Worlds, times and selves revisited

Synthese 193 (11):3713-3725 (2016)
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Abstract

In Prior’s tense-logical analysis, we can avoid mentioning instants in our language by construing them as propositions of a special kind. Instead of qualifying instants by predicates, we may qualify propositions by modalities. Prior shows that by changing the informal interpretation of our modal-like language, we can similarly attempt to avoid ontological commitments to worlds and even to selves and other bona fide individuals. As he notes, the paraphrasing strategy works too generally to be of direct metaphysical use. I wish to speak of several types of entities within one and the same language. This leads to the issue of cross-context identity: how to make sense of speaking of the same entity of one type relative to distinct entities of another type. My analysis employs the notion of world line. I discern a structure of mutually interrelated categories with three informal interpretations: tense, modal and egocentric. They correspond to different metaphysical views on the interrelations of time, logical alternatives and individuals. Prior’s dilemma regarding the possibility of modalizing, not only our talk concerning times and worlds, but even our discourse pertaining to the ‘real world of individuals’ does not vanish but reappears also in my setting.

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Tero Tulenheimo
Tampere University

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References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Past, present and future.Arthur N. Prior - 1967 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
Realism and reason.Hilary Putnam (ed.) - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
How things persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Past, present, and future.Arthur Prior - 1967 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 157:476-476.

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