Le dualisme est peu répandu aujourd'hui, en philosophie de l'esprit. Le plus souvent, il est réduit au dualisme de Descartes, dont certaines faiblesses permettent une critique facile. Pourtant, un autre classique, plus proche de nous, défend un dualisme différent de Descartes : il s'agit de Bergson. Un des traits les plus intéressants du dualisme de Bergson est qu'il s'accompagne d'une conception relativement précise de la matière, qui rencontre assez bien la physique d'aujourd'hui. En comparaison, le physicalisme contemporain semble indifférent à (...) la question de la nature de la matière, et paradoxalement éloigné de la physique. In the phisosophy of the mind nowadays, dualism is not widespread. It mostly boils down to Descartes' dualism, whose weaknesses make for easy criticism. Nevertheless, closer to us, another classic defends a dualism different from Descartes': it is Bergson. One of the most interesting features in Bergson 's dualism is that it comes along with a relatively precise conception of matter, which fits current physics well enough. By comparison, contemporary physicalism appears indifferent to the question of the nature of matter, and paradoxically remote from physics. (shrink)

In this essay I attempt to show the limitations of analytic thinking and the kinds of dead ends into which such analyses may lead us in the philosophy of sport. As an alternative, I argue for a philosophy of complementation and compatibility in the face of what appear to be exclusive alternatives. This is a position that is sceptical of bifurcations and other simplified portrayals of reality but does not dismiss them entirely. A philosophy of complementation traffics in the realm (...) of ambiguities, paradoxes, differences by degree, tendencies, mixtures, polarities, tensions, complexes, transitions and all other forms of messiness. I note that this position has been generated, in part, by work conducted in the empirical sciences and that complementation provides a paradigm that is useful across the academic disciplines. To show the ways in which analytic thinking leads to dead ends, I analyse the epistemological debate over ?broad internalism? engaged in by Russell (1999, 2004), Dixon (2003), Simon (2000, 2004) and Morgan (2004). Evidence for the claim that they reached a mostly unhelpful stalemate is based on the fact that they did not provide any third option and moreover that the analytic tools and ground rules they employ prevent its discovery. I suggest that all four authors are comfortable with the analytic tendency to bifurcate reality and require choices among exclusionary alternatives. I also claim that they treat reason as if it were generated by a ?mind from nowhere?. Philosophical anthropology, I suggest, provides much-needed somatic grounding that would reign in excessively optimistic views of reason (Dixon, Simon and Russell) or excessively plastic interpretations of mind (Morgan). It can also provide evidence that could help us understand why hominids (even modern ones) are so attracted to dichotomies and why we have so much trouble in reconciling apparent incompatibilities. (shrink)

A discussion of a view proposed by Anthony Kenny, that inferences from factual statements to evaluative or normative statements, are in fact as unproblematic as the commonly accepted inferences inferences in the reverse direction,i. i. i from evaluative or normative statements to factual ones, The paper draws attention to some difficulties inherent in Kenny's view.

Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de mettre en évidence deux stratégies émergentistes possibles qui constituent une médiation intéressante entre les extrêmes classiques que sont le physicalisme réductionniste et le dualisme des substances. En distinguant trois niveaux de tension possibles entre monisme et dualisme — le niveau des substances, le niveau des propriétés causales et celui des prédicats — nous sommes amené à formuler deux positions philosophiques associées à deux concepts d’émergence distincts : l’émergence représentationnelle et l’émergence causale. Ces deux (...) concepts s’avèrent fidèles aux intuitions des premiers émergentistes véhiculées au travers de l’étymologie même du concept d’émergence, et permettent une interprétation non triviale de la maxime classique : « Le tout est plus que la somme des parties. »I emphasize in this paper two possible emergentist strategies that constitute interesting middle grounds between classical views that are reductive physicalism and substance dualism. By distinguishing three levels of tension between monism and dualism — the levels of substance, causal properties and predicates — one is allowed to formulate two philosophical views that may be associated with two distinct concepts of emergence : representational emergence and causal emergence. Both concepts are faithful to the intuitions of early emergentists that are conveyed in the very etymology of the concept of emergence, and they allow a non-trivial reading of the classical maxim : “the whole is more than the sum of the parts”. (shrink)

Jim Garrison’s recent criticisms of what he refers to as ‘dangerous dualisms’ in my theory of critical thinking are unsuccessful. They fail, in large part, because of misinterpretations of my view, but also because of Garrison’s systematic reliance on problematic aspects of Dewey’s terminology and philosophy.

Harvey Siegel’s conception of critical thinking is riddled with unnecessary and confusing dualisms. He rigidly separates ‘critical skill’ and ‘critical spirit’, the philosophical and the causal, ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and the moral and the epistemological. These dualisms are easily traced to his desire to defend an absolutist and decontextualised epistemology. To the Deweyan naturalist these dualisms are unnecessary. Appealing to the pragmatist notion of beliefs as embodied habits of action evincing emotion, I show how language, meanings and (...) the mind, including the mind of the critical thinker, emerge from our biological being. (shrink)

The contentious topic of female circumcision brings together medical science, women’s health activism, media, and national and international policy-making in pursuit of the common goal of eradicating such practices. Referring to these diverse and heterogeneous practices as ‘female genital mutilation’ (FGM), eradicators have then condemned them as ‘barbaric’ and medically harmful to female bodies and sexuality. In presuming that bodies can be separated from their cultural contexts, the anti-FGM discourse not only replicates a nature/culture dualism that has been roundly questioned (...) by feminists in science studies and cultural studies, but has also perpetuated a colonialist assumption by universalizing a particular western image of a ‘normal’ body and sexuality in its quest to liberate women and girls. I use my own story as a circumcised woman to highlight the entanglements of body and culture as presented in these feminist theories of female bodies. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a way of characterizing Plato’s dualism through his use of the intermediate {metaxu). There are three distinct uses of the metaxu : a) as an interval between two limits, b) as a median position between two extremes, and c) as a step towards a distinct and positive pole. The intermediate is that according to which the value of an interval or of an opposition can be justified as such, in order to have a better intelligibility (...) of the realm of becoming. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the impacts of agrarian change and social reorganisation on gender-nature relations through the lens of an indigenous group named the Kuruma in South India. Building upon recent work of feminist political ecology, I uncover a number of dualisms attached to the gender-nature nexus and put forward that gender roles are constituted by social relations which need to be analysed with regard to the transformative potential of gender-nature relations. Three main themes are at the centre of (...) the empirical inquiry: gender subjectivities, rural off-farm employment and the human-nature nexus. I seek to show that, first, the production of gendered subjectivities cannot be simplified through essentialist assumptions that romanticise women’s relationships with nature; second, off-farm employment strategies both reinforce the social hierarchy in gender and contradict the Kuruma’s moral economies; and, finally, environmental and agrarian change redefine the use of agrobiodiversity and are related to ideas on progressive versus nonprogressive cultivation practices. The research is informed by qualitative research methods and offers a conceptual approach to the deconstruction of gender-nature relations from a poststructuralist feminist perspective. (shrink)

This essay reviews a body of literature on feminism, development, and knowledge construction. This literature rejects essentialist constructions of women, challenges the universality of the Western scientific method, and creates a discursive space for reconstructing the dualisms embedded in the modern worldview. It suggests that an understanding of knowledge systems other than the modern one can aid us in constructing epistemologies that result in less dominating ways of producing knowledge.

En opposant comme deux substances irréductibles l’âme et le corps, Descartes n’explique pas l’unité qui est en l’homme. En décrivant l’effort comme une réalité intermédiaire entre le corps et l’âme, Maine de Biran ressaisit l’individualité même. Devant le mystère humain, il faut donc invoquer l’expérience biranienne et non la métaphysique cartésienne : il convient d’appréhender, avant toute analyse, l’unité d’un élan, qui se disperse peut-être, mais garde sa souplesse.

This article employs the basic tenets of critical realism to provide a philosophical foundation for understanding and resolving the dualisms of activity theory. Its argument follows in four parts. First I develop an immanent critique that shows the problems within activity theory; it reveals that several dualisms were present from the onset, and further that an implicit ontology allows activity theorists to presuppose critical realism in practice. I claim that the historical development of activity theory is marked by (...) attempts to resolve contradictions, which are signalling devices pointing to the need for theoretical expansion. To shed light on attempts to mend dualisms, I then introduce the notion of a ‘patch’ because it functions as a mechanism that sustains dualisms and gaps in practice. An omissive critique identifies the key omitted element that causes the dualisms; namely, the omission of a critique of Humean philosophy and classical empiricism. Finally,, after effectively isolating and explaining the source of dualisms, I prepare the ground for a protoexplanatory critique to rectify them. (shrink)

Before I reply to the account of Gretchen Reydams‑Schils on the theory of matter in the Commentary on Timaeus by Calcidius, I would like to clarify the organization of various topics into the commentary. Nevertheless the first point will deal with the study of dualism in Plato’s dialogue. Then I will show that the cosmos works as a continuum and I will present the ‘symphonic’ composition of the Latin exegesis. About the matter‑hyle, I will try to link it with the (...) soul. (shrink)

La forme substantialiste, sous laquelle le dualisme cartésien de la pensée et de l’étendue a été réfuté, n’est que l’aspect d’époque d’une position philosophique d’importance capitale : le dualisme de l’intuition d’être et de la représentation.Ce dualisme constitue l’authentique forme de jeunesse de la philosophie moderne. Les deux siècles suivants n’étaient pas en état d’en poursuivre le développement. Mais à cette tâche invitent notre temps les progrès accomplis de la science et de la réflexion intuitive.

Joachim Renn argues that Schutz fails to integrate two fundamental strands in his work: phenomenology and pragmatism. Gaps between separated consciousnesses block synchronization and access to others, and objective symbol schemes, absorbed within the egological outlook, cannot bridge these gaps. Renn, however, construes phenomenology as practicing a solipsistic withdrawal of a self cut off from its environs, denies that contents correlative to individual intentional acts can be objective and common, and overlooks the intricacies of Schutz’s descriptive methodology. Furthermore, for Renn, (...) Schutz’s distinctions between inner and outer time and ego and alter congeal into hardened dualisms. Renn expects more than Schutz’s methodology can deliver, but correctly points to problems of the social world that need to be addressed by several philosophical strategies, including pragmatism and Schutzian phenomenology. (shrink)

Descartes's dualism did not result from Cartesian doubts, Christian beliefs, from a bias against animal nature, or from a conflict of reason and emotion. In fact, Descartes's dualism was the very fruitful product of the mechanistic conception of causality with which the French philosopher sought to replace the souls, qualities and intelligences contemporaries put forward as alternatives for the outdated Aristotelian principles of matter, form and privation. Descartes's naturalistic turn in physiology and physics not only formed the basis for his (...) dualistic metaphysics; it still bears fruit in the work of scientists such as Antonio R. Damasio today. Descartes gave scientists the paradoxical instruction to describe nature without reference to human experience. (shrink)

This paper summarises the issues of dualism in the philosophy of Hans Jonas. Dualism was a central topic for him to understand gnosticism in late antiquity, and it became also a key concept to understand moral nihilism of the XXth century. Jonas demonstrates that Heidegger’s thought in Sein und Zeit ‑ which enables him to elaborate the heuristic method to shed light on gnostic dualism ‑ was in fact itself based on a dualistic anthropology. On the one hand, Jonas attempted (...) to reply to it with a philosophical biology ; on the other hand, his reply to the cosmological dualism thanks to his speculative and mythical concept of the weak God. (shrink)

Feminist epistemologists who attempt to refigure epistemology must wrestle with a number of dualisms. This essay examines the ways Lorraine Code, Sandra Harding, and Susan Hekman reconceptualize the relationship between self/other, nature/culture, and subject/object as they struggle to reformulate objectivity and knowledge.

Joachim Renn argues that Schutz fails to integrate two fundamental strands in his work: phenomenology and pragmatism. Gaps between separated consciousnesses block synchronization and access to others, and objective symbol schemes, absorbed within the egological outlook, cannot bridge these gaps. Renn, however, construes phenomenology as practicing a solipsistic withdrawal of a self cut off from its environs, denies that contents correlative to individual intentional acts can be objective and common, and overlooks the intricacies of Schutz's descriptive methodology. Furthermore, for Renn, (...) Schutz's distinctions between inner and outer time and ego and alter congeal into hardened dualisms. Renn expects more than Schutz's methodology can deliver, but correctly points to problems of the social world that need to be addressed by several philosophical strategies, including pragmatism and Schutzian phenomenology. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.