This paper is an attempt to illuminate today’s economic science with the light of Aristotle’s philosophy of economics. The author first describes Aristotle’s thoughts about the economy. Then, he distinguishes and discusses three Aristotelian principles: (a) economics should be a classical practical or moral science, (b) economics should not look for an unlimited wealth, but for the wealth necessary for the good life, and (c) economics should be aimed at the common good.

In this paper I will argue that when Aristotle uses the word ‘ἀρχή’ he is often referring to what we call a condition, whether necessary, sufficient or necessary and sufficient. To this end I will discuss how conditions for being, change, and knowledge, as identified by Aristotle, can be equated to ontological, physical and noetic principles, respectively.

U Metafizici Γ. 3 počelo neproturječnosti otkriva se kao počelo mišljenja, ali i počelo svih bića. Prema tome, PN ima svoja dva aspekta – ontički i logički. Ti su aspekti izraženi različitim formulacijama počela neproturječnosti koje nalazimo u Γ. 3. Ne može se govoriti o primatu nekog od aspekata, jer su oni upućeni jedan na drugoga: mišljenje je mišljenje bića, a biće je ono što se u mišljenju misli. PN se ističe time da je najpostojanije počelo jer je ono nužno (...) najspoznatljivije. Spoznatljivost ovoga počela ne ovisi o nekim subjektivno- psihološkim uvjetima već o tome da je PN ono konstitutivno svakog spoznavanja, što proizlazi iz njegove onto logičke naravi.In Metaphysics Γ. 3 the principle of non-contradiction is revealed as the principle of thought but also as the principle of all beings. Thus, it has two aspects – ontical and logical. These aspects are expressed by different formulations of PN which can be found in Γ. 3. It cannot be said that any aspect has primacy, because each one bears necessary relation with the other: thinking is the thinking of being and being is that which is thought in the thinking. PN is distinguished as the firmest principle because it is that which is necessarily the most knowable. Knowability of this principle does not depend on some subjective-psychological conditions, but on the fact that the PN is that which is constitutive in every knowledge, and that follows from its onto-logical nature. (shrink)

The era in which Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī emerged as a canonical scientist significantly contributed to his education and shaped his scientific worldview. The formation of al-Farabi’s spiritual worldview and his ideas is directly associated with embracing the ancient philosophical tradition, more precisely, Aristotle’s philosophy and logic. The focus of the article is alFarabi’s analysis of Aristotle’s principles in the study of logic and their further development. Al-Farabi’s worldwide reputation as the Second Teacher after Aristotle, the First Teacher, in the East (...) is directly rooted in his mastery and advancement of the science of logic. In simple terms, the philosopher states that logic leads a person to a straight path to being capable of radically discerning between good and bad, truth and lies, and honesty and deceit. This, in turn, steers humanity away from succumbing to mistakes or getting into trouble. Al-Farabi constructs a comprehensive scientific analysis of the socio-cultural foundations of Aristotle’s doctrine of logic and the ability to adapt it in his unique way to society. The study of the theoretical basis of al-Farabi’s teachings on logic and its significance involves employing hermeneutic, comparative, and stylistic methods in the research of the texts. (shrink)

In what follows I will say little if anything about the animadversions vis-à-vis Irwin and Lukasiewicz and Owen, because there is so much of such greater interest in what Code has told us about Aristotle, the great preponderance of which, in my opinion, is true. I will review some of this truth, specify one place where I have trouble reconciling his account with the evidence, and then try to give a better account that I think is entirely compatible with the (...) rest of what he has given us. (shrink)

Exploring Aristotle's philosophical method and the merits of his conclusions, Irwin here shows how Aristotle defends dialectic against the objection that it cannot justify a metaphysical realist's claims. He focuses particularly on Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics, stressing the connections between doctrines that are often discussed separately.

how does one inquire into the truth of first principles? Where does one begin when deciding where to begin? Aristotle recognizes a series of difficulties when it comes to understanding the starting points of a scientific or philosophical system, and contemporary scholars have encountered their own difficulties in understanding his response. I will argue that Aristotle was aware of a Platonic solution that can help us uncover his own attitude toward the problem.Aristotle's central problem with first principles arises from (...) the fact that they cannot be demonstrated in the same way as other propositions. Since demonstrations proceed from prior and better-known principles, if the principles themselves were in need of... (shrink)

Review of Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis, and Notes , pp. xliv + 274, ?31.95, ISBN 0 8078 2327 9 ; ?10.50, ISBN 0 8078 4637 6 and Peter L. Phillips Simpson, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle , pp. xxxvi + 476, $49.95, ISBN 0 8078 2380 5.

The eighth book of Aristotle's Physics is the culmination of his theory of nature. He discusses not just physics, but the origins of the universe and the metaphysical foundations of cosmology and physical science. He moves from the discussion of motion in the cosmos to the identification of a single source and regulating principle of all motion, and so argues for the existence of a first `unmoved mover'. Daniel Graham offers a clear, accurate new translation of this key (...) text in the history of Western thought, and accompanies the translation with a careful philosophical commentary to guide the reader towards an understanding of the wealth of important and influential arguments and ideas that Aristotle puts forward. (shrink)

Aristotle is without question the founder of the science of biology. In his treatise On the Parts of Animals, he develops his systematic principles for biological investigation, and explanation, and applies those principles to explain why the different animal kinds have the different parts that they do. It is one of the greatest achievements in the history of science. This new translation from the Greek aims to reflect the subtlety and detail of Aristotle's reasoning. The commentary provides help in (...) understanding each argument as well as an integrated account of the goals and methods of the work taken as a whole. (shrink)

Aristotle shares with Plato the attitude that the world, ‘the all,’ is a kosmos, a well-ordered and beautiful whole which, as such, can be rendered intelligible, or understood, by the intellect. One understands things, generally speaking, by tracing them back to their sources, origins or principles and causes or explanatory factors, and seeing in what manner they are related to these principles. We know, or understand, a thing when we grasp ‘the why’ or cause. Consequently, understanding is systematic. Some things (...) we understand through themselves - these are the first principles and as such are not understood by tracing them back to causes. We understand other things by systematically relating them in appropriate ways to what is known through itself. These other things are known through, or by means of, their causes and principles. (shrink)

David Botting defends Aristotle as an empiricist against those who see him as a rationalist, focusing on Aristotle's account of how we acquire the first principles of science. The author argues that Aristotle's account is empiricist and that first principles are, perhaps surprisingly, known inferentially and not by intuition.

Originally published as 'Das Problem des Prinzipienforschung und die aristotelische Physik' in Kant-Studien 52 (1960-1), pp. 206-19, the revised text of a lecture given on 28 October 1959 in Hamburg. It presents in summary form the main line of argument developed in the introduction and first two parts of Wieland's book, Die aristotelische Physik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1962).

By a thorough study of the Posterior Analytics and related Aristotelian texts, Richard McKirahan reconstructs Aristotle's theory of episteme--science. The Posterior Analytics contains the first extensive treatment of the nature and structure of science in the history of philosophy, and McKirahan's aim is to interpret it sympathetically, following the lead of the text, rather than imposing contemporary frameworks on it. In addition to treating the theory as a whole, the author uses textual and philological as well as philosophical material (...) to interpret many important but difficult individual passages. A number of issues left obscure by the Aristotelian material are settled by reference to Euclid's geometrical practice in the Elements. To justify this use of Euclid, McKirahan makes a comparative analysis of fundamental features of Euclidian geometry with the corresponding elements of Aristotle's theory. Emerging from that discussion is a more precise and more complex picture of the relation between Aristotle's theory and Greek mathematics--a picture of mutual, rather than one-way, dependence. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

No one influenced and shaped our thinking about dispositions and causal properties more than Aristotle. What he wrote about power (dynamis), nature (physis) and habit (hexis) has been read, systematised and criticised again and again during the history of philosophy. In this chapter I sketch Aristotle's thoughts about dispositions and argue that his theory can still be regarded as a good one.

The object of this paper is to show the predominance of the influence of geometrical ideas in Aristotle's account of first principles in the Posterior Analytics— to show that his analysis of first principles is in its essentials an analysis of the first principles of geometry as he conceived them. My proof of this falls into two parts. I. A consideration of the parallel between Aristotle's and Euclid's account of first principles. II. A comparison between the general movement (...) of thought in the Aristotelian παγωγ and πδειξις and in the δινοια and νησις of the Platonic dialectic. (shrink)

This volume contains the first critical edition of the Summa Alexandrinorum, that is the medieval Latin translation made in 1243 by Hermann the German of an Arabic abridgment of the Nicomachean Ethics known as the Iḫtiṣār al-Iskandarānīyīn. It is accompanied by a French translation. The volume also contains a full study of the manuscript tradition of the Latin text and sets out the principles used in the edition, which takes account, where necessary, of the Arabic version of the text, which (...) has survived in the form of fragments. A study of the origin of the Summa Alexandrinorum and the relations between the Summa and the fragments and testimonies which are extant in other traditions and different languages completes the volume. Ce volume propose la toute première édition critique, accompagnée d'une traduction française, de la Summa Alexandrinorum, traduction latine médiévale exécutée en 1243 par Hermann l'Allemand d'un abrégé arabe de l'Éthique à Nicomaque connu sous le titre d'Iḫtiṣār al-Iskandarānīyīn. Il présente également une étude complète de la tradition manuscrite du texte latin, et les principes d'édition adoptés dans l'édition, qui prennent en compte, ponctuellement, la version arabe du texte qui a été conservée sous la forme de fragments. L'étude de l'origine de la Summa Alexandrinorum et des relations entre la Summa et les fragments et témoignages conservés dans d'autres langues et appartenant à autant de traditions parallèles et diverses vient compléter ce volume. (shrink)

We propose a model of cognition grounded in ancient Greek philosophy which encompasses Aristotle’s categories. Taking for First Principles the brute facts of the mental actions of separation, aggregation and ordering, we derive Aristotle’s categories as follows. First, Separation lets us see single entities, giving the simple concept of an individual. Next, Aggregation lets us see instances of some kind, giving the basic concept of a particular. Then, Ordering lets us see both wholes-with-parts as well as parts-of-some-whole, giving the subtle (...) concept of a relational or Gestalt. The basic and the subtle concept give us the major and minor categories. The categories constitute a top-level ontology and describe universal usage so that any other category necessarily describes particular or domain usage. (shrink)

This article presents a case for thinking that moral principles within Aristotle's ethical theory can be both codifiable and action-guiding without minimizing the role of practical reason in determining what should be done. I argue that McDowell dismisses this possibility too hastily. Much of the force of this case rests on my interpretation of "for the most part" relationships in Aristotle.

In the first book of Physics, Aristotle is concerned with the question “What is Being?” Ti to on? The determinations of Being are obtained from our experience of things in movement: on kinoumenon. His discussion on Being and One, on matter and form, on subject and privation, etc. does not differ from metaphysics. Contents of the translated chapters: 1. Method, 2-3. Theories of the Presocratic physicists on the principles of nature; the essent exists not as one the way Parmenides and (...) Melissus supposed; the multiplicity of Being, 7. Analysis of becoming: the pair of contraries presupposes something third – a substratum, 9. Not-Being as the condition of becoming: Aristotle’s notion of matter. (shrink)

The starting point of this paper is an apparent contradiction, often pointed out by commentators of the Poetics. In his treatise on poetry, whose object is human action, why does Aristotle assign a major role to necessity, while in the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics he clearly states that in the field of human action there is no place for necessity but only for probability? One answer has been, that in the Poetics Aristotle refers to a weaker type of necessity, (...) which in the end is more or less the same as probability. The fact that Aristotle (the argument continues) speaks almost always not only of necessity but also of probability, is proof of this weakening of necessity. I argue, on the contrary, that in the Poetics necessity and probability are two distinct principles, which concern different aspects of the tragedy (i. e. the most accomplished poetical work according to Aristotle), and which therefore should not be blurred. The first step is to make clear that the alleged contradiction is only apparent. It is in fact true that in the world of action, according to Aristotle, there can be no necessity, but action is only the object of poetry and not poetry itself. Poetry as such is a technique, which differs from other techniques (like medicine) on account of its ends, and, consequently, also on account of its object. In the world of technique, as is clearly stated both in the Methaphysics and in the Posterior Analytics, there is necessity, in the sense that to reach this or that end you have – necessarily – to do this or that. But then – this is the second step – what is the relation between technical necessity and the principle of probability? Evidently probability concerns the world of action, the object of poetry. This brings me to the following conclusion: When Aristotle tells us that the aim of the poet is to say what is possible according to probability and necessity, he means that the poet should take probable actions as objects and use them as necessary means to reach a particular end. This end, in the case of tragedy, is the tragic plot. The two principles are then strictly connected (every moment of the tragedy has to be looked at from one side and the other), but nonetheless distinct. (shrink)

A very detailed piece of scholarship devoted to showing the fundamental importance and meaning of Aristotle's notion of phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, which express Aristotle's complete philosophy of human life. The infelicity of style and omnipresence of scholarly paraphernalia obscure the philosophic importance of the analysis unnecessarily. This is especially true in the case where imprecision of language leads Michelakis to treat phronesis as a faculty along with nous praktikos rather than a disposition modifying (...) it. As a result an important section of the second chapter is mystifying, if not completely wrong, issuing in the identification of the subordinate disposition nous with the nous praktikos itself. Michelakis is correct in thinking that an analysis of phronesis is urgently needed to clear up the confusion of interpretations of Aristotle's ethical and political doctrine. This book presents much of the requisite material for that analysis, but not the requisite analysis.--W. G. E. (shrink)

In 'Metaphysics' book 4 Aristotle offers several arguments in defense of the principle of noncontradiction (PNC). In this paper I want to focus on the stretch of argument from 1006a11 to 1006b34 which Aristotle calls a proof by refutation (elenktikos apodeixai), (1006a11). Contrary to Elizabeth Anscombe and others, I will argue that in this section of the defense Aristotle can defend a version of the principle that extends to nonessential predication, predication of properties, aggregates, and transcategorials.

Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on (...) which there's good sense to be made of the claim that we come to grasp first principles inductively, and show that this reading is a natural one given Aristotle's broader views on scientific learning. (shrink)

We may sum up the five roles which human beings might play in the existence of the polis in the following way: (1) Human nature plays the role of the inner principle of change which explains the type of human relation a polis takes (the polis as a type); (2) General patterns of human behaviours, together with patterns of societal conditions, play the role of material conditions which explain the variety of forms of polis; (3) Statesmen or politicians play (...) the role of political craftsmen which explains the particular form of the natural type a polis actually takes; (4) Human effort plays the role of one of the external conditions which explains the occurrence of a polis; (5) Individual human persons or groups play the role of an artificer which is responsible for and wholly explains the type of the human relation a polis takes. What I have argued in this paper is, firstly, that (1) is compatible with (2), (3) and (4), but not with (5), and secondly, that Aristotle affirms (1), (2), (3) and (4), but denies (5). Aristotle's theory of the naturalness of the polis is, therefore, not the blundered doctrine its critics suppose it to be. (shrink)