Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution

Synthese 197 (6):2357-2374 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Radical scepticism contends that our knowledge of the external world is impossible. Particularly, radical scepticism can be motivated by the closure principle. Several commentators have noted that a straightforward way to respond to such arguments is via externalist strategies, e.g., Goldman, Greco, Bergmann. However, these externalist strategies are not effective against a slightly weaker form of the argument, a closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge, closureRK.\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${closure}_{RK.}$$\end{document} The sceptical argument, framed around the closureRK\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}$$\end{document} principle, targets rationally grounded knowledge. Although externalist strategies are ineffective against this form of argument, its conclusion can nonetheless be resisted by combining, in a novel way, the resources of Wittgenstein and Davidson. In particular, I argue that the sceptic is assuming an unrestricted way of using the closureRK\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}$$\end{document} principle, which is incorrect. Alternatively, I argue for The Conditionality of Rational Support Thesis, i.e., the thesis that rational support via competent deduction is conditional. In particular, rational support must be provided within an evaluative system in which hinge propositions are presupposed and contentful beliefs are being evaluated. In the end, we can resist the closureRK\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK }}$$\end{document}-based sceptical argument while retaining the closureRK\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}$$\end{document} principle.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,063

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Two-cardinal diamond and games of uncountable length.Pierre Matet - 2015 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 54 (3-4):395-412.
Minimal elementary end extensions.James H. Schmerl - 2017 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 56 (5-6):541-553.
Rationalizing epistemic bounded rationality.Konrad Grabiszewski - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (4):629-637.
Isomorphic and strongly connected components.Miloš S. Kurilić - 2015 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 54 (1-2):35-48.
Peter Fishburn’s analysis of ambiguity.Mark Shattuck & Carl Wagner - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):153-165.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-21

Downloads
74 (#280,085)

6 months
10 (#379,980)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 38 references / Add more references