Abstract

In the first essay, Stokhof discusses the nature and presuppositions of the formal semantic project as such. He shows that considerations of so-called radical interpretation and the normativity of meaning force us to rethink the relationship between the meaning of a linguistic utterance and its interpretation in a way that is hardly compatible with this project. In the second essay, the author introduces the early Ludwig Wittgenstein as an obvious, if completely neglected, precursor of formal semantics. He discusses the systematic and, to a lesser extent, historical connections between the Tractatus and later formal semantics. From the similarities and differences found, it then draws conclusions regarding the contemporary status of this discipline at the interface of philosophy and the empirical sciences. Finally, the third study looks at formal semantics in terms of its contrast with Wittgenstein's later thinking about language. It attempts to answer the question of whether Wittgenstein's later reflections lead to a theory of linguistic meaning that could be a viable alternative to contemporary formal semantics.