Abstract

This paper examines freedom and the determination of the will in §4 of Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in light of Aristotle’s concept of leading arts (architektonikē technē) from Metaphysics A.1–2. Traditionally, intellect determines truth, while will determines action—a distinction central to Aristotle’s differentiation between theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel, however, challenges this division, arguing that will is an extension of intelligence, integrating insight and goal-setting into a unified self-determination. By engaging with contemporary interpretations—Fulda, Pippin, and Pinkard—this paper explores the tension between theory and practice. While Fulda defends philosophy’s indirect political relevance, Pippin argues it lacks practical justification. Pinkard links philosophy to institutional self-understanding, grounding practical reasoning in human biology. Reassessing Hegel’s implicit use of Aristotle’s leading arts, this paper argues that freedom of the will in §4 should be understood as intersubjective self-determination—not a mere choice among possibilities, but an identification with a politically and normatively determined highest practical ground. This reading reconciles theory and practice while emphasizing the institutional and social dimensions of self-determination.