Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism about Truth-Aptness?

Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):81-98 (2010)
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Abstract

I argue that deflationism about truth does not imply minimalism about truthaptness. The condition for truth-aptness can be strengthened and the disquotationalschema restricted without resorting to any inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions.

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