Proponents of Veritism believe that truth is the sole non-instrumental epistemic good. This view is often taken to entail that all truths should be of equal epistemic value. Hence, it is put under stress by the presence of trivial truths: truths to which we attach relatively little or no epistemic value. Pritchard, in the defense of Veritism, has tried to argue that the best way to understand the implications of Veritism is to think in terms of how an intellectually virtuous (...) inquirer would pursue truth. Furthermore, he thinks that such an inquirer would prefer weighty truths and set aside trivial ones. As such, he thinks that our epistemic disregard for trivial truths is just to be expected given Veritism. We argue that Pritchard’s defense of Veritism fails, and the problem of trivial truths remains a significant challenge for Veritism. (shrink)

Davidson (in: LePore (ed), pp 433–46, 1986) uses the existence of malapropisms to motivate a model of linguistic communication where communication succeeds between conversational partners without their having to rely on conventional meanings. Davidson uses this model to then claim that there is no such thing as a conventional language shared by a linguistic community which must be known in advance for linguistic communication to succeed. However, for many cases, Davidson relies on there being standard lines of interpretation for communication (...) to be successful according to his model. Dummett (in: LePore (ed), pp 459–76, 1986) calls out Davidson on his reliance on the notion of standard lines, but does not clearly spell out why that is a problem for Davidson’s claim. I, taking cue from Dummett’s complaint, argue that the reliance on standard lines of interpretation is unavoidable for Davidson’s model and yet detrimental for Davidson’s claim. (shrink)

Technology assessment (TA) is an important instrument for the regulation of innovation. From the perspective of sociology of knowledge, the regulatory process can be understood as a complex interplay between different forms of knowledge. The prevailing instruments of TA, expertise and participation, are both facing difficulties in dealing with the limits and impasses of regulatory knowledge in the realm of innovation. Nevertheless, as is argued in this article, reflexive forms of TA offer a good, if not the only, answer to (...) the question of how we can deal with the contradictions and paradoxes involved in the regulation of innovation. (shrink)

Ever since Kripke’s influential arguments against descriptivism philosophers have attempted to provide solutions to Frege’s puzzle of substitution failure that adhere to Naïve Semantics—the view that names contribute their referents and referents alone to propositions expressed by sentences containing them. Recently, philosophers have also appealed to psychological objects called mental files, which are used to represent and store information on individuals, in solving the puzzle. Combining the two promises to revive a simple commonsensical theory while, at least prima facie, doing (...) away with the need to rely on Fregean senses. Though I welcome the combined approach, I argue that the only plausible version of it is a pretense-based one. (shrink)

Jeshion (New essays on singular thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b) believes that singular thought is implemented by the tokening of mental files (MFC). She also believes that an individual’s being significant to the agent is necessary and sufficient for the agent’s having singular thought about the individual (Cognitivism). Goodman (Rev Philos Psychol 7(2):437–461, 2016a, Philos Q 66:236–260, 2016b) argues that mental files created under a description lead to descriptive not singular thought. She uses this to criticize Cognitivism’s sufficiency claim (...) and MFC. I show that this criticism rests on a faulty conception of the singular thought versus descriptive thought distinction and such files indeed lead to singular thought. This in turn shows that Cognitivism’s necessity claim is false. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 18 Heft: 1 Seiten: 281-318.

Participation of a broad variety of actors in decision-making processes has become an important issue in science and technology policy. Many authors claim the involvement of stakeholders and of the general public to be a core condition for legitimate and sustainable decision making. In the last decades, a wide spectrum of procedures has been developed to realize biotechnological citizenship. These procedures, composed of multiactor arenas, are either located in close relation to the system of politics, or, as in the case (...) of administrative decision making, more closely to the system of law. In the latter case, a problematic constellation arises. Here, law and science can build a technoscientific normativity that systematically excludes political discourse. The law, although intending to provide for political freedom and citizenship rights, at the end appears to be an ‘‘iron cage’’ for political communication. (shrink)

This article is analysing the legal perspective on whistleblowing, at European and national level, focusing on the scientific studies’ results and theories, emphasizing nuances which worth discussing in order to a better understanding of the social phenomenon and of individual psychological decision process for reporting a wrongdoing or the suspicion of a possible breach. We are also arguing that current whistleblower regulations must take into account both the European directive and recent research in this field, pointing out some question which (...) are raising from the lack of the ethical and cultural focused research of Romanian society perspective on whistleblowing, considering also the recent past experiences of Romanians with political police actions in years of communism. We are establishing a few research directions which we conclude that could bring the knowledge to drawing a more relevant and applicable whistleblowing law. (shrink)

Der Produktionsfaktor Wissen produziert nicht nur Wissen, sondern zugleich auch Unwissen. Die Wissensgesellschaft ist auch eine Risikogesellschaft, in der die Normalität von Unfällen ebenso zu akzeptieren ist, wie das Fungieren der Gesellschaft als Labor neuer Technologien. Vor diesem Hintergrund der Gesellschaft als Wissensgesellschaft mit ihren beiden Seiten der Innovation und des Risikos ist die Frage zu sehen, wie die moderne Gesellschaft die ihr spezifische Problematik bearbeitet, mehr denn je von einem nicht auf seine positive Seite festlegbaren Wissen abhängig zu sein.

Care Ethics needs to make clear and defensible normative claims. Michael Slote’s work shows how accounts taking care as a sentimental motive can do the needful. Such motive accounts of care can also provide a way to capture the important distinction between care and justice approaches to morality. However, it is important for Care Ethics to establish harmony between caring motives and acting rightly. Slote’s account does so at the cost of an unintuitive account of obligation. We propose another way (...) to capture this harmony. (shrink)

The tripartite model of militant extremist mind-set proposed by Stankov et al. (2010b) includes three components: War (justification of violent acts); God (extremist acts are moral because they are done in the name of God/Allah); and West (violence against Western countries is justified because they are perceived as evil). There is a lack of conceptual framework regarding psychological mechanism that underlie radicalization and extremism, and there is little evidence regarding risk factors for radicalization in the scientific literature. In the present (...) study, it is hypothesized that irrational beliefs and a constellation of personality factors are two possible psychological mechanisms that put adolescents in a vulnerable position and could influence them to develop an extremist mind-set. The sample consists in 295 Romanian adolescents, ages 15-18 years, and the mean age being 16.41. The present study was conducted in several schools from Bihor County located in the north-western part of Romania. Adolescents took part on a voluntary basis in the study after the written, informed consent was obtained from their parents. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the structure of Militant Extremist Mind-Set Scale confirmed the three-factor model of the extremist mind-set. Two confirmatory factor analyses were also conducted for the other two administered scales: CASI and Mini-IPIP. The results support the previous models for both subscales, including items loading on factors. SEM analysis was performed with AMOS 23 statistical package on a final sample size of 242 participants and there were no missing data. Fifth structural models were specified. The fifth model had adequate fit based on all three indices including the RMSEA (0.054), CFI (0.958), and SRMS (0.047). Global evaluation of self seems to be the only irrational belief that was somewhat related with the extremis mind-set, being part of it. Neuroticism was not identified as being a variable that could have a direct influence on mind-set extremism, or an indirect influence through personality. Religious adherence is a good predictor of extremist ideology. A global personality factor consisting in low Intellect/Imagination, low Extraversion and high Agreeableness seems to be a vulnerability factor that influences people to believe in extremist ideology. (shrink)

Priyanshu Prabal Upadhyaya, b. 1919, Sanskrit scholar; contributed articles on various aspects of Indic philosophy, Vedic and Sanskrit literature.