This volume provides a clear and exhaustive exposition of Buddhist epistemology and logic, based on the works of classical thinkers such as Vasubandhu, Dinnaga,..

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction (...) with one’s own words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox. (shrink)

One of the major aims of this article is to provide the theoretical account of mindfulness provided by the systematic Abhidharma epistemology of conscious states. I do not claim to present the one true version of mindfulness, because there is not one version of it in Buddhism; in addition to the Abhidharma model, there is, for example, the nondual Mahāmudrā tradition. A better understanding of a Buddhist philosophical framework will not only help situate meditation practice in its originating (...) tradition, but it will also clarify a Buddhist perspective on consciousness. In this article, I present the Abhidharma account of mindfulness—as explicated in the Abhidharmakośa, the root text for the Abhidharma tradition—and the theoretical model of the mind that underlies its practice. Abhidharma–Yogācara model of the mind, I believe, contains critical philosophical insights relevant to contemporary concerns while at the same time placing mindfulness meditation in its proper philosophical context. (shrink)

Epistemology – the study of the nature and scope of knowledge – has been an integral topic in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist scholastic communities for the past 1500 years. This article provides an overview of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, emphasizing the central role that the concept of pramana plays in Indian theories of knowledge. After elucidating the two pramanas accepted by the Buddhist epistemological tradition, the article concludes by discussing the relationship between Buddhist epistemology (...) and Buddhist soteriology. (shrink)

This volume includes translations of three separate Tibetan works composed by individuals who are now regarded as iconic figures of the Geluk school of Buddhism. The first work is Banisher of Ignorance: An Ornament of the Seven Treatises on Pramāṇa, by Khedrup Gelek Palsang (1385-1438), and the second is On Preclusion and Relationship, by Gyaltsab Darma Rinchen (1364-1432). The authors-popularly known as Khedrup Jé and Gyaltsab Jé-are represented as the foremost disciples of Tsongkhapa Losang Drakpa (1357-1419), and each succeeded him (...) as the Ganden throneholder. The third text, Mighty Pramāṇa Sun, a commentary on Candrakīrti's Clear Words (Prasannapadā), is by Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721), a later luminary in the Geluk school. These works concern themselves primarily with the Buddhist theory of knowledge-the means by which we are able to know things and how we can be certain of that knowledge. Encapsulating this theory is the notion of pramāṇa, a concept derived from India, the Buddhist understanding of which was shaped most significantly by the masters Dignāga (fifth to sixth century) and Dharmakīrti (seventh century). Based on their explanation, pramāṇa is often translated as "valid cognition," a literal reference to the kind of cognition that they proposed could be relied upon to supply indisputable knowledge. In recognition of the crucial role that reasoning is held to play in gaining certain knowledge, the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition that the treatises of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti gave rise to is described as a logico-epistemological system. The works in this volume demonstrate how important a component scholastic rigor has been to Tibetan religion. They illustrate how those who follow the tradition have viewed the ordered, systematic approach as necessary not only for textual analysis, for those seeking to unravel the complexities of the Indian Buddhist scriptures and treatises, but also for practitioners aiming to progress along the spiritual path and achieve the higher Buddhist goals. (shrink)

As a specific domain of inquiry, “ Buddhist epistemology” stands primarily for the dialogical-disputational context in which Buddhists advance their empirical claims to knowledge and articulate the principles of reason on the basis of which such claims may be defended. The main questions pursued in this article concern the tension between the notion that knowledge is ultimately a matter of direct experience---which the Buddhist considers as more normative than other, more indirect, modes of knowing---and the largely discursive (...) and argumentative ways in which such experiential claims are advanced. (shrink)

This book provides readers with an introduction to epistemology within the Buddhist intellectual tradition. It is designed to be accessible to those whose primary background is in the “Western” tradition of philosophy and who have little or no previous exposure to Buddhist philosophical writings. The book examines many of the most important topics in the field of epistemology, topics that are central both to contemporary discussions of epistemology and to the classical Buddhist tradition of (...) epistemology in India and Tibet. Among the topics discussed are Buddhist accounts of: the nature of knowledge episodes, the defining conditions of perceptual knowledge and of inferential knowledge, the status of testimonial knowledge, and skeptical criticisms of the entire project of epistemology. The book seeks to put the field of Buddhist epistemology in conversation with contemporary debates in philosophy. It shows that many of the arguments and debates occurring within classical Buddhist epistemological treatises coincide with the arguments and disagreements found in contemporary epistemology. The book shows, for example, how Buddhist epistemologists developed an anti-luck epistemology—one that is linked to a sensitivity requirement for knowledge. Likewise, the book explores the question of how the study of Buddhist epistemology can be of relevance to contemporary debates about the value of contributions from experimental epistemology, and to broader debates concerning the use of philosophical intuitions about knowledge. (shrink)

It has been argued that the use of the concept of ākāra—a mental “form,” “appearance” or “aspect”—in Buddhist epistemological analysis or pramāṇa exhibits continuities with earlier Buddhist thinking about mental processes, in particular in Abhidharma. A detailed inquiry into uses of the term ākāra in pertinent contexts in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya brings to light different semantic nuances and functions of this term. The characteristic use of ākāra in Buddhist epistemological discourse turns out to be continuous with only some (...) of the nuances it has in Abhidharma. Moreover, ākāra becomes associated with novel explanatory functions in Buddhist pramāṇa. These discoveries underscore the need to pay closer attention to the reuse of terms and concepts, ideas and arguments in Buddhist philosophy, and to the often subtle adaptations and transformations that formed an integral part of its history. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to cover in broad outline the Buddha's views on knowledge – his “epistemology” – as they are expressed in the Pāli Nikāyas. Buddha's views on knowledge are developed for the specific purpose of understanding and eliminating the causes of suffering. Noncognitive or affective dimensions of experience, such as feelings, dispositions, and habits, play an essential role in human experience, according to the Buddha's account in the Pāli discourses. But the fact that the Buddha held such a (...) richer view of experience is not a good reason to reject calling early Buddhism a form of empiricism. The conception of highest knowledge does not require anything like omniscience, and this point indicates a clear contrast between early Buddhism and the Brahmanist quest for knowledge of an Absolute Reality. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasaṃvitti ('self-awareness', 'self-cognition') following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by (...) Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignāga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of svasaṃvitti_ as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness. (shrink)

This is a translation of the chapter on perception by Kumarilabhatta's magnum opus, the Slokavarttika , which is one of the central texts of the Hindu response to the criticism of the logical-epistemological school of Buddhist thought. It is crucial for understanding the debates between Hindus and Buddhists about metaphysical, epistemological and linguistic questions during the classical period. In an extensive commentary, the author explains the course of the argument from verse to verse and alludes to other theories of (...) classical Indian philosophy and numerous other technical matters. Notes to the translation and commentary go further into the historical and philosophical background of Kumarila's ideas. The book provides an introduction to the history and the development of Indian epistemology, a synopsis of Kumarila's work and an analysis of its argument. It is a valuable contribution to the field of Indian philosophical studies. (shrink)

This is a translation of the chapter on perception of Kumarilabhatta's magnum opus, the Slokavarttika, one of the central texts of the Hindu response to the criticism of the logical-epistemological school of Buddhist thought. In an extensive commentary, the author explains the course of the argument from verse to verse and alludes to other theories of classical Indian philosophy and other technical matters. Notes to the translation and commentary go further into the historical and philosophical background of Kumarila's ideas. (...) The book provides an introduction to the history and the development of Indian epistemology, a synopsis of Kumarila's work and an analysis of its argument. (shrink)

Among the key factors that play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, Buddhist philosophers list (i) the testimony of sense experience, (ii) introspective awareness (iii) inferences drawn from these directs modes of acquaintance, and (iv) some version of coherentism, so as guarantee that truth claims remains consistent across a diverse philosophical corpus. This paper argues that when Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order to advance a range of empirical and introspective claims. As a result, (...) reasoning, in particular inductive reasoning on the testimony of perception, is based on a theory of causation. (shrink)

The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural (...) correlates of state consciousness or creature consciousness. (shrink)

Dieser Band beinhaltet Beiträge der in Wien 1989 veranstalteten Dharmakirti-Tagung, die einen wissenschaftsgeschichtlich bedeutsamen Schritt von den bisher ueblichen doxo-graphischen Arbeiten zu problemgeschichtlich vorgehenden Arbeiten gebracht hat.

Study done under the aegis of Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University.

As the title of the present article shows, it highlights the three philosophically integrated areas – (1) pramāṇa-epistemology (theory of comprehensive knowledge involving both perception and inference), (2) logic (although a part of pramāṇa-epistemology, it has two modes, namely, inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning), and (3) language (or semantics, i.e. the double negation theory of meaning, which falls under inference). These are interconnected as well as overlapping within the Buddhist mainstream tradition of the process philosophy as opposed (...) to the substantialist philosophy. The same is the case with the three celebrated Buddhist thinkers – Vasubandhu, Dignāga (also spelt as Diññāṇa), and Dharmakīrti – who develop their radical and critical views focusing on these areas in historical-cum-philosophical order. It is worth noting that within the same mainstream Buddhist tradition, each one of the three thinkers picks up the problematic issues from their predecessors – from the Buddha to their immediate predecessors respectively – for their solutions against the backdrop of the two conflicting mainstream traditions – Buddhist and non-Buddhist. The central focus of these thinkers is first to identify the crucial issues, doctrinal principles, terminology, and methodology in their own ways and conceptual frameworks, which generate not only the mutual conflicts in the course of dialogues but also strengthen their positions by means of their new radical ideas, innovations, terminologies, methodologies, and doctrinal principles. As a result, the three selected areas and their crucial issues are explained, elaborated, and interpretated for better understanding. All of which are rooted in the Buddha’s path of wisdom, ethics, and liberation from the human predicament (duḥkha-nivṛtti). In this grand project of the deepest concerns, the Buddha utilized multiple strategies like understanding and controlling the problematic nature of the mind (Pāli citta, manasa) and its concomitance (Pāli cetasika, dhammā) by means of the concentrative meditation (Pāli jhāna, Sanskrit (hereafter Skt., dhyāna), cultivation of knowledge (Pāli vijjā, Skt. vidyā) and conduct/moral purity (Pāli caraṇa, Skt. ācaraṇa), destruction of afflictions/defilements (Pāli kilesa, Skt. kleśa), critical and logical thinking with valid arguments, and so on. His disciples also treat him as the possessor of valid method, arguments, meaning, practice, and purpose (Skt. pramāṇabhūta, the term used by Dignāga). He believed in the common humanity as the community of sufferers and the autonomy of every human being (Pāli attakāra), but strongly rejected the hierarchy of humanity on the basis of caste, birth, and dogmatic religious identity. For these reasons, following the Buddha and his celebrated followers like Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti, my task in this article is how to clearly and elaborately discuss the above identified issues and theories, first to understand them for myself and then logically prove the whole process of knowledge and the designed purpose through communication to those who have the intention to hear and understand the framework of common language for their benefits. I wish the readers like students and young teachers benefit from my research work. Further, since my learning of the Tibetan language is zero, but comfortable in Sanskrit and Pāli, I have been heavily dependent on three great modern thinkers who have widely written independently and also translated the Buddhist Tibetan texts, which were translated from the original Sanskrit texts now lost, into English in the areas of Buddhist epistemology, logic, and semantics. These modern scholars are Masaaki Hattori, Shoryo Katsura, and Richard Hayes. Besides them, I have also little benefitted from some other scholars who have worked in the same areas. (shrink)

Jonathan Stoltz’s Illuminating the Mind: An Introduction to Buddhist Epistemology is an excellent book that will be valuable to those familiar with analytic epistemology but unfamiliar with, and curious about, Indian philosophical traditions. It is also a valuable book for those seeking to teach Buddhist epistemology to advanced philosophy students. Philosophers interested in cross-cultural philosophical methodology will also find this book an interesting case study.With respect to cross-cultural methodology, Stoltz aims to demonstrate the philosophical legitimacy (...) of Buddhist epistemology to a “Western” audience by presenting the epistemological themes and arguments of various Buddhist thinkers in terms he thinks... (shrink)

In _Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief_, Dan Arnold examines how the Brahmanical tradition of Purva Mimamsa and the writings of the seventh-century Buddhist Madhyamika philosopher Candrakirti challenged dominant Indian Buddhist views of epistemology. Arnold retrieves these two very different but equally important voices of philosophical dissent, showing them to have developed highly sophisticated and cogent critiques of influential Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti. His analysis--developed in conversation with modern Western philosophers like William Alston and J. (...) L. Austin--offers an innovative reinterpretation of the Indian philosophical tradition, while suggesting that pre-modern Indian thinkers have much to contribute to contemporary philosophical debates. In logically distinct ways, Purva Mimamsa and Candrakirti's Madhyamaka opposed the influential Buddhist school of thought that emphasized the foundational character of perception. Arnold argues that Mimamsaka arguments concerning the "intrinsic validity" of the earliest Vedic scriptures are best understood as a critique of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy stemming from Dignaga. Though often dismissed as antithetical to "real philosophy," Mimamsaka thought has affinities with the reformed epistemology that has recently influenced contemporary philosophy of religion. Candrakirti's arguments, in contrast, amount to a principled refusal of epistemology. Arnold contends that Candrakirti marshals against Buddhist foundationalism an approach that resembles twentieth-century ordinary language philosophy--and does so by employing what are finally best understood as transcendental arguments. The conclusion that Candrakirti's arguments thus support a metaphysical claim represents a bold new understanding of Madhyamaka. (shrink)

디그나가는 집량론 k.6ab와 자주(vṛtti)에서 욕망 등의 자기인식(svasaṃvitti)도 의지각(mānaspratyakṣa)으로 직접지각(pratyakṣa)이라고 한다. 본고는 구사론에서의 감수작용(受 vedanā)에 관하여 바수반두의 입장을 중심으로 고찰하여 디그나가의 심작용과 자기인식 그리고 의지각의 상관 관계를 미시적으로 모색해 보고자 한다. 구사론의 「세간품」에서의 증어촉(增語觸 adhivacana-saṁsparśa)의 순수(順受 vedanīya)와 심수(心受 caitasikī vedanā)의 의근행(意近行 manopavicāra)은 디그나가의 인식의 2상성(二相性 dvirūpatā)으로 분석되어 삼수(三受)는 인식 결과(pramāṇaphala)에 해당한다. 따라서 구사론의 감수작용은 디그나가의 심작용의 자기인식이 진행되는 과정을 구체적으로 보여 준다. 즉 욕망, 분노, 어리석음, 즐거움, 고통 등은 직접경험의 결과로 자기인식(svasaṃvedana)이라 할 수 있다. 또한 심작용의 자기인식은 ‘의에 의해서(mānasa)’만 일어나는 직접경험으로 (...) 문자 그대로 ‘의지각(mānasapratyakṣa)’인 것이다. 여기서 직접경험(anubhava)은 감수작용의 정의인 동시에 직접지각(pratyakṣa)과 동일한 의미이다. (shrink)

This study investigates how a comparison between the Catholic theologian Edward Schillebeeckx's controversial reading of Thomist philosophy and the Tibetan Buddhist Gendun Chopel's challenge to the standard Geluk teaching of Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka philosophy might assist in rethinking conceptions of religious knowledge. Jason M. VonWachenfeldt shows how Gendun Chopel's Madhyamaka approach to the questions of knowledge in light of cultural conventionality and historical contingency can possibly better inform a Christian theological response to similar questions of modern society. Utilizing a wide (...) variety of methodical approaches to establish an imaginary dialogue between these two thinkers, this comparison remains embodied in the thought and praxis of actual individuals, and yet still firmly embedded within the conversations and trajectories of their broader religious traditions. The final chapter constructively combines and contrasts the insights of both thinkers regarding the knowability of ultimate truth in order to develop new possible approaches to epistemology that assist the contemporary believer in avoiding the problematic nihilism of a purely subjectivist epistemology-which is so rampant in the contemporary "postmodern" milieu-while still always maintaining and sharpening the practitioner's humility towards discourses on metaphysics through the critical eye of a deconstructive apophaticism. (shrink)

디그나가는 분별지를 “nāmajātyādiyojanā”라고 정의한다. 이에 대해 지넨드라붓디는 PSṬ에서 ‘명칭’과 ‘종류 등’이 대상과 결합하는 행위의 주체가 대상을 이해(pratīti)하는 것이 분별이라는 취지로 해석한다. 즉 ‘명칭’은 실재하는 것이고 ‘종류 등’는 비실재로 그것은 동등한 입장에서 병렬적 관계에 놓일 수 없음을 지적한다. 한편 그가 ‘pratīti’라는 용어를 사용하는 것 등은 다르마키르티의 영향으로 보인다. 산타락시타와 카말라쉴라는 이 복합어의 해석을 둘러싸고 “명칭과 종류 등의 결합을 가진 인식” 또는 “명칭과 종류 등의 결합”이라는 두 가지 해석의 가능성을 제시한다. 전자는 소유복합어로 명칭과 종류 등이 결합한 어떤 인식이 분별지라는 의미이고 후자는 한정복합어로 (...) 명칭과 종류의 결합 그 자체가 분별지라는 의미이다. TSP는 최종적으로 디그나가의 자주(vṛtti)를 근거로 “종류 등에 의해서 명칭과 결합한 인식”이라고 해석하여 ‘종류 등’을 명칭이 결합하는 형태들로 파악한다. 다르마키르티는 분별지를 언어(abhilāpa)와 결합 가능성이 있는(yogya) [형상의] 현현(pratibhāsa)을 가진 이해(pratīti)라고 정의한다. 이것은 디그나가의 정의를 다르마키르티 자신의 언어로 표현한 것으로 실질적으로 디그나가의 것과 의미상의 차이는 없다. 다만 “(결합의) 가능성이 있는”, “현현”, “이해”라는 그의 정의에 나타나는 새로운 정보는 디그나가의 정의를 보다 구체적으로 서술해 준다. 다르못타라는 “가능성이 있는”을 언어 표현의 가능성 즉 내적 관념도 분별지에 해당하는 것으로 보고 “현현”이라는 말의 해석에 있어서는 지식의 二相性을 도입하여 분별지의 형성 과정을 설명한다. 목샤카라굽타는 다르마키르티의 분별지를 언어 표현의 가능성과 내적 관념은 물론 동물 등에게까지 적용한다. 이것은 기억과 같은 인식 작용까지 분별지의 개념으로 확장한 것으로 해석할 수 있다. (shrink)

Most of the papers presented at a conference held at Oxford in August 1982.

The evolving field of neuroscience provides a fresh perspective for understanding and clarifying the nondualistic epistemology of Buddhist philosophy. Its egalitarian adherence to “wisdom embracing all species” required an epistemological shift beyond both egocentric and anthropocentric assumptions, outlined in such texts as the Lotus Sūtra and the Diamond Sūtra. Parallels can be drawn to the Triple Loop learning process, “an ‘epistemo-existential strategy’ for profound change on various levels.” Inherently hierarchical tendencies in Daoist and Confucian philosophies posed a challenge (...) to the egalitarian stance of Buddhist nondualism. Passages from Daoist, Confucian, and Neo-Confucian texts demonstrate the limits of Chinese nondualism. The hybrid brain cultivated through Buddhist practice was able to maintain the benefits of the task-driven dorsal attentional network, while being grounded in the stimulus-driven ventral attentional network. The Five Ranks of Chan meticulously trace the process of recognizing the nondualism of deluded mind and awakened mind. The final rank, “Unity Attained,” restores the role of allocentric attention, which has been described as “the basic simplicity of the undyed fabric,” as the default. Thus, inspired by the pedagogy of cognitive dissonance woven into Sanskrit texts, Chinese practitioners deployed their own “circuit-breakers” of ventral attention to disrupt the dogmatic “perseveration” of dorsal attention. The resulting epistemological reorientation reveals the nondualism of reality. (shrink)

I approach Murasaki Shikibu’s marvelous literary pearl The Tale of Genji (Genji Monogatari) as analogous to glistening orbs that “come out of the disease of suffering oysters,” the suffering being the death of her beloved husband Fujiwara no Nobutaka (950?–1001). In addition to drawing evidence from the novel itself, I have relied on Murasaki’s lesser-known Poetic Memoirs and Diary that offer important insights into her state of mind and circumspect literary style. The Lotus Sūtra is the key that unlocks Murasaki’s (...) philosophical intent, with its use of parables and poems to provoke deeper understandings of Buddhism and personal realizations. The Buddhist principle of impermanence (Sanskrit anitya; Japanese mujōkan) serves as both the aesthetic of aware and an unavoidable fact that residents of the Heian court (like those in the Lotus Sūtra’s Burning House) choose to ignore or escape by reveling in superficial pursuits of beauty and political power. Various characters in the novel attempt to follow the path to the epistemological awakening the author Murasaki sought for herself. (shrink)

Review of Westerhoff, J.. The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buddhists point to the soteriological value not only of the dispelling of ignorance, but the arising of insight or wisdom which constitutes the salvific goal of practice. Madhyamaka’s unique conception of the ultimate nature of reality makes this cognition of what is metaphysically ultimate distinct from other kinds of knowledge, as these soteriologically valuable cognitive states aim at something unlike anything else so known: the lack of ‘own- being,’ or emptiness, of all reality. After considering and rejecting some popular interpretations (...) of the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition regarding this soteriologically valuable epistemological state, I propose that a Thomistic conception of the Gift of Wisdom might provide a model that explains the unique nature of such insight into ultimate reality and its soteriological value. In short, wisdom involves a direct nonjudgmental veridical self-awareness arising from a good moral character, which is therefore also indirectly a direct nonjudgmental awareness of what ultimate reality is like. The final part will address the obvious dissimilarities between Christian and Buddhist metaphysics which might be thought to undermine these epistemological parallels and show, by contrast, that Christians are uniquely placed among theists in sharing many relevant features of Madhyamaka metaphysics that undergird parallels even in soteriological aims. (shrink)

The lay follower Citta’s debate with Mahāvīra in the _Nigaṇṭha Sutta_ reflects not just simple polemic, but a fundamental epistemological division between Early Jains and Buddhists. A close reading of the _Ācārāṅga Sūtra_ shows that the Jains see the truth as a property of the self-knowing purified soul that knows all things. For the Buddhists, consciousness is conditioned and dependent. If truth is a property or relation of consciousness, then it too is conditioned and dependent. In order to maintain that (...) truth is the end of the Buddha’s path, Buddhists sever the connection between consciousness and truth by formulating a negative definition of truth. Truth is that which lacks a deceptive nature and accordingly, Nirvāṇa is the ultimate truth. The Buddha’s path culminates in the discovery of truth through the elimination of deception by the annihilation of consciousness, which the Jains hold is impossible because knowledge is essential to the soul. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Religious Epistemology Through Schillebeeckx and Tibetan Buddhism by Jason VonWachenfeldtRobert MagliolaRELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY THROUGH SCHILLEBEECKX AND TIBETAN BUDDHISM. By Jason VonWachenfeldt. T&T Clark: London, 2021. 240 pp.In his "Introduction," Jason VonWachenfeldt explains the "crisis of authority" experienced by many religious believers, and then commits his book (hereinafter RET) to a "dialogic negotiation" offering middle ways between religious tradition and postmodernity. The "dialogic negotiation" is between the brilliant (...) but controversial Catholic theologian, Edward Schillebeeckx (1914–2009), and the brilliant but controversial Tibetan monk (then ex-monk), Gendun Chopel (1903–1951). They both deconstruct the epistemologies of their respective traditions, but insist on the orthodoxy of their "middle ways."VonWachenfeldt opts for Aaron Stalnaker's methodology of "bridge concepts" (topics enabling interfaith comparison) and the comparison of two "historically situated" individuals (13). He names "religious epistemology" as RET's "bridge-concept," and to further facilitate comparison, three epistemological "categories" are posited: "perspectivalism, hermeneutics, and apophaticism" (64). Schillebeeckx's "phenomenological Thomism" constitutes his perspectivalist first phase, and holds that revelation includes both a "concrete-existential" and non-conceptual "implicit intuition" of the divine reality (32). There is an antinomy between the individual's act of abstraction and the "implicit intuition" of the "reality of God in Godself" (33).Chopel's negative way is more extreme. Chopel is a Madhyamakin but rejects Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka's version which affirms the "conventional validity" of the mundane. For Chopel, all formations lack even conventional validity but "common [End Page 404] beings" falsely affirm them (35). The few "noble ones" (the enlightened) are those aware of pure emptiness (understood as "absence," not "openness"). Schillebeeckx's second phase affirms that one is embedded in ongoing history and cannot escape mundane finitude. God must be seen as "mystery" active within it (45). Chopel's second phase extends the notion that an unbridgeable chasm exists between the conventional and the ultimate but that the Buddha can manipulate the mundane so the leap to enlightenment can occur (49). Schillebeeckx's third phase practices a "negative realist metaphysic": The individual encounters the "really real" external to oneself only by way of "glimpses negative in nature" (58). Chopel's apophaticism describes ultimate reality in terms of a "nonaffirming negative" (63).Next, RET treats the role of religious community in knowledge formation (67). For Schillebeeckx, our "non-divine finitude is precisely the place where the infinite and the finite come most closely into contact" (90). The later Schillebeeckx retains loyalty to the institutional Church but because of the finitude of language and human nature he deems it necessarily subject to critique (92). Chopel practices a "pious skepticism" (97), and increasingly satirizes institutional monasticism (circa 1934, he disrobes). Addressing the role of historical founders of religions, Schillebeeckx maintains that theology should shift from an unsalvageable truth lost in the past to the more eschatological language of "the [always] Coming One" (123). Jesus's epistemological authority does not reside in his ability "to supply answers" as much as it is to open up individuals to "a future reality in the making" (148). Honorific titles such as "Savior" or "Christ" as such are not serviceable. Jesus's story is an exemplar of how to construct meaning in our lives by the "praxis" of helping the suffering. Chopel likewise demythologizes Sakyamuni Buddha (151), but—unlike Schillebeeckx—insists he does so endogenously. For example, he enters the definitive/provisional (nītārtha/neyārtha) debate, but argues that all the teachings of Śākyamuni are both—they are definitive for those whom they help toward emptiness and merely provisional for all others (157, 158).RET's chapter 5 addresses the authority of personal experience in the apophatic knowledge of ultimate reality. How is it possible for "true knowledge" to be "primarily experiential in nature as distinct from being conceptually or linguistically based?" (163). Schillebeeckx holds that our very experience of human finitude brings us negatively in contact with the "unknown ultimate reality itself" (169). He maintains that the apparent lack of ontological contact between beings and ultimate reality (God) is "one-sided," persisting only from the side of our finitude and not from the side of ultimate reality: Though humans can never directly... (shrink)