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A componential view of theory of mind: evidence from Williams syndrome
Cognition 76 (1):59-90 (2000)
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Citations of this work
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
The social brain in psychiatric and neurological disorders.Daniel P. Kennedy & Ralph Adolphs - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (11):559-572.
From face to face: the contribution of facial mimicry to cognitive and emotional empathy.Hanna Drimalla, Niels Landwehr, Ursula Hess & Isabel Dziobek - 2019 - Cognition and Emotion 33 (8):1672-1686.
Why Pragmatics and Theory of Mind Do Not Overlap.Francesca M. Bosco, Maurizio Tirassa & Ilaria Gabbatore - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
References found in this work
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1985 - Cognition 21 (1):37–46.
Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
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