Traditionally, the formulae in modal logic express properties of possible worlds. Prior introduced “egocentric” logics that capture properties of agents rather than of possible worlds. In such a setting, the article proposes the modality “know how to tell apart” and gives a complete logical system describing the interplay between this modality and the knowledge modality. An important contribution of this work is a new matrix-based technique for proving completeness theorems in an egocentric setting.

Originally proposed by Prior, egocentric logic is a class of logical systems that capture properties of agents rather than of possible worlds. The article proposes a doxastic egocentric system with rigid names for reasoning about beliefs that an agent might have about herself.

David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of (...) being an eye doctor/oculist under the description ‘eye doctor’ without believing that he or she has this property under the description ‘oculist’. Believing that one has a property P under a description D involves the additional self-ascription of the propositional property of inhabiting a world with respect to which that description denotes the property P. This is not the same sort of solution as the one proposed for singular beliefs by Nathan Salmon. Unlike Salmon’s account, belief on the account I am defending is regarded as a two place-relation rather than a three-place relation. Since, on Lewis’s account, self-ascriptive belief subsumes de dicto belief, my solution also sheds light on the problem of logical omniscience. (shrink)

I here adapt some ideas of Prior’s 1967 paper ‘On spurious egocentricity’ in the interest of seeing how much sense can be made of the doctrine that ‘I’ is not a referring-expression. I suggest how an account of ‘I’ might draw upon both Prior’s treatment of the operator ‘I believe that’ and of operators like ‘it is true that’ and ‘it is now the case that’, which Prior argues are logically very different from ‘I believe that’. In the final section (...) I present some objections to Prior’s account of ‘now’, and try to give a more adequate account of the analogy between ‘now’ and ‘I’. (shrink)

The recent discovery and translation of Herman Bavinck’s (1854–1921) Reformed Ethics and the ongoing work on the sources and contours of his organic ontology create the impetus to relate these two trajectories together. The twin questions this article will be asking, precisely, are these: what is the logical relationship between Bavinck’s organic whole federalism, where ethical ties are ontologically constitutive, with his claim in the Reformed Ethics that sin’s organizing principle is the prioritization of the ego above all else? Further, (...) how does that organic whole anthropology inform his vision of renewal and the subsequent ethical imperative that flow from the Spirit’s regenerative work? This article traces Bavinck’s logic through the Ethics on these twin questions, while being cognizant of the rest of his oeuvre. With this exposition in hand, this article then relates Bavinck’s outlook to current discussions in Protestant theological ethics. (shrink)

In Prior’s tense-logical analysis, we can avoid mentioning instants in our language by construing them as propositions of a special kind. Instead of qualifying instants by predicates, we may qualify propositions by modalities. Prior shows that by changing the informal interpretation of our modal-like language, we can similarly attempt to avoid ontological commitments to worlds and even to selves and other bona fide individuals. As he notes, the paraphrasing strategy works too generally to be of direct metaphysical use. I wish (...) to speak of several types of entities within one and the same language. This leads to the issue of cross-context identity: how to make sense of speaking of the same entity of one type relative to distinct entities of another type. My analysis employs the notion of world line. I discern a structure of mutually interrelated categories with three informal interpretations: tense, modal and egocentric. They correspond to different metaphysical views on the interrelations of time, logical alternatives and individuals. Prior’s dilemma regarding the possibility of modalizing, not only our talk concerning times and worlds, but even our discourse pertaining to the ‘real world of individuals’ does not vanish but reappears also in my setting. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende situar a candente questão das teologias índias no tempo atual e o desafio essencial do reconhecimento da alteridade indígena e dos direitos que acompanham essa singularidade. Inicia-se com a reflexão sobre as controvérsias que envolvem o tema das teologias índias no contexto eclesial contemporâneo. A seguir, discute-se o difícil aprendizado que envolve a tomada de consciência dos povos indígenas como “povos distintos”. Nota-se na atual conjuntura da Igreja católica romana um particular embaraço nesse delicado campo, e (...) uma tendência a entender a diversidade religiosa como momento passageiro ou conjuntural. A questão da alteridade ganha uma peculiar atualidade para a teologia cristã, que vem provocada a ampliar o seu campo de compreensão. Tal aprendizado envolve a ampliação do olhar e também o resgate de valores que são fundamentais, e que nem sempre estão presentes no repertório cristão, como o resgate da espiritualidade terrenal desses povos indígenas. A vida espiritual expressa pela teologia índia revela-se “cosmoteândrica”. Nos rituais andinos celebra-se uma grande comunhão que integra a comunidade humana, o meio ambiente e a divindade geradora de vida. Encontra-se uma viva consciência da imanência de Deus e da sacralidade da criação, da transparência de Deus e de sua diafania por toda parte. Essa espiritualidade recupera valores que são essenciais para o ser humano e que estão esquecidos e abafados em nossa sociedade marcada por uma lógica egocêntrica e pela racionalidade do mercado. Palavras-chave: Teologia índia; alteridade; espiritualidade terrenal; espiritualidade cosmoteândrica. ABSTRACT The present article aims to situate the discussion of the Indian theologies nowadays. It also seeks to situate the essential challenge of the recognition of native alterity as well as the rights that go with such peculiarity. This paper first begins by reflecting on controversies that cover the question of the Indian theologies in the current days.. After that, a detailed discussion on the difficulties of general apprenticeship involving consciousness of the native people as “a different people ” is made. Expressive difficulties on the part of the Catholic Church in dealing with diversity as well as its tendency to comprehend diversity as a conjunctural and not a structural subject are currently observed. The discussion on alterity has required full attention on the side of Christian theology, which has broadened understanding on such issue. Apprenticeship concerning the question of alterity involves expansion of vision and also the recovering of those values which have always been present on Christian repertoire. It is important to emphasize here that one of those basic Christian values to be considered are those related to the recovering of terrestrial spirituality of native people. The spiritual life expressed by the Indian theology appears to be "cosmoteandric". In the Andean rituals, celebration and integration of human community, environment and divinity, are always present. A lively consciousness of the immanence of God, as well as awareness of the sacrality of the creation and the transparency of God and of his manifestation in everywhere is often found among Indian people. Such spirituality recovers values considered of strong importance for human being but unfortunately put aside in our society which is undoubtedly marked by an egocentric logic and by the rationality of economy and market. Key words : Indian theology; alterity; terrestrial spirituality; cosmoteandric spirituality. (shrink)

Resumo A cultura ocidental, erigida sob a égide da ontologia grega, historicamente relegou o outro em sua alteridade ao esquecimento, numa supremacia do ser que justificou as cruzadas, a colonização, a escravidão, os regimes totalitários como o fascismo e o nazismo, entre outros. Este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as perspectivas do professor Joel Birman e do filósofo Emmanuel Lévinas sobre a importância da construção de um novo paradigma na cultura ocidental. Paradigma que reconheça a alteridade, numa abertura inédita do (...) eu , que supere a lógica egocêntrica do ser . A abordagem de Birman consiste na leitura feita, a partir da psicanálise, das causas e consequências da cultura do narcisismo, que norteia a sociedade do espetáculo na pós-modernidade. Essa cultura, ao centrar-se no eu , faz do outro objeto para suas satisfações egoístas. Já a abordagem de Lévinas é uma crítica filosófica ao primado da ontologia, que desde sua origem na Grécia antiga desconsiderou o outro, numa negação violenta da alteridade. A proposta levinasiana é a de que a ética precede a ontologia, ou seja, a ética como filosofia primeira deve nortear a relação entre os homens, num reconhecimento do outro em sua alteridade. Não se pretende neste breve trabalho analisar de forma minuciosa as concepções de Birman e de Lévinas, mas apontar que, apesar das diferenças de abordagem, ambos se aproximam no que tange à questão da alteridade na cultura ocidental. Palavras-chave: Alteridade; Paradigma; Eu; Narcisismo; Ontologia.The Western Culture based on the aegis of the Greek ontology, has historically relegated the other in his alterity to the forgetfulness, in supremacy of the Being who justified the crusades, the colonization, the slavery, the totalitarian regimes like the Fascism and the Nazism, among others. It is in this perspective that this article has as objective to present the perspectives of the teacher Joel Birman and of the philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas on the importance of constructing a new paradigm in the western culture that recognizes the alterity. This paradigm which recognizes the alterity of other is an unpublished opening of myself , who surpasses the egocentric logic of the Being. The approach of Birman consists of reading, from the psychoanalysis, of the causes and consequences of the narcissism culture, that leads society of spectacles in the post-modernity, which while be centering in myself, it does from another object for his selfish satisfactions. The approach of Lévinas is already a philosophical criticism on the primacy of the ontology, which from his origin in ancient Greece, disregarded other in a negation of the alterity in a violent form. The proposal Levinasiana is the one that the ethics precedes the ontology, in other words, the ethics as first philosophy must lead the relation between the men, in recognition of other in his alterity. It is important to find out that it's not intention of this short work to analyze in details the conceptions of Birman neither of Lévinas, but to highlight the similarities between their thought in spite of the differences between their approaches regarding to the question of the alterity in the western culture. Key words: Alterity; Paradigm; Narcissism; Ontology. (shrink)

Classical phenomenology -- The transcendental tradition -- The logical investigations of the I -- From the I to the ego -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Strawson on the primacy of personhood -- Wittgenstein on the lure of words -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Zahavi on transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity -- Contemporary arguments for the transcendental ego : Marbach, Soffer -- Schutz, Theunissen on social phenomenology -- Husserl's later thought -- The multidiscipline of dialogical phenomenology (...) -- Sociolinguistics -- Personal pronouns : reconsidering the traditional view -- Egocentrism and polycentrism -- Person deixis and polycentrism -- Anscombe -- Wittgenstein -- Personal pronouns : reconsidering the traditional view -- I and we : a relational community -- Benveniste and I : you connectedness -- Objectification in the third person -- Castaneda's phenomeno-logic of the I -- Developmental perspectives -- Piaget's legacy -- Recent research on the sociality of children -- Proto-conversations in infancy -- The dialogic model of Jaffe and Feldstein -- From proto-conversation to conversation -- Perspectives from blindness and autism -- Polycentrism and personal pronoun acquisition: loveland and others -- An egocentric model of personal pronoun acquisition : Charney and others -- Philosophical implications and directions for future research -- Philosophy of dialogue -- Rosenstock-Huessy's grammatical method of social research -- Rosenzweig's speech-thinking -- Buber's I and you -- The primordial duality in Buber, Humboldt, Plato -- Buber and his critics -- Rosenstock-Huessy -- Levinas -- Dialogical phenomenology -- The dialogic dimension of meaning and experience -- The practice of phenomenology -- Implications for politics and feminism. (shrink)

The essays included in this book break new ground in the philosophy of reason by situating rationality - logical theory, ontology, first philosophy, philosophical hermeneutics - in a global context and tapping the global essence of natural reason. The essays formulate and resolve a fundamental problem in the human condition which has not been adequately dealt with: how discourse between two profoundly different worlds is possible. The formulation and solution of this vital human concern requires the clarification of the universal (...) logos in natural reason - the universal logic which is the common ground between worlds. The essays open the way to the emerging frontier of global reason in expanding the foundations of logic, ontology, hermeneutical practice and the discourse of philosophy in a global context. This calls for a paradigm shift in rational practice from egocentric reason to dialogical or global reason. (shrink)

Critics have charged that Heidegger's account of authenticity is morally nihilistic, that his fundamental ontology is either egocentric or chauvinistic; and many see Heidegger's turn to Nazism in 1933 as following logically from an indifference, and even hostility, to "otherness" in the premises of his early philosophy. In_ The Fragile "We": Ethical Implications of Heidegger's "Being and Time,"_ Lawrence Vogel presents three interpretations of authentic existence--the existentialist, the historicist, and the cosmopolitan--each of which is a plausible version of the (...) personal ideal depicted in _Being and Time._ He then draws parallels between these interpretations and three moments in the contemporary liberal-communitarian debate over the relationship of the "I" and the "We." His book contributes both to a diagnosis of what there is about _Being and Time_ that invites moral nihilism and to a sense of how fundamental ontology might be recast so that "the other" is accorded an appropriate place in an account of human existence. (shrink)

By “essentially embodied Kantian selves,” I mean necessarily and completely embodied rational conscious, self-conscious, sensible (i.e., sense-perceiving, imagining, and emoting), volitional or willing, discursive (i.e., conceptualizing, judging, and inferring) animals, or persons, innately possessing dignity, and fully capable not only of free agency, but also of a priori knowledge of analytic and synthetic a priori truths alike, with egocentric centering in manifestly real orientable space and time. The basic theory of essentially embodied Kantian selves was spelled out by Kant (...) over the course of slightly less than two decades, between 1768 and 1787, but above all, it flows from an empirical realist and metaphysical reading of the “Refutation of Idealism” that Kant inserted into the Postulates of Empirical Thought section in the 1787 edition of the first Critique. In my opinion, all rational but also “human, all-too-human” creatures like us are, synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves. Let’s call that the essentially embodied Kantian selves thesis, or for short, EEKST. If EEKST is true, then it’s synthetic a priori impossible for the selves of creatures like us to exist independently of our own living organismic animal bodies or beyond the deaths of those bodies, whether temporarily or permanently, by any means whatsoever. Indeed, the very ideas of disembodied selves, their survival after death, and of human immortality, while minimally logically consistent, are in fact conceptually empty and incoherent, even over and above the synthetic a priori impossibility of such things, since the term “myself” indexically picks out an essentially embodied Kantian self, all of whose core features require grounding in a particular living organismic animal body. According to the recent and contemporary movement of transhumanism, the selves of creatures like us can not only exist independently of our bodies, as functional systems of representational content that are inherently able to be implemented or realized in digital-mechanical technology and uploadable to servers, but also to survive accidental or natural human death in server-limbo, then be downloaded into technologically enhanced partially mechanical humanoid bodies or even into wholly artificially-created completely mechanical non-humanoid bodies, survive in these new implementations or realizations for an indefinitely long time, repeat that process, and possibly even become immortal. Transhumanism is in fact metaphysically equivalent to Swedenborgianism, which Kant so effectively criticizes and wittily derides in his 1766 book, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics. Moreover, and more importantly, if EEKST is true, then, just like Swedenborgianism, transhumanism is not only conceptually empty and incoherent, but also synthetic a priori impossible. And what’s more, it’s also existentially and morally reprehensible. In short, then, the belief in transhuman selves is nothing but a reprehensible noumenal fantasy or Hirngespinst. (shrink)

This research project investigated manifestations of critical thinking in pupils 10 to 12 years of age during their group discussions held in the context of Philosophy for Children Adapted to Mathematics. The objective of the research project was to examine, through the pupils' discussions, the development of dialogical critical thinking processes. The research was conducted during an entire school year. The research method was based on the Grounded Theory approach; the material used consisted of transcripts of verbal exchanges among the (...) pupils. Analysis of the transcripts revealed that: critical thinking appears to the extent that a 'dia-logue' is established among pupils; on the cognitive level, dialogical critical thinking is comprised of four thinking modes: logical, creative, responsible and meta-cognitive; and on the epistemological level, dialogical critical thinking is only manifested in a context where egocentricity of perspective and relativism of beliefs are transcended. (shrink)

Cancel culture necessitates a thorough examination for optimizing the efficacy of reputation management and societal influence. It’s essential to assess its effectiveness in driving social change, recognize ethical nuances, and pinpoint potential issues. Originally a value-driven phenomenon, it has evolved into a manipulative tool, amplifying societal emotions. Despite attempts at crisis communication, it often fails to alleviate the consequences for individuals or businesses subjected to «cancellation». The purpose of the study. The article explores cancel culture as a mechanism for social (...) influence and activity, presenting it as an ambiguous phenomenon without clear positive or negative connotations. Methods. The study employed interdisciplinary and logical methods, incorporating systemic and functional approaches, to comprehensively analyze cancel culture. The logical-contradictory method characterized cancel culture as a neutral phenomenon. Content analysis of mass media, social networks, and other platforms was conducted to determine its impact on the public sphere. Results.The article delves into cancel culture within an instrumental context, scrutinizing its effects on influencers and the broader audience. It highlights trends in cancel culture and its significance in the media landscape. Examining its origins across historical contexts, from ancient Greece to Soviet denunciations, reveals cancel culture’s rise in popularity through internet influence. Its core aim is to attribute «violations» to individuals or their communicators, employing mechanics like mass negative reactions and imposing consequences such as boycotts, dismissals, and even death threats. Cancel culture introduces contradictions, resembling a «witch hunt» with the potential for unfair cancellations due to the presumption of innocence and challenges in proving guilt. It denies the right to make mistakes and impacts individuals differently across cultures. While effective on social media, cancel culture often shifts from broad campaigns to personal-level cancellations, capturing societal attention and influencing perceptions of canceled entities.Despite initial destructiveness, it can stimulate constructive discussion and shape public opinion, but risks include excessive sensitivity and the potential for aggression and psychological self-assertion. Cancel culture poses the danger of low personal responsibility, fostering manipulation and abuse. Sociocultural aspects involve the tolerance paradox and the influence of egocentrism on participants.Cancelling may become a tool for personal aggression rather than a quest for justice. Distinguishing real violations from exaggerated or outdated statements is crucial to avoid unjust sanctions. Despite its justice-seeking appearance, cancel culture often relies on emotions and subjective factors, emphasizing the need for careful case analysis. Conclusions. Cancel culture provides a space for discussion as it can serve as a tool for advocating social change and raises questions about the responsibility of influential individuals. However, it is manipulative and selective, and the examination of each cancellation case should consider potential bias and subjectivity. Another danger lies in the increasing sensitivity of audiences to content, which may lead to the perception of offensive material without considering the real context of events. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Masao Abe: D. T. Suzuki’s Legacies and an “Academic Dharma Lineage” in North AmericaMichiko YusaProfessor Abe is generally regarded as the torch bearer of D. T. Suzuki. But how did that come about? This essay sheds light on the relationship between Suzuki and Abe.Abe’s professor, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, had come to know Suzuki through his mentor Nishida Kitarō. Suzuki was one of Nishida’s closest friends. It appears that Hisamatsu’s and (...) Suzuki’s cordial relationship became closer after Nishida’s death in 1945. Hisamatsu in turn was the link for Abe to come to know Suzuki. Abe recalls his first encounter with Suzuki, which took place in the winter of 1947, when Suzuki was in bed with a bad cold and Abe was sent by Hisamatsu to make a sick call on his behalf. Abe was then Hisamatsu’s teaching assistant ( joshu). Seeing Suzuki in person for the first time, Abe could not help but feel the unique spiritual presence of this man. At that time, Abe, though a committed follower of Pure Land Buddhism, was deeply troubled with his spiritual quest. Perhaps sensing Abe’s agony, Suzuki gave him a copy of his imperial lecture The Essence of Buddhism, in which he had treated Zen and Pure Land thought as sharing the same Mahayana roots.1Abe’s second visit to Suzuki came in the spring of 1949, when Suzuki was preparing to leave for the United States to spend “the rest of his life in order to bring the message of Zen Buddhism” to the West. At that time Abe was to convey Hisamatsu’s concern that Suzuki ought to remain in Japan and contribute to internationalizing Zen by translating Zen texts into English, for, in Hisamatsu’s mind, there was no one better qualified than Suzuki to carry out that task.2Suzuki was ready to make a bold move, however. Having witnessed Hiroshima-Nagasaki, he was convinced that the message of wisdom and compassion based on the awakening to the “true self” that Zen speaks of was an effective and necessary antidote to the egocentric mindset, which manifested also as national ego-centrism, rampant in the post–World War II world. He was convinced that the message of awakening and compassion would give the humanity a better chance at peace. In fact, by the early 1950s, with the intensification of the Cold War and the turmoil in Korea, there was a palpable fear that World War III might break out any day, and Suzuki certainly shared that ominous sense.3 [End Page 111]Zen Must Adopt New ExpressionsSuzuki left for the United States on June 16, 1949, to attend the Second East-West Philosopher’s Conference and to teach at the University of Hawai‘i in the summer and the fall semesters. Through his interaction with Western and Asian thinkers at the conference as well as with his students at the university, he came to feel strongly that (1) it was important to emphasize compassion (hi) in the face of an excessive Zen emphasis on the koan practice, (2) Zen Buddhists must develop their “logical” expression to articulate Zen teaching in language understandable to Westerners, and, in this connection, (3) it was incumbent on him to introduce the thought of Nishida Kitarō to the West. In Suzuki’s own words, “Contemporary Zen is short of compassion (hi). Therefore, it lacks the momentum to engage society and work from within it. Again, it lacks a logical discourse (riron). This is something Nishida always used to say. In order to make Western thinkers understand Zen teaching, one must have a logical system (ronri).” 4These three points are clearly present and developed in Abe’s works. In his introduction to Zen and Western Thought (1985), Abe wrote that (1) Zen embraces a profound philosophy (echoing Suzuki’s concern for the necessity for logical articulation), (2) the ultimate in Zen and in Buddhism is “absolute Nothingness” or “Emptiness” (echoing Nishida’s philosophy), (3) Buddhism is a radical realism and a compassionate way of life (echoing Suzuki’s concern for compassion), and (4) a new cosmology, not a new humanism, is needed in... (shrink)

In this paper, we study the manifestations of what we call “dialogical critical thinking” in elementary school pupils when they are engaged in philosophical exchanges among peers: What are thecharacteristics of dialogical critical thinking? How does it develop in youngsters? Our research was conducted during an entire school year, with eight groups of pupils from three different cultural contexts: Australia, Mexico and Quebec. Our findings were constructed in an inductive manner, inspired by qualitative analysis as defined by Glaser and Strauss (...) (1967). From our analysis, a grid was developed, illustrating the process by which dialogical critical thinking developed among the pupils involved in our research. This process is manifested via four modes of thinking (logical, creative, responsible and meta-cognitive), which become increasingly complex according to three epistemological perspectives (egocentricity, relativism and inter-subjectivity oriented toward meaning). (shrink)

Discusssion of passages 243 et. seq. of Wittgenstein's Philosophical lnvestigations tends to concentrate on the argument supporting the thesis that a logically private language is impossible. When the discussion becomes broader, the presumption is generally that this thesis is one premifs of an argument against solipsism. I believe that the passages will support a valid argument that might, at first glance, give comfort to someone in the egocentric predicament, but that this comfort would quickly grow cold on closer examination. (...) I do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein offers no escape from the predicament, only that the escape will not be a consequence of the pluralism necessary to the existence of language, but rather a byproduct of his discussion of the logic of mental discourse. In this paper, I state an alternative to the contra-solipsist reading of the passages, taking Wittgenstein there to be reflecting a three part dispute, the other participants of which are a skeptic and a philosopher I'll call ‘the Realist'. (shrink)

This paper examines ways leading Song-dynasty Chan teachers, especially Cishou Huaishen 慈受懷深 (1077–1132), a prominent poet-monk (shiseng 詩僧) and temple abbot from the Yunmen lineage, transform the intricate rhetorical techniques of Chinese poetry in order to explicate the relationship between an experience of spiritual realization beyond language and logic and the ethical decision-making of everyday life that is inspired by transcendent principles. Huaishen’s poetry expresses didactic Buddhist doctrines showing how an awareness of nonduality and the surpassing of all conceptual (...) boundaries and categories can and must be applied to negotiating moral choices in concrete everyday situations that are either conducive or detrimental to the attainment of enlightenment. My main argument is that Song Chan discourse does not lead to antinomianism or an indifference to the conflicts of the mundane world but, instead, features an ethical approach for determining an aspirant’s degree of illumination. This function is central to the school’s overall teaching mission of assisting those seeking to overcome their egocentric delusions by realizing the benefits of Chan insight. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 327 Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy. By WENDY FARLEY. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990. 150 pp. Wendy Farley sets herself an ambitious task in her book. She is dissatisfied with past theodicies, which account for evil and suffering as punishment for sin, as counterpoints in a larger aesthetic cosmic harmony, as means of purification and formation of character, or something that will be (...) as compensated for by other-worldly vindication and reward. These four theories may explain some forms of evil and suffering, but in the face of " radical suffering " they are " unable to exorcise the demons that whisper that life is futile, suffering is meaningless, and the cosmos an empty and evil void " (p. 22). By " radical suffering " Farley means that kind of suffering which debases and destroys the human dignity of the sufferer: " Radical suffering pinches the spirit of the sufferer, numbing it and diminishing its range. The distinctiveness of radical suffering does not lie in its intensity or its injustice but its power over the sufferer" (p. 54). Radical suffering drives the person to self-loathing and despair and therefore destroys her or his capacity to resist it. Despite its massive destructive power radical suffering is not rare; it occurs in familial, cultural, poli· tical, and economic relations under the forms of, e.g., child abuse, sexism, racism, violation of human rights, poverty, and starvation. To account for radical suffering, Farley proposes that (a) one place suffering rather than sin at the center of the problem of evil; (b) one replace the notion of a primordial fall with that of tragedy; (c) one repudiate the idea of divine omnipotence in favor of that of divine compassion (pp. 12-13). The second and third proposals are captured in the title of the book, " Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion." Farley's first proposal leads one to expect that she would do away with the notion of sin altogether, hut this is not the case. Strangely, she devotes a good deal of attention to sin, describing it as " catastrophic because it introduces chaos and disharmony into history " (p. 43). She sees sin as (self)-deception, callousness, bondage, and guilt (pp. 4451 ). Whereas traditional theology perceives a causal link between sin and suffering, the logic of Farley's alternative proposal entails her locating the origin of suffering elsewhere, namely, the tragic character of human existence: "... tragic vision locates the possihilirty of suffering in the conditions of existence and in the fragility of human freedom " (p. 29). A tragic vision of life does not, Farley claims, rationalize (radical) 3~8 BOOK REVIEWS suffering, nor is it atheistic. It recognizes, honestly and bluntly, that " the conditions of finite existence include conflict and fragility " (p. 31). Multiplicity ·and' variety enrich creation hut they inevitably lead to division and.separation; relationships warm the heart hut they must include some and exclude others; values sometimes conflict, such as mercy and justice; embodiment allows us to enjoy the pleasures of life but it leads to decay and death. Even human freedom, Farley points out, is infected with fragility caused by anxiety and desire: "Freedom is the tragic flaw of human existence, at once the stamp of its greatness and its destruction " ·(p. 37). What should one do in face of inevitable suffering? One must have compassion. Farley takes compassion to mean an enduring disposition horn of sympathetic knowledge of another person's suffering leading to love (which is a liberation from egocentrism that enables one to care for others) and working for justice (especially removing social in· justice). In contrast to dominating power, compassion empowers the sufferers to speak and act in their own defenses. It rejects the tempta· tion of passivity before evil and the use of violence to overthrow it. Rather, it empowers sufferers to resist evil. For Farley, God's power must he understood as compassion or love. As a noncoercive form of power, divine love (a) creates a tragic world in which radical suffering is inevitable and (b) because of suffering redeems it. Hence, divine compassion is both creative and redemptive. But why does God go through this seemingly redundant exercise? Why doesn't God create... (shrink)

God -- On the cognitivity of mystical experiences -- The problem of evil -- God eternal and Paul helm -- A new cosmological argument, co-authored with Alexander Pruss -- A response to oppy and to Davey and Clifton -- Co-authored with Alexander Pruss -- The ecumenicalism of William James -- Time -- Is it now now? -- McTaggart's analysis of time -- The egocentric particular and token-reflexive analyses of tense -- The impossibility of backward causation -- An identity theory (...) of the A- and B-series -- Co-authored with Michelle Beer -- Disanalogies between space and time -- Nonbeing -- Negative statements -- On what there isn't -- Nonbeing and the receptacle -- Could logical space be empty? (shrink)

IT IS POSSIBLE to discern three main types of answers commonly given to the question about the nature of sensations. The first is the classical "private access" theory, according to which I can sense my own pain, while the pains of others can never be subject to direct inspection by me. The presence of overt pain behavior may inductively confirm the hypothesis that the body thus behaving is besouled [[sic]] and subject to a sensation of pain, but I can never (...) be sure that such pain really exists. I can feel only my own pain, and every pain I feel is necessarily my own. One token of this view is Cartesian dualism, but it is also adopted by most kinds of interactionism, epiphenomenalism, and their ilk. One of the notorious consequences of this theory is, that it makes the problem of Other Minds practically insoluble. Do the other humanoids have minds like my own, do they experience raw feelings similar to mine? The question remains logically unanswerable. The argument from analogy was often shown to be very tenuous, and one is therefore driven to accept the conclusion that sensation words must mean one thing in the context of egocentric sentences and quite another thing when the subject of the sentence is other than I. But if this is the case, mentalistic attributes proper are only I-ascriptive: that is, it would be a logical howler to apply them to anything other than myself; grammar thus forces me to adopt a position similar to that of the solipsist. (shrink)

Drawing insights from queer theory, this essay argues for making sex a more central category in political theorists’ interpretations of Diderot’s Supplement, and also of his contributions to History of the Two Indies. The Supplement has sometimes been considered a “libertine” text for depicting Tahiti as a society where sex is open, and indeed where foreign guests are treated to sexual hospitality. This essay reconstructs how and why Diderot’s Tahitians make promiscuity public policy and why Diderot makes miscegenation central to (...) his views on how to improve colonialism morally and politically. In the end, though, the Supplement is beset by asymmetric sexual logics that erode its apparent affirmation of egalitarianism, consent, hospitality, and non-egocentric interest. Although the presentation of sexual hospitality serves to critique French imperialism, its heterosexuality is compulsory and patriarchal. Nevertheless the text unwittingly offers a glimpse of a more radical, queer model of sociability. (shrink)

A volume in the International Library of the Philosophy of Education under the general editorship of R. S. Peters, which will both interest and repay close study by epistemologists and philosophers of language, as well as philosophers of education. The book concerns concept formation and the growth of knowledge, i.e., as the general editor of the series writes, "the genesis of knowledge and not just the logical properties of its outcome." The book is divided into two parts: in the first, (...) Hamlyn, employing a Piagetian framework and terminology, examines first the classical empiricist account of the genesis of knowledge, which, after Piaget, he strictures as "genesis without structure." This account fails to explain the existence of intersubjective agreement. Then Hamlyn goes on to examine the rival rationalist account, which he strictures as "structure without genesis." Here, the failure is that there is no good account of how knowledge even gets started. Finally, Hamlyn examines an account of the growth of knowledge to which he is more sympathetic; that of the French psychologist, Piaget: "structure with genesis." Hamlyn finds striking similarities between the Piagetian theory and that of Kant, but, in the end, this account has a fatal flaw as well. Indeed, according to Hamlyn, all three accounts really fail for the same basic cause, viz., their account of knowledge is too egocentric, and "they all start from the same starting point, the individual set against his environment." In the second part of the book, Hamlyn sets out his own view, the object of which is to correct the egocentric view of knowledge which undermines the traditional theories and even their more modern versions, in Chomsky as the representative of Rationalism, and Piaget, as the Kantian representative. Here Hamlyn argues that knowledge would be impossible without what Wittgenstein called "agreement in judgments" and then argues that this implies common reactions, attitudes, wants, and interests, in relation to the world. Finally, Hamlyn proceeds to apply this "social view" of knowledge and understanding to the acquisition of both in the case of the child. In the course of doing so, he relates the acquisition of knowledge and understanding in the child to the child’s acquisition of language. In the course of his discussion, Hamlyn has interesting things to say about a wide variety of topics such as "non-epistemic seeing" and the relations between knowledge and understanding. In addition he provides illuminatingly critical discussions of the main ideas of Piaget and Chomsky; and although most philosophers are persuaded that they should become familiar with the ideas of the latter, Hamlyn makes out a good case that philosophers ought to start to think about the work of the former as well. All of this is done in a pleasingly straightforward way, devoid of any tiresome literary conceits. (shrink)

In his struggle to vindicate the religious enterprise from the charge that it is unfalsifiable and meaningless, McKinnon reduces both science and religion to distorted caricatures, ignores the centrality of the problems of evil, anguish, absurdity, and the egocentric predicament for religion, and asserts that religion and science are fundamentally one and the same. He builds his thesis on a distinction between "assertional," "self-instructional," and "ontological-linguistic" intentionality of utterances. By equivocating about whether these usages are logically independent, McKinnon holds (...) that, as "self-instructional," utterances are outside the positivist's arena. He presses the noteworthy point--that utterances sometimes are intended to report an existential stance--in such a way as to divert attention from the vast differences between religious and scientific methods and subject matter. Not content with leaving religious utterances restricted to mere reporting, McKinnon builds a case for bypassing positivistic attack under the other two usages by trading on a supposed incommensurability between particulars and universals. E.g., he holds that "God is love" must be indeterminate and unfalsifiable since both nouns are universals and since God is incomprehensible. And so it goes, a battle between straw men on a shifting field of honor for a prize of dubious worth. Notwithstanding, this is a thought provoking treatment of a difficult topic.--M. D. P. (shrink)

While it is commonly observed that visual experiences have an egocentric character, it is less clear how to properly characterize it. This manuscript presents a new argument in favor of a thesis that (a) visual experiences represent a subject-element, i.e., an element to which the perceived objects stand in egocentric relations, and (b) the subject-element is represented as a complex bodily structure. More specifically, it is argued that there are two plausible interpretations of directional perceptual qualities such as (...) ‘being to the left’: (a) representing directional qualities consists in representing objects as having intrinsic properties, or (b) representing directional qualities consists in representing objects as related to parts of the bodily structure. Relying on this observation, it is shown that only the second option can explain the role of directional qualities in action selection based on visual experiences. Consequently, the most plausible interpretation of directional qualities is that, in representing objects as being to the left or right, visual experiences represent objects as being related to parts of the bodily structure. (shrink)

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main (...) sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency. (shrink)

It has long been known that the popular account of egocentric thoughts developed by David Lewis is in conflict with a natural account of communication, according to which successful communication requires the transmission of a thought content from speaker to hearer. In this paper, I discuss a number of proposed attempts to reconcile these two accounts of egocentric thought and communication. Each of them postulates two kinds of mental content, where one is egocentric, and the other is (...) transmitted from speaker to hearer in communication. I argue that Ninan’s account, which involves multi-centered contents, and Kölbel’s and Moss’s accounts, which postulate centered and uncentered proxy contents, respectively, are unsatisfactory. Therefore, I propose a two-dimensionalist account, according to which egocentric thoughts are represented by primary intensions, while the thoughts shared by speaker and hearer in cases of successful communication are represented by secondary intensions. Finally, I argue that aside from being able to reconcile Lewis’s account of egocentric thoughts with the natural account of communication, two-dimensionalism also provides the means for modeling agreement and disagreement. (shrink)

Egocentricity and Mysticism is a philosophical milestone that clarifies our relationship to language, social interaction, and mortality. Ernst Tugendhat casts mysticism as an innate facet of what it means to be human--a response to an existential need for peace of mind.

Revised simulation theory allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor's genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias. I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors' own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided (...) by revised simulation theory. (shrink)

I discuss the relation between egocentric spatial representation and the capacity for bodily activity, with specific reference to Merleau-Ponty.

Robin Le Poidevin; II*—Egocentric and Objective Time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999, Pages 19–36, https://doi.org/10.

In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the (...) other person needs to be represented as independent from the self. We suggest here that people with Asperger syndrome suffer from a disconnection between a strong naı¨ve egocentric stance and a highly abstract allocentric stance. We argue that the currently used distinction between first-person and third-person perspective-taking is orthogonal to the distinction between an egocentric and an allocentric stance and therefore cannot serve as a critical test of allocentrism. (shrink)

This chapter offers an indirect defence of the Evansian conception of egocentric space, by showing how it resolves a puzzle concerning the unity of egocentric spatial perception. The chapter outlines several common assumptions about egocentric perspectival structure and argues that a subject’s experience, both within and across her sensory modalities, may involve multiple structures of this kind. This raises the question of how perspectival unity is achieved, such that these perspectival structures form a complex whole, rather than (...) merely disunified set of individually, distinctively structured experiences. The shortcomings of variety of accounts are considered: switch accounts ; sensory accounts; transformation accounts; and ultimate accounts. These shortcomings are addressed by a further kind of account provided by the Evansian conception – an agentive account – according to which egocentrically structured experiences present the world in relation to parts of a single thing, the body as a dynamic unity. (shrink)

The medial temporal lobe supports both navigation and declarative memory. On this basis, a theory of phylogenetic continuity has been proposed according to which episodic and semantic memories have evolved from egocentric and allocentric navigation in the physical world, respectively. Here, we explored the behavioral significance of this neurophysiological model by investigating the relationship between the performance of healthy individuals on a path integration and an episodic memory task. We investigated the path integration performance through a proprioceptive Triangle Completion (...) Task and assessed episodic memory through a picture recognition task. We evaluated the specificity of the association between performance in these two tasks by including in the study design a verbal semantic memory task. We also controlled for the effect of attention and working memory and tested the robustness of the results by including alternative versions of the path integration and semantic memory tasks. We found a significant positive correlation between the performance on the path integration the episodic, but not semantic, memory tasks. This pattern of correlation was not explained by general cognitive abilities and persisted also when considering a visual path integration task and a non-verbal semantic memory task. Importantly, a cross-validation analysis showed that participants' egocentric navigation abilities reliably predicted episodic memory performance. Altogether, our findings support the hypothesis of a phylogenetic continuity between egocentric navigation and episodic memory and pave the way for future research on the potential causal role of egocentric navigation on multiple forms of episodic memory. (shrink)

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is the most likely site where egocentric spatial relationships are represented in the brain. PPC cells receive visual, auditory, somaesthetic, and vestibular sensory inputs; oculomotor, head, limb, and body motor signals; and strong motivational projections from the limbic system. Their discharge increases not only when an animal moves towards a sensory target, but also when it directs its attention to it. PPC lesions have the opposite effect: sensory inattention and neglect. The PPC does not (...) seem to contain a “map” of the location of objects in space but a distributed neural network for transforming one set of sensory vectors into other sensory reference frames or into various motor coordinate systems. Which set of transformation rules is used probably depends on attention, which selectively enhances the synapses needed for making a particular sensory comparison or aiming a particular movement. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes two approaches to understanding the representational content of sentences and intentional states, and its role in describing people, predicting and explaining their behavior, and so forth. It sets forth the case for one of these approaches, the “egocentric” one, initially on the basis of its ability to explain the near‐indefeasibility of ascriptions of content to our own terms (“‘dogs’ as I use it means dogs”), but more generally on the basis of its providing an attractive overall (...) picture of the descriptive and explanatory role of representational content. In doing this, the paper relates the egocentric view to an “immanent” or “deflationary” view of reference and truth conditions, and also to the view of reference‐talk and truth‐talk as anaphoric devices. It discusses the indeterminacy of content ascriptions to those in communities with radically different theories, a phenomenon that is unsurprising on the egocentric approach, and connects this to the thesis of the normativity of meaning. (It does all this in rather broad brush: many strands of the egocentric account will be familiar, and are the subject of familiar controversies; the point of the paper is less to address these controversies individually than to tie the strands together into what is hoped to be an appealing package.). (shrink)

Le langage égocentré et son dépassement par la parole. Une étude de l’acquisition du langage inspirée de Merleau-PontyDans les notes de travail du Visible et l’invisible, Merleau-Ponty se proposait d’élucider la nature du dépassement de l’être pré-langagier par la parole. Dans ses cours de la Sorbonne, il avait en outre jeté les fondements théoriques d’une confrontation fructueuse entre la linguistique et la psychologie de l’enfant, en ouvrant un dialogue de fond avec la théorie linguistique et avec les recherches psychologiques de (...) son époque sur l’acquisition du langage. Le phénomène de l’acquisition du langage par l’enfant nous fait assister à la transition de l’être pré-langagier à l’être parlant ; nous y trouvons l’occasion d’une mise en relation de l’incarnation perceptive et charnelle avec le corps parlant qui agit dans le champ symbolique.Cette étude reprend le projet de Merleau-Ponty, en s’appuyant sur les résultats récents de la recherche en matière de développement psycho-linguistique afin de mettre à l’épreuve les thèses merleau-pontiennes sur le langage. L’analyse herméneutique et phénoménologique de trois moments clés de l’acquisition du langage – indication, premiers mots, babil – met en lumière la nature du symbolisme, la fonction interpersonnelle de l’acte de parole et la nature de la grammaire en tant qu’événement diacritique existentiel.Linguaggio egocentrico e oltrepassamento nella parola. Uno studio dell’acquisizione del linguaggio ispirato a Merleau-PontyNelle note di lavoro de Il visibile e l’invisibile Merleau-Ponty si propone di chiarire la rivoluzione che il linguaggio introduce nell’essere pre-linguistico. Valendosi della propria familiarità con la teoria linguistica e con la coeva ricerca psicologica sull’acquisizione del linguaggio da parte dei bambini, nelle sue lezioni alla Sorbonne Merleau-Ponty ha gettato le fondamenta per un fruttuoso dialogo tra la linguistica e la psicologia infantile. Nel fenomeno dell’acquisizione linguistica del bambino assistiamo alla transizione dal pre-linguistico all’essere parlante: ciò fornisce un punto di vista privilegiato sulla connessione tra la percezione, l’incarnazione ed il corpo linguistico che agisce nell’ambito simbolico. Questo contributo riprende il progetto teorico merleaupontiano e guarda alle recenti scoperte nel campo dello sviluppo psico-linguistico per mettere alla prova le tesi di Merleau-Ponty sul linguaggio. Un’analisi ermeneutico-fenomenologicadei tre momenti dell’acquisizione del linguaggio – l’indicazione gestuale, le prime parole, i monologhi infantili nella culla prima di addormentarsi – permette di far luce sulla natura del simbolismo, sulla funzione interpersonale dell’atto linguistico e sulla natura della grammatica come evento esistenziale diacritico. (shrink)

Jennifer Nagel (2010) has recently proposed a fascinating account of the decreased tendency to attribute knowledge in conversational contexts in which unrealized possibilities of error have been mentioned. Her account appeals to epistemic egocentrism, or what is sometimes called the curse of knowledge, an egocentric bias to attribute our own mental states to other people (and sometimes our own future and past selves). Our aim in this paper is to investigate the empirical merits of Nagel’s hypothesis about the psychology (...) involved in knowledge attribution. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDepression is marked by rigid thinking and the inability to generate different and more positive views on the self. The current study conceptualises this a perspective-taking deficit, which is defined as a deficit in the ability to overcome one’s egocentrism. Previous research has demonstrated that individuals with depression are impaired in Theory of Mind reasoning and empathy – two social cognitions that involve cognitive and affective perspective-taking. Here, it was investigated whether these deficits generalise to visuo-spatial perspective-taking. To test this, (...) a convenience sample completed a test-battery including measures of cognitive and visuo-spatial perspective-taking and closely matched cognitive and visuo-spatial control tasks. The results showed that individuals exhibiting high levels of depressive symptoms were specifically impaired on both perspective-taking tasks but performed equally well on the cont... (shrink)

A recent debate in the literature on delusions centers on the question of whether delusions are beliefs or not. In this paper, an overlooked distinction between egocentric and encyclopedic doxastic states is introduced and brought to bear on this debate, in particular with regard to delusions of misidentification. The result is that a more accurate characterization of the delusional subject’s doxastic point of view is made available. The patient has a genuine egocentric belief (“This man is not my (...) father”), but fails to have the commonly attributed encyclopedic belief (“My father has been replaced by an impostor”). (shrink)

What principles and mechanisms allow humans to encode complex 3D information, and how can it be so fast, so accurately and so flexibly transformed into coordinated action? How do these processes work when developed to the limit of human physiological and cognitive capacity—as they are in high-speed sports, such as alpine skiing or motor racing? High-speed sports present not only physical challenges, but present some of the biggest perceptual-cognitive demands for the brain. The skill of these elite athletes is in (...) many ways an attractive model for studying human performance “in the wild”, and its neurocognitive basis. This article presents a framework theory for how these abilities may be realized in high-speed sports. It draws on a careful analysis of the case of the motorsport athlete, as well as theoretical concepts from: (1) cognitive neuroscience of wayfinding, steering, and driving; (2) cognitive psychology of expertise; (3) cognitive modeling and machine learning; (4) human-in-the loop modellling in vehicle system dynamics and human performance engineering; (5) experimental research (in the laboratory and in the field) on human visual guidance. The distinctive contribution is the way these are integrated, and the concept ofchunkingis used in a novel way to analyze a high-speed sport. The mechanisms invoked are domain-general, and not specific to motorsport or the use of a particular type of vehicle (or any vehicle for that matter); theegocentric chunking hypothesisshould therefore apply to any dynamic task that requires similar core skills. It offers a framework for neuroscientists, psychologists, engineers, and computer scientists working in the field of expert sports performance, and may be useful in translating fundamental research into theory-based insight and recommendations for improving real-world elite performance. Specific experimental predictions and applicability of the hypotheses to other sports are discussed. (shrink)

Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will suggest that so-called third-person bank cases threaten to sever the connection between bank case intuitions and salience-sensitivity. I will go on to argue that salience-sensitivists can overcome this worry if they appeal to egocentric bias, a general tendency (...) to project our own mental states onto others. I will then suggest that a similar strategy is unavailable to stakes-sensitivists, who hold that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on what is at stake for the believer. Bank case intuitions motivate salience- but not stakes-sensitivity. (shrink)

It is frequently said that words like ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘ago’, ‘present’, ‘past’, ‘future’ and the various indications of tense, are ‘egocentric’ or ‘token-reflexive’ in character. I want to suggest, on the contrary, that the apparent egocentricity or token-reflexiveness of this class of expression is deceptive. It is perhaps not easy to see how on a point of this sort deception is possible, but a parallel case may make the position clearer.