La critique de l’héliocentrisme d’Aristarque de Samos par le stoïcien Cléanthe n’était-elle qu’une défense de la religion traditionnelle? On montre qu’il n’en est rien, en replaçant cette polémique dans le contexte des débats cosmologiques et épistémologiques de l’époque hellénistique. Cléanthe devait d’abord considérer l’héliocentrisme comme un produit de la physique sans dieu de Straton de Lampsaque. Par ailleurs, son adoption d’une théologie solaire originale obligeait Cléanthe à se distinguer nettement de tout héliocentrisme. Enfin, loin de les ignorer, Cléanthe discutait les (...) constructions de l’astronomie mathématique et prétendait les relativiser au profit d’une explication cosmobiologique héraclitéenne des mouvements des astres. (shrink)

A persuasive argument that theism is a Humean “natural belief” relies on the assertion that belief in intelligent design is caused by “Cleanthes’s propensity,” introduced in Hume’s Dialogues—a universal propensity to believe in a designer triggered by the observation of apparent telos in nature. But Hume neverclaims in his own voice that religious belief is founded on anything like Cleanthes’s propensity. Instead, in the Natural History, he argues that the belief in invisible intelligent power is caused by the (...) psychological propensity to anthropomorphize triggered by the observation of disorder. I argue that religious belief is among theHumean natural beliefs only if this propensity is relevantly similar to the propensity responsible for inductive beliefs—the paradigmatic case of natural belief. Evidence from the Natural History and Treatise confirm that this is not the case. I conclude that belief in intelligent design is not, for Hume, a natural belief. (shrink)

Hume’s famous character Cleanthes claims that there is no difficulty in explaining the existence of causal chains with no first cause since in them each item is causally explained by its predecessor. Relying on logico-mathematical resources, we argue for two theses: (1) if the existence of Cleanthes’ chain can be explained at all, it must be explained by the fact that the causal law ruling it is in force, and (2) the fact that such a causal law is (...) in force cannot explain the occurrence of the events in the chain. In order to perform (1), we manage to express in mathematical terms the intuitive idea that indefinitely delayed explanation is ultimately no explanation. In order to achieve (2), we identify a logical relation we can prove to be as strong as the causal relation at issue in the Cleanthes passage, according to a precise notion of strength of relations. (shrink)

Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to Musonius Rufus, a noted teacher and philosopher in first–century CE Rome, despite ample evidence for his impact in the period. This paper attempts to situate Musonius in relation to his philosophical predecessors in order to clarify both the contemporary status of the Stoic tradition and the value of engaging with the central figures of that school’s history. I make the case for seeing Cleanthes as a particularly prominent predecessor for Musonius and reaffirm (...) the importance of framing his philosophical commitments in the context of the Stoic tradition. On this latter point, I attempt to connect Musonius’ perspective on askesis and moral development with that of Posidonius (and Seneca). In doing so, I push back against the sometimes overly schematic intellectualism attributed to Stoic ethics generally. (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply to this illustrative (...) analogy in Part 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)

Our primary evidence for the contribution of Cleanthes, the second Stoic scholarch, to the school’s distinctive theory of cyclical ekpyrosis (conflagration) is limited to a single difficult passage found in Stobaeus attributed to Arius Didymus. Interpretations of this text have largely proceeded by emendation (von Arnim, Meerwaldt) or claims of misconstrual or misunderstanding (Hahm). In recent studies, Salles and Hensley have taken the passage at face value and reconstructed opposed interpretations of Cleanthes’ position. The former suggests that it (...) differs significantly from that of Zeno and Chrysippus. Both the sequence of elemental transformation and its scope are said to be challenged by Cleanthes, suggesting cosmogony was a deeply controversial area in the early Stoa. I resist this interpretation of the evidence while also attempting to read the text without textual correction. Hensley, on the other hand, finds all three to be in strict harmony. Here I advocate for a middle ground where Cleanthes is closer to the positions of both Zeno and Chrysippus, but I also find room for his development of Stoic cosmogony as composed of a series of discrete stages radiating outwards from the middle. We are left with a clearer, more nuanced picture of how Stoic natural philosophy develops in its early period. (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply to this illustrative (...) analogy in Part 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)

Hume’s Dialogues give one of the most elegant presentations of the Problem of Evil ever written. But often overlooked is that Hume’s problematic takes the form of a dilemma, with the traditional Problem representing only one horn. The other is what Hume calls “mysticism,” a position that avoids the Problem of Evil by maintaining that God is wholly other, and that God is therefore good in a fashion that mere humans simply cannot fathom. Mysticism is not the denial of God’s (...) moral perfection defended by Philo’s positing of an indifferent deity. Nor is it an ad hoc final theistic entrenchment meant to stave off the Problem of Evil at any cost. Mysticism is, in fact, a position that Hume takes quite seriously and helped shape theism as it was practiced in Hume’s day. This paper studies Hume’s relationship with mysticism. First, it will recast the Problem of Evil as Hume intended, as only part of the larger theistic dilemma of choosing between anthropomorphism and mysticism. Once this polarization is understood and the respective consequences of the adopting either of the two opposites is traced out, I locate Hume’s “genuine theism” as significantly lying between these two extremes. (shrink)

Zeno's so-called proofs of divine existence -- Zeno and the traditional gods: a serious problem -- Cleanthes' proofs -- Cleanthes and the traditional gods -- Chrysippus' contribution -- Chrysippus and the traditional gods -- Other Stoic proofs -- Other (Stoic?) arguments in Sextus -- Polemics against the arguments pro the existence of God(s) -- Abolishing the gods leads to odd consequence: the atopical arguments pro the existence of the gods -- The counter-arguments -- Carneades and the data of (...) Sextus and Cicero -- The sorites arguments as a weapon against the traditional gods -- Epilogue -- Appendix I. Cleanthes' humn on Zeus: a running commentary -- Appendix II. Where is God? -- Appendix III. Alexinus' Parabolai. (shrink)

The ἐκπύρωσις, or world's conflagration, followed by the restoration of an identical world seems to go against the rationality of the Stoic god. The aim of this paper is to show that Cleanthes, the second head of the School, can avoid this paradox. According to Cleanthes, the conflagration is an inevitable side-effect of the necessary means used by god to sustain the world. Given that this side-effect is contrary to god's sustaining activity, but unavoidable, god's rationality requires the (...) restoration of an identical world once the conflagration subsides. The paper also deals with the relation between Cleanthes and other early Stoics on the topic of conflagration. In particular, Cleanthes' position seems to differ from Chrysippus'. For in contrast with the Cleanthean god, who causes the conflagration as a side-effect only, the Chrysippean god, according to an influential interpretation put forward by Jaap Mansfeld, causes the conflagration as his ultimate cosmological goal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69. A PROPOS D'UNE DIFFICULTE LOGIQUE DANS L'ARGUMENT DE CLEANTHE L'argument de Cléanthe ("the Argument from Design", c'est-à-dire la preuve de Dieu par le dessein du monde) se fonde sur le principe que "des effets semblables prouvent des causes semblables" pour montrer que la ressemblance entre le dessein du monde et le dessein des machines amène la conclusion que la cause du dessein du monde ressemble à l'intelligence humaine. (...) Dans l'attaque de Philon contre cet argument, nous trouvons deux passages dans les Parties IV et V consacrés aux difficultés qui proviennent de l'anthropomorphisme de Cléanthe. Et le raisonnement par l'absurde de Philon prend pour point de départ cette conception anthropomorphique de Dieu: Et que dites-vous des découvertes d'anatomie, de chimie, de botanique?... - Ce ne sont certes pas là des objections, répondit Cléanthe; elles découvrent seulment de nouveaux exemples d'art et d'industrie. C'est encore l'image de l'esprit que réfléchissent sur nous d'innombrables objets. - Ajoutez: un esprit pareil à l'esprit humain, dit Philon. - Je n'en connais point d'autre, répondit Cléanthe. - Et plus it est pareil, mieux cela vaut? insista Philon. - Bien sûr, dit Cléanthe. (p. 53) La première étape de son argument s'ensuit: Eh bien, Cléanthe, dit Philon, avec un air d'allégresse et de triomphe, remarquez les conséquences. Premièrement, par cette méthode de raisonnement, vous renoncez à toute prétention à l'infinité en aucun des attributs de la Divinité. Car, puisque la cause doit seulement être proportionnée à l'effet, et que l'effet, pour autant qu'il tombe sous notre connaissance, n'est pas infini, quel droit avons-nous, selon vos suppositions, de prêter cet attribut à l'Etre divin? Vous soutiendrez encore 70. qu'en l'éloignant à ce point de toute similitude avec les créatures humaines, nous donnons dans l'hypothèse la plus arbitraire, et, en même temps, affaiblissons toutes les preuves de son existence. (p. 53) On pourrait croire que l'argument de Philon est inadmissible, soit à cause de son pyrrhonisme, soit à cause de sa doctrine sur la causalité (celle de Hume lui-même) qui n'admet pas la connaissance a priori des causes. Mais en fait l'argument déployé par Philon ne représente pas sa propre position (et n'entre donc pas en conflit avec son pyrrhonisme), et en tant qu'il fait appel à la causalité, n'est point valable. Pour voir qu'il en est ainsi, on n'a qu'à regarder sa phrase préliminaire "par cette méthode du raisonnement" ainsi que la phrase "selon vos suppositions" qui montrent que cette première étape s'ensuit de la position de Cléanthe. Pourquoi Philon met-il en avant cet argument? Ou plutôt, qu'a dit Cléanthe pour amener Philon à mettre cet argument à son compte? La response se trouve dans la version de Cléanthe de la preuve de Dieu par le dessein, dans la Partie II: "Puis donc que les effets se ressemblent entre eux, nous sommes conduits à inférer, d'après toutes les règles de l'analogie, que les causes se ressemblent également, et que l'auteur de la nature est quelque peu semblable à l'esprit de l'homme, quoique doué de facultés bien plus vastes, proportionnées à la grandeur de l'oeuvre qu'il a exécutée. Par cet argument a posteriori, et par cet argument seul, nous prouvons à la fois l'existence d'une Divinité et sa similitude avec l'esprit et l'intelligence de l'homme." (p. 26 les italiques sont de moi) C'est donc Cléanthe qui peu après le début voudrait que, dans ces cas où seul l'effet se fait observer, nous devions proportionner la cause à l'effet. 71. On pourrait m'objecter que je n'ai pas encore montré que l'argument de Philon ne l'engage pas à poser un Dieu fini qui conviendrait à l'effet fini (le dessein du monde), que son propos que "la cause devrait être proportionnée à l... (shrink)

This is a reply to Willem Lemmens’ discussion of my interpretation of the Dialogues on Natural Religion in my 2000 collection Themes from Hume: Self, Will, Religion. I use Lemmens’ careful textual analysis to clarify my considered position and to further the reading of Part 12 of the Dialogues.

Questo articolo in un primo tempo avrà il fine di indagare le carat­teristiche che costituiscono la teologia stoica, così come esse sono presenti nell’Inno a Zeus di Cleante. Per perseguire questo obiettivo, in un secondo tempo bisognerà tracciare la nozione della divinità secondo gli Stoici, insistendo sull’aggettivo πολυώνυμος attribuito a Zeus e rivedere certi punti dell’Inno secondo un’interpretazione personale. Infine, in un terzo e ultimo tempo si tenterà di proporre una esegesi del termine πάνδωρος, anch’esso attribuito a Zeus, e di (...) individuare nella sua etimologia quale sia il rapporto tra la divinità e la vita dell’uomo. (shrink)

Nostalgia is only the beginning of a recognizably ideological discourse. The way through to the ideological sense of Tennyson’s “failure,” beneath the phenomenal glow of Eliot’s nostalgia, lies in the entanglement of minority in this complex of meanings, the determination that Tennyson is properly placed when seen as a “minor Virgil.” The diffusion of a major talent in minor works suggests that what Tennyson or Eliot might have been was another Virgil, and for Eliot that means simply a “classic.” In (...) “What Is a Classic?,” we are told that English literature has no classic poet who would exalt, as Virgil or Dante did, the truths of his age.14 The absence of a modern classic reflects not an individual failure but rather the absence of a universal truth, which has been hidden in the minor works. Here is the reason both for the ambivalence Eliot expresses about the fact of minority and for the peculiar, and certainly not necessary, association of poetic minority with a marginal elite.15It is the latter point to which I now want to turn. If it has been shown that the canon Eliot legislated in his early career was not merely an arbitrary set of aesthetic preferences, we have not yet fully evinced the ideological sense of Eliot’s canonical principle. We have only determined that one way to reconstruct Eliot’s canon would be to list those “minor” poets. But the essential quality of their minority, what drives them away from the “mainstream” of English literature, is what Eliot approved as their fidelity to “tradition.” Such a concept of tradition must be exclusive as well as revisionary, because it implies that the major poets of English literary history cannot also be “traditional.” Eliot finally understood that his canonical principle was the literary reflection of a more fundamental evaluative norm, extrinsic to literature, which he identified as “orthodoxy.” So he tells us in After Strange Gods that he is rewriting “Tradition and the Individual Talent” by substituting “orthodoxy” for “tradition,” and this is unquestionably an ideological correction.16 In the same way, the canon of minor writers is established retrospectively as determined by the rule of orthodoxy. Neither they nor the young Eliot need be orthodox Christians for this rule to have enabled their productions. It is precisely Eliot’s meaning that these elite, like the “elect” before them, may come at some point to a conviction of their election, yet they were always the elect. In this sense, Eliot’s conversion to Christianity was the recognition that he already belonged to a marginal elite, whose membership had been polemically foreshadowed by the construction of an alternative canon. 14. The whole argument of “What Is a Classic?” is interesting in this respect. Eliot’s standard of classical value is “universality,” which is opposed to the “provincial.” The closest English literature comes to a classical age is in the eighteenth century, and this too fails because its “restriction of religious sensibility itself produces a kind of provinciality: the provinciality which indicates the disintegration of Christendom, the decay of a common belief and a common culture”.15. But at least a hint about how to make this connection is given in Eliot’s “The Classics and the Man of Letters,” To Criticize the Critic : “The continuity of literature is essential to its greatness; it is very largely the function of secondary writers to preserve this continuity, and to provide a body of writings which is not necessarily read by posterity, which plays a great part in forming the link between those writers who continue to be read”.16. Eliot, After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy, p. 22. John Guillory, assistant professor of English at Yale University, is the author of Poetic Authority: Spenser, Milton, and Literary History. He is currently working on a study of canon-formation. (shrink)

According to the ancient Greek Stoics, the cosmos regularly transitions between periods of conflagration, during which only fire exists, and periods of cosmic order, during which the four elements exist. This paper examines the cosmogonic process by which conflagrations are extinguished and cosmic orders are restored, and it defends three main conclusions. First, I argue that not all the conflagration’s fire is extinguished during the cosmogony, against recent arguments by Ricardo Salles. Second, at least with respect to the cosmogony, it (...) is not necessary to posit the existence of proto-elements. Third, while scholars such as Salles and David Hahm have argued that Cleanthes held a distinct theory of cosmogony from Zeno and Chrysippus, I argue that each of these Stoics endorse the same cosmogonic theory. (shrink)

In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Philo and Cleanthes make use of irregular arguments—arguments whose veracity is founded on the force and vivacity with which they strike the mind. This paper provides an analysis of the irregular arguments by the two characters in the Dialogues and by Hume in the Treatise of Human Nature. Since both characters accept the veracity of irregular arguments, it seems that they are in agreement at the end of the Dialogues. The similarity between their (...) arguments and those Hume presents in the Treatise seem suggests that both characters represent Hume’s actual position. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Chrysippus is a reconstruction of the philosophy of an eminent Stoic philosopher, based upon the fragmentary remains of his voluminous writings. Chrysippus of Cilicia, who lived in a period that covers roughly the last three-quarters of the third century B.C., studied philosophy in Athens and upon Cleanthes’ death became the third head of the Stoa, one of the four great schools of philosophy of the Hellenistic period. Chrysippus wrote a number of treatises in each of the (...) major departments of philosophy, logic, physics, and ethics. Much of his fame derived from his acuteness as a logician, but his importance for Stoic philosophy generally was acknowledged in antiquity in the saying, “Had there been no Chrysippus, there would be no Stoa.” Previous accounts of Chrysippus’ philosophy, including Émile Bréhier’s study, the only work in this century which had sought to deal with Chrysippus’ philosophy alone, blurred the distinctive contributions of Chrysippus to Stoic philosophy and failed to bring to light the peculiar features in his thought. The vagueness in these accounts resulted in large measure from the assumption that if an ancient author ascribed a doctrine to “the Stoics” or “Stoicism”, one could infer that the doctrine belonged to Chrysippus. Professor Gould works from the more circumspect methodological principle that unless an ancient author explicitly ascribes a doctrine to Chrysippus, his testimony cannot be used in reconstructing Chrysippus’ philosophy. Working with those of the fragments in Hans von Arnim’s collection, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, which are explicitly Chrysippean in the sense suggested, Mr. Gould has worked out an account of Chrysippus’ views in the fields of logic, natural philosophy, and ethics. In order that Chrysippus’ thought might be viewed in context Mr. Gould provides a background picture by describing the third century milieu in which the Stoic philosopher worked. This follows an account of Chrysippus’ life and reputation in antiquity and a description of modern assessments of Chrysippus’ position in the Stoa. In his account of Chrysippus’ philosophy Mr. Gould frequently introduces comparisons and contrasts with Plato and Aristotle to help emphasize the continuity between Hellenic and early Hellenistic philosophy. Finally, in a concluding chapter, the author shows that the dominant themes in Chrysippus’ philosophy, while not exhibiting a thoroughly well-knit system, nevertheless are woven together into a remarkably comprehensive whole, which must have been extraordinarily impressive in antiquity. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:There are two ways of hearing Philo's unexpected endorsement of a version of the design hypothesis in the final part of Hume's Dialogues. We might register it in accordance with Cleanthes's descriptivist approach to religious speech, taking Philo to be reasoning with Cleanthes in Cleanthes's own way. Or we might hear Philo's words in accordance with his own expressivist account of religious speech, an account that Philo appears to have borrowed from Hobbes. I argue that Hume intended (...) this double layering of meanings, presenting us with two distinct ways we might understand Philo's closing remarks. Each possible reading reveals a distinct Humean lesson about the limitations of natural theology. (shrink)

Existe una aparente correspondencia entre los géneros literarios y el ejercicio de la filosofía, pero ¿cuál es? Si recordamos la a-tipicidad del filósofo en búsqueda de un sentido que oriente la vida entendemos que no hay ningún género literario exclusivo para el ejercicio de la filosofía. La manera griega de filosofar puede acomodarse tanto de la estructura de un himno como de un diálogo o de una epístola. Ningún género es exclusivo de una experiencia filosófica porque para entender esta experiencia (...) es preciso revelar primero una definición negativa de lo que ella no es; dicha experiencia no consiste en provocar el sin sentido o la pérdida del sentido y no existe en la antigüedad un ejercicio de la literatura que se preste al culto a la fealdad o a una apertura sobre la sin razón. El caos o la hybris no es del dominio de lo discutible y la filosofía se opone a valores que no son los verdaderos valores. Después del lugar de incertidumbre en el cual se sitúa el filósofo, en esta tensión entre doxa y episteme, viene la elección fundamental de vida y es ésta la que determina, a su turno, la elección de uno u otro género literario. La elección fundamental de vida es en realidad una escuela de formación y el discurso que la conforma debe corresponderle plenamente. Así se explica la elección casi exclusiva de talo cual género literario en talo cual escuela. A modo de ejemplo lo anterior sirve para aprehender el Himno a Zeus de Cleantes. (shrink)

In part ix of "dialogues concerning natural religion", Demea advances an "a priori" argument for the existence of god: an argument of which cleanthes and philo then make a number of trenchant criticisms. These criticisms are acknowledged by all commentators to be hume's own, And they are regarded by almost all commentators as being fatal to demea's argument. I show that, On the contrary, Hume's main criticisms are all worthless, And that they even include an inconsistency of the most (...) glaring kind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:120 A WORD ON BEHALF OF DEMEA Little attention has been given to the a priori argument for God's existence espoused by Demea in Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. This circumstance is neither surprising nor unjustified. Given Hume's well-known theological sympathies, certainly no one would be tempted to regard Demea as Hume's spokesman. Demea's argument plays so small a role in the Dialogues as to suggest that Hume does (...) not take it at all seriously. He may present it only to establish that he is aware of alternative arguments for God's existence, but thinks them even less successful than the design argument and hence undeserving of extensive critique. Yet, if a philosopher criticizes an argument he deems unworthy of respect, he should still provide sound, not spurious, reasons for rejecting it. This is exactly what D. C. Stove has argued that Hume fails to do in Part IX of the Dialogues, assuming, as is generally done, that the speeches of Cleanthes and Philo present reasoning that Hume would personally endorse. Stove argues that most of the criticisms of Demea's argument are "extremely defective, and that they even include an inconsistency" (Stove, p. 300). This contention has been challenged by Donald Stahl, who has published a succinct point by point rebuttal of Stove's contentions.3 The Stove-Stahl controversy only deals with the reasoning presented in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 10 of Part IX because those are the contentions Stove attacks. He has "nothing to say against" the criticisms presented in paragraphs 8 and 9, which he assumes will be generally agreed to be 121 less important than the others (Stove, p. 308). He totally ignores the argument of paragraph 11. However, I am not convinced that the criticisms of these paragraphs are less important and I do have something to say against them. Consequently, instead of intervening directly on either side of the dispute between Professors Stove and Stahl, I shall attend principally to the argumentation of paragraphs 8, 9, and 11. I shall (1) summarize Demea's argument, (2) argue for the significance of the criticisms of paragraphs 8-9, (3) examine those criticisms, and (4) assess the role of Philo's concluding remarks in paragraphs 10-11. 1. Demea's Argument Early on Hume has Demea speak so obviously inconsistently as to make the reader wonder whether this character is supposed to think at all about the implications of the claims he espouses. At the beginning of Part II, he proclaims that God's existence is surely not at issue, since no one of common sense... ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident." The nature of God is the only proper object of theological inquiry, and that is "altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us" (D 141)! Given such a radically apophatic position (Hume calls it "mystical"), it is hardly surprising that the sceptical Philo readily concurs, once he specifies that he takes 'God' to mean just "the original cause of this universe (whatever it be)" (D 142). But Demea immediately buttresses his alleged self-evident truth by appealing to the authority of Father Malebranche and the whole tradition of Christian theology, apparently oblivious to the impropriety of 122 supporting an indubitable truth by citing authorities (D 141-142). Further, scarcely more than a page later, after Cleanthes has sketched out the design argument, this same Demea is horrified that Cleanthes gives no abstract arguments or a priori proofs and calls for a "demonstration of the being of a God" (D 143). When, in Part IX, Demea himself undertakes to provide the "simple and sublime argument a priori" (D 188) he expected from Cleanthes, he characterizes the argument as "the common one," which suggests he is more engaged in paraphrasing authority than in thoughtfully arguing. The argument, in fact, as has been generally recognized, closely follows one given by Samuel Clarke in the Boyle Lectures of 1704. 5 Demea begins by assuming that "whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence," (D 188) since nothing can cause itself to exist. He then states a dilemma: in tracing the... (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the Stoic theory of signs as reported by Sextus Empiricus in AM and in PH belongs to Stoic logicians which precede Chrysippus. I further argue that the PH-version of this theory presupposes the version in AM and is an attempt to improve the older theory. I tentatively attribute the PH-version to Cleanthes and the AM-version to Zeno. I finally argue that the origin of this Stoic theory is to be found in the Dialectical (...) school (probably Philo of Megara) whose theory of signs has been preserved in Pseudo-Galen, Historia philosopha cap. 9. (shrink)

This article deals with the design argument for the existence of God as it is discussed in hume's "dialogues concerning natural religion". Using bayes's theorem in the probability calculus--Which hume almost certainly could not have known as such--It shows how the various arguments advanced by philo and cleanthes fit neatly into a comprehensive logical structure. The conclusion is drawn that, Not only does the empirical evidence fail to support the theistic hypothesis, But also renders the atheistic hypothesis quite highly (...) probable. A postscript speculates upon the historical question of hume's own attitude toward the design argument. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the epistemological positions of Philo and Cleanthes in the Dialogues. I find that Philo's attitude towards skepticism mirrors that of the first Enquiry, most notably in its endorsement of mitigated skepticism, and its treatment of religious reasoning as distinctly discontinuous with science and philosophy. Meanwhile, Cleanthes's epistemological framework corresponds to that of the Treatise, most notably in its adoption of something like the Title Principle, and its treatment of some forms of religious reasoning (...) as broadly continuous with science and philosophy. It is not merely that the epistemological systems of the Treatise and Enquiry are echoed in Cleanthes's and Philo's positions respectively; these frameworks seem to clarify, provide a substantive basis for, and render more complete their somewhat piecemeal statements on this topic in the Dialogues. Thus, Philo's and Cleanthes's dispute is not limited to the theological, but extends to the epistemological. -/- . (shrink)

Concerning a conversation about grounding between Philo, a quizzical maverick, and Cleanthes, a studious devotee of the very latest trends in metaphysics. Whereas Cleanthes enthuses about grounding, Philo counsels methodological caution and greater immersion in actual scientific practice.

This is a re-Examination of hume's intentions in the final part of the "dialogues". It is here, If anywhere, That we find the resolution of the conflict between his naturalistic acceptance that belief has non-Rational causes, And his wish to expose religious belief as irrational. The paper amends its author's previous view that hume is shown to have accepted, At least verbally, That such a theism is a result of cleanthes' arguments, But to have maintained his secularism by showing (...) it to be religiously vacuous, And hence a socially benign influence. The argument relies on hume's use of the thought and language of the fideist tradition, And on questioning how far we can identify hume with philo as the "dialogues" conclude. (shrink)

Si le cynisme a toujours eu mauvaise presse sur la scene philosophique, c'est en partie a cause des traits scandaleux que l'Antiquite, s'appuyant sur la Politeia et les tragedies de Diogene, lui a pretes. Mais ces traits se retrouvent dans la Politeia de Zenon et chez des Stoiciens aussi importants que Cleanthe et Chrysippe. Comment expliquer que des philosophes dont la reputation de serieux est bien connue aient pu accepter et meme louer des principes aussi scandaleux que l'anthrophagie, la liberte (...) sexuelle totale, l'indifference a la sepulture, l'egalite hommes/femmes, la negation du sacre, la remise en cause de la cite et de ses lois? Un Appendice sur Apollodore de Seleucie (IIe s. av. J.-C.), entend rendre justice a ce philosophe au role meconnu. (Franz Steiner 2003). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Against Ethical CriticismRichard A. PosnerOscar Wilde famously remarked that “there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all.” He was echoed by Auden, who said in his poem in memory of William Butler Yeats that poetry makes nothing happen (though the poem as a whole qualifies this overstatement), by Croce, and by formalist critics such as (...) Cleanth Brooks, a doyen of the New Critics, who insisted that edification was the function of religion but not of poetry. 1 George Orwell, though himself a didactic novelist, was of this view as well, 2 and it is one that most critics adopt when the issue is censorship. I accept Wilde’s thesis—the creed of aestheticism, of art for art’s sake—if understood to mean that the moral content and consequences of a work of literature are irrelevant to its value as literature; or as the critic Helen Vendler has put it, that “treating fictions as moral pep-pills or moral emetics is repugnant to anyone who realizes the complex psychological and moral motives of a work of art.” 3 This is not to deny that reading can have consequences, including moral and political ones. Information affects people’s outlook and behavior, and reading is a source of information. Imaginative literature conveys ideas, opinions, and information, often with great power. Think of the role that novels by Turgenev (Fathers and Sons), Dostoevsky (The Possessed), Conrad (The Secret Agent, Under Western Eyes), Koestler (Darkness at Noon), Orwell (Animal Farm, Nineteen Eighty-Four), and, of course, Solzhenitsyn played in exposing the horrors of anarchism and communism. Of A Passage to India it has been said that “as an account of the social conditions of British India it was powerful enough to have influenced events.” 4 Upton Sinclair’s novel The Jungle is thought to have incited federal regulation of food processing; and few doubt the effect of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) on the abolitionist cause. [End Page 1]At the core of the aesthetic tradition, which I shall be defending in this essay particularly against its opponents in the “law and literature” movement, are three theses. First, immersion in literature does not make us better citizens or better people. One might be able to pick out some works of literature that would have such an effect because of the information they convey or the emotional state they induce, but they would constitute a skewed sample of literary works. Second, we should not be put off by morally offensive views encountered in literature even when the author appears to share them. A work of literature is not to be considered maimed or even marred by expressing unacceptable moral views; by the same token, a mediocre work of literature is not redeemed by expressing moral views of which we approve. The proper criteria for evaluating literature are aesthetic rather than ethical. Third, authors’ moral qualities or opinions should not affect our valuations of their works.The insistence, in short, is on the separation of the moral from the aesthetic—but with two qualifications. Some literature has little interest or value apart from the didactic and for it the proper criticism is didactic. And the separation of moral from aesthetic values is not a rejection of the former. The aesthetic outlook is a moral outlook, one that stresses the values of openness, detachment, hedonism, curiosity, tolerance, the cultivation of the self, and the preservation of a private sphere—in short, the values of liberal individualism.The counter tradition in literary criticism to the aesthetic originates with Plato and insists upon the importance, in some versions to the near or even total exclusion of anything else, of the ethical or political content and effects of works of literature, and less commonly of the author’s own morality. Martha Nussbaum, for example, deems Greek tragedies and Anglo-American realistic novels a part of moral philosophy. 5 Reading novels, she argues, “develops moral capacities without which citizens will not succeed in making reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however excellent.” 6 Wayne Booth, disagreeing with his illustrious... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 1, April 1996, pp. 193-202 Why Hume Wasn't an Atheist: A Reply to Andre BERYL LOGAN In a recent issue of Hume Studies,1 Shane Andre argues that, as Hume's position on theism can be read primarily from Philo's position in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and since Philo's position in the Dialogues is one of "limited theism," Hume was also a "limited theist" and (...) therefore not an atheist. According to Andre, a "limited theist" is one like Epicurus, "who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs" and, he continues, "...at least in philosophical circles, the term 'atheist' is generally restricted to people who disbelieve any form of theism, and this is the sense in which I propose to enquire whether Hume was an atheist" (142). Andre's claim then is that Hume is not an atheist in this latter sense, but is a limited theist in the former sense. This is shown in "three major objections to standard theism" in the Dialogues: those addressing the Argument from Design and the problem of evil, as well as the lack of debate on whether or not God exists. Philo's criticisms of the Argument from Design amount to the claim that, "not that there is no God, but that, if there is a God," empirical evidence cannot show that God has any of the traditional characteristics of wisdom, power or goodness. The "proper conclusion" of Philo's argument from evil does not concern God's existence, but establishes that God is "limited in some important respect." Philo's "limited theism" is expressed in his ambivalent attitude toward Cleanthes' Argument from Design in Part 12 ("that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human Beryl Logan is at the Department of Philosophy, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, 1265 Military Trail, Scarborough, Ontario MlC 1A4, Canada, email: logan@lake.'scar.utoronto.ca 194 Beryl Logan intelligence"). In sum, Philo and Cleanthes never debate God's existence, and they accept a limited Deity, therefore they hold positions of limited theism, therefore Philo is not an atheist. While I agree with Andre's conclusion that Hume is not an atheist, I will show in this paper first, that the interpretation which provides his means for arriving at this conclusion is not consistent with the text and faces a number of difficulties, and second, that the sense in which Hume is a limited theist has to do with the limitations of human reason and experience, and not with God's limited nature. My criticisms of Andre's position will be directed at three points in his argument: (1) his claim for Philo's theism based on Philo's lack of scepticism about God's existence; (2) what he regards to be the "proper conclusion" (153) to the problem of evil, as this directly influences his view of Philo's scepticism and the nature of the Deity; and (3) his view that Philo's theism is to be found in his acceptance of the Argument from Design (Philo's limited theism). My arguments will centre upon the "suspense of judgement," and where and how this.mental stance is used by Hume in the arguments of the Dialogues.2 Scepticism about God's Existence Andre claims that the arguments in the Dialogues are directed only to God's nature and do not address God's existence in spite of the fact that Cleanthes concludes his Argument from Design by claiming that the data in the world provide conclusive analogical support for the existence and (human-like) intelligence of the (traditional) Deity.3 Cleanthes' anthropomorphic Argument from Design purports to "prove" that the world has an intelligent divine designer just like machines have intelligent human designers and the only difference between the causes based on the effects is one of degree and not one of kind: the designer of the world is far grander than the designer of a computer because the world is more complex than a computer. I would urge, though, that Philo's scepticism is directed at both aspects of the Argument... (shrink)