Abstract

A closely reasoned, although overly long study of the somewhat less than revolutionary contributions of Moore, Stevenson, Toulmin, and Hare to meta-ethical theorizing. The final chapter moves beyond commentary to a balanced analysis of the problems of analyzing moral language. Kerner argues, following Austin, that the bifurcation of moral language into description and evaluation is crude and misleading. Rather, moral judgments differ from descriptive utterances because of their characteristic "performative force," their use or function. Hence moral philosophy properly does not offer pseudo-descriptive definitions, but rather explores in an empirical way the criteria of application and the performatory forces of moral utterances. However, Kerner recognizes that the relevant criteria of application, as well as the specification of the performative forces, are fixed only by our decisions, which in turn can be supported only by arguments which attempt to establish the competence of the person making such decisions. In other terms, Kerner argues that since moral principles are neither descriptions of a nonnatural world of values nor empirical generalizations, they must be treated as enunciations by a legislator. Unfortunately, as Kerner points out, the concept of being well qualified as a moral legislator lacks clear-cut applicability if developed outside a particular moral system.--S. A. S.