Abstract

The aim of this paper is to vindicate the Cartesian quest for certainty by arguing that to aim at certainty is a constitutive feature of cognition. My argument hinges on three observations concerning the nature of doubt and judgment: first, it is always possible to have a doubt as towhetherpin so far as one takes the truth ofpto be uncertain; second, in so far as one takes the truth ofpto be certain, one is no longer able to genuinely wonder whetherpis true; third, to ask the question whetherpis to desire to receive a true answer. On this ground I clarify in what sense certainty is the aim of cognition. I then argue that in judging thatpwe commit ourselves top’s being certain and that certainty is the constitutive norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty.