Abstract

This chapter explores the concept of knowing as a contested terrain within the education. It takes, as its starting point, the classical philosophical distinction between knowing how, knowing that and the lesser-attended-to notion of knowing by acquaintance. Charting key historical debates pertaining to knowing that and knowing how, the chapter considers the extent to which conceptions of these forms of knowing evident in educational policy and practice are often limited and reductive. The chapter then explores how contemporary work within the philosophy of education has served to challenge too-stringent conceptions of propositional and practical knowledge – often by reference to the Aristotelian conception of phronesis. With a view to building on this literature and taking it in a new direction, the chapter ends by exploring what might need to be at stake in a richer conception of knowledge for education. In connection with this, it offers a sketch of a renewed account of knowing by acquaintance, developed in relation to the phenomenological philosophy of Martin Heidegger.