Abstract

A previous paper examined Fabre's attitude toward Darwin's theory of evolution.1 It was concluded that while he was deeply influenced by the theory and rejected its principles, his work cannot possibly be read as a single minded anti evolutionary manifesto. The purpose of the present paper is to continue the account by unravelling the underlying themes which pervade Fabre's work. It will be argued that although he never offered a viable alternative to the theory of evolution, he did subscribe to a set of rather vague and incomplete views concerning nature and the proper way to know it. It will be shown that even his studies which bear no discernable relation to the theory of evolution are clearly infused with these views. Fabre believed that natural phenomena reflect certain fixed harmonious relationships which cannot be deduced from a single unifying framework. He saw the scientific enterprise as a quest for these immutable harmonic principles which govern all natural phenomena. However, save for the ambiguous case of mathematics, he did not believe that man-made theories in any way approach these principles. The only things man can know with certainty are the phenomena of nature. Theory, he believed, is the human mind's way of infusing natural phenomena with meaning. As such, he regarded theory as an invaluable tool, but cautioned against ever allowing it to take precedence over the phenomena one unravels with its aid. This creates an ever present tension in Fabre's work: On one side it requires hypotheses and generalizations for guidance; on the other side it represents an uncompromising attempt to preserve the credibility and independence of '...the brutal fact, the only thing that can be trusted'. These vague, incomplete, and at times problematic notions are far more crucial to the understanding of Fabre's work than the criticism he levelled at the theory of evolution. Indeed, the criticism itself stems in large measure from these notions