Results for 'aim of belief'

956 found
Order:
  1. Does belief have an aim?David John Owens - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
    The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  2.  20
    Teach what you preach? The relationship between teachers’ citizenship beliefs and citizenship education in the classroom.Lisa De Schaepmeester, Johan van Braak & Koen Aesaert - 2022 - Journal of Social Studies Research 46 (4):363-378.
    This study aims to investigate how teachers’ citizenship beliefs relate to the way they teach citizenship in the classroom. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 65 sixth-grade primary sch...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  85
    Do religious beliefs aim at the truth?Michael Scott - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (2):217-224.
    This paper evaluates Brian Zamulinski's argument from considerations of relative likelihood for preferring a ‘religion-as-fiction’ hypothesis to metaphysical realism. The paper finds that the argument fails to consider numerous variant hypotheses, and that the ‘religion-as-fiction’ hypothesis is poorly formulated. It is concluded that an argument from likelihood about the status of religious belief will not, in the way Zamulinski constructs it, give support to a hypothesis unless supplemented by an estimate of its probability. Moreover, once probability is taken into (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Keep Changing Your Beliefs, Aiming for the Truth.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):255-270.
    We investigate the process of truth-seeking by iterated belief revision with higher-level doxastic information . We elaborate further on the main results in Baltag and Smets (Proceedings of TARK, 2009a , Proceedings of WOLLIC’09 LNAI 5514, 2009b ), applying them to the issue of convergence to truth . We study the conditions under which the belief revision induced by a series of truthful iterated upgrades eventually stabilizes on true beliefs. We give two different conditions ensuring that beliefs converge (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  5. Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist?François Jaquet & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):193-207.
    The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. Is Belief Justified only if it qualifies as Knowledge.Marie Oldfield - manuscript
    In this paper I will first examine Williamsons case where he posits that ‘Justified Belief’ is not acceptable to use in the cases where one is deceived in some way, regardless of how the belief has been formed. Williamson aims to eradicate the use of the term ‘justified’ in these cases and instead impose the term unjustified but blameless. I counter this by suggesting that Williamson sets the bar too high to attain knowledge and does not give enough (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  6
    Beyond Foundationalism: Rethinking Justified Belief in a Networked Age.Dr Katerina Papadopoulos - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Criticism 6 (2):151-160.
    _The traditional philosophical concept of justified belief, a cornerstone of epistemology, faces unprecedented challenges in the digital age. The rise of social media, online information overload, and the proliferation of echo chambers have cast doubt on the possibility of establishing reliable knowledge claims in a networked environment. This article argues that the foundationalist approach to justified belief, which emphasizes individual justification based on private evidence, is no longer tenable in this new context. Instead, we propose a networked epistemology (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Belief, Correctness and normativity.Davide Fassio - 2011 - Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):471.
    ABSTRACT A belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true. Some philosophers argued that from this standard of correctness it is possible to derive the statement of a norm, a claim about what a subject ought to do. Many formulations of the standard in terms of an ‘ought’-claim have been suggested, but all resulted affected by some problem. My aim in this article is to suggest a new formulation of the standard in ‘ought’-terms based on (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  9.  19
    Subjective Beliefs About Farm Animal Welfare Labels and Milk Anticonsumption.Albert Boaitey - 2022 - Food Ethics 7 (2):1-14.
    Food labels serve important informational and signaling purposes however, the subjective beliefs associated with ethical labels such as farm animal welfare labels and their influence on anti-consumption behavior are not well-understood. This paper aims to address how subjective beliefs about FAW labels affect the milk anti-consumption behavior for different segments of consumers. Data from an in-person opt-in survey conducted in the US were used to address the objectives of this study. Information on respondents’ sociodemographic profile, milk choice and perceptions about (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  10
    Rational Belief and Dialetheism.Paolo Bonardi - 2021 - Intercultural Pragmatics 18 (Pragmatics and Philosophy):309-335.
    It is usually maintained that a subject with manifestly contradictory beliefs is irrational. How can we account, then, for the intuitive rationality of dialetheists, who believe that some manifest contradictions are true? My paper aims to answer this question. Its ultimate goal is to determine a characterization of (or rather a constraint for) rational belief approvable by both the theorists of Dialetheism and its opponents. In order to achieve this goal, a two-step strategy will be adopted. First, a characterization (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Desire as belief, Lewis notwithstanding.Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):116-122.
    In two curiously neglected papers, David Lewis claims to reduce to absurdity the supposition (commonly labeled DAB) that (some) desires are belief-like. My aim in this paper is to explain the significance of this claim and rebut the proof.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  12.  22
    Theological belief towards Islamic spiritual belief: Evidence from South Sulawesi, Indonesia.Ruslan Ruslan, Muhammad A. Burga & Muli U. Noer - 2022 - HTS Theological Studies 78 (4):6.
    Indonesia has the biggest Muslim population globally, and one of the Islamic beliefs among people of this nation is tarekat, which is sometimes considered as a heretic. Therefore, this article aims to analyse the meaning of diction tarekat according to the Qur’an and its implications for the Buginese community, one of the oldest ethnicities in Indonesia. This is a conceptual and empirical research with the purposive sampling method used to determine the informants from several tarekat leaders and congregations. Data were (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  14
    Interrogative Belief Revision.Sebastian Enqvist - 2011 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis deals with the theory of interrogative belief revision, a recent development in the subfield of philosophical logic known as belief revision theory. While classical belief revision theory deals with the dynamics of an agent’s beliefs, interrogative belief revision aims to describe the dynamics of the agent’s questions about the world, or research agenda, as well. Great emphasis is put on the interaction between belief change and changes in the research agenda. I develop both (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  36
    Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology.René Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.) - 2005 - De Gruyter.
    Over the last two decades foundationalism has been severely criticized. In response to this various alternatives to it have been advanced, notably coherentism. At the same time new versions of foundationalism were crafted, that were claimed to be immune to the earlier criticisms. This volume contains 12 papers in which various aspects of this dialectic are covered. A number of papers continue the trend to defend foundationalism, and foundationalism's commitment to basic beliefs and basic knowledge, against various attacks. Others aim (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  19
    An elementary belief function logic.Didier Dubois, Lluis Godo & Henri Prade - 2023 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 33 (3-4):582-605.
    1. There are two distinct lines of research that aim at modelling belief and knowledge: modal logic and uncertainty theories. Modal logic extends classical logic by introducing knowledge or belief...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  24
    Paul M. Churchland.Translucent Belief & Catherine Z. Elgin - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (1).
  17. Beyond belief: On disinformation and manipulation.Keith Raymond Harris - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Existing analyses of disinformation tend to embrace the view that disinformation is intended or otherwise functions to mislead its audience, that is, to produce false beliefs. I argue that this view is doubly mistaken. First, while paradigmatic disinformation campaigns aim to produce false beliefs in an audience, disinformation may in some cases be intended only to prevent its audience from forming true beliefs. Second, purveyors of disinformation need not intend to have any effect at all on their audience’s beliefs, aiming (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  18. How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
    Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   362 citations  
  19. Georg Meggle.Common Belief - 2003 - In Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller, Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 321--251.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  59
    Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity.I. Testimony-Based Belief - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa, The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Michael Goldstein.Belief Revision - 1994 - In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl, Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: Papers From the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 117.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  96
    On Mathematical and Religious Belief, and on Epistemic Snobbery.Silvia Jonas - 2016 - Philosophy 91 (1):69-92.
    In this paper, I argue that religious belief is epistemically equivalent to mathematical belief. Abstract beliefs don't fall under ‘naive’, evidence-based analyses of rationality. Rather, their epistemic permissibility depends, I suggest, on four criteria: predictability, applicability, consistency, and immediate acceptability of the fundamental axioms. The paper examines to what extent mathematics meets these criteria, juxtaposing the results with the case of religion. My argument is directed against a widespread view according to which belief in mathematics is clearly (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  15
    Beyond Belief: On Disinformation and Manipulation.Keith Raymond Harris - 2025 - Erkenntnis 90 (2):483-503.
    Existing analyses of disinformation tend to embrace the view that disinformation is intended or otherwise functions to mislead its audience, that is, to produce false beliefs. I argue that this view is doubly mistaken. First, while paradigmatic disinformation campaigns aim to produce false beliefs in an audience, disinformation may in some cases be intended only to prevent its audience from forming true beliefs. Second, purveyors of disinformation need not intend to have any effect at all on their audience’s beliefs, aiming (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision.Georg Brun & Hans Rott - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25.  4
    If not belief in God, then what? Identifying factors that contribute to well-being among Polish nonbelievers.Paweł Łowicki & Sally B. Barker - forthcoming - Archive for the Psychology of Religion.
    Recent estimates by the Pew Research Center show that Poland is one of the fastest secularizing countries in the world. Despite the growing role of such attitudes in Poland and other countries around the world, still little is known about the psychosocial functioning and mental health of nonbelievers. The present study aimed to fill in this knowledge gap by examining various factors that may contribute to nonbelievers’ well-being, including perceived social support, emotion regulation strategies, secular beliefs (humanism and belief (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Against Publishing Without Belief: Fake News, Misinformation, and Perverse Publishing Incentives.Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker, Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The problem of fake news and the spread of misinformation has garnered a lot of attention in recent years. The incentives and norms that give rise to the problem, however, are not unique to journalism. Insofar as academics and journalists are working towards the same goal, i.e., publication, they are both under pressures that pervert. This chapter has two aims. First, to integrate conversations in philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphilosophy to draw out the publishing incentives that promote analogous problems (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27.  80
    Motivated belief and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):353 – 369.
    Can the existence of motivationally biased beliefs plausibly be explained without appealing to actions that are aimed at producing or protecting these beliefs? Drawing upon some recent work on everyday hypothesis testing, I argue for an affirmative answer. Some theorists have been too quick to insist that motivated belief must involve, or typically does involve, our trying to bring it about that we acquire or retain the belief, or our trying to make it easier for ourselves to believe (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  28.  57
    Belief Revision and Computational Argumentation: A Critical Comparison.Pietro Baroni, Eduardo Fermé, Massimiliano Giacomin & Guillermo Ricardo Simari - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (4):555-589.
    This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reasoning they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the broad area of defeasible reasoning (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  57
    Belief and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13523-13542.
    This paper is about an anti-expertise paradox that arises because of self-referential sentences like: = I do not believe that is true. The first aim is to motivate, develop, and defend a novel view of epistemic rationality according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy, i.e., it can be indeterminate which doxastic states an agent is rationally permitted or required to have. The second aim is to show how this view can provide a solution to this paradox while also (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.
    In this paper, we compare and contrast two methods for the revision of qualitative beliefs. The first method is generated by a simplistic diachronic Lockean thesis requiring coherence with the agent’s posterior credences after conditionalization. The second method is the orthodox AGM approach to belief revision. Our primary aim is to determine when the two methods may disagree in their recommendations and when they must agree. We establish a number of novel results about their relative behavior. Our most notable (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  31.  35
    Threshold as place: Ariella Azoulay talks with Aïm Deüelle Lüski.Ariella Azoulay & Aïm Deüelle Lüski - 2013 - Philosophy of Photography 4 (1):13-23.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Partial belief, full belief, and accuracy–dominance.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - manuscript
    Arguments for probabilism aim to undergird/motivate a synchronic probabilistic coherence norm for partial beliefs. Standard arguments for probabilism are all of the form: An agent S has a non-probabilistic partial belief function b iff (⇐⇒) S has some “bad” property B (in virtue of the fact that their p.b.f. b has a certain kind of formal property F). These arguments rest on Theorems (⇒) and Converse Theorems (⇐): b is non-Pr ⇐⇒ b has formal property F.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  10
    Negotiating Beliefs.Robert E. Goodin - 2003 - In Reflective Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This is the first of four chapters on belief democracy, and discusses democratic bargaining in relation to beliefs. Disputes over beliefs sometimes get resolved through persuasion, but in the real world of democratic politics, more are resolved through negotiation; each person still believes the truth of the proposition they originally advocated, but each sees the need to ‘get on with it’, so all agree to treat certain propositions ‘as if true’, for the particular purposes at hand. The latter process (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Kant on Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge.Thomas Höwing - 2016 - In Thomas Höwing, The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 201-222.
    The paper addresses an exegetical puzzle that is raised by Kant's distinction between opining (Meinen), believing (Glauben), and knowing (Wissen). In presenting his moral arguments, Kant often points out that belief, as he conceives of it, has a unique feature: it requires non-epistemic justification. Yet Kant's official formulation of the tripartite distinction runs counter to this claim. It describes Belief in terms of a set of two features, each of which also pertains to either opinion or knowledge. My (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  35. Objectual understanding, factivity and belief.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig, Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 423-442.
    Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  36. Sven ove Hansson.Taking Belief Bases Seriously - 1994 - In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl, Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: Papers From the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Naturalism, evolution and true belief.Stephen Law - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):41-48.
    Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that naturalism is, as he puts it, ‘incoherent or self defeating’. Plantinga supposes that, in the absence of any God-like being to guide the process, natural selection is unlikely to favour true belief. Plantinga overlooks the fact that adherents of naturalism may plausibly hold that there exist certain conceptual links between belief content and behaviour. Given such links, natural selection will favour true belief. A further rather surprising consequence of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  38.  25
    (1 other version)Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief.Emma C. Gordon & J. Adam Carter - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig, Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 423-442.
    Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  39. Jonathan E. Adler.Aims-Curricula Fallacy - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 27 (2):223.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  29
    Cameras.Aim Luski - 2013 - Philosophy of Photography 4 (1):3-12.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  21
    Beliefs and Actions Towards an Environmental Ethical Life: The Christianity-Environment Nexus Reflected in a Cross-National Analysis.Ruxandra Malina Petrescu-Mag, Adrian Ana, Iris Vermeir & Dacinia Crina Petrescu - 2020 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 33 (3):421-446.
    The present study seeks to introduce the European Christian community to the debate on environmental degradation while displaying its important role and theological perspectives in the resolution of the environmental crisis. The fundamental question authors have asked here is if Christianity supports pro-environmental attitudes compared to other religions, in a context where religion, in general, represents the ethical foundation of our civilization and, thus, an important behavior guide. The discussion becomes all the more interesting as many voices have identified the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. (1 other version)Acceptance without Belief.Patrick Maher - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:381-392.
    Van Fraassen has maintained that acceptance of a scientific theory does not involve the belief that the theory is true. Blackburn, Mitchell and Horwich have claimed that acceptance, as understood by van Fraassen, is the same as belief; in which case, van Fraassen's position is incoherent. Van Fraassen identifies belief with subjective probability, so the question at issue is really whether acceptance of a theory involves a high subjective probability for the theory. Van Fraassen is not committed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  43.  36
    Eliciting critical care nurses’ beliefs regarding physical restraint use.Gemma Via-Clavero, Marta Sanjuán-Naváis, Marta Romero-García, Laura de la Cueva-Ariza, Gemma Martínez-Estalella, Erika Plata-Menchaca & Pilar Delgado-Hito - 2019 - Nursing Ethics 26 (5):1458-1472.
    Background: Despite the reported harms and ethical concerns about physical restraint use in the critical care settings, nurses’ intention to apply them is unequal across countries. According to the theory of planned behaviour, eliciting nurses’ beliefs regarding the use of physical restraints would provide additional social information about nurses’ intention to perform this practice. Aim: To explore the salient behavioural, normative and control beliefs underlying the intention of critical care nurses to use physical restraints from the theory of planned behaviour. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.
    When a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer's own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that they can't. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45.  88
    Is True Belief Really a Fundamental Epistemic Value?Lance K. Aschliman - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):88-104.
    In this paper, I question the orthodox position that true belief is a fundamental epistemic value. I begin by raising a particularly epistemic version of the so-called “value problem of knowledge” in order to set up the basic explanandum and to motivate some of the claims to follow. In the second section, I take aim at what I call “bottom-up approaches” to this value problem, views that attempt to explain the added epistemic value of knowledge in terms of its (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46.  28
    Pascal: Reasoning and Belief.Michael Moriarty - 2020 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is a study of Blaise Pascal's defence of Christian belief in the Pensees. Michael Moriarty aims to expound--and in places to criticize--what he argues is a coherent and original apologetic strategy. Setting out the basic philosophical and theological presuppositions of Pascal's project, the present volume draws the distinction between convictions attained by reason and those inspired by God-given faith. It also presents Pascal's view of the contradictions within human nature, between the 'wretchedness' and the 'greatness'. His mind-body (...)
  47. Relationship between climate change belief and water conservation behaviors: Is there a role for political identity?Quan-Hoang Vuong, Dan Li, Viet-Phuong La, Minh-Phuong Thi Duong & Minh-Hoang Nguyen - manuscript
    In the United States, public opinions about climate change have become polarized, with a stark difference in the belief in climate change. Climate change denialism is pervasive among Republicans, especially conservatives, contrasting the high recognition of human-induced climate change issues among Democrats. As the water crisis is closely linked to climate change, the current study aims to examine how the belief in climate change’s impacts on future water supply uncertainty affects water conservation behaviors and whether the effect is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Absolute value as belief.Steven Daskal - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):221 - 229.
    In “Desire as Belief” and “Desire as Belief II,” David Lewis ( 1988 , 1996 ) considers the anti-Humean position that beliefs about the good require corresponding desires, which is his way of understanding the idea that beliefs about the good are capable of motivating behavior. He translates this anti-Humean claim into decision theoretic terms and demonstrates that it leads to absurdity and contradiction. As Ruth Weintraub ( 2007 ) has shown, Lewis’ argument goes awry at the outset. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  49. Secularism and Belief in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge.Rebecca Gould - 2011 - Journal of Islamic Studies 22 (3):339-373.
    This paper discusses the diverse forms of contemporary Islam practised by the Kists, inhabitants of Georgia's Pankisi Gorge related to the Chechens. The newest wave of Salafi-inspired Islam among the young generation of Chechens, mostly men who have fought in the Chechen-Russian war, is aesthetically marked by a distinctive style of minaret and by a more public adhān than Pankisi has hitherto known. The reactions of local Kists to the aesthetics and morality of the new Islam, and the distinctions between (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  68
    Expressivism and I‐Beliefs in Brandom’s Making it Explicit.Steven Levine - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (1):95 – 114.
    In his book Making it Explicit, Robert Brandom takes it as one of his aims to formulate a non‐Cartesian theory of I‐beliefs that can do justice to the two features of I‐beliefs that most lend thems...
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 956