Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the (...) literature is mistaken. (shrink)

Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters (...) is true if you can have knowledge about controversial matters. That’s because, when it comes to a belief about a controversial matter, there could easily be an apparently sound argument that the belief is false. But, often, if your knowledge can withstand this fact (which it can, the literature on disagreement notwithstanding), then it can withstand your discovering the apparently sound argument and finding it apparently sound. (shrink)

In this article, I want to argue that scepticism for Kant must be seen in ancient and not just modern terms, and that if we take this into account we will need to take a different view of Kant's response to Hume from the one that is standardly presented in the literature. This standard view has been put forward recently by Paul Guyer, and it is therefore his view that I want to look at in some detail, and to (...) try to correct. (shrink)

The article juxtaposes Jan Srzednicki’s conception of cognition with Jean Piaget’s psychology of cognition. Human’s (child’s) cognition is syncretic. Various cognitive data are confused, systematized, dogmatized or become chaotic, and mistakes appear. These mistakes can be overcome thanks to analytical, intuitive or logical perspectives. Cognition moves from the sphere of “children’s dogmatism” to the world of “mature skepticism”. The syncretic cognition can be overcome thanks to various cognitive procedures, e.g., analytical, logical or intuitive. The intuitive cognition is primary and (...) synthetic—it is present in the acts of analytical cognition. Syncretism may lead to dogmatism if it is uncritical or to skepticism if it is connected with logical procedures. It is explained to a different extent both by Piaget’s epistemology of development and also by epistemology of Srzednicki’s logical gap. (shrink)

Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), one of the most fascinating characters of eighteenth-century intellectual history, came from a traditional orthodox Jewish community in Eastern Europe to Berlin to seek Enlightenment. Maimon remained an outsider: an 'Ostjude' among the enlightened Jews in Berlin, a freethinker among observant Jews and a Jew among the non-Jews. His autobiography became a classic of autobiographical literature of the Enlightenment. His 'inter-cultural' experience is reflected in his philosophy. Indebted to the Maimonidean as well as to the modern (...) European (notably Kantian) philosophical tradition, he attempted a synthesis of normally exclusive orientations: 'Rational Dogmatism' and 'Empirical Skepticism'. Maimon's importance in the development from Kant to German Idealism has been acknowledged, but the interpretation of his own philosophical position suffered much from this narrow perspective. The essays of leading scholars collected in this volume focus on his synthesis of 'Rational Dogmatism' and 'Empirical Skepticism'. (shrink)

This dissertation brings Plato's critique of poetry to bear on the issue of how to read his dialogues. Since antiquity commentators on Plato have debated the extent to which he actually meant the philosophical doctrines in his works; since the early nineteenth century this debate has been complicated by the claim that the dialogues count as literature. To treat them as literature is to hold, in a subtler sense, that Plato does not himself assert what their characters say. (...) ;I therefore categorize this view as a brand of skepticism. Only one sort of attention to the form of the dialogues avoids both this skepticism and its equally undesirable opposite, simple acceptance of the philosophical claims as Plato's own. That alternative is the aporetic reading, according to which one treats the dialogues as open-ended discussions to be continued by the reader. ;I argue that this model of reading arises naturally from the short Socratic dialogues. When pressed to its extreme implication, it turns Socrates' veneration for logical argument into a method of reading that denies all appeals to the author. ;Moreover, a view of reading much like this one can be found in Plato's fullest criticisms of poetry, in the Republic and Phaedrus. There the problem with existing literature turns out to be the context-dependence of its claims: they only mean what they mean because a dramatic character, or a poet, asserts them. The cure lies in a detachment of truth-claims from all conditions of their assertion. ;Like the simpler aporetic model, this prescription to readers turns us away from the person of the author. Skepticism and dogmatism about Plato's dialogues disagree over whether Plato meant the claims in his dialogues; the aporetic model denies the epistemological possibility of that question. It does not state that Plato's authorial intentions cannot be reached, but that reaching them does not count as knowledge. Worse, the endeavor leads away from knowledge. ;This denial of the individual person in the search for knowledge affects more than the debate over the dialogues. It also reveals philosophy's anti-literary self-conception, and its ideal of an impersonal universal voice. (shrink)

The Life of Voltaire delves into the profound influence of Voltaire's ideas on the betterment of humanity during the eighteenth century. In an era when France was dominated by the authority of the Catholic Church, which stifled science, literature, and freedom, Voltaire stood as a singular force. This book explores how he fearlessly confronted the Church's intolerance, cruelty, and suppression of basic rights. Drawing from a diverse range of French and English sources on Voltaire, and enriched by extensive research, (...) the book not only presents a compelling biography but also offers glimpses into the lives of key eighteenth-century figures who crossed paths with Voltaire. While accessible to general readers, this book provides in-depth insights into Voltaire's philosophical, religious, and literary contributions, examining his most significant works. Notably, it sheds light on his transformation from a literary giant into a staunch advocate for victims of injustice and a vocal opponent of the Catholic Church's dogmatism in the later years of his life. The book is a captivating journey through history, showcasing the enduring relevance of Voltaire's ideas and his pivotal role in shaping modern concepts of human rights and intellectual freedom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Against the Ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos XI) by Sextus EmpiricusJohn Christian LaursenSextus Empiricus. Against the Ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos XI). Translation, Commentary, and Introduction by Richard Bett. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Pp. xxxiv + 302. NP.Sesto Empirico. Contro gli etici. Introduction, Editing, Translation, and Commentary by Emidio Spinelli. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1995. Pp. 450. NP.Joining the rising tide of scholarly literature that says that skeptics can indeed live their skepticism, (...) and that it is not necessarily a bad life, are these two fine translations of Book XI of Sextus Empiricus’s Against the Mathematicians (known as MXI), the most important for ethics and politics. Considering that the length of Sextus’s text is only 39 pages (in the English version), the length of these two volumes alone indicates that a great deal of philosophical and philological scholarship will be found in them. Both authors do an excellent job of tracking down Sextus’s sources and his targets.Spinelli accepts the traditional position (Janacek’s) that MXI was written after Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism, although he is aware of the minority position that it was the other way around. Bett makes a convincing case for the minority position, including a substantial appendix comparing passages from the two works which suggest that Outlines polishes MXI. This has the merit of explaining Sextus’s apparent “negative dogmatism” in MXI as part of early skepticism and a phase on the way to the more refined and more thoroughly undogmatic skepticism of the Outlines. However, Bett himself mentions counterevidence to his thesis, so it cannot be considered decisively established. Spinelli explains the apparent dogmatism on the assumption that Outlines came first: the usual skeptical reservations set forth in that book should be understood as implied (165–66, 169). Other explanations are that apparent affirmations are ad hominem polemic “inside” Stoic theory (240ff.) or merely relative and with no ontological status (291).Bett divides the text into part A (1–167) and part B (168–end), arguing for compilation of the two parts of the book from different sources with different purposes. Spinelli writes that the often-denigrated 168–end “has a precise function in the internal compositional strategy” of the book (339).English speakers have had to rely too long on the Loeb translation by” B. Bury. Bett questions many of his renderings. For example, Bury translated kakon and kakia as “evil,” with connotations of intentionality, and at MXI 121 even supplied a footnote to Genesis! Bett prefers the less-loaded “bad” and “vice.” Spinelli usually translates kakon with “mali” but uses the loaded “malvagità” for kakia at MXI 121, where Bett would have suggested “vizio.” Bury translated alogon and alogois with “irrational” which Bett corrects to “non-rational” at MXI 143, 148, and 161 to capture the point that what is in question is neither rational nor irrational, but rather “sensory happenings” which have [End Page 313] nothing to do with reasoning (161). Spinelli renders alogon as “irrazionale” at MXI 143 and alogois as “sottrati al ragionamento” at MXI 148 and 161.Spinelli’s is a much more useful and substantial volume than the previous Italian translation. The only thing that might keep Bett’s volume from replacing the Loeb edition is that it does not supply the Greek text on facing pages. Spinelli does.The exhaustive and careful analyses of Spinelli and Bett allow them to disagree in important ways with parts of the substantial recent work on ancient skepticism by Hankinson, McPherran, Annas, Nussbaum, Striker, and Decleva Caizzi (cited as Caizzi by Bett), not to mention the older work of Janacek and the debates from the early 1980s (now dated) among Frede, Burnyeat, and Barnes. Although they do not find Sextus’s work to be flawless by any means, it is clear that we are long past the point at which his work could be dismissed as silly or merely derivative.On the test case of the treatment of Sextus’s example of the tyrant (MXI 166), both Spinelli and Bett point in the right direction. Spinelli sees that “the Pyrrhonist can live easily” (330) and that MXI 165–67 provides “a new key to understanding the ‘moral skepticism... (shrink)

In Science as Social Knowledge in 1990 and The Fate of Knowledge in 2002, Helen Longino develops an epistemological theory known as Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE). Knowledge production, she argues, is an active, value-laden practice, evidence is context dependent and relies on background assumptions, and science is a social inquiry that, under certain conditions, produces social knowledge with contextual objectivity. While Longino’s work has been generally well-received, there have been a number of criticisms of CCE raised in the philosophical (...) class='Hi'>literature in recent years. In this paper I outline the key elements of Longino’s theory and propose modifications to the four norms offered by the account. The version of CCE I defend, which draws on lessons learned by medical researchers in recent years, gives principles of epistemic diversity a central role and also provides greater specification of three of the four norms. Further, it offers additional resources for defending CCE against Alvin Goldman’s suggestion that there is a need for a “healthy dogmatism” in science, as well as a concern about “manufactured uncertainty” arising out of recent work by David Michaels. Finally, the modified version proposed here is also well positioned to respond (negatively) to a suggestion from Kristen Intemann that CCE needs to be adapted to incorporate a central insight from feminist standpoint theory. In light of the variety of social pressures influencing contemporary scientific research, and the role of science in shaping public policy, I argue that a rigorous social epistemology such as CCE is indispensable for understanding and assessing contemporary scientific practice. (shrink)

This entry does not have an abstract. The following is a summary. -/- Dogmatism, as popularized by Jim Pryor (2000), holds that the perceptual experience or perceptual phenomenal seeming that p can confer at least some degree of immediate, prima facie propositional justification on the belief that p. This entry begins by explaining what we mean by "propositional," "immediate," and "prima facie." Propositional justification contrasts with doxastic justification. We then discuss different kinds of dogmatism and examine some objections.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10.2 (2000) 175-188 [Access article in PDF] Scope Note 38 Bioethics Resources on the Web * Once described as an "enormous used book store with volumes stacked on shelves and tables and overflowing onto the floor" (Pool, Robert. 1994. Turning an Info-Glut into a Library. Science 266 (7 October): 20-22, p. 20), Internet resources now receive numerous levels of organization, from basic directory listings (...) to elaborate "links" (cross-references to other Internet documents) that flash and glow in the dark. In many ways, the Internet functions as a direct extension of the traditional library. Following linked references across various sites is an electronic version of browsing library stacks, and the serendipitous discoveries made while "surfing the Net" recall the wonders of physically going "book-to-book." Although many of the Internet's best aspects augment library strengths by eliminating physical distance from sources, Net resources pose unique problems for researchers. It is not always clear who is responsible for the content of Web documents, when the document was produced, or how often (if ever) it is updated. Internet resource tools, then, must enable researchers to identify appropriate resources and to evaluate what they find when they get there. Web Research as Taking "Snapshots" Given the Internet's visual nature and fluid content, the process of conducting research on the Web has been likened to taking an informal picture of information on a specific date at a particular time. This metaphor also conveys the "zoom-in" aspect of searching through Web pages by going from general to specific categories. In the first section of this Scope Note, National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature (NRCBL) staff present a snapshot of bioethics resources taken during the spring months of 2000. Entries are divided into the categories of directories, electronic journals, full-text documents, news/current awareness, and teaching resources. In the two subsequent sections, this series of categories is repeated for entries on a specific topic within bioethics-genetics-and again for general search and evaluation tools. Where a Web site may contain pages applicable [End Page 175] to more than one category, multiple entries are made for that site with appropriate information for each category.Much as telecommunication advances have strengthened the relationship of patients and providers as partners, the dynamic nature of the Internet acknowledges that the researcher functions as a librarian whenever accessing the Web. It is our hope that BIOETHICSLINE and the other NRCBL databases not only will enable researchers to search the Web more efficiently, but also will help them to evaluate what they find when they get there. Bioethicsline on the Web: An International Plan in Progress Once only available through libraries, the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM), the funding agency for the ongoing development of the BIOETHICS LINE® database from the Kennedy Institute, has provided free Web access to that database of 63,000 citations since September 1998 through Internet Grateful Med. Plans are now underway to eliminate such specialty databases and incorporate all citations into PubMed (for journal articles) or LOCATORplus (for book-like materials and chapters in books). Both of these databases are likewise available at no cost on the Web. In the transition to PubMed and LOCATORplus some features of BIOETHICSLINE that presently are available may be lost. Researchers are encouraged to contact the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature with search requests or for search strategy assistance with either the current or the future system ([email protected]).The inclusion of bioethics citations in PubMed and LOCATORplus will have several advantages. First, unique keywords from the Bioethics Thesaurus will be considered for inclusion in Medical Subject Headings (MeSH), the indexing vocabulary for PubMed and LOCATORplus, thereby enhancing retrieval of relevant clinical literature by offering more precise terminology covering ethical issues. Second, it will be easier to identify foreign-language materials, which are not currently included in the scope of BIOETHICSLINE. Third, the updating schedule will become more frequent. On the other hand, there may be some loss of searching precision because certain specialized features... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Michael Fischer ACCEPTING THE ROMANTICS AS PHILOSOPHERS The romanticsarenot widely regarded as philosophers, at least not in philosophy departments, where they are seldom taught.1 Some of the reasons behind this exclusion of the Romantics involve a general disdain for literature; other reasons suggest a more specific uneasiness with Romanticism itself—with its apparent interest in animism, its selfindulgence, its coolness toward reason, and, perhaps above all, its refusal to (...) abide by Kant's containment of skepticism. These complaints are not the invention of paranoid or obtuse academic philosophers (as some literary critics might like to think). In fact, some ofthese objections have dogged the Romantics from the beginning. There is something risky, or outlandish, about Romanticism that these criticisms bring out. I want here to pursue what is at stake in accepting the Romantics as philosophers. In discussing what may be threatening about Romanticism, I will be drawing on the work of Stanley Cavell. Unlike most professional philosophers, Cavell declares his indebtedness to the Romantics, but unlike some literary critics, he appreciates the dangers of the Romantic quest that he nevertheless joins. The Romantics often leave Cavell feeling nervous and wretched, as Thoreau left Emerson— and as Cavell leaves many of his own readers. Cavell affirms Romanticism while acknowledging the risks that have repelled some ofits critics: hence his usefulness to me here. The Romantics' quarrel with Kant perhaps best accounts for the contempt, or indifference, that Romanticism can inspire in academic philosophers. Cavell pictures Kant as arriving at a settlement with skepticism, a compromise that concedes the inaccessibility of things-inthemselves, while reassuring us of our right to say that "we do know the existence of the world, or rather, that what we understand as knowl179 180Philosophy and Literature edge is ofthe world."2 For Kant, again as Cavell portrays him, limiting knowledge—by relinquishing any claim to know things-in-themselves— is necessary to shoring up knowledge, to our still claiming that there is such a thing. By "knowledge" Kant, in effect, means science: he saves science by positioning it between skepticism (the denial of knowledge) and fanaticism or dogmatism (the expansion of knowledge beyond acceptable limits). By affirming the possibility of (scientific) knowledge, Kant thus contains skepticism, or at least curtails its damage. But by putting thingsin -themselves beyond knowledge, he also gives in to skepticism. According to Cavell, the Romantics balk at this trade-off, saying, in effect, "Thanks for nothing." 3 Knowledge of things-in-themselves is precisely the knowledge that the Romantics are most interested in. From this point ofview, Kant concedes too much to skepticism—and gets too little in return. Resisting Kant accordingly entails putting us back in touch with things, or bringing us face-to-face with them, which in turn means showing that we can face things or shy away from them, presumably as we can confront or avoid people. Cavell finds examples of Romantic writers facing things and even listening to them in Waiden, the "Intimations" ode, and other texts.4 But I want to focus here on a poem that Cavell does not mention, "Tintern Abbey," where Wordsworth speaks of that blessed mood, In which the burthen of the mystery, In which the heavy and weary weight Of all this unintelligible world, Is lightened:—that serene and blessed mood, In which the affections gently lead us on,— Until, the breath of this corporeal frame And even the motion of our human blood Almost suspended, we are laid asleep In Body, and become a living soul: While with an eye made quiet by the power Of harmony, and the deep power ofjoy, We see into the life of things. (11. 37-49) By "things" Wordsworth means nothing less than "all objects of all thought" (1. 101), "all that we behold / From this green earth"(11. 1045 ), "all the mighty world / Of eye, and ear" (U. 105-6). He specifically mentions "setting suns" (1. 97), "the round ocean and the living air, / Michael Fischer181 And the blue sky" (11. 97-98) and he declares himself "a lover of the meadows and the woods, / And mountains" (11. 103-4). In these lines—and others I need not cite—the world... (shrink)

In the literature on conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism, we find so-called vice explanations for the extreme behavior and extreme beliefs that they involve. These are explanations in terms of people’s character traits, like arrogance, vengefulness, closed-mindedness, and dogmatism. However, such vice explanations face the so-called situationist challenge, which argues based on various experiments that either there are no vices or that they are not robust. Behavior and belief, so is the idea, are much better explained by appeal to (...) numerous situational factors, like one’s mood or how orderly one’s environment is. This paper explores the situationist challenge to vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism in more detail by assessing the empirical evidence, analyzing the argumentation based on it, and drawing conclusions for where this leaves vice explanations. The main conclusion is that vice explanations for such extreme behavior and extreme beliefs need to be fine-tuned on various points, but that there is no reason to think that they have been discredited by empirical evidence. Moreover, the situationist challenge shows that sensitivity is needed for distinguishing when vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism are appropriate, when appeal to situational factors is more fitting, and when the two can be combined. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Giulio Castellani (1528-1586): A Sixteenth-Century Opponent of Scepticism CHARLES B. SCH1VHTT THE PROBLEMOF THE ORIGINS of scepticism in early modern philosophy has been a much debated issue. Sanches, Montaigne, Charron, and Bayle all contributed to the milieu which made it possible for the sceptical direction of thought to develop into such a potent force by the time of David Hume. The actual origins of modern scepticism, which seem to (...) go back to a slightly earlier date, lie in the confluence of several different intellectual movements during the early years of the sixteenth century: Christian anti-intellectualism, the reintroduction of the literary remains of the ancient sceptical tradition, the epistemological developments of scholastic nominalism, and certain inherent tendencies of Renaissance humanism. It is in the early decades of the sixteenth century that the seeds which later blossomed forth at the time of Hume originally took root. Hume himself merely reaped the harvest of several hundred years of sceptical preparation? Aside from certain manifestations of doubt which developed out of the epistemological theories of fourteenth-century nominalism, the origins of modern scepticism are generally held to date from the first publication of Sextus Empiricus' ancient summaries of Pyrrhonism during the decade of the 1560's. While it has previously been recognized that at least hints of scepticism were current in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the implications to be derived from this fact do not seem to have been adequately exploredT I shall not here go into these early manifestations of scepticism in a detailed way. Rather, I shall briefly touch upon a few little-known examples of the influence of ancient scepticism during the Reniassance and, then, I shall focus upon an early and practically neglected attack upon scepticism published before the first printings of Sextus Empiricus' writings. I shall discuss the circumstances of the composition of Giulio Castellani's anti-sceptical work, Adversus Marci TuIlii Ciceronis academicas questiones disi For a recent survey of early modem scepticism see Richard H. Popkin, The History o] Scepticism /tom Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: 1960). Of the large literature which connects scepticism with religious doubt during this period see especially Henri Busson, Les sources et le dgveloppement du rati~nalizme dar~ la litt~rature ]ran~aise de la Renaissance (Paris: 1957) and Don Cameron Allen, Doubt's Boundless Sea (Baltimore: 1964). The di.~cussionof this period seems to be the weakest part of Popkin's excellent book, particularly with regard to the treatment which he gives to Italian thought. See, also, his other articles, especially,"Skepticismand the Counter-Reformation in France," Archiv/fir Re/armationsgeschichte, LI (1960),58-86and "The High Road to Pyrrhonism," American Philosophical Quarterly, II (1965),18--32.In my forthcoming study, Gian]rancesco Pico (1469-1533) and His Critique o/Aristotle, I give a detailed analysis of the major representative of early sixteenthcentury scepticism. [151 16 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY putatio (1558), which antedates the first printing of Sextus Empiricus by four years, indicating that scepticism was already widespread enough to provoke an attack from the camp of the dogmatists. Furthermore, I shall analyze Castellani 's arguments in the context of the philosophical views of the mid-sixteenth century. Scepticism in the Early Renaissance Direct knowledge of the major ancient source of scepticism, the already mentioned writings of Sextus Empiricus, was rare throughout the Middle Ages. There are but two known extant Latin manuscripts which date before 1400. s From the fifteenth century we know of two more manuscripts, neither complete in itself, but together containing a significant portion of the extant writings of Sextus. 4 This evidence indicates that Sextus' works were not well known in translation before the first Latin editions of The Oulines o] Pyrrhonism (1562) and of Against the Mathematicians (1569). With the advent of an increased interest in and knowledge of Greek in Western Europe in the fifteenth century, we find a corresponding increase in the number of Greek manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus. Consequently, by the time of the first printings, an appreciable number of copies of his writings were available. Some were brought from the East, but a large number also are attributable to European scribes. 5 We also know that in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 651-664 [Access article in PDF] Walter Charleton and Early Modern Eclecticism Eric Lewis The publication of Michael Albrecht's Eklektik (1994) revived a small amount of scholarly interest in an early modern "movement" with a lineage that can be traced back to Clement of Alexandria, who described a method of constructing a philosophical system by selecting among different philosophical sects. 1 Not (...) surprisingly, the reception of Albrecht's work demonstrated the complexities associated with identifying the "movement" and categorizing those who labeled themselves "eclectic" philosophers; that is, those who seemed to expound a system of philosophy assimilated from ancient and modern sources. The difficulties involved with defining "eclecticism" and applying the term to early modern natural science is further complicated by the tendency for "eclectics" to categorize their contemporaries in ways that are counterintuitive to our modern sensibilities. 2 Nevertheless, the proponents of this patchwork style of natural science are interesting precisely because they give us a glimpse into their interpretation of the state of philosophy and its relation to history during a time when the authority of The Philosopher was falling under ever increasing scrutiny.The recent literature on philosophic eclecticism largely ignored the English context where rising sentiment against sectarianism influenced the formation of the Royal Society. 3 The perceived chaos of a nation divided and redivided by the multiplication of religious associations produced a plethora of proposals for the restoration and maintenance of intellectual and social order. In particular the problems of religious and political order motivated certain members of the [End Page 651] "Newcastle Circle" (largely Royalists) to construct philosophical methodologies at least congruent with their ideological commitments to social stability. Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, and her close friend the physician Walter Charleton each offered his and her own style of natural science. 4 Both Hobbes and the Duchess of Newcastle were excluded from participating in the community of natural philosophers formed in 1660; yet Charleton became a founding member of the Royal Society that year. Despite relative neglect, Charleton's importance to understanding the development of modern natural science in England should not be overlooked; and particularly his prescribed method of doing natural philosophy needs more attention. 5 Like the radically different methods developed by Margaret Cavendish and Thomas Hobbes, Charleton's eclecticism should be viewed as an exhaustive effort to prescribe a remedy to the perceived threat of rampant sectarianism. 6 Unlike Hobbes and Cavendish, however, Charleton saw authoritarianism and dogmatism as the greatest challenge to order, and found the solution to that challenge in mitigated skepticism and a style of philosophy that did not make an epistemic differentiation between the novel philosophies of his day and those of the ancients.Despite being a prolific writer, having a considerable reputation as a physician and placing himself in the center of the English community of natural scientists, Walter Charleton has been mostly ignored by modern scholars. In part this lack of attention can be attributed to the common view that he never developed a comprehensive philosophy nor maintained consistent metaphysical commitments. References to him claim that he was an "intellectual barometer of the age," 7 and his work has been described as "important as a case study in the reception of a mechanical philosophy." 8 His name is virtually absent from discussions concerning scientific methodology, though he is often described as a Renaissance [End Page 652] alchemical philosopher who fell under the influence of mechanistic atomism and the experimental agenda of a fledgling society of natural philosophers. Most accounts simply portray Charleton as a converted follower of the novel philosophy rather than as a novel thinker.The failure to see Charleton as more than a converted empiricist and mechanist likely results from the opinion that eclecticism does not constitute a philosophical method as much as it constitutes the last refuge for scholars during periods of intellectual crisis. The article on eclecticism in Encyclopedia Britannica (fourteenth edition) states: Eclecticism always tends to spring up after a period of vigorous constructive speculation, especially in the later stages of a controversy between... (shrink)

A distinguished group of authors reflects on problems currently enlivening the space shared by philosophy and literary theory in a series of chapters that range in scope from Plato to postmodernism.

Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy examines an important theme in Jewish thought from the Book of Genesis to the present day. Although it is customary to view Judaism as a legalistic faith leaving little room for free thought or individual expression, Kenneth Seeskin argues that this view is wrong. Where some see the essence of the religion as strict obedience to divine commands, Seeskin claims that God does not just command but forms a partnership with humans requiring the consent of both (...) parties. Looking at classic texts from Biblical, Rabbinic, and philosophical literature, Seeskin shows that Judaism has always respected freedom of conscience and assigned an important role to the power of human reason. The book considers both existing arguments and presents new ideas about the role of autonomy in Judaism. Clear and concise, it offers a refreshing alternative to the mysticism and dogmatism prevalent in much of the recent literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Tibullus: Elegies II. With introduction and commentaryThomas A. SuitsPaul Murgatroyd, ed. Tibullus: Elegies II. With introduction and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. xx + 305 pp. Cloth, $65.00.This is the companion volume to Murgatroyd’s Tibullus I (Pietermaritzburg, 1980) and with it forms the first detailed commentary on the poet since Kirby Flower Smith’s 1913 edition. The editor has been better served by the Clarendon than the University of (...) Natal Press in that the quality of production is superior and the layout less huddled. Users will want to have access to Tibullus I, however, since Murgatroyd makes regular reference to it. In the main, the new volume follows the pattern of its predecessor; but since the latter received relatively little critical notice in English-language periodicals, it seems appropriate to describe principal features, especially where they represent a change from Murgatroyd’s previous practice.General matters received attention in the introduction to Tibullus I, and so the introduction here is brief, addressing the question of the completeness of this extraordinarily short libellus, its structure, and its main characters. The text is essentially Postgate’s 1915 OCT, without apparatus but rather with the handful of departures discussed in a critical appendix.The commentary itself is bulky—254 pages on only 430 verses, or an average of more than a page per distich. (By way of comparison, the commentary in Tibullus I averages just over half a page per distich.) Each elegy has an introductory essay; each of the five to nine sections into which Murgatroyd divides a poem receives its own introduction; and each distich is discussed separately in detail. All this is rather daunting, and few, other than reviewers, are likely to work through the whole, but there is something to engage readers wherever they decide to dip into it. As befits a commentary on a poet whose Alexandrianism is becoming ever more appreciated, Murgatroyd’s work exhibits both sensitivity [End Page 498] and sophistication. In what follows I touch on some of the book’s leitmotifs, in an attempt to convey its general character.There is naturally a vast store of material illustrative of both language and subject matter, selected from predecessors (the debt to Smith is considerable, though he is not followed in his predilection for copious parallels from modern vernacular literatures) and augmented by the editor, in part through diligent use of the TLL and OLD. Unlike Tibullus I, this volume provides English translations for the relatively few Greek quotations. My extensive samplings suggest a rare degree of accuracy in the citations.In his interpretations, Murgatroyd will often leave open a number of possibilities: e.g., “may refer to... or... or... may denote... or... could be... or... may mean... or... if...” is the wording in one short paragraph on 2.3.1–2. Again, he will lay before the reader a whole menu of possible senses, as he does for nubilus (on 2.5.75–76); it is salutary to be reminded of the wide range of possible connotations, even where one seems to deserve clear preference.A similar lack of dogmatism characterizes Murgatroyd’s many attempts to describe rhythmic and sound effects. Conscious of how subjective these can be, he always couches them guardedly, as (on 2.4.7–10), “the sudden preponderance of spondees and assonance involving long vowels seem to me to have an air of dejection and weariness.” Likewise, he is appropriately cautious in his frequent suggestions of possible etymological plays (here building on F. Cairns, Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome [Cambridge 1979] 90–99); the general phenomenon, in any case, is clearly established, even if particular instances may be in doubt.Another recurrent type of note seeks to establish instances where Tibullus was the first to use a word in a new sense or to use a particular word combination (iunctura). Although the accidents of preservation make absolute claims in this area impossible, Murgatroyd makes an impressive case for Tibullus’ inventiveness. He is on more solid ground in his analyses of artistry in the word arrangement in individual lines and distichs. He has a very keen sense for this and demonstrates an impressive variety of... (shrink)

Popper repeatedly emphasized the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for ‘normal scientists’. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended. Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual scientist should fulfil similar functions. The trick is (...) to consider science at the group level; and doing so shows how puzzle solving and ‘offensive’ critical activity can simultaneously have a legitimate place in science. This analysis shifts the focus of the debate. The crucial question becomes ‘How should the balance between functions be struck?’ In this talk, Rowbottom would show why this is the crucial question, and also strive to make some new headway in answering it. (shrink)

Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...) this, but I do not. The skeptic I want to consider goes beyond these familiar points to the much more radical conclusion that our perceptual experiences can’t give us any knowledge or even justification for believing that our surroundings are one way rather than another. (shrink)

The objective is to show the peculiar way in which Cicero’s philosophical thinking is original and distances itself from the main representatives of the New Academy: the Roman thinker does not practice epoche, nor does he assign any special role to it in his thought. Instead, Cicero introduces the concept of doubt to characterize his own way of thinking.

M'illumino/d'immenso - I'm lit/with immensity is Geoffrey Brock's translation of Giuseppe Ungaretti's poem Mattina. In the poem's minimalism, Ungaretti points to the maximal: the richness of poetry's expressive possibilities and the power of thinking in literature. This book addresses the fascination of readers to transcend the boundaries of their own in fiction, and literature's capacity, according to Kant, even to evoke, with the help of the development of aesthetic ideas, representations that exceed what is empirically and conceptually graspable (...) - in case studies about myths of creativity, images of death and the beyond after the 'death of God', of the soul, of melancholy as the dark ground of genius, of metamorphoses of both evil and good, of ecstasy, of the economy of self-sacrifice, of the art of resistance, and, among others, about figurations of biography and the portrait as approaches to singularity, what is particular and cannot be fully subsumed to any universality. (shrink)

Objective Apeiron was founded in 1966 and has developed into one of the oldest and most distinguished journals dedicated to the study of ancient philosophy, ancient science, and, in particular, of problems that concern both fields. Apeiron is committed to publishing high-quality research papers in these areas of ancient Greco-Roman intellectual history; it also welcomes submission of articles dealing with the reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition. The journal appears quarterly. Articles are peer-reviewed on (...) a double-blind basis. Topics ancient philosophy ancient science reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition Article formats Original Articles. (shrink)

(1996). Surprise in literature. Angelaki: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 58-68.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s “Outlines of Pyrrhonism.” by Benson MatesDavid K. GliddenBenson Mates. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s “Outlines of Pyrrhonism.” New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. x + 335. Cloth, $55.00, Paper, $22.95.Benson Mates’s translation and commentary of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism appears nearly half a century after Mates first began his pioneering work on Sextus and Hellenistic philosophy. This publication coincides with another (...) new translation of the Outlines by Annas and Barnes, who provide only an abbreviated commentary (Cambridge University Press, 1994). After decades when the only available English translation was by Bury from the Loeb, there are now choices available which allow Sextus to be taught to different sorts of English readers.In comparing the two translations, this reader found the Annas and Barnes version more mellifluous. Mates is not as sweet. His style is plain-spoken, but this approach has merits when the arguments get going. The Annas and Barnes version uses footnotes for commentary, along with a brief introduction. Their notes cite parallel passages in other works by Sextus, provide brief guidance for interpretation when it is most needed, and connect the reader with a focused list of bibliographical references, inviting readers themselves to turn toward scholarly debates over certain controversial passages. Consequently, Annas and Barnes opens out to a wide audience of classicists, historians, students of literature, general readers interested in scepticism, as well as philosophers of whatever ideology. [End Page 460]The Mates edition is directed toward philosophers alone. It is much less oriented toward historical scholarship, preferring to read Sextus as a contemporary professional philosopher might. In this way, Mates will approach a passage from the Outlines in terms of a passage in Hume or Berkeley, even though, of course, these latter-day philosophers derived their views from reading Sextus. Mates employs philosophese with ease, constructing a version of Sextus from the professional philosopher’s interpretive stance, in the language of propositions and Fregean intensions. The audience Mates is writing for and the viewpoint he is writing from more or less correspond to the “analytical” faction of the American Philosophical Association. Postmodern Foucaultians, contextualist historians, and Hellenistic scholars might find this approach unhelpful, even irritating. But busy, mainstream American philosophers could find Mates’s approach sufficiently sympathetic to actually read some Sextus, in the way Chisholm once had done, finding a passage on the Cyrenaics in Sextus which led to the reinvention of “adverbial appears locutions” and which, in turn, played for decades in the epistemological arcades.Mates begins his edition with a systematic introduction to the Outlines and follows his translation with another hundred pages of narrative, reflecting primarily what Mates finds interesting about certain selected passages. Although, like Annas and Barnes, he provides parallel passages, ancient references, and highly abbreviated accounts of scholarly disputes, his own narrative line dominates both his introductory essay and his commentary. Mates writes in a somewhat chatty style prone to the blunt Cephalean confidence that comes with considerable experience and success as a professional philosopher. His narrative line is clear, connected, often compelling, as for instance when he argues that for Sextus “dogmatizing and believing turn out to be one and the same” (61).Fashion has returned to favor Pyrrhonism in the late twentieth century, just as the cycle had come around before, toward the end of the sixteenth century, sparking a philosophical renaissance. This time around the import may be different. Both Annas and Barnes as well as Mates find Sextus worth reading as serious philosophy. This is a considerable improvement in the fortuna of the Outlines. For decades Sextus was banned in American philosophy departments, as no philosopher at all. He was not taught, he was not read. One highly prominent American philosopher was expressly forbidden to write a dissertation on him, around the time Mates and Chisholm had the courage to publish on him. Sextus is now welcome in the Canon.If Sextus now is one of us, a serious philosopher, then the dogmatists (Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics, etc.) he ridiculed were merely failures. The game continues. So, Mates, Annas and Barnes can embrace Sextus as ours. His readers won’t... (shrink)

This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation (or corroboration) functions and rules of scientific method.

ABSTRACT Since the seventeenth century, scholars have been accusing each other of ‘dogmatism’. But what exactly did this mean? In exploring this question, this article focuses on philosophy and Biblical scholarship in nineteenth-century Germany. Scholars in both of these fields habitually contrasted Dogmatismus with Kritik, to the point of emplotting the history of their field as a gradual triumph of critical thinking over dogmatic belief. The article shows that charges of dogmatism derived much of their rhetorical force from (...) such progressive narratives. Especially neo-Kantian philosophers and Biblical scholars of liberal Protestant persuasion liked to depict their opponents as clinging to long-superseded modes of thought, thereby implying that these colleagues harked back to a past from which modern Wissenschaft had emancipated itself. This ‘denial of coevalness’, as Johannes Fabian calls it, demonstrates to what extent the vice of dogmatism was imbued with normative visions of how the field or, more broadly, German intellectual life should develop. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IS THERE A LANGUAGE-GAME THAT EVEN THE DECONSTRUCTIONIST CAN PLAY? by Steven Fuller After reading A. J. Cascardi's fascinating "Skepticism and Deconstruction," I am led to ask the question that "entitles" this response.1 The answer I want to give is "yes," but Cascardi has made the task more difficult than I would have liked. In brief, he has dissociated deconstruction from all philosophical pursuits, including skepticism, which it superficially (...) resembles. I shall proceed, first, by reasserting deconstruction 's skeptical credentials and, then, by showing how these credentials enable the deconstructionist to play an interesting language-game. I Cascardi's thesis is most vividly stated in the following passage: But the deconstructionist, wrongly thought of as a skeptic, has no idea of what an epistemology counter to his uncertainties and indeterminacies would look like. This is because he is out to question the very axis ofwhich skepticism and epistemology are the opposite poles. Because his questioning shows up as a denial of the principle of non-contradiction, one is likely to think that deconstruction is a form of irrationalism. (p. 7) For all its forcefulness, this statement suggests that Cascardi may have fallen prey to a Cartesian ruse involving the meaning of "skepticism." A coherent history of skepticism can be told that extends from Sextus Empiricus's Outlines ofPyrrhonism (c. 200 AD) to Pierre Bayle's Historical and Critical Dictionary (c. 1700) without ever mentioning Descartes. The theme 104 Steven fuller105 of this history would be that no claims to knowledge are certifiable. In a more modern vein, we would say that no proposition has a determinate truth-value. The skeptics in our history would be presented as moral philosophers instructing their readers on how to live in a world in which they can never tell the true from the false — a world in which doubt is the natural attitude. The paraphrase is crucial because virtually all philosophers — most notably Husserl — have regarded doubt as unnatural, a psychic tension that must somehow be resolved. And just as hunger motivates the drive for food, it has usually been assumed that doubt motivates the drive for method. Whereas food sustains the physical needs of the sentient being as it reduces hunger, so too method sustains the cognitive needs of the rational being as it reduces doubt. Our skeptics have perennially noted that to think of all knowledge claims as certifiably true or false would be to think that nature answers us directly upon being addressed. In less metaphorical terms, we would be speaking a language whose predicates pick out natural kinds. The "dogmatists," as Sextus and Bayle liked to call their opponents (we would now call them "foundationalists"), could then easily conceive of how nature appears to us as nature's response to our utterances. To drive home the dogmatists' intentionalist stance toward nature, instead of "how nature appears to us," we might say "how nature represents itselfto us." In the case of truths, nature represents itself transparently, while in the case of falsehoods, representation has gone awry: either we misspoke or nature deceived us. To put the blame on ourselves is to call for a revision in method; to put the blame on nature is to suspect that an evil designer, a Cartesian demon, is behind the faulty appearances. The point, of course, is that one needs to be a dogmatist in order to have Descartes's more demonic thoughts. The classical skeptic, who held the language-world link to be purely conventional, used the uncertifiability of knowledge claims as an argument for denying any design whatsoever to nature — either for good or for ill. Descartes muddled things, however, when he interpreted the skeptical stance as claiming that all knowledge claims may turn out to be false. From the First Meditation, it is never made clear why we should worry about the Cartesian demon (and hence send him into cognitive exile as quickly as possible). Presumably, the concern arises from the possibility of discovering that the appearances are indeed illusory — that is, certifiablyfalse. This concern becomes a full-fledged anxiety once the doubter realizes that he ultimately has no control over how his doubt is resolved. In other words... (shrink)

How does literature illuminate the way we live? Maurice Natanson, a prominent champion of phenomenology, draws upon this method's unique power to show how fiction can highlight aspects of experience that are normally left unexamined. By exploring the structure of the everyday world, Natanson reveals the "uncanny" that lies at the core of the ordinary. Phenomenology--which involves the questioning of that which we usually take for granted--is for Natanson the essence of philosophy. Drawing upon his philosophical predecessors Edmund Husserl, (...) Alfred Schutz, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Natanson paves his own way with stories and examples that themselves bear witness to how phenomenology occurs in literature. In considering such works as Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain, and Franz Kafka's The Metamorphosis, Natanson shows how literature opens us to the domain of possibility and how metaphor offers philosophical power when we think about freedom and change. This book, written by one of the twentieth century's leading phenomenologists, will interest students in philosophy and in literature. They will value the work particularly for its clarification of concepts and terms that frequently emerge in the contemporary intellectual climate. (shrink)

In his numerous philosophical writings Cicero mostly adapted contemporary Greek sources, but occasionally he took up certain positions of his own. His propensity to scepticism in epistemology and dogmatism in ethics and political philosophy appears to be a further development of the model set forth by Carneades. Though Cicero was influenced by both Antiochus of Ascalon and Philo of Larissa—both of them claimed the heritage of the Platonic Academy—he owed a life-long allegiance to the Academic tradition of Carneades. Very (...) often we are faced with a poor state of his own argument. But it seems to me very likely that in main questions his position was consistent throughout his life, and I consider his own philosophy as the beginning of the rising Middle Platonism. (shrink)

This collection emphasizes a cross-disciplinary approach to the problem of scale, with essays ranging in subject matter from literature to film, architecture, the plastic arts, philosophy, and scientific and political writing. Its contributors consider a variety of issues provoked by the sudden and pressing shifts in scale brought on by globalization and the era of the Anthropocene, including: the difficulties of defining the concept of scale; the challenges that shifts in scale pose to knowledge formation; the role of scale (...) in mediating individual subjectivity and agency; the barriers to understanding objects existing in scalar realms different from our own; the role of scale in mediating the relationship between humans and the environment; and the nature of power, authority, and democracy at different social scales. (shrink)

Richly illustrated study drawing on art, literature and science to explore Victorian attitudes towards sight.

Robert Wallace (1697–1771) was a leading minister of the Church of Scotland, but he remains a largely overlooked figure in the literature. Nevertheless, his participation in philosophical and theological debates offers a glimpse of the complex positions of the Scottish clergy – and of Scottish moderation on its own terms. Wallace’s moderation was evident, for example, in his opposition both to radical deism and orthodox dogmatism. Yet what makes Wallace’s case particularly interesting is that he described himself as (...) a ‘moderate freethinker’ in a letter to David Hume, while distinguishing elsewhere the ‘moderate’ and ‘sober’ freethinkers from the dangerously sceptical ones. Exploring his consistent statements on this issue in various writings throughout his career, this article investigates the self-identified moderation of Wallace – in opposition, for example, to his rival freethinker William Dudgeon – and thus the clergy’s attempt to use this category in the shaping of their vision of the Scottish Enlightenment. (shrink)

In Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation, Michael Davitt Bell charts the important and often overlooked connection between literary culture and authors' careers. Bell's influential essays on nineteenth-century American writers—originally written for such landmark projects as The Columbia Literary History of the United States and The Cambridge History of American Literature—are gathered here with a major new essay on Richard Wright. Throughout, Bell revisits issues of genre with an eye toward the unexpected details of authors' lives, and invites us to (...) reconsider the hidden functions that terms such as "romanticism" and "realism" served for authors and their critics. Whether tracing the demands of the market or the expectations of readers, Bell examines the intimate relationship between literary production and culture; each essay closely links the milieu in which American writers worked with the trajectory of their storied careers. (shrink)

Often portrayed as a period bound by the dogma of slavish obedience to the diktats of reason and progress, the Age of Enlightenment is revealed by this profound analysis to have been riddled with skeptical attitudes and characters, even in the Enlightenment's most codified locations, such as Germany. Most philosophers of the period are still widely regarded today as having been dominated by a core triple nexus of optimism, dogmatism and rationalism, and despite a growing body of literature (...) exploring the features of their work that could be regarded as informed by skepticism, this unrivaled survey points up the deficiencies of the former. This volume, then, offers an exploration of the impact of skepticism in both its historic and geographic dimensions, providing readers with a reevaluation of the role played by skepticism itself. The detailed narrative covers every identifiable instance of skepticism in the Eighteenth Century, tracing its influence of thought on major British, French and German philosophers, and including lesser-known figures whose contemporary influence requires their inclusion in a comprehensive study such as this. This volume, then, offers an exploration of the impact of skepticism in both its historic and geographic dimensions, providing readers with a reevaluation of the role played by skepticism itself. The detailed narrative covers every identifiable instance of skepticism in the Eighteenth Century, tracing its influen ce of thought on major British, French and German philosophers, and including lesser-known figures whose contemporary influence requires their inclusion in a comprehensive study such as this. (shrink)

Works of literature that are too overtly instructive are commonly faulted for being didactic. For so-called literary cognitivists, who believe that instruction is an important literary value, this seems to pose a problem: if we value literature for the instruction it affords, why would we ever object to overt instruction? In this paper I propose the following answer: overt instruction can arouse suspicion of intellectual vices in the author, such as intellectual arrogance, dogmatism, and prejudice, which can (...) make the lessons the author seeks to convey less rationally acceptable. Overt instruction in a work of literature is sometimes a fault, therefore, precisely because it makes the work less valuable as a source of instruction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Defense of Poetry: Reflections on the Occasion of WritingJack KolbA Defense of Poetry: Reflections on the Occasion of Writing, by Paul H. Fry; 256 pp. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, $45.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.And the worm turns. It might elicit dubious laughter from those Yale critics who taught Paul Fry, now William Lampson Professor at their institution, by his admission a Berkeley student in the 1960s (and (...) still, clearly, trying to come to terms with the absolutism of his era), to have him (a)rise to the occasion of verse. After all, the question he asks at the outset of his study—“how are we to account for all the poetry, not to mention fiction, not to mention all the criticism... that still gets written?”—seems anathema except to us academic conservatives, those who resent the encroachment of sterile philosophic approaches into literature. And irrelevant to those writers who don’t give a damn about academic criticism. Fry’s reality, and not just his literary reality, here confronts the weight of academia.What is most troublesome to me about this worthy book is the vast prolegomena that seems, alas, de rigueur these days, the critical dross that Fry must apparently spend an inordinate amount of time attempting to placate, dodge, and negotiate. If academic criticism must perform such elaborate obeisance to questionable philosophies of literature, then academic criticism is truly dead. No reason to grieve: it will be replaced by those who seek to understand and relish literature, still informed by the worthy questions of imitation and audience and authorial psychology, and even internal construction that have enticed readers for centuries.Fry is anything but a happy deconstructionist. One senses immediately that he is distinctly discontented with theoretical discourse, that what he really wants to discuss is poetry, and the poetic impulse. And when he does, he does it brilliantly. Indeed, it is only his argument that inhibits him. To oversimplify (an inevitable process in this book), Fry wants to rescue some poetry from the self-destructiveness, as he sees it, of sterile critical approaches—mostly from the neo-historicists, but also from all others who would deny the essential job of poetry to replicate reality. Both human and historical values have got in the way [End Page 522] of this “pure” conveyance. Somehow poetry (unique of the arts) can escape this:It is the function of indication, of saying that something just is (to which until now I have confined my notion of ostension), to estrange utterance from its historical situation by refusing to say that that something is predicated upon, determined by, something else, whether in narrative, description, or explanation....This is the moment, completing the structure of ostension, which reduces the estranged, necessarily “situated” utterance to sound and trace, and thus returns it to the unsignifying sphere of actuality, of things in themselves, from which history for its part is by nature forever estranged. Literature, then, is that mode of utterance which lays bare the irreducible distance between history and actuality from the parti pris of the latter. By suspending our purposeful engagement with the world, it reattaches itself to the world.(pp. 54–55)No single passage can do Fry justice, for his approach is accretive, and fearsomely intelligent (this is one of the few books of contemporary criticism I’ve read in which I felt that the awful vocabulary was merited). Yet, ultimately, Fry’s ontology sounds very much like old-fashioned mimesis; it is the universality of experience, he asserts, that escapes the historicist or the dogmatist or the deconstructionist. At some level poetry is what it is. In fact what Fry seemingly wants is in his terms an obliteration of the mediation of mimesis: his true poetry wants to be reality, or at least as close as we come to it in art.Of course the problem with this definition of poetry is that it is, despite Fry’s twistings and turnings, a definition of poetry. Poetry, as even Plato tells us, is an imitation. So how do we try to get closest to reality? With poetry, Fry suggests; poetry that acknowledges the universal reality... (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply to this illustrative analogy in (...) Part 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply to this illustrative analogy in (...) Part 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)

I have based my psychological hypotheses on studies in perception and in personality. Research in these two areas began independently, but by the late forties the supposedly unconnected processes came to be seen as different aspects of one process. For instance, a low tolerance for perceptual ambiguity and cognitive dissonance was found to be significantly correlated with lack of emotional responsiveness, dogmatism, and authoritarianism; conversely, a high tolerance for perceptual ambiguity and cognitive dissonance was found to be significantly correlated (...) with tolerance of emotional ambivalence, openness to new experience, and a liberal world view.1 Later studies, primarily those conducted in the sixties, then established strong correlations between these findings and information-processing styles. Information processing involves three stages: first, stimuli are selected from the environment ; these stimuli are then arranged into "dimensions"; finally, if two or more dimensions result, they are compared and/or combined according to certain rules. H. M. Schroder and his colleagues have established correlations between personality styles and styles of information processing.2 For example, an intolerant personality—that is, one with a low integration index—"identifies and organizes stimuli in a fixed way, and the rules derived from existing schemata are explicit in defining this one way" . What psychologists call an "abstract personality" and identify in terms of "flexibility" or "tolerance of ambiguity"—what in literary studies is most conveniently called "negative capability"—is not necessarily characterized as lacking rules but rather as possessing a greater number of conflicting rules on a lower level which may be accommodated by rules on a higher level. · 1. See Jerome S. Bruner and David Krech, eds., Perception and Personality, 2nd ed. and Robert R. Blake and Glenn V. Ramsey, eds., Perception: An Approach to Personality . Although, as Else Frenkel-Brunswick says, "rigidity in one respect may go with flexibility in another," she also adds: "There is some indication that in the case of distinct intolerance of emotional ambivalence one may as a rule be able to locate at least some aspects of intolerance of cognitive ambiguity although these may often be more apparent on a higher level than that of perception proper" The present essay, since it is one section of a projected larger study, deals with the issues inherent in this approach in only a limited fashion. One could, for instance, quote whole essays in this branch of psychology dealing with ambiguity and point to their relevance for some aspects of literary study and the teaching of literature. Ambiguity, of course, is also a central term in New Criticism. See William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity and Ernst Kris and Abraham Kaplan, "Aesthetic Ambiguity," in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, ed. Kris , pp. 243-64.· 2. H. M. Schroder, M. J. Driver, and S. Streufert, "Levels of Information Processing," in Thought and Personality, ed. Peter B. Warr , pp. 174-91. All citations to this work will appear in the text. Reuven Tsur, senior lecturer in Hebrew literature at Tel-Aviv University, is the author of several books in Hebrew on medieval and modern Hebrew poetry and, in English, A Perception-Oriented Theory of Metre. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the forgotten friendship between Georges Bataille and the Russian émigré poet and philosopher Boris Poplavsky. Comparing their solar metaphysics, I focus on conceptions of friendship, sacrifice and depersonalisation. First, I retrace Bataille’s relationship to early Surrealis and Russian circles in interwar Paris, with a focus on his friendship with Irina Odoevtseva. I then offer a novel reading of Poplavsky’s poetry through the lens of Bataille’s philosophy, analysing a recurring motif that I call ‘dark solarity’. Uncovering a hidden (...) intertextual dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I argue for Poplavsky’s lasting impact on Bataille’s anti-Icarian sun cult. Finally, my paper demonstrates how Poplavsky’s writings on solar sacrifice, excess and friendship left marks on Bataille’s vision of a solar community, embodied in the secret society Acéphale. The dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I finally suggest, is a missing piece in the entangled history of Russian and French philosophy, as well as an original contribution to discourses on friendship in twentieth-century continental thought. (shrink)

South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world. This article is a literature study on the role of theology and the African philosophy of botho or ubuntu trying to address this social inequality. It is this situation that has led to poor (if not the absence of) cohesion in society. It shows how theology through its constructive nature has for years shifted from dogmatism to interdisciplinary dialogue with other sciences and philosophies in order to (...) arrive at facts that are helpful to building harmonious societies. Dialogue is a vehicle that makes this interaction possible. It is pointed out that dogmas, creeds, symbolics, apologetics, etc., all emanated from dialogical deliberations. Botho as life practice of humanity to others is a philosophy that emphasises togetherness or communality. It is a philosophy that puts an individual at the centre of a community. No individual can be contextually rooted without other human beings. It is the people in context that give individuals the meaning and the essence of life. The goal of this dialogue is social cohesion, which is defined as strong relationships enhanced by a sense of solidarity amongst members of a community. It is when botho is socially situated, resulting in theology constructed through dialogue towards desired social cohesion, in order to address the cosmic imbalances that threaten humans' quality of life. It can be presented in a formula: theology + botho or ubuntu = cohesive society. CONTRIBUTION: This article contributes towards the importance of dialogue between theology and the African philosophy of botho. The dialogue leads to social cohesion which is needed for harmonious co-existence in unequal society of South Africa. (shrink)

It is clear from this brief analysis that Sartre the Existentialist is alive and well, even as a self-proclaimed Marxist. In his later work he fuses Marxism with Existentialism, giving to the former a strong dose of individuality which has been prescribed by Western humanists for decades. Thus far I have given only the bare outline of Sartre's view. It needs to be followed up with a further analysis of his stand on groups and classes, which takes up the bulk (...) of theCritique. But the essential direction of his work is already clear. Sartre reminds us that the contradictions of the dialectic first live in the minds and careers of individuals. He finds Marxist literature fraught with the view that man is inert in the historical process, and he hopes that his work helps to correct this failure. It remains to be seen how much impact Sartre's challenge to Marxist dogmatism will have both on his fellow Marxists, who are no doubt uncomfortable with his brand of Marxism, and on the Western liberal who is both attracted to and repulsed by Marx. (shrink)