In the autumn of 1915 at Princeton, the graduate student, Charles Hendel, and the professor, Norman Kemp Smith, went for a walk. Hendel thought the time auspicious to announce his desire to write a dissertation on Rousseau. As happens not infrequently between an adviser and a student, Kemp Smith attempted to dissuade his student from his intention and advised him to look into David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, instead. The professor noted that a (...) ‘deadlock’ had long existed between those who thought the sceptic, Philo, spoke for Hume, and those who thought the theistic views of Cleanthes most nearly echoed Hume's true opinions on religion. Perhaps through researching the problem, Kemp Smith suggested, Hendel could ‘resolve that impasse and establish Hume's position on the religious question’. (shrink)

An introduction for the general reader to David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Long before the current dispute in the USA about the teaching of evolution, Hume's dialogues presented and critically analyzed the idea of intelligent design. What should we teach our children about the creation of the world? What should we teach them about religion? The characters Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo passionately present and defend different answers to that question. Demea opens the dialogue with a position derived from René Descartes and Father Malebranche — God's nature is a mystery, (...) but God's existence can be proved logically. Cleanthes attacks that view, both because it leads to mysticsm and because it attempts the impossible task of trying to establish existence on the basis of pure reason, without appeal to sense experience. As an alternative, he offers a proof of both God's existence and God's nature based on the same kind of scientific reasoning established by Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton. Taking a skeptical approach, Philo presents a series of arguments that question any attempt to use reason as a basis for religious faith. He suggests that human beings might be better off without religion. The dialolgue ends without genuine agreement among the characters, justifying Hume's choice of dialogue as the form of presentation. (shrink)

Long before the current dispute in the USA about the teaching of evolution, Hume's dialogues presented and critically analyzed the idea of intelligent design. What should we teach our children about the creation of the world? What should we teach them about religion? The characters Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo passionately present and defend different answers to that question. Demea opens the dialogue with a position derived from René Descartes and Father Malebranche — God's nature is a mystery, (...) but God's existence can be proved logically. Cleanthes attacks that view, both because it leads to mysticsm and because it attempts the impossible task of trying to establish existence on the basis of pure reason, without appeal to sense experience. As an alternative, he offers a proof of both God's existence and God's nature based on the same kind of scientific reasoning established by Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton. Taking a skeptical approach, Philo presents a series of arguments that question any attempt to use reason as a basis for religious faith. He suggests that human beings might be better off without religion. The dialolgue ends without genuine agreement among the characters, justifying Hume's choice of dialogue as the form of presentation. (shrink)

David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a philosophical and literary classic of the highest order. It is also an extremely relevant work because of its engagement with issues as alive today as in Hume's time: the design argument for a deity, the problem of evil, the dangers of superstition and fanaticism, the psychological roots and social consequences of religion. In this outstanding and unorthodox collection, an international team of scholars engage with (...) Hume's classic work. The chapters include state-of-the-art contributions on the central interpretive questions posed by the Dialogues as well as major contributions relating it to contemporary issues in philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, moral psychology, and social philosophy. Additional contributions tackle the historical and philosophical background of the Dialogues, relating it to Hume's own systematic philosophy, to the work of other key seventeenth and eighteenth-century figures - Locke, Clarke, Bayle, Cudworth, Malebranche, Spinoza, Lord Bolingbroke, and Voltaire, among others - to early modern neo-Epicureanism in the life sciences, and, notably, to what Darwin missed by thinking too much like William Paley and not enough like Hume's Philo. Overall, this volume provides fresh and even groundbreaking perspectives on Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. It is essential reading for students and scholars of Hume, the history of modern philosophy, philosophy of religion and the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This introduction provides a brief overview of the issues and arguments that arise in Hume's _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_ (1779). It also provides a few brief comments relating to the historical context in which this text should be interpreted , as well as an account of the place of the _Dialogues_ in relation to Hume's other philosophical works.

David Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, first published in 1779, is one of the most influential works in the philosophy of religion and the most artful instance of philosophical dialogue since the dialogues of Plato. It presents a fictional conversation between a sceptic, an orthodox Christian, and a Newtonian theist concerning evidence for the existence of an intelligent cause of nature based on observable features of the world. This new edition presents (...) it together with several of Hume's other, shorter writings about religion, and with brief selections from the work of Pierre Bayle, who influenced both Hume's views on religion and the dialectical style of the Dialogues. The volume is completed by an introduction which sets the Dialogues in its philosophical and historical contexts. (shrink)

Contributors: -/- John Beatty (British Columbia); Kelly James Clark (Ibn Haldun, Istanbul); Angela Coventry (Portland State); Thomas Holden (UC Santa Barbara); Willem Lemmens (Antwerp); Robin Le Poidevin (Leeds); Jennifer Marusic (Edinburgh); Kevin Meeker (South Alabama); Amyas Merivale (Oxford); Peter Millican (Oxford); Dan O’Brien (Oxford Brookes); Graham Oppy (Monash); Paul Russell (Lund); Andre C. Willis (Brown).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 1, April 2002, pp. 113-130 Bayesianism, Analogy, and Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion SALLY FERGUSON Introduction Analyses of the argument from design in Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion have generally treated that argument as an example of reasoning by analogy.1 In this paper I examine whether it is in accord with Hume's thinking (...) about the argument to subsume the version of it given in the Dialogues under the model of probabilistic reasoning offered by Bayes's theorem. Wesley Salmon attempted this project in 1978.2 In related projects, David Owen3 as well as Philip Dawid and Donald Gillies4 have more recently attempted to construct Bayesian analyses of Hume's argument concerning testimony in "Of Miracles." I want to be careful at this stage to note exactly what I will claim. It is not that Bayesian reasoning sheds no light on the argument from design, or on arguments concerning testimony. All of the analyses mentioned above are beneficial in that they have been able to expose subtleties in these arguments that had previously gone unnoticed. Salmon's paper, in particular, contributes nicely to an understanding of just how the design argument may function in relation to contemporary scientific reasoning. In this paper I argue that, nonetheless, the attempt to apply Bayesian reasoning to the argument as presented in the Dialogues is not well supported as a reconstruction of Hume's own approach to the argument from design. Sally Ferguson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of West Florida, UOOO University Parkway, Pensacola, FL 32514, USA. e-mail: sallyf@uwf.edu 114 Sally Ferguson There are two stages to my treatment of the issue. I begin by considering how much Hume knew of Bayes's theorem, and what consequence that knowledge might have had on his treatment of the argument in the Dialogues. This discussion includes a consideration of exactly what has been claimed by other authors on this subject, including what some have argued concerning Hume's reasonings in "Of Miracles," section 10 of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I conclude that, based on the historical data, there is little reason to think of Hume's approach to the argument from design as anything more than proto-Bayesian at best. I then argue further, through a close textual analysis of the Dialogues, that there are good reasons for not treating Hume's reasoning there as even proto-Bayesian. In the end, the benefits that have been claimed for that approach, in terms of exposing both the subtleties of the argument and of Hume's reasoning about it, can equally well be derived from a careful analysis of the argument under a model of analogical reasoning, without need of Bayes's theorem. Section One Perhaps one might think that there is not much use for a consideration of the question whether Hume himself conceived of any of his arguments along specifically Bayesian lines. As Gower argues,5 Hume's knowledge of mathematics in general was fairly limited, and Bayes's theorem was not well known even up until Hume's death. It is important, therefore, for me to establish that there have not only been those who thought that Bayesian reasoning illuminates the arguments Hume gave, but also his own thinking about those arguments. It is also important for me to establish that it is not obvious that knowledge of Bayes's theorem did not affect Hume's reasonings. Each of these points will be addressed in the following. As to the first point, the claims of some authors on the subject are ambiguous. Dawid and Gillie, for example, make no statement to the effect that the probabilities involved in Bayes's theorem were in fact examined in "Of Miracles," nor do they attempt to produce any passages from Hume in support of that view. Thus it would be assumed that they see their attempt not as an attempt to provide an analysis that represents Hume's own approach to the argument, but rather simply as one that provides an illuminating method of analysis and support for an argument that Hume happened to give. Indeed, their conclusion, to the effect that a... (shrink)

Understandably, given the interpretive challenges posed by the dialogue form, the focus of David Hume's interest in religion in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion can be difficult to pinpoint.1 Much Hume scholarship on the Dialogues has traditionally suffered from two major shortcomings. First, its treatment of Hume's interest in religion is primarily theoretical or speculative, as though Hume were concerned above all to determine the nature of "true religion," say, (...) or to dismiss religious belief altogether as simply irrational. Such scholarship regards the Dialogues as a vehicle for delivering a theoretical or epistemological treatment of questions concerning the nature and existence of God, and has little... (shrink)

David Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, first published in 1779, is one of the most influential works in the philosophy of religion and the most artful instance of philosophical dialogue since the dialogues of Plato. It presents a fictional conversation between a sceptic, an orthodox Christian, and a Newtonian theist concerning evidence for the existence of an intelligent cause of nature based on observable features of the world. This edition presents it (...) together with several of Hume's other, shorter writings about religion, and with brief selections from the work of Pierre Bayle, who influenced both Hume's views on religion and the dialectical style of the Dialogues. The volume is completed by an introduction which sets the Dialogues in its philosophical and historical contexts. (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply (...) to this illustrative analogy in Part 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply (...) to this illustrative analogy in Part 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)

Neste ensaio, parto da pergunta acerca da motivação original dos Diálogos sobre a religião natural de Hume : de onde a propensão para o argumento pelo desígnio obtém força suficiente para prevalecer sobre a propensão natural a se acreditar nos sentidos e na experiência? Em minha hipótese, os Diálogos, não obstante seu título, representam uma falha na compreensão mútua. Enfocando o drama da peça, pretendo mostrar que, em Cleantes, eles expõem um viés prosélito no teísmo moderno; mais especificamente, (...) que apontam subterfúgios ad hominem que se acoplam aos argumentos teístas, com o fim de evitar os argumentos do ceticismo irreligioso de Fílon. Assim, no que concerne aos argumentos filosóficos, a força do desígnio, parece-me, deve-se a uma má retórica, indício do que denomino Hipótese Prosélita, denunciada por Fílon em, pelo menos, três momentos dos Diálogos. Acredito que esse fator, pouco observado na literatura, ajuda a explicar a perseverança da propensão ao desígnio, fenômeno que sempre intrigou Hume. (shrink)

This study advances the claim that Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which drew its inspiration and guidelines from Cicero's De Natura Deorum, fulfills four basic elements of Michel Meyer's theory of problematology. In doing so, it is argued, the Dialogues contribute importantly to our understanding of the question-answer pair, and to the notion of rhetoric as a way of knowing.

Based on the original handwritten manuscript, this book provides a new, accurate edition of Hume’s important work, faithful to his original text, marginal notes, and changes. Stanley Tweyman’s comprehensive introduction gives an interpretation of the _Dialogues_ as a whole, as well as close analysis of each of the work’s twelve parts. Hume’s views on evil are discussed in four previously published articles, and the volume concludes with an extensive bibliography. Originally published in 1991.

This book is a defense of Hume's philosophical principles in the Treatise of Human Nature. Nelson shows that Hume's new philosophy was a uniquely original and profound masterpiece in philosophical literature, worthy of serious study and acceptance. It is argued that Dialoguesis a reflective philosophical autobiography of Hume himself.

Professor Kemp Smith in providing a new edition of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , embodying all the author’s additions and corrections, has given expression to the perennial interest and fascination which this work has possessed for many minds during the odd one hundred and fifty years since it was first published by Hume’s nephew. The editor himself has performed a great service by contributing an Introduction and a clear and concise summary of the Dialogues (...) , in both of which he expounds his own view as to how Hume’s discussion is to be interpreted. Hume employs three characters—Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes; and. (shrink)

Influencing ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of science, David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature remains unrivalled by perhaps any other works in philosophy. The Treatise is of interest, and not merely historical interest, to professional academic philosophers. It is remarkable that it can, and often does, also serve as one of the best introductions to philosophy-to what philosophers really do-for the novice.

This book is primarily a textual analysis that demonstrates the close relationship of David Hume's The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion with David Hume's central philosophical writings and its centrality to his relationship with scepticism.

Hume'sDialogues Concerning Natural Religion are still much with us. What appears to be the definitive edition was published by Professor Norman Kemp Smith in 1935 with a learned introduction which, among other things, assembled a mass of evidence pointing to the conclusion that Philo is to be identified with Hume himself, and that Hume in the Dialogues is deliberately trying to undermine the religious hypothesis. Though these conclusions have been widely accepted, Dr. B. M. Laing, in (...) the April issue of Philosophy, strenuously attacked them in an ingenious argument based in part on his already published thesis that Hume's fundamental philosophy is not really the scepticism so long assigned him. Dr. Laing takes the opportunity in passing to indicate his sympathy with the recent position of a distinguished British poet that Voltaire, also, has been traditionally abused in the assumption that on the question of religion he wrote with his tongue in his cheek. The present examination is not designed to inquire into this new mode of making the wicked pious; nor to push the question back from the Dialogues to Hume's basic philosophy; nor to press the writer's conviction [“The Enigma of Hume,” Mind, XLV pp. 334–349] that not only is Philo to be identified as Hume, but in addition, Cleanthes as Joseph Butler, and Demea as Samuel Clarke. The present purpose is solely to indicate certain unhistorical bases of Dr. Laing's attack on the more traditional view so ably championed by Professor Norman Kemp Smith. (shrink)

According to recent commentators like Paul Guyer, Kant agrees with Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that physico-theology can never provide knowledge of God and that the concept of God, nevertheless, provides a useful heuristic principle for scientific enquiry. This paper argues that Kant, far from agreeing with Hume, criticizes Hume's Dialogues for failing to prove that physico-theology can never yield knowledge of God and that Kant correctly views Hume's Dialogues as a (...) threat to, rather than an anticipation of, his own view that the concept of God provides a useful heuristic principle for science. The paper concludes that Kant's critique of physico-theology reflects Kant's deep dissatisfaction with Hume's manner of argumentation and suggests that Kant's attempt to provide a more successful critique of physico-theology merits continued philosophical attention. (shrink)

Many think that the aim of Hume’s Dialogues is simply to discredit the design argument for the existence of an intelligent designer. We think instead that the Dialogues provides a model of true religion. We argue that, for Hume, the truly religious person: believes that an intelligent designer created and imposed order on the universe; grounds this belief in an irregular argument rooted in a certain kind of experience, for example, in the experience of anatomizing complex (...) class='Hi'>natural systems such as the eye; and retains this belief, on the basis of these reasons, even after careful scrutiny. We argue that two of the Dialogues’s characters, Philo and Cleanthes, exhibit true religion. A third character, Demea, exhibits false religion and a persistent impiety. Taken as a whole, we see the Dialogues as an educational performance for the benefit of Pamphilus, Cleanthes’s ward, as well as for the benefit of readers of the Dialogues. Specifically, we think, given that its lessons concern theology and the principles of religion, the dynamics of the Dialogues’s discussion and the interplay between its characters can be seen as a demonstration of a method for becoming truly religious. (shrink)

"... establishes the literary and philosophical greatness of the Dialogues in ways that even its warmest admirers have been unable to do before." -- Terence Penelhum In this lively reading of David Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, William Lad Sessions reveals a complex internal hermeneutic that gives new form, structure, and meaning to the work. Linking situations, character, style, and action to the philosophical concepts presented, Sessions finds meaning contained in the work itself (...) and calls attention to the internal connections between plot, character, rhetoric, and philosophy. The result avoids the main preoccupation of previous commentaries, namely, the attempt to establish which of the main characters speaks for Hume. Concentrating on previously unexplored questions of piety and theology, Sessions asks important questions in the philosophy of religion today -- what is the nature of true religion, what is the relationship between theology and piety, and how should we actively engage with God? (shrink)

Urbaniana University Journal 73.3 (2020): 73-99. -/- A close reading of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reveals that it is not what it appears. Rather than a work of natural theology, meant to show something about arguments concerning the existence and nature of God, the Dialogues turn out to embody a moral pedagogy exemplifying and attempting to instill a conception of piety and religion as virtues. This paper defends this interpretation by reviewing (...) three alternative, but ultimately inadequate, interpretations of the text, and then compares Hume’s moral pedagogy with that of Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae to highlight the ambition, and the limitation,of Hume’s attempt to characterize piety without metaphysics. (shrink)

Many interpretations of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume's view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo's reversal: first, I show that Philo is not (...) ironic either in his skepticism or in his theistic reversal. Second, I reject the suggestion that the Design Argument is a natural belief, since it differs significantly from causal and external world beliefs. Finally, I argue that the control the Design Argument exerts is the product of a youthful indoctrination that prevents Philo from consistently maintaining his skeptical position. (shrink)

The prominence of David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in contemporary philosophy of religion has led it to overshadow his other short work, The Natural History of Religion, and thus obscure the fact that the social psychology of religion was in many ways of greater interest and more widely debated among the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment than philosophical theology. This paper examines and compares the social psychology of religion (...) advanced by Hume and Adam Smith. It argues that Hume's account of the psychological sources and social significance of religion is less satisfactory than Smith's. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 4, Page 546-547, July 2012.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S DIALOGUES AND THE REDEFINITION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION GEORGE ScHNER, S.J. Regis College Toronto, Ontario HETHER ONE IS rethinking the content of a course and the place of one's study in the context of a broader curriculum, or whether there is a moment of fundamental questioning which grows out of rereading a classic text or engaging in contemporary debates, such moments of questioning are (...) essential. This essay proposes one of those simple and general questions: in what does the work of the philosophy of religion consist? My consideration of the question, as will become evident, is an exercise in prolegomena, and after this brief introduction there will be two parts to my essay in which the context for a full answer to the question will be explored, before a summary conc1usion will propose an agenda for ful1ther work. Though concept clarification is essential to philosophical reflection, attention to historical development is of equal importance. The two inner parts of this essay will give attention to both, first by discussing a specific texrt and,author, and then by sorting out some fundamental matters of definition. My choice of a classic text and context is David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.1 Such a choice is not to imply that the philosophy of religion begins there or that Hume's notion of either philosophy or religion is: somehow normative. On the contrary, I am entering rthe story in mid1 Dialogues Oonoerning Naturai Religion, ed. R. H. Popkin (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980). References will be indicated within the text by page number. 88 84 GEORGE SCHNER, S.j. stream and am not of the mind that any philosophy is definitive. However, I wish to propose a reading of Hume's text which can be very helpful not only to understand what he is about but also to encourage a rethinking of what the philosophy of religion should be about. Simply as a text, Hume's Dialogues is intriguing. He withheld its publication on the advice of seveml of his friends and continued to revise it until his death, altering nearly every page styJistica1ly and substantively changing all hut four sections. :Before he died, he ensured that his nephew David would have the work published and was busy with some of the most lengthy additions to the text in the last months before his death.2 The work and its contents dearly remained a matter of importance and preoccupation for Hurne, and both the contents and form of the text present essentials of Hume's mature thought. The apparent meandering of the text, as a dialogue among the characters Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea, belies its careful construction. Despite Cleanthes' accusation that Philo proposes his notions in a " rambling way," the logic of the text is a masterpiece of exposition, movement, internal reference, and cumulative rhetorical effect. David Livingston has recently discussed the dialect~cal and narrative character of Hume's writing considered in general as a philosophy of "common life." 3 Hume is seen as both the critic of false philosophy and the artificer of the true by means of the application of his principles of the association of ideas, of nrutural beliefs, of sympathy. In both efforts, Livingston finds Hume increasingly employing narrative aocounts and dialectical argument as he develops his,thought, until in the Dialogues "inquiry is cut free of all systematic constraints and allowed to proceed on its own." 4 I find the insight into Hume's paradigmatic use of 2 These and other details concerning the Dialogues can be found in Ernest C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). s D. W. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Comm01~ Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), esp. chapter two. 4 Livingston, 43. HUME.AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 85 the narrative structure of historical inquiry a helpful clue, but I wouJd modify Livingston's assertion of the abandonment of systematic constraints in the Dialogues. Hume's corrective of speculative systems does not mean that his own text is devoid of a logic or ol'der quite in keeping with the demands of narrative structure, common life, and the past-entailing aspects... (shrink)

CHAPTER The Philosophic Background to the Dialogues HUME'S VIEWS ON REASONING1 Hume believed that given the way in which the world presents itself to us, ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:347 THE ROLE OF PART XII IN HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION Anyone appreciative of Hume's greatness as a philosopher will want to suppose that the Dialogues both form a coherent whole and express Hume's own views on natural religion or religion based on reason (as opposed to religion based on revelation). In the last connection, given (...) what we know of Hume's epistemology, life, and correspondence, one would be inclined to suppose that he would reject out of hand the claims of revealed religion and contend that if there existed an acceptable religion it would have to be some form of natural religion. But insofar as natural religion claimed to establish scientifically the existence and nature of God one would envisage Hume dissenting. Now as long as we restrict our gaze to Parts I-XI of the Dialogues we seem to be able, easily enough, to satisfy all these suppositions. In Part IV, under the name of 'mysticism, ' revealed religion is summarily and facetiously dismissed as 2 indistinguishable from atheism. Demea's apparently permanent departure from the discussion at the conclusion of Part XI as much as says, symbolically, that revealed religion is not a serious contender for one's belief. Its a priori arguments -- the argument from sufficient reason and the ontological argument -- are almost as shortly attacked and dismissed (D 188-192). Also quite in keeping with Hume's philosophical view on knowledge of matters of fact is, on the other hand, the lengthy and detailed examination he bestows on the empiricist argument from design. That Philo, ostensibly his spokesman, is however able to uncover all kinds of logical short-comings in its claims to scientifically 348 establish the existence and nature of God does not surprise us; it coheres perfectly with our preconceived picture of Hume the skeptic, and his system as restricting science to numbers and quantities or, in the term's looser sense, to human nature and its more immediate surroundings. In short, Parts I-XI seem to be all of one Humean whole. But at first and even second glance Part XII notoriously seems to tear our hopes to find coherence and a plausible representation of Hume to tatters. There are, for one thing, those mocking sentences that seem to paint Hume in the colors of a devout, believing Christian, 'avid' for revelation. Thus, at the end of Part XII, apparently expressing Hume's deepest convictions, Philo says that "a person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity" and immediately afterwards, "To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian" (D 227, 228). For another thing, in Part XII Hume seems to be completely reversing his refutations in Parts I-XI of the argument from design's claims to establish the existence and nature of God. Thus, where in Part II he had Philo reject the use of causal reasoning in the establishment of a Mind as the first cause of the universe on the relevantly Humean grounds that, to do so, "it were requisite, that we had experience of the origin of worlds" (D 150), in Part XII he has Philo, apparently speaking for himself (Hume), argue that "as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes; and in particular ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause than any we have ever observed in mankind. 349 Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly ascertained by reason" (D 217). Indeed, all forms of the argument of design, purely analogical as well as causal, seem resurrected in Part XII, although they were one and all hanged and buried in Parts I-XI. Moreover, it seems that in Part XII Hume via Philo is saying that science itself leads us "to acknowledge a first intelligent Author" (D 214-215). Before proceeding to deal with certain other incoherencies with which Part XII seems to confront us let us address ourselves to the two that I have so far... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) describes a philosophical discussion on the validity of the argument from design. What Hume investigates, however, is not the rational grounds of religion, but human nature and its attraction to the idea of design. I argue that the key to understanding Hume’s Dialogues is his conception of the imagination as described in the Treatise. Hume characterizes the human imagination or mind as self-indulgent, with a strong drive to (...) unite perceptions in relations of resemblance, contiguity or causality, often adding fictional constructions to create an easy transition between ideas. Natural religion is a prime example, as the whole universe is united in orderly means-to-ends relations and provided with a familiar cause: something resembling the human mind. This reading of the Dialogues, however, does not warrant the conclusion that Hume provides a reductionist natural explanation of natural religion. Knowing human nature helps to understand religion’s attraction and the attraction of religion helps to understand humans, because it is paradigmatic of who we are. To connect perceptions, construct wholes and create meaning out of chaos is an essential feature of human nature, and a source of great pleasure. (shrink)