Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games

Abstract

Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes of learning which change game models. Thus, strategic equilibrium gets linked to fixed-points of operations of repeated announcement of suitable epistemic statements. This dynamic stance provides a new look at the current interface of games, logic, and computation.

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Johan Van Benthem
University of Amsterdam

References found in this work

Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
[Omnibus Review].Yiannis N. Moschovakis - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (3):471-472.

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