists, some realists have argued for the need to elaborate internal theories of legitimacy, ones that develop normativity internally – that is, from within the political context under evaluation. This commitment entails the effort to reconnect legitimacy to the beliefs and attitudes of people subjected to the political power. In these accounts of legitimacy, critique is typically exercised internally, by means of self-reflection and ideology critique. Contra some realists, I argue that some forms of externalism are desirable and compatible with internalist accounts of legitimacy, and I show how to accommodate them within internalist theories of legitimacy. They are desirable because they strengthen the emancipatory potential of internal reflection and, in some cases, even stimulate it, as when, because of political circumstances, internal critique cannot be exercised. In addition, they prevent internalist approaches from falling into descriptive accounts of de facto acceptance of power. These forms of external critique can be compatible with internalist accounts of legitimacy, provided that they do not contrast with what I call methodological and substantive internalism. Accordingly, in the article, I discuss which stances of external critique can and should be accommodated within internalist accounts of legitimacy, without renouncing to the realist character of the approach. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against readings of Hertz that overly assimilate him into the thought of late 20th century anti-realists and pluralists. Firstly, as is well-known, various images of the same objects are possible according to Hertz. However, I will argue that this envisaged pluralism concerns the situation before all the evidence is considered i. e. before we can decide whether the images are correct and appropriate. Hertz believes in final and decisive battles of the kind he (...) participated in while doing experiments in electrodynamics. Secondly, I will argue that the concept of representation is still quite appropriately applied to important aspects of images, namely when it comes to fundamental physical equations. In this context Hertz explicitly allows that “characteristics of our image, which claim to represent observable relations of things, do really and correctly correspond to them” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 9). A final consideration is Hertz’s consistent appeal to the concept of the hypothesis. I will argue that his use of the concept does not indicate that he contributed to an increasing hypothetization of science, if this trend is understood in a strong sense, i. e. as the belief that the correctness of scientific theories cannot be established for principled reasons. As mentioned, when it comes to experimental evidence Hertz believes in decisive battles. (shrink)

It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it is argued (...) that causal explanations do not license the sort of inferences to theoretical entities that would embarass the anti-realist. Section IV examines the epistemic commitments involved in accepting a causal explanation. Section V presents my conclusions: contra Cartwright, the anti-realist may incorporate a causal account of explanation into his vision of science in an entirely natural way. (shrink)

It is widely believed that science is in the business of finding out what the world is really like. The philosophical version of this belief is scientific realism -- a doctrine about science that tells us that we ought to believe that the best theories in science are true, and that the world is occupied with the objects that those theories contain. If scientific realism was not correct, the argument goes, the incredible success of science would be a miracle. The (...) best explanation for the success of science however, is not that it is a miracle, but that scientific theories are true. This argument is an instance of inference to the best explanation, or IBE. Skeptics have questioned why scientific success must imply its truth given that there are so many abandoned, false scientific theories in the history of science that were nevertheless successful. One of the controversies in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists surrounds the legitimacy of reasoning in accordance with IBE. Realists need IBE to be a justified and reliable guide to truth. In this compilation thesis, I address various questions related to IBE and scientific realism. Paper 1 argues that scientific realism without IBE loses too much of its epistemic optimism, and that it in some contexts even becomes more pessimistic than the most prominent rival philosophical doctrine about science -- constructive empiricism. To avoid deflating realism, I argue, a defense of IBE is necessary. Paper 2 addresses whether methodological similarities between science and metaphysics force scientific realists to also be realists with respect to metaphysics. If IBE is legitimate, it should not only be valid in science, but also in metaphysics, effectively inflating the ontology that scientific realists are rationally bound to accept. I argue against this conclusion. Paper 3 offers a proof of concept regarding a novel way to justify inferences to unobservable objects. Paper 4 establishes a novel critique of non-probabilistic versions of IBE in scientific realism. (shrink)

Species pluralism gives us reason to doubt the existence of the species category. The problem is not that species concepts are chosen according to our interests or that pluralism and the desire for hierarchical classifications are incompatible. The problem is that the various taxa we call 'species' lack a common unifying feature.

This book discusses the problem of mathematical knowledge, and its broader philosophical ramifications. It argues that the problem of explaining the (defeasible) justification of our mathematical beliefs (‘the justificatory challenge’), arises insofar as disagreement over axioms bottoms out in disagreement over intuitions. And it argues that the problem of explaining their reliability (‘the reliability challenge’), arises to the extent that we could have easily had different beliefs. The book shows that mathematical facts are not, in general, empirically accessible, contra Quine, (...) and that they cannot be dispensed with, contra Field. However, it argues that they might be so plentiful that our knowledge of them is intelligible. The book concludes with a complementary ‘pluralism’ about modality, logic and normative theory, highlighting its revisionary implications. Metaphysically, pluralism engenders a kind of perspectivalism and indeterminacy. Methodologically, it vindicates Carnap’s pragmatism, transposed to the key of realism. (shrink)

Sharon Street’s influential Darwinian Dilemma argues that moral realism is incompatible with moral knowledge. In this paper I argue that Street’s argument cannot give us reason to reject moral realism. This is because the debunker’s own arguments imply that our evidence for the claim that we have moral knowledge underdetermines its truth. Furthermore, the final part of the Street’s argument, where she infers that moral realism must be false because we have moral knowledge, commits her to the view that underdetermining (...) evidence cannot justify belief. This implies that the debunker is not justified in believing that we have moral knowledge. As a result, Street’s debunking argument does not give us reason to reject realism (or accept anti-realism), even if we grant that they successfully establish the incompatibility of moral realism with our having moral knowledge. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade.ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. (shrink)

According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether accepting a scientific theory involves believing that the theory is true. On van Fraassen’s own anti-realist empiricist position, accepting a theory involves believing only that the theory is correct in its claims about observable aspects of the world. However, a number of philosophers have argued that acceptance and belief cannot be distinguished and thus that the debate is either confused or trivially settled in favor of the (...) realist. In addition, another set of philosophers have argued that van Fraassen’s empiricist position appeals to an unmotivated distinction between observable and unobservable aspects of the world. This paper aims to reconstruct a van Fraassen-style empiricism about scientific acceptance that avoids these two objections – reconstructed empiricism. (shrink)

The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief-forming methods are noncausal (for example, not perception based or memory based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. (...) This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true—in a sense of “true” to be articulated. The final step shows how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that singularist approaches to solving the Pessimistic Induction, such as Structural Realism, are unacceptable, but that when a pluralist account of methodological principles is adopted this anti-realist argument can be dissolved. The proposed view is a contextual methodological pluralism in the tradition of Normative Naturalism, and is justified by appeal to meta-methodological principles that are themselves justified via an externalist epistemology. Not only does this view provide an answer to the Pessimistic Induction, it (...) can also accommodate our strongest intuitions regarding the progress of science. (shrink)

We live in a liberal, pluralistic, largely secular society where, in theory, there is fundamental protection for freedom of conscience generally and freedom of religion in particular. There is, however, both in statute and common law, increasing pressure on religious believers and conscientious objectors (outside wartime) to act in ways that violate their sincere, deeply held beliefs. This is particularly so in health care, where conscientious objection is coming under extreme pressure. I argue that freedom of religion and conscience need (...) to be put on a sounder footing both legislatively and by the courts, particularly in health care. I examine a number of important legal cases in the UK and US, where freedom of religion and conscience have come into conflict with government mandates or equality and anti-discrimination law. In these and other cases we find one of two results: either the conscientious objector loses out against competing rights, or the conscientious objector succeeds, but due to what I consider unsound judicial reasoning. In particular, cases involving cooperation in what the objector considers morally impermissible according to their beliefs have been wrongly understood by some American courts. I argue that a reasonable theory of cooperation incorporated into judicial thinking would enable more acceptable results that gave sufficient protection to conscientious objectors without risking a judicial backlash against objectors who wanted to take their freedoms too far. -/- I also venture into broader, more controversial waters concerning what I call freedom of dissociation – the fundamental right to withdraw from associating with people, groups, and activities. It is no more than the converse of freedom of association, which all free societies recognise as a basic right. How far should freedom of dissociation go? What might society be like if freedom of dissociation were given more protection in law than it currently has? It would certainly give freedom of religion and conscience a substantial foundation, but it could also lead to discriminatory behaviour to which many people would object. I explore some of these issues, before going back to the narrower area of freedom of conscience and religion in health care, making some proposals about how the law could strengthen these basic pillars of a liberal, free society. (shrink)

In the first section, I characterize realism and illustrate the sense in which Wittgenstein's account of mathematics is anti-realist. In the second section, I spell out the above notion of objectivity and show how and anti-realist account of truth, namely, Putnam's idealized rational acceptability, preserves objectivity. In the third section, I discuss the "majority argument" and illustrate how Wittgenstein's anti-realism can also account for the objectivity of mathematics. What Putnam's and Wittgenstein's anti-realisms ultimately show is that (...) this notion of objectivity is distinct from the notion of realism and that an account of objectivity is no reason to be either realist or anti-realist. (shrink)

The article aims to determine whether it is possible to build the reliably practiced classical philosophy, understood as a metaphysical research, directed towards the nature of objective reality. The purpose of this kind of philosophizing is knowledge and truth. Moreover, the practice of such philosophizing and its results should meet some of the characteristics of science. The paper establishes a set of conditions that have been imposed on the science of metaphysics by Kazimierz Twardowski. Among the conditions of such philosophizing (...) are anti-dogmatism, criticism, inter-subjectivity of philosophizing and its results, proper epistemic justification of philosophical beliefs, application of the analysis method, rigorous language and reasoning, the use of experience and scientific knowledge. The paper considers these conditions to be correct in most cases and argues that metaphysics can meet them. The existing cases of analytical metaphysics show that metaphysics is possible as a science. Next, the article argues that the late Twardowski failed to substantiate his claim that metaphysical positions which he classified as a world-view philosophy could not be scientifically justified, which could have been possibly done with differentiating ways of understanding what such a scientific justification should be. The article argues that he did not take into account a reductive conception of the metaphysical philosophy, which even though it allows the plurality of metaphysical explanations and does not force anyone to accept one position as the only possible and correct explanation, would have an objective value, if such metaphysics were elaborated indeed. (shrink)

In this thesis, I investigate realist, anti-realist and pluralist views in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of complexity. The philosophy of science can inform the philosophy of complexity and vice versa because we can consider scientific inquiry to largely involve the study of complex systems. I however find that the relevant realist, anti-realist and pluralist views are problematic in various ways, and that a version of pragmatism suggests a promising alternative. This version of pragmatism incorporates elements (...) of pluralism, but maintains a commitment to epistemic hierarchy, convergence and progress. The way to develop such a version of pragmatism is, I argue, by rebooting William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science. Whewell however held to the following two transcendental claims: 1. Empirical inquiry undertaken in science properly practiced can reveal necessary truths. 2. The revelation of such necessary truths grants us a glimpse of the mind of God. Such transcendental claims are obviously at odds with pragmatism. There are however core features of Whewell’s view that are notably pragmatist in nature, features that explicitly inspired Charles Sanders Piece’s convergent pragmatism. These are as follows: 3. Subject and object (or mind and world) are inextricably entwined during scientific inquiry; they are not separated by anything like a correspondence relationship. 4. Science progresses via what Whewell calls the consilience of inductions (an ongoing merging of scientific theories, a merging that increases our understanding of the world over time). I modify Whewell’s view by stripping away its transcendental elements while maintaining its pragmatist elements. What remains is, I argue, a robust and novel kind of pragmatism suitable for being introduced into the contemporary philosophy of science. Whewell suitably-pragmatised can offer new insights into ongoing debates, particularly those around the nature of scientific progress, scientific truth and scientific understanding. (shrink)

Lee McIntyre’s Respecting Truth chronicles the contemporary challenges regarding the relationship amongst evidence, belief formation and ideology. The discussion in his book focusses on the ‘politicisation of knowledge’ and the purportedly growing public (and sometimes academic) tendency to choose to believe what is determined by prior ideological commitments rather than what is determined by evidence-based reasoning. In considering these issues, McIntyre posits that the claim “race is a myth” is founded on a political ideology rather than on support from scientific (...) evidence. He contrasts this view with the argument that racially correlated biomedical outcomes for self-identified racial groups suggest that biological races are real. I explore how McIntyre’s framing of the claim “race is a myth” as fundamentally ideological results in him failing to engage with the arguments and evidence many constructionists and biological anti-realists put forward in support of their views. I also show how the biomedical evidence he thinks supports biological realism is unconvincing. (shrink)

In this paper, the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science which began in the author's previous papers is continued. It is argued that practical realism is opposed to standard scientific realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other. Standard scientific realism is challengeable due to its abstract character, as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological presupposition which raises the problem of the God's Eye point of view (as it was called (...) by Hilary Putnam). Joseph Rouse's conception of science as practice, Sami Pihlström's pragmatic realism, and even Ilkka Niiniluoto's critical scientific realism are interpreted as practical realist conceptions. Pihlström suggests that the contemporary scientific realist should be prepared to accept the pragmatically naturalized Kantian transcendental perspective on realism. It is argued, however, that this realistically naturalized Kantianism can be nothing more than practical realism, as originated by Karl Marx. (shrink)

Using a quantified propositional logic involving the operators it is known that and it is possible to know that, we formalize various interesting philosophical claims involved in the realism debate. We set out inferential rules for the epistemic modalities, ranging from ones that are obviously analytic, to ones that are epistemologically more substantive or even controversial. Then we investigate various aporias for the realism debate. These are constructively inconsistent triads of claims from our list: a claim expressing some sort of (...) common ground in the debate; a characteristically anti-realist thesis about truth and knowability; and a characteristically realist thesis about determinacy of truth value. Various patterns of reductio proof for these inconsistent triads are generated, so as to display their variety. The reductio proofs use only the inferential rules set out earlier. The philosophical utility of each aporia for the anti-realist is then assessed. This involves consideration of the acceptability of the premiss expressing common ground; the strength and plausibility of the anti-realist premiss; the strength of the realist premiss that is the ultimate target of the reductio; and the analytic status of the inferential rules applied within the proof. (shrink)

Starmaking brings together a cluster of work published over the past 35 years by Nelson Goodman and two Harvard colleagues, Hilary Putnam and Israel Scheffler, on the conceptual connections between monism and pluralism, absolutism and relativism, and idealism and different notions of realism -- issues that are central to metaphysics and epistemology. The title alludes to Goodman's famous defense of the claim that because all true representations of stars and other objects are human creations, it follows that in an (...) important sense the stars themselves are made by us. More generally, the argument moves from the fact that our right representations are constructed by us to the claim that the world itself is similarly constructed. Starmaking addresses the question of whether this seeming paradox can be turned into a serious philosophical view. Goodman and Putnam are sympathetic; Scheffler is the critic. Although many others continue to write about pluralism, relativism, and constructionalism, Starmaking brings together the protagonists in the debate since its beginnings and follows closely its still developing form and substance, focusing sharply on Goodman's claim that "we make versions, and right versions make worlds.". (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers draw a distinction between two kinds of entities: ultimately real entities and conventionally real entities. Among Abhidharma Buddhist philosophers, who accept the fundamental existence of ultimately real entities, there is a debate over the existential status of conventionally real entities. The most prevalent interpretation of the general Abhidharma position is an anti-realist one: conventionally real entities do not exist. Here, however, I will argue that there is at least one Abhidharma philosopher who is not an anti-realist (...) about conventionally real entities. Saṅghabhadra, a fifth-century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher belonging to the Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda tradition of Abhidharma Buddhism, offers an account of conventionally real entities that takes them to be real. According to him, conventional entities exist, although in a derivative and degenerate way—a way that is supervenient on and grounded in what is ultimately real. Saṅghabhadra’s view substantiates, in his specific case, Kris McDaniel’s argument that Abhidharma accounts of conventional reality are profitably interpreted as the view that conventional entities exist but enjoy a mode of being that is distinct from the fundamental mode of being enjoyed by ultimately real entities. In what follows, I will argue that the pluralist framework that McDaniel lays out for understanding the mode of being that non-fundamental entities enjoy fits well with and makes the most sense of, the account of conventional entities offered by Saṅghabhadra. (shrink)

Even if we know all relevant descriptive facts about an act, we can still be uncertain about its moral acceptability. Most literature on how to act under such normative uncertainty operates on moral realism, the metaethical view that there are objective moral facts. Lay people largely report anti-realist intuitions, which poses the question of how these intuitions affect their interpretation and handling of normative uncertainty. Results from two quasi-experimental studies (total N = 365) revealed that most people did not (...) interpret normative uncertainty as referring to objective moral facts but rather as uncertainty regarding one’s own view, uncertainty regarding the culturally accepted view or as the result of ambivalence. Especially the anti-realist majority of participants interpreted normative uncertainty different to how it is described in the literature on choice under normative uncertainty. Metaethical views were also associated with lay peoples’ choice of uncertainty reduction strategies and with assumptions about the intended aim of such strategies. The current findings suggest that empirical investigations of normative uncertainty might benefit from considering folk metaethical pluralism, as the lay public largely disagrees with the metaethical assumptions underlying the current discourse on choice under normative uncertainty. (shrink)

In the discussion about Yablo’s Paradox, a debated topic is the status of infinitary proofs. It is usually considered that, although a realist could (with some effort) accept them, an anti-realist could not do it at all. In this paper I will argue that there are plausible reasons for an anti-realist to accept infinitary proofs and rules of inference. En la discusión sobre la Paradoja de Yablo, un tópico debatido es el estatus de las pruebas infinitarias. Se suele (...) considerar que, aunque un realista podría (con cierto esfuerzo) aceptarlas, un anti-realista no podría hacerlo en absoluto. En este artículo, argumento que hay razones plausibles para que un anti-realista acepte pruebas y reglas de inferencia infinitarias. (shrink)

The paper considers Paul Natorp's Kantian reading of Plato's theory of ideas, as developed in his monumental work, Platos Ideenlehre, eine Einführung in den Idealismus (1903, 1921). Central to Natrop's reading are, I argue, the following two claims: (1) Plato's ideas are laws, not things; and (2) Plato's theory of ideas in the first instance a theory about the possibility and nature of thought - in particular cognitive and indeed scientific or explanatory thought - and only as a consequence is (...) it a theory about the nature of reality. Natrop thus argues that Plato's theory of ideas is at its heart a transcendental theory, and that Plato's metaphysics is built on this basis. The paper considers these claims - and their textual basis in Plato - in some detail, and attempts an initial evaluation of their plausibility as a reading of Plato. I am on the whole sympathetic to Natorp's reading, though a proper assessment goes beyond the present paper. The wider interest of this idealist or anti-realist reading of Plato ought to be obvious, especially in view of the commonly accepted assumption these days that both Plato and Aristotle, and indeed the Greeks in general, took realism entirely for granted (see e.g. M. Burnyeat). Natorp argues that this is true of Aristotle, but quite untrue of Plato. But he is quite clear that the idealism he ascribes to Plato is not Berkeleyan or metaphysical idealism, but a certain kind of transcendental or epistemological idealism. Natorp, however, is no uncritical follower of Kant, and the version of trascendental idealism that he ascribes to Plato is, I argue, very different from Kant's. (shrink)

In those parts of his paper that have the clearest bearing upon mycontributions, Simon Deichsel 1) elaborates various conceptions ofrealism; 2) declares himself an anti-realist of a specific sort; 3) seeks toidentify and criticise pragmatic aspects of my justification for adoptinga realist orientation; and 4) argues that his anti-realist perspective ispreferable to realism.An immediate problem with Deichsel’s project, if intended as acritique of my own realist orientation, is that the sort of realism againstwhich his anti-realism is oppositionally (...) defined is not the versionof realism I maintain. In fact the only one of Deichsel’s formulationsthat I unambiguously accept as a version of realism is ontological realism. Realism as I understand the term is about existence.It is ontological in nature. At its most basic, it posits the existence of an‘external’ reality.1So understood, realism is not a theory of knowledge, or of language,or even of truth. Indeed so formulated it says nothing about knowledgeor truth.2In particular it does not commit anyone to the correspondencetheory of truth, or indeed to any other theory or conception of truth.In fact it is not a semantic theory at all. (shrink)

Famously, Michael Dummett argues that considerations concerning the role of language in communication lead to the rejection of classical logic in favor of intuitionistic logic. Potentially, this results in massive revisions of established mathematics. Recently, Neil Tennant (“The law of excluded middle is synthetic a priori, if valid”, Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 205-229) suggested that a Dummettian anti-realist can accept the law of excluded middle as a synthetic, a priori principle grounded on a metaphysical principle of determinacy. This article (...) shows that the for the anti-realist, the law of excluded middle entails that humans have wildly implausible abilities. The proposed synthesis between anti-realism and classical mathematics thus fails. (shrink)

Many philosophers equate naturalism with physicalism. Non‐reductive naturalists object that physicalism is inadequate to human agency. Despite their disagreement, both labor under a vestigial Cartesianism that regards the human mind as the sole exception in an otherwise monolithic physical nature. But nonhuman nature is complex, exhibits emergence, and requires multiple sciences. This paper argues that nonhuman nature cannot be adequately understood by physicalism with its doctrine of the causal closure of the physical. At the same time, non‐reductive naturalism cannot deny (...) the dependence of human processes on nonhuman nature. A pluralistic naturalism can acknowledge this dependency without accepting physicalism. The Cartesian ghost can only be exorcized by thinking through the complexity of the nonhuman nature that is our home. This permits us to accept the realist, albeit fallibilist, truth of human cognition of the nature that evolved it. (shrink)

Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted in believing. If so, truth cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are (...) warranted by coherence with a system of beliefs. Next they drew upon their verification theory of meaning, a consequence of which is that truth cannot transcend what can be warranted. The coherence theory of knowledge and verificationism together entail that truth cannot transcend what can be warranted by coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's argument for coherentism is strong and anticipates contemporary anti-realism. (shrink)

TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHICS. AFTER NIETZSCHE -/- Preface This book tells the story of twentieth-century ethics or, in more detail, it reconstructs the history of a discussion on the foundations of ethics which had a start with Nietzsche and Sidgwick, the leading proponents of late-nineteenth-century moral scepticism. During the first half of the century, the prevailing trends tended to exclude the possibility of normative ethics. On the Continent, the trend was to transform ethics into a philosophy of existence whose self-appointed task was (...) that of describing the human condition as consisting of choices, as unavoidable as arbitrary, without any attempt at providing criteria for making such choices. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the heir of ethics was a philosophy of morality, that is, an analysis of the language of morality that intended to clarify valuations without trying to justify them. 1958 was the year of the normative turn that led to the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy, a turn followed by decades of controversies between distinct kinds of normative ethics: utilitarian, Kantian, virtue ethics. While the controversy was raging, a quiet revolution took place, that of applied ethics which surprisingly dissolved the controversy's very subject matter by providing methods for making convergence possible on intermediate principles even when no agreement was available about first principles. The normative turn and the revolution of applied ethics have led us, at the turn of the century, to a goal that was quite far from the starting point. Instead of scepticism and relativism that was the fashion at the beginning of the century, at the beginning of the third millennium impartial and universal moral arguments seem to hold the spot being supported, if not by a final rational foundation, at least by reasonableness, the most precious legacy of the Enlightenment. -/- ● TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- ● I Anglo-Saxon philosophy: naturalism 1. Dewey beyond evolutionism and utilitarianism 2. Dewey and anti-essentialist moral epistemology 3. Dewey and naturalist moral ontology 4. Dewey and normative ethics of conduct and function 5. Perry and semantic naturalism -/- ● II Anglo-Saxon philosophy: ideal utilitarianism and neo-intuitionism 1. Moore's critique of utilitarian empiricism 2. Moore on the naturalistic fallacy 3. Moore on the nature of intrinsic value 4. Moore on ideal utilitarianism 5. Prichard on the priority of the right over the good 6. Ross's coherentist moral epistemology 7. Ross's moral ontology: realism, pluralism, and non-naturalism 8. Ross's normative ethics of prima facie duties -/- The chapter reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore's early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. It stresses the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. It argues that PE is more a patchwork of somewhat diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. -/- ●III Anglo-Saxon philosophy: non-cognitivism 1. The Scandinavian School, the Vienna circle and proto-emotivism 2. Wittgenstein and the ineffability of ethics 3. Russell's and Ayer's radical emotivism 4. Stevenson and moderate emotivism 5. Stevenson and the pragmatics of moral language 6. Stevenson and the methods for solving ethical disagreement 7. Hare and prescriptivism The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of 'good', its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with 'emotive' meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell's ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson's theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. A section reconstructs the discussion from the Forties about Hume's law, mentioning Karl Popper's argument and Richard Hare's early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- ●IV Anglo-Saxon philosophy: critics of non-cognitivism 1. Neo-naturalism and its objections to the naturalistic fallacy argument 2. Objections to Hume's law 3. Clarence Lewis and the pragmatic contradiction 4. Toulmin and the good reasons approach 5. Baier and moral reasons 5. Baier, social moralities and the absolute morality 6. Baier and the moral point of view 7. Baier and the contents of absolute ethics -/- ● V Continental philosophy: the philosophy of values 1. Max Weber and the polytheism of values 2. Phenomenology against psychologism and rationalism 3. Reinach and the theory of social acts 4. Scheler and the material ethics of values 5. Hartmann and the ontology of values 6. Plessner, Gehlen and the Philosophische Anthropologie -/- The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl's project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the apriori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy conducted in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach's theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that sketches the ideas 'discovered' later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section discusses Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of 'values' – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler, who claimed to be Husserl's legitimate heirs. -/- ● VI Continental philosophy: the critics of the philosophy of values 1. Freud, the Superego and Civilization 2. Heidegger on original ethos against ethics 3. Sartre and de Beauvoir on authenticity and ambiguity 4. Adorno and Horkheimer on emancipation and immoralism -/- ●VII Post-liberal theologians and religious thinkers 1. Barth on the autonomy of faith from ethics 2. Developments of Reformed moral theology after Barth 3. Bonhoeffer on the concrete divine command and ethics of penultimate realities 4. Developments of Reformed and Catholic moral theology after world war II 5. Baeck and the transformation of liberal Judaism 6. Rosenzweig against liberal Judaism 7. Buber and religion as the vital lymph of morality 8. Heschel and Judaism as a science of actions -/- The chapter examines the main protagonists of Christian theology and Jewish religious thinking in the twentieth century. It stresses how the main dilemmas of contemporary philosophical ethics lie at the root of the various path of inquiry taken by these thinkers. -/- ● VIII Normative ethics: neo-Utilitarianism 1. The discussion on act and rule utilitarianism 2. Hare on two-tiered preference utilitarianism 3. Harsanyi, Gauthier and rational choice ethics 4. Parfit, utilitarianism and the idea of a person 5. Brandt and indirect conscience utilitarianism -/- The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick's and Moore's fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine refuted. Two examples give the reader a glimpse at this uproarious process. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This transformation results in preference utilitarianism combined with a 'Kantian' version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare's two-level preference utilitarianism, where act utilitarianism plays the function of the eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of an action-guiding practical device. -/- ● IX Normative ethics: neo-Aristotelianism and virtue ethics 1. Hannah Arendt, action and judgement 2. Hans-Georg Gadamer and phronesis 3. Alasdair MacIntyre on practices, virtues, and traditions 5. Stuart Hampshire on deliberation 6. Bernard Williams and moral complexity 7. Feminist ethics -/- Sect 1 reconstructs the post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named 'Rehabilitation of practical philosophy' is described. Heidegger's most brilliant disciples were the promoters of this Rehabilitation. Hans-Georg Gadamer is a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle's lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger's lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the significant role of the notion of phronesis. Sect 3 discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. It argues that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. The chapter gives a short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot's and Peter Geach's critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre's grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly inevitable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- ● X Normative ethics: Kantian and rights-based ethics 1. Dialogical constructivism 2. Apel, Habermas and discourse ethics 3. Gewirth and rights-based ethics 4. Nagel on agent-relative reasons 5. Donagan and persons as ends in themselves Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This current started with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. The chapter offers an examination of his argument in some detail, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas's elaboration on Apel's theory. -/- ● XI The applied ethics renaissance 1. Elisabeth Anscombe on the atom bomb 2. From medical ethics to bioethics 3. Rawls and public ethics 3. Nozick, Dworkin and further developments of public ethics 5. Sen and the revival of economic ethics -/- The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin's new casuistry. The chapter argues that Rawls's distinction between a "political" and a "metaphysical" approach to the theory of justice, one central part of ethical theory, is a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and the new casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter. The idea is that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls' view never will be close – on the essential criteria for judgment. -/- ● XII Fin-de-siècle metaethics 1. Deontic logics 2. Anti-realism 3. External realism 4. Internal realism 5. Kantian constructivism -/- The chapter illustrates the fresh start of meta-ethical discussion in the Eighties and Nineties and the resulting new alignments: metaphysical naturalism, internal realism, anti-realism, and constructivism. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. (shrink)

My purpose is to examine the realism/anti-realism issue in the philosophy of mind and to lay the foundation for its resolution. To that end I formulate the issue in terms of Dummett's semantic criterion of bivalence, and the question becomes one of whether or not statements about the mind are determinately either true or false. I shall signify this formulation by capitalizing: Realism or anti-Realism. One of the virtues of this approach is that it is a clear and (...) unambiguous way of posing the problem in the philosophy of mind, where the traditional formulation in terms of a mind-independent reality is suggestive but inadequate. ;I then discuss two principal types of theories from the perspective of this issue, and examine in detail specific representative theories of these types. I find Quine's behaviorism to be Realist and Dennett's functionalism to be anti-Realist. I also show that Wittgenstein gives arguments against a certain kind of Realism about the mind which are similar to Quine's, but where Quine opts for a less problematic Realism Wittgenstein opts for anti-Realism. ;Finally, I offer some conclusions to the effect that it may not be determinately true or false that Realism about the mind is true or false, and so suggest the possibility of a second-order anti-Realism. To that end I try to make plausible the claim that there is no compelling reason to be a Realist with respect to the mind. A major motivation for adopting Realism in the philosophy of mind may be a belief in scientific Realism coupled with a tendency to import the same considerations into other areas of philosophy. Since I want to preserve the possibility of scientific Realism, I argue that the two issues are independent and that Realism about science does not entail Realism about the mind. (shrink)

Some theologians are inclined to regard realism with hostility or indifference. I do not present an argument for realism, but for why realism matters, and what is at stake.First of all, I separate the heart of realism from gratuitous doctrines which are too often associated with it. Religious realism is the claim that truth is independent of our beliefs about truth, and that we can in principle hope to have true beliefs about God. Realism is not intrinsically concerned with the (...) existence of ‘objects’, with natural theology or rational justification.I then show that even thinkers who are hostile or indifferent to religious realism so defined, usually make an implicit appeal to a similar realism in the sphere of ethics.To establish that realism matters in religion as well as ethics I draw an analogy with realism/anti‐realism about persons, to show that anti‐realism makes mutually risk‐taking and courageous relationships impossible. I go on to argue that far from it being a realist who is obsessed with rational certainty, this is one of the worst vices of the anti‐realist, who cannot bear there to be a gap between her beliefs and reality.I conclude that the most vital feature of religious realism is not certainty of belief, but the opposite – the acknowledged risk that all our hope could be in vain. In closing the possibility on this risk, the anti‐realist demonstrates an unfaithful and uncourageous movement of thought. (shrink)

The essay has two purposes. One is to point out connections and parallels between, On one hand, The debates of metaphysical realists and anti-Realists, And on the other hand, The debates surrounding moral realism. The second is to provide the outlines of a case for a kind of position that would generally be classified as moral realism. One feature of this position is that it emerges as parallel to, And compatible with, A metaphysical position that would generally be classified (...) as anti-Realism. (shrink)