Abstract

Forster’s study is welcome and important, not least because it corrects the widespread but mistaken impression that Hegel and skepticism are mutually exclusive opposites. Forster is one of the few who have taken seriously Hegel’s early Critical Journal essay, “The Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy.” This essay shows that, contrary to received opinion, Hegel was not only familiar with skepticism, but also that he regarded ancient skepticism as more important than its modern Humean counterpart. But the point is not simply that Hegel knew the history of philosophy better than most others; Forster’s thesis is that Hegel’s interpretation of the skeptical tradition is fundamental to Hegel’s own philosophical position, such that large regions of Hegel’s thought remain obscure if Hegel’s interpretation of and relation to skepticism are not understood. Moreover, Hegel’s construction of a system of philosophy, far from ignoring skepticism, is a response to those skeptical problems that Hegel regarded as genuinely important, which any philosophy worthy of the name must meet. To view Hegel from this perspective is not only to gain understanding of his thought, it shows the standard picture of Hegel as the culmination of metaphysics based on naively optimistic epistemological assumptions, to be an irresponsible caricature.