Enough of enough

Abstract

Prioritarianism itself is not committed to any particular claim about how moral importance decreases. It could decrease quickly or slowly, for example, and at a uniform or a variable rate. The defining feature of the view is just the claim that, somehow, moral importance decreases with the increasing advantage of the recipient.

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Christopher Woodard
Nottingham University

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Justice as fairness: a restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Justice as fairness.John Rawls - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (2):164-194.
Equality as a moral ideal.Harry Frankfurt - 1987 - Ethics 98 (1):21-43.
Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2001 - In John Harris (ed.), Bioethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 81-125.

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