This paper examines recent deployments of Wittgenstein’s thought, by Mustafa (2018) and Asad (2020), in defense of the Islamic “traditionalism” of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school. I will briefly summarize the key features of Wittgenstein’s thought crucial to this, and then examine their ramifications. I argue that Wittgenstein’s position actually undermines any claim to interpretive authority, whether of the “rationalist” or salafi “traditionalist” sort. Secondly, the approach to religious language most commonly associated with Wittgenstein—so-called “Wittgensteinian Fideism” may pose (...) bigger problems for traditionalists than the influence of classical philosophy or “rationalist” theological responses to modern skeptical challenges. (shrink)

Según las fuentes hanbalíes, el imám Ibn Hanbal (m. en 855) no capituló ante inquisición `abbásí. En tiempos recientes, sin embargo, se tiende a pensar que sí debió capitular porque si no, nunca habría sido liberado. Sin embargo, una comparación del proceso de Ibn Hanbal con el de Hunayn b. Isháq (m. 873), indica que los califas `abbá-síes, cuando tenían que juzgar a un sospechoso de herejía, lo hacían más bien basados en razones de estado que en motivos dogmáticos. En (...) este contexto, en la narración del proceso recogido por Hanbal b. Isháq, puede leerse una explicación plausible de por qué el califa al-Mu'tasim puede haber liberado a Ibn Hanbal a pesar de que éste desafiara a la Inquisición. = According to Hanbali sources, the imam (d. 855) did not capitulate to the `Abbásid Inquisition. In modem times, a persuasive argument has been made that he must Nave done so; otherwise, he would never Nave been released. Yet a comparison of Ibn Hanbal's trial with that of Hunayn b. Isháq (d. 873) suggests that the `Abbásid caliphs, when asked to judge suspected heretics, made their decisions based on reasons of state rather than dogmatic grounds. Against this background, the trial report of Hanbal b. Isháq can be read as a plausible account of why the caliph al-Mu'tasim might Nave released Ibn Hanbal despite the latter's defiance of the Inquisition. (shrink)

The first poems about the Prophet Muḥammad appeared while he was alive. These first examples, which are panegyrics (madīḥ, i‛tiẕār, fakhr and ris̱ā), largely reflect the characteristics of the pre-Islamic qaṣīda poetry. Due to the developments in the following centuries, the number of poems about the Prophet increased. And thus, a separate literary genre was formed under the name al-madīḥ al-nabawī. Especially the fact that sufi leaning poets contributed to the literary richness in this field. Another factor is the beginning (...) of the tradition of writing mawlid poems in memory of the birth of the Prophet Muḥammad. The thirteenth century was an important period for poems praising the Prophet Muḥammad. Two important poets emerged in this century. One of them is Egyptian poet al-Būṣīrī and the other is Baghdad's famous poet, Yaḥyā al-Ṣarṣarī. Even after his death, Ṣarṣarî’s works with high literary value were read and memorized in the circles of science, literature and Sufism. Due to his competence in the field, al-Ṣarṣarī was known as the poet of the Prophet and Ḥassān b. Thābit of his time. However, it is understood that his poems, which lost their importance in literary circles over time, were not studied as much as they deserved in the modern period. In this article, his life and works are introduced and basic language and stylistic features of his poems are examined. Also, the image of the Prophet in his poems was determined within the framework of the political conditions of the period.Summary: In the field of madīh nabawī, which first appeared in the ‘Asr al-Sa’āda and has continued to the present day, especially two names stand out in the 7th/13th century, when famous poets such as Macduddīn al-Vitrī (d. 662/1264), Ibn al-Muraḥḥal (d. 699/1300) and Ṣafiyyuddīn al-Ḥillī (d. 749/1348) were also raised. One of them is the Egyptian poet al-Būṣīrī (d. 695/1296), who left his mark on the field of madīh nabawī with his many poems, especially Qaṣīda Burda, and the other is the Iraqi poet Yahya al-Ṣarṣarī (d. 656/1258), who was named Shā‘iru Rasūlillāh (The poet of the Prophet) and Ḥassānu Vaḳtihī (Ḥassān of that period) because of the quality of his poems in this field.al-Ṣarṣarī, was born in the village of al-Ṣarṣar, near Baghdad, spent most of his life in the shadow of Baghdad’s political instability and the social collapse that developed in parallel. He was killed in 656/1258 by the Mongolian forces that invaded Baghdad. al-Ṣarṣarī was extremely knowledgeable in fiqh, hadith, language, and ‘ilm al-qirāa. Our poet adopted the views of the Hanbalī law school. In addition, he turned to Sufism and became a murīd (disciple) of Ali ibn Idrīs al-Ya‘kūbī, a student of Abdalqadīr al-Gīlanī who was accepted as the founder of Qādiriyya. He was closely attached to the Sunnah of the Prophet and was fond of reading the Quran. He was chaste and patient and was content with what he had himself. All his works are poetic and they all concern the madīh nabawī or fiqh.Since his poems, almost all of which are about the praise of the Prophet, have a high literary value, they were read, memorized and narrated for a long time in the circles of science, literature and Sufism. In terms of its structure, his poems are based on the traditional forms of Arab qasīda. In the introductory sections of his poems, he often expresses his longing for Madina. The main subject in poems is usually the Prophet and his superior features. In the last part, he usually says salāt for the Prophet and seeks help from him. It can be said that he used simple language in his poems. The vocabulary reflects the characteristics of the urban life in which he lived. The source of inspiration for his poems are the Qur’an and especially the hadith of the Prophet. He uses the potential of literary arts as much as possible while conveying his feelings. But he does not allow the correct information to be lost due to these arts on a serious subject such as depicting the Prophet. We can see a lot of badī‘ (creative) art in some of his poems. But we can immediately understand that these arts do not spoil the beauty of his expression. The poet provides rhythm and harmony in his poetry with the meter and rhyme in accordance with the classical Arabic qasida rules. In addition, he strengthens the musicality in poetry with puns (jinās) and repetition.The influence of the instability of the region where al-Ṣarṣarī lived on his poems is obvious. According to him, the main reason for the terrible situation that Muslims were in was that they were away from the way of the Prophet. He thought that it would be possible to go back to the old peaceful days by following the way of the Prophet. Perhaps as a result of this opinion, he allocated his qasīda to the narration of the Prophet and his Companions. In his poems, he describes the Prophet with his names, superior qualities, physical and moral characteristics. He says that the sentences describing the Prophet are the ornament of poems and believes that praising him is a mean of salvation in the next world. He also hoped that the poems he said in order to achieve spiritual ascension would protect himself against the troubled events of the period.In his poems, especially on the occasion of mawlīd, al-Ṣarṣarī mentions the Prophet’s physical characteristics and likens his smiling face to a bright full moon, his brows to the letter nûn, his teeth to pearls. He describes the Prophet as a man with black eyes, broad shoulders, born with kohl-lined eyes, and who emanates a beautiful scent as a requirement of his creation. The poet, who also touches on the Prophet’s powerful address, states that his speech is more effective than Luqman’s wise words by virtue of his jawami‘ al-kalim (comprehensive speech) and faṣl al-khiṭab (clear speech), and that his soft address, which states nothing other than the truth, is a blessing from Allah. He additionally describes the Prophet’s plain words, easy to understand by all, as more valuable than jewels. al-Ṣarṣarī, who praises the Prophet in terms of morality with basic human virtues such as bashfulness, justice, modesty, and courage, emphasizes that he is, a paragon of patience, perseverance, kindness, and compassion through analogies such as, “his clothes are peace and perseverance”, his “cover is kindness and forgiveness”. In his world of imagery, the Prophet’s benevolence is so abundant like the rain that the clouds cannot compete with him. Also, he does not shame anybody for what he gives. He bestows the most valuable possessions like gold and camels. Even the respectable personalities of the tribe benefit from his grace. He is so generous that he is giving even when the clouds are stingy about giving rain during times of drought. He welcomes with a smile those who approach him with requests. The donations he makes privately are entirely satisfying.The image of prophethood in al-Ṣarṣarī’s poems, is centralized around the thought of nūr Muhammadī (prophetic light) and the miracles of the Prophet. He reminds that the Prophet never gave up despite the calamities he encountered and that he was supported with extraordinary events in various stages of his life since he was born, and reflects the understanding that the prophet is spiritually supporting the community with his nūr, and in the case the community follow his sunnah, overcoming the Mongolian attacks, which seems like a miracle, is possible. The mention of Qattāl (warrior), Māḥī (eliminator of disbelief), Ẓāhir, Ẓāfir, Manṣūr and Muẓaffar (victorious) among the Prophet’s names, especially those that evoke the superiority he gained in his fight against the disbelievers, giving greater prominence to his courage and valor among his virtues are also related to the political and social conditions of the period. The couplets about the Companions of the Prophet following the couplets that describe the Prophet’s valor, the emphasis of their aid to the Prophet, and the particular mention of their fighter spirit may be considered in the same context. Perhaps, in this way, the poet aims to boost the courage of the Muslims who are exposed to Mongolian attacks with respect to protecting their spiritual and holy values against the enemy. (shrink)

The validity of the prayer which is accepted as the most basic worship of Islam has been tied to a set of rules. These rules which must be followed before and during the prayer are called conditions and pillars in the fiqh language. The recitation performed while standing during the prayer is one of the most significant of these rules and is accepted one of the pillars of the prayer. Therefore, in order for the prayer to be valid, it is (...) required to make enough recitations. If it is not done, the prayer is considered invalid. For this reason, the topic of recitation in prayer has been discussed in detail by the jurists, and different opinions have been submitted what, when and how much to recite. The jurists have suggested three basic views on this issue. Ḥanafīs have stated that a person who follows the imām in prayer should not recite, and they have accepted the recitation of ma’mūm as makruh regardless of whether the recitation is loud or silent. The Shāfiʿīs who uphold the opposite view of the Ḥanafīs have said that the ma’mūm have to recite in all the prayers in which the qirā'āt is loud and silent, and that it is obligatory for the ma’mūm to recite. According to Shāfiʿīs the prayer of a ma’mūm without recitation is not valid. Malikīs and Ḥanbalīs who have explained their opinions by taking into account that the recitation is loud and silent have stated that the ma’mūm should recite during prayers in which the recitation is silent. In the prayers where the recitation is loud the Ḥanbalīs have said that the ma’mūm should recite when the imām takes a break from recitation, while the Malikīs have said that the recitation is not required for the ma’mūm. However the jurists of both sects have not considered that the recitation is obligatory to ma’mūm. And they have acknowledged that the prayer of the ma’mūm was valid even if he has not recite. There is intra-sectarian disagreement in all of these three basic views which are presented as the general opinion of the sects. Although we are talking about the intra-sectarian disagreement, it is understood that the jurists except the Ḥanafīs have determined their views on the recitation of the ma’mūm within the context of whether the ma’mūm hear or do not hear the recitation of the imām. It can be said that this understanding is at the basis of the views put forward by the Shāfiʿīs who take into account that the recitation is loud and silent about the ma’mūm’s recitation of the sūrat after the Fātiḥa. Likewise it is possible to say that this understanding is at the basis of the perceptives brought forward by the Malikī and Ḥanbalī jurists about the prayers in which the recitation is sound. The jurists who expressed different opinions about the recitation of the ma’mūm similarly brought evidence from the Qurʾān, the Sunnah, opinions of the Companions and qiyās to justify their views. Although the jurists have grounded their views on similar evidence, they have reached different conclusions. The reason for this difference it can be shown that the direction of the verse (āyat) to be taken as evidence, their different approaches when evaluating the narrations transmitted from the Prophet (pbuh) and the fact that the arguments of qiyās are different. (shrink)

Satr al-awrah (Hijab /veiling) is one of the obligatory provisions for men and women in Islam. Satr al-awrah, as a religious/jurisprudential term, means covering the parts of the body (awrah) that should be covered by religion. Islamic jurisprudents have disagreed on whether satr al-awrah is a condition of validity for prayer. There are two basic approaches to this issue, one of which belongs to the public (jumhūr including the Hanafī, Shafiī and Hanbalī schools) and the other to the Mālikīs. According (...) to the majority (jumhūr), satr al-awrah is a validity condition of the prayer. Therefore, a prayer performed without fulfilling the satr al-awrah condition is not valid. A prayer performed in this way must be re-performed absolutely within or outside of time. There are two approaches in the Mālikī school regarding whether the satr al-awrah is a condition for the validity of the prayer. The first approach is (partly) the same as the jumhūr. According to the second approach (without any distinction between prayer and outside the prayer), satr al-awrah is a general obligation in Islam and is not a valid condition for prayer.According to the Mālikīs who accept this second view, it is sunnah to comply with the satr al-awrah condition in prayer. On the other hand, in the Mālikī school, awrah is divided into two as ʿawrah mughallaẓa and ʿawrah mukhaffafa in terms of its effect on the validity of prayer. The disagreement about whether the satr al-awrah is a condition of validity for the prayer is related to the ʿawrah mughallaẓa. On the other hand, there is an agreement that the ʿawrah mukhaffafa is not a condition for the validity of the prayer. The disagreement in the classical fiqh doctrine about whether the satr al-awrah is a condition for the validity of the prayer has some jurisprudential consequences. As a matter of fact, according to the majority, whether it is ʿawrah mughallaẓa or mukhaffafa, a prayer performed with an uncovered awrah is not valid and must be re-performed absolutely. In the Mālikī school, there are different opinions depending on whether it is ʿawrah mughallaẓa or mukhaffafa. If the place uncovered on the body is ʿawrah mughallaẓa; According to those who accept the satr al-awrah as a condition for the validity of the prayer, the prayer is not valid and must be re-performed absolutely. After the time has passed, the prayer does not have to be repeated. If the place uncovered on the body is ʿawrah mukhaffafa, according to all Mālikīs, unanimously the prayer is valid. Although it is recommended to reperformed it in time, it is not required to be returned after the time has passed. The following can be said about the practical examples of the disagreement in the classical fiqh doctrine regarding whether the satr al-awrah is a condition for the validity of the prayer, especially in terms of ʿawrah mukhaffafa: According to Mālikīs, who do not accept the validity of the satr al-awrah for prayer, it is valid for women to pray with their heads down, below the knees and with their arms uncovered. Again, according to them, it is valid for men to perform prayers with their thighs/hips (fakhz) uncovered, since it is considered one of the private parts. (shrink)

Sunnah is the second main source for Islamic law following the Qur’ān. Sunnah in the books on the Methodology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) is examined in two main parts, one of which is as the source for religious commands and the other is being as religious/taklīfī commands. Sunnah is divided into three categories in terms of being the source for Islamic commands: qawlī (verbal), fi‘ilī (behavioral) and taqrīrī (approval). In the Islamic literature, when the word “sunnah” is mentioned, first (...) of all, it is understood as a verbal appeal, which is qawlī sunnah (hadith). Verbal sunnah has a rhetoric/wording that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). And ultimately to the wording of this verbal address, some religious commands, such as farḍ/wājib, sunnah/mandūb, and permissible/mubāḥ are attributed. The behavioral sunnah (the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other hand, does not have a rhetoric that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). The command/judgment is based on rhetoric. In other words, if there is an address, there is a command; if there is no address, there is no command/judgment. Therefore, it is problematic that the acts of the Prophet are decreed in the form of farḍ/ wājib, sun-nah/mandūb and mubāḥ. For this reason, the acts of the Prophet in the books on the Method-ology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) have been particularly examined under the title of Afʿāl al-Rasūl. While some of the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad have a religious character, some of them are the acts that he performed completely in accordance with the customs and traditions in the society he lived in. Therefore, not all of the Prophet’s deeds/acts (behavioral sunnah) are at the same level in terms of obligation. Therefore, while some of the acts/deeds of the Prophet express wucūb, some other mandūb (sunnah-mustaḥab) and still some other ibāhā/mubāḥ. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad, in terms of being the source of religious commands, are divided into two categories: the tashrīī (religiously) qualified and non tashrīī (religiously) qualified. What is meant by a religious act is the actions of the Prophet, which he performed as being a prophet, for the purpose of worshiping and that he wanted his followers act accordingly. What is meant by a non-religious act is the behavior of the Prophet as a human being or as a requirement of the society he lived in. Sunnah, in terms of being a religious com-mand, refers to commands other than fard and wājib. Ḥanafī scholars are of the opinion that sunnah as a religious decree is divided into two parts as sunnah-i hudā and sunnah-i zawāid. The acts of the Prophet, in accordance with his being a human or the custom of the society he lived in, are included in the scope of sunnah zawāid. In other words, sunnah zawāid generally means the actions of the Prophet that he did not do with the intention of worship. In this con-text, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad are important. Because, the acts of the Prophet are not the same in terms of qualification (command), nor are they the same in terms of their nature (being religious or humanly natural). The acts of the Prophet Muḥammad with a religious nature are divided into two as known qualities and unknown qualifications. In principle, the religious acts of the Prophet, whose qualities are known, are also obligation for the ummah (Muslims). Therefore, when it is known for what purpose the Prophet Muḥammad made a deed/behavior, that act is accordingly is binding for the ummah (Muslims). Accordingly, if the attribute of a deed/behavior made by the Prophet is wājib/farḍ, it is also wājib for the ummah and permissible (ibāḥā) for the ummah if it is permissible. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet in the Qur’ān as a mujmal (ambiguous nass /verse) are also subject to the command of mujmal. There is a dispute regarding the verdict of the Prophet’s acts of religious nature whose qualifications are unknown. According to the majority of Hanafī scholars, what is essential in the actions of the Prophet whose qualifications are unknown and that contain the characteris-tics of worship, is that it is mustahab/mandūb. According to Kerkhī (d. 340/952), what is es-sential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. Jassās (d.370 / 980) expresses the same opinion with Kerkhī. Opinions on this issue are conveyed from Imām Mālik and Imām Shafiī that he declared permissibility. The preferred opinion in Hanbalis is to declare permissibility. Non-religious acts of the Prophet Muḥammad as a human being or as per the custom of the society he lives in are not obligation for the ummah. Therefore, what is essential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. (shrink)

This article deals with the elevation of the administrative status of Jerusalem from vilāya to niyāba and the impact of this transformation on the judicial organization and the appointments in the city. During the early Mamluk period, Jerusalem remained as wilāya, a less significant administrative unit, subordinate to the nā’ib of Damascus. However, in the later eighth/fourteenth century, the city was turned into a separate niyāba, an administrative unit governed by the viceroy (nā’ib al-saltana) of the sultan, and attached directly (...) to Cairo, the political centre of the Mamluks. While the existing scholarship tends to see this change as a manoeuvre against the Crusader threat, this article argues that the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem was associated with the bureaucratic centralisation of the Mamluk Sultanate and the religious importance of the city. Unlike the Ayyubid politics of fragmented sovereignty between the dynasty members, the Mamluks appointed viceroys on behalf of the sultan to the significant cities of Syria. Therefore, the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem can be seen as a continuation of this attempt toward the centralisation of the Syro-Egyptian lands. On the other hand, with this change, the Mamluk sultan had the opportunity to express his patronage over Jerusalem in a more powerful way and to control the administrative, judicial, and scholarly realms in the city directly. What is more important in terms of the judicial practices is that Jerusalem was introduced to four chief judgeships (Shāfi‘ī, Hanafī, Mālikī, and Hanbalī) within the thirty-year period after the founda-tion of niyāba. All these changes meant that the city became bureaucratically more integrated with Cairo so that the Cairene elite were increasingly in-volved in local appointments of scholars. Moreover, it became increasingly crucial for Jerusalemite scholars to have connections with Cairene bureaucrats in order to secure scholarly positions in Jerusalem. (shrink)

In the absence of a codified Family Law, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has traditionally applied the Hanbali school of Islamic Law in its family courts. However, the court’s handling of children’s custody cases has been criticised as being too rigid and narrow in interpreting the principles of Islamic Law. To overcome some of the problems faced in children’s custody cases, the Saudi authorities have recently made a number of Directions and Decisions for the family courts to follow. Through (...) looking at these measures and some relevant court judgements, this Article aims to shed some light on the effect of these changes in emphasising the human rights of children in family law cases. (shrink)

Understanding the developments in the early period when Ṣūfism became widespread in the Islamic society, both necessitates studies on other disciplines from Ṣūfism, and also requires the consideration of Ṣūfism from the perspective of other religious sciences. In this regard, one of the important names is the famous Ḥanbalī scholar Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā. Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā who was interested in ḥadīth, Islamic law and tafsīr as well as Ṣūfism and theological issues, has an important place especially with his works in (...) the Ḥanbalī tradition. Abū Yaʿlā, who grew up in a period when the Sunnī theology schools were formed, spread and exercised its influence, he maintained the Ḥanbalī viewpoint and criticized both some schools of kalām and the Ṣūfis by using the kalām method. Therefore, analyzing his views is important for understanding the formative conditions of the first period of religious science tradition, as well as giving clues about the relationship between Ṣūfism and Ḥanbalī tradition. In this article, his views of zuhd, tawakkul and Ṣūfism in general is examined in the context of his works Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn and Kitāb al-tawakkul, and his importance in understanding the relationship between Ṣūfism and Ḥanbalī tradition is emphasized. (shrink)

As mentioned in the narrations, the messenger of Allah (pbuh) used to recite some prayers known as opening prayers such as Subhaneke, Wejjehtu and Allâhümme Bâid before reciting Fatiha surah while starting the obligatory and supererogatory worships (salat). In this study, it is aimed to find out the reflections of the abovementioned prayers in narrations, and to determine their authenticity and to reveal the reasons why jurisprudential sects preferred different prayers. Benefitting from literature review method, hadith inferences were made, and (...) moving from the books of refutation & corrections and biographies, the cases of the narrators of the hadiths, who took part in the ascription of the narrations, were put forth. After the investigation, it was determined that the narrated narrations about Subhaneke, an opening prayer, were found to have been narrated by eight different prophet companions in their later works through Aisha and Abu Sâ’id al-Khudrî in early hadiths resources; and that all these narrations were week in terms of authenticity. However, it was revealed that the most authentic narrations about the issue were those depending on the practice of Umar. In the hadith resources, it was seen that five different prophet companions narrated some narrations about the Wejjechtu prayer, and that the great majority of these narrations were through Ali, and that most of these narrations were authentic, yet only one reference was found to be weak. On the other hand, it was revealed that the narrations narrated by Abu Huraira between the opening prayer, Allâhümme Bâid, turned out to be genuine in terms of authenticity. For instance, while Hanafis and Hanbalis have preferred reciting Subhaneke during salat, Shafiîs have found it appropriate to recite the prayer Wejjectu in the salat. On the other hand, Malikis have thought that it was obligatory to start the salat with Surah Fatiha, and that it was makruh to recite these prayers in salat. (shrink)

The relationship between reason and revelation has been on the agenda of Islamic scholars for a long time and it has been discussed as an essential argument with regard to developing the source of religious epistemology. The Salafist approach represents the most traditionalist fundamental religious idea of Islam, they subordinate the reason to the revelation and hence they consider the revelation and religious narrations as a pure and the only source. Ibn ʿAqīl was a member of the Salafi/Hanbali scholars (...) and he had some counter-view/discourses against intellectual tradition that he belonged to. He attached great importance to reason and this is the most notable discourse in his doctrine. Also, this is an indication of his traditionalist approach and meanwhile, he tends towards rationalism. The main argument of Ibn ʿAqīl regarding the relationship between reason and revelation is the compatibility of reason and revelation. Reason confirms revelation and revelation agrees with reason. So, there is no contradiction or conflict between reason and revelation. Thusly, a correct understanding of revelation is only possible by using the mind/by putting the mind into action correctly. (shrink)

This article documents the main developments in the textual history of a short polemical treatise ascribed to Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Radd ʿalā al-zanādiqa wa-l-jahmiyya. In particular, I show that three different, if related, recensions of the text exist in manuscript. Then, drawing on evidence from the text and biobibliographical sources, I show that al-Radd only emerged over several centuries. The idea for the text finds its roots in the earlist elaborations of Hanbali theology, perhaps even in the notebooks of (...) Ibn Ḥanbal himself. The first recension of the text, however, only emerged after the mid-fourth/tenth century in Baghdad. Another recension appears at the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century, perhaps also in Baghdad. These recensions were combined to form a third recension no later than the eighth/fourteenth century, and it is the third recension that became the basis for most print editions of the work. (shrink)

The Quran makes repentance an important element of piety and exhorts believers to repent of their sins. Numerous hadith also emphasize its importance, along with God’s merciful forgiveness of the repentant sinner. In his K. al-Tawwābīn, the Hanbali scholar Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī draws on a wide range of akhbār to present examples of repentance of angels, prophets, Companions of Muḥammad, pious mystics, and others, including non-Muslims. Ibn Qudāma’s treatise stands out for his frequent citation of accounts maligned by other (...) scholars as isrāʾīliyyāt. In addition, his willingness to highlight the sins of prophets and the Prophet’s Companions, while in line with other Hanbalis, challenges common notions of prophetic impeccability and the ethical qualities of the ṣaḥāba. In this article we argue that Ibn Qudāma is willing to challenge these notions because of his vision for the construction of the pious self. He sees human initiative in overcoming the self’s natural inclination to sinfulness as a necessary step toward spiritual excellence. In this regard his spiritual vision is shaped by certain Sufi notions. While divine grace still plays a role in the working of repentance, it does not eliminate the need for human initiative. This led Ibn Qudāma to construct a mythical past in which many of the great spiritual figures were involved with a spiritual struggle with their own immoral or impious instincts. (shrink)

If all things and events, including human actions, are predetermined by God since pre-eternity, then what space is left for human freedom of will, and hence, for moral responsibility? In the beginning of the 14th century, a non-Muslim scholar, probably of Jewish faith, confronted several Muslim scholars from Damascus and Cairo with precisely this question in versified form. Among them is the well-known Ḥanbalī theologian and jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who is said to have responded instantly with a 184-verse (...) poem (of which 125 verses are extant). This article provides an analysis of Ibn Taymiyya’s stance on the question of how it can be said that God is just in predetermining and judging human actions and compares it to that of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī. The article ends with the first full translation of the versified question and Ibn Taymiyya’s response into a European language. Both thinkers depart from similar positions, insofar as both deny human free will. However, while Ibn Taymiyya tries to show that the fact that God will hold human beings accountable for their predetermined actions does not go against our inborn sense of justice, ar-Rāzī adduces that fact as part of his strategy to show that God’s actions cannot be subject to rational moral assessment, as they would otherwise have to be declared as senseless and even harmful. (shrink)

This study contains a critical edition of Ibn al-Jawzī’s Kitāb Akhbār as-Sifāt along with an annotated translation and introduction. KAS is primarily a critique of anthropomorphic conceptions of God, directed against fellow Hanbalis and traditionalists generally. It sheds important new light on the intellectual fault-lines within medieval Hanbalism, and reveals the extent to which kalām had penetrated the school by the 12th century.

This article aims at examining the limits of change in the field of worship through a study on the origins of the ḥukm[religious ruling] of Shawwāl fasting that is widely practiced in the different parts of Muslim world. The study, firstly, deals with the evolution of the ḥukm of Shawwāl fasting chronologically among four sunnī schools of law, then analyzes the solitary reports on the topic. It concludes that in Mālikīand Ḥanefīschools, the ḥukm of this specific worship changed within the (...) limits of karāha [reprehensibility], ibāha [permissibility], and nadb [recommendation]. This ḥukm was constructed based on solitary reports which later became a paradigmatic source of religious legitimacy in the Ḥanbalīschool beginning with the eponymous Imām and in the Shāfiʿīlong after the founding authorities. It also claims that it is strongly probable that the solitary reports on the topic go back to a deduced opinion in the age of companions, but then reached to a form of prophetic solitary report in the corpus of hadīth reports. Ultimately, this specific worship that has restricted number of fasting was established with the paradigmatic effect of the approach to solitary reports as the only authentic way of transmitting the sunna, even though it is at odds with the fact that this worship had not been implemented in the first two centuries after hijra, i.e. contrary to the established practice [ʿamal]. Summary: The issue of change of rulings in Islamic law comes up frequently on various occasions, and an increasing number of academic studies are trying to determine the characteristics and limits of this change in numerous books, articles and papers. These studies mostly seem to focus on bringing together the arguments that can be compiled under the title of ‘the flexibility of Islamic law in response to the challenges of modernity’. Although the change of rulings in Islamic law is an undeniable fact, reading it only from the lens of the change in Islamic law depending on the requirements of time is an inadequate reading. The change of rulings in Islamic law has different motives; and the change of time, more precisely the change of custom, is only one of them.On the other hand, another issue that comes up in relation to the change of rulings is the claim that this change can only take place in terms of the rulings regulating the interpersonal relations, i.e. muʿāmalāt. In fact, this claim relies on the abovementioned approach that limits the change in Islamic law with the change of custom. Hence, because other two main areas of Islamic law, worships (ʿibādāt) and punishments (ʿuqūbāt) are not open to change through custom, their rulings will not change at all. This article will try to reveal that the change in rulings might reside in a sort of another change emerged in relation to the sources of these rulings, which is a neglected point. Thus, by exposing that the field of worships which is mostly considered as a closed area for change in rulings is actually open to it, this article will examine the limits of this change.For this analysis, the article deals with the fasting of six days in the month of Shawwāl as an example, which is widely practiced in various parts of the Islamic world. The main evidence on which this fasting is based on is a report transmitted in the considerably authentic hadith sources of Ahl al-Sunnah, which reads as follows “Whoever fasts the Ramaḍān and adds six days from Shawwāl, will get reward of the entire year”. This fasting, which is the subject of a great agreement on its ruling as recommended (mustaḥāb) practice today, was actually regarded as reprehensible (makrūh) by the two great eponymous jurists of the first two schools of law in the second Hijrī century, namely Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa. In his al-Muwaṭṭaʾ,Mālik clearly expresses that he did not recognize any scholar who keeps this fast, and that no [authentic] report has reached him on this. The fact that both Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa declared an opinion on the subject shows that this practice started to appear in the first half of the second ḥijrī century as a practice or as a solitary report (khabar al-wāḥid). However, both imāms have stated that such a specific worship would be makrūh. In spite of these very sharp expressions, the schools of law, which were founded by the followers of these two eponymous scholars, abandoned their views and widely accepted Shawwāl fasting as mustaḥāb. This article examines why this sharp change occurred in a worship in the schools of law and in which way it took place.Accordingly, the fundamental motive in this change is a paradigmatic transformation in understanding and identifying the sunna as a source of normativity. Although an agreement was formed on the validity of solitary reports as a source of knowledge in the second ḥijrī century, it was not yet accepted that these narrations are identical to sunna as a source of normativity. For that reason, both Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik did not hesitate to reject any solitary report that contradicted a stronger evidence. However, as a result of the extraordinary efforts of Ahl al-Ḥadīth, the epistemic value of solitary reports has reached to an authority equating them to the sunna with a very rapid acceleration as of the end of the second century and throughout the third century. This situation led later scholars of schools to abandon the views of the eponymous scholars of these schools on certain topics in favor of certain solitary reports. This was also the process for the change in Shawwāl fasting.This thesis will be put under two headings, a section that tries to determine the periods and processes for the Sunnī schools of law in considering this fasting as mustaḥāb; and another section that provides an evaluation of transmitted reports in relation to the Shawwāl fasting. Accordingly, in the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools, due to the effect of the reports, the ruling of Shawwāl fasting has been transformed from makrūh into the mustaḥāb as a result of the interpretational activities that started in the fourth ḥijrī century. Shawwāl fasting was accepted as mustaḥāb in the Shāfiʿī school, although there was no transmitted opinion on the subject from the founding imāms, in the fifth ḥijrī century; and in the Ḥanbalī school directly by the founding imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, whose main aim was to follow a concept of religion that puts the transmitted reports at the center. When the reports on the subject are examined, it demonstrates that the mustaḥāb ruling is mainly rooted in a report by Saʿd b. Saʿīd transmitted in the famous hadīth compilations including Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ.Yet, this report was criticized in its both chain and text. Combining the facts that the same report with the same chain was also transmitted as the words of the companion in some sources and the verse that declares good deed will be rewarded ten times higher than what it deserves will make the following explanation a valid one: As Mālik put it such a fasting practice was commonly unknown to the Muslim society in the first two centuries after the ḥijra. Sometime after the death of the Prophet, an inference was made probably by a companion(s) as that it would be a good deed if someone who fasted an entire month already and got used to the fasting to fast six more days in order to get a reward of fasting for the entire year according to the verse that rewards good deeds with ten times higher. Since it is a recommended practice in essence, i.e. fasting for the sake of Allah, this inference transformed into a report and easily passed through the filters of hadīth scholars who are linked to a sort of piety promoting worships among people. After the solitary reports gained an authority to the extent that they can rarely be challenged, the followers of later schools of law preferred to get in a process of re-interpreting the opinions of their imāms in order either to reconcile them with the content of report, or at least to show why these imāms actually spoke against this fasting. Eventually, the later scholars of madhhab decided for the standard opinion of the madhhab depending on the reports in favor of the Shawwāl fasting rather than following their eponymous imāms. (shrink)

: The founder of Wahhabism, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, is on the side of those who advocate that ijtihād’s gate is open. In his thought, the continuity of knowledge about the truth is based on the sustainability of ijtihād, and in every period, there have been mujtahids to interpret the nass in consistent with the issues. The later scholars have developed the thoughts related to ijtihād on this platform. Wahhābī thought does not describe madhhab as a systematic integrated approach. According (...) to them, the madhhab is the ḥukm that were made within the discretion of mujtahids on the basis of nass on the issues open and free to ijtihād. With this approach, they have tried to explain what refers to the word of “Our madhhab is the one of Ahmad ibn Hanbal ”. It has been suggested that this acknowledgment does not mean taqlīd that the words of madhhab imāms are replaced with the Qur’ān and Sunna just as some other members of madhhab do so. Either Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb or his disciples have based their own opinions of such as ijtihād, madhhab, taqlīd, ittibā and ikhtilāf upon the proofs that Ḥanbalī Madhhab, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim used. Our aim in this study is to determine how the issues regarding such as ijtihād,taqlīd, madhhab, ikhtilāf, etc. were examined in the primary sources that formed Wahhābī thought. In the early period Wahhābī sources, it is not possible to find definitions of Islamic law in technical terms. Topics have been dealt with within the framework of the answer to a problem/fatwā or a criticism. For this reason, our method will be based on reaching a conclusion about "The Status of Ijtihād in the Early Period of Wahhābī Thought and The Meaning of Commitment to a Madhhab on Fiqh." in the light of the opinions of the first period thinkers. Summary: The connection and similarity of the Wahhābī movement, which started in the Islamic world at a time close to the time when the reform ideas appeared, have been hesitantly welcomed for a few reasons. The fact that members of the Wahhābī movement are intolerant in terms of reform in people’s beliefs, and they use the concept of takfīr, are chief among these reasons. Another reason is that Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb does not accept any religious discipline and individual as an authority. The reactions and discourses developed by Wahhābī thinkers against the established practices of faith, ijtihād, taqlīd and denominationalism has brought many objections and criticism. The founder of Wahhabism, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, is on the side of those who advocate that ijtihād’s gate is open. In his thought, the continuity of knowledge about the truth is based on the sustainability of ijtihād, and in every period, there have been mujtahids to interpret the nass in consistent with the issues. According to him, in a number of controversial cases where no right path has been declared in the naṣṣ, all the efforts of a believer should be focused on understanding the command of God and his messenger and act accordingly. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb does not seek the condition of being a mujtahid to understand the Qur’ān and the sunna. He therefore opposed those who claimed that it is imperative for non-mujtahids to taqlīd a madhhab to understand the provisions of religion. According to him, everybody who has the ability to understand the Qur’ān and the sunna must make ijtihād. Blind allegiance to man-made law against the teachings of God and the Qur’ān is a type of shirk. Fuqahā’ are human and not infallible. The ‘ulamā’ that followed also developed their thoughts about ijtihād and taqlīd on this ground. The Wahhābīs say that they do not completely reject the taqlīd of the ‘ulamā’, but what they do not accept is no one, except the absolute mujtahid, can perform ijtihād. Differentiating ittibā‘, which means accepting an opinion based on evidence, from taqlīd despite the evidence, the Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ have defined the criteria of issuing or accepting a fatwā as performing ijtihād and ittibā‘ to those who have evidence of the Qur’ān and the sunna, or to the remarks of the scholars who are eligible for the Qur’ān and the sunna. According to the Wahhābīs, neither ijtihād nor taqlīd on the issues of ‘aqā’id is permissible in religion. The individual must learn what God and His messenger commands and forbids in terms of ‘aqā’id and worshipping. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb accepts that taqlīd in furū‘ al-fiqh is permissible in absolutely necessary situations such as not being able to reach sources from various views, and not having the time to evaluate these sources. According to Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, the notion that the dispute of ‘ulamā’ is a blessing is superstitious. According to him, the alliance and agreement of ‘ulamā’ is a deed, and their unity is a blessing. Despite this, the way to be followed in a matter of dispute is not in the madhhab views but the presentation of the matter in the Qur’ān and the sunna. Defining the field of dispute, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb said that the predecessor and the successor disagreed in the matters of furū‘ al-fiqh that were not declared in the naṣṣ; and in such affairs, the duty of the believer is to investigate what is the covenant of God and His messenger, and to show respect for the ‘ulamā’ even if it is mistaken. However, according to him, showing respect to the ‘ulamā’ is not saying ‘’they know better than us’’ despite the presence of evidence in matters of dispute. Wahhābī thought does not describe madhhab as a systematic integrated approach. According to them, the madhhab is the ḥukm that were made within the discretion of mujtahids on the basis of naṣṣ on the issues open and free to ijtihād. With this approach, they have tried to explain what refers to the word of “Our madhhab is the one of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal ” It has been suggested that this acknowledgment does not mean taqlīd that the words of madhhab imāms are replaced with the Qur’ān and the sunna just as some other members of madhhab do so. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and his followers emphasize in many places the movement is not a fifth and a new madhhab, they are members of the Ḥanbalī madhhab and they do not direct anyone to any organization in the form of fiqh, kalām, or ṣūfī. However, they say that madhhabs are not religion, and even if a new madhhab is aimed, this is not a problem. Although an emphasis of being part of the Ḥanbalī madhhab is made without sectarian fanaticism, it is stated that it is imperative to take the views of other madhhabs where the evidence is strong. With the emphasis of being part of the Ḥanbalī madhhab, they support their discourse of not being a new madhhab. However, the general description of the Ḥanbalī madhhab has a stricter approach regarding the way of accepting and using mental and transitional evidence than the other madhhabs. Accordingly, the Wahhābīs are described by a stricter version of the description. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb used their methodology to arrive at judgments instead of taking the specific provisions of the madhhabs, and accepted the adoption of provisions and refused bigotry and the madhhabs are authorities almost equal to God. The Qur’ān, the sunna and ijmā‘ were accepted as the primary authorities and the four madhhabs were not denied as long as they were not contrary to majority of Muslim community. The Wahhābīs, who follow Ibn Taymiyya on the matter of practicing according to a judgment of another madhhab in the presence of evidence, believe that changing a madhhab without any reason or for worldly reasons is not permissible in religion. Although the Wahhābīs do not display a clear attitude on denying madhhabs, they have developed a supra-madhhabs approach with the thoughts of direct access to the ḥukms and accepting the ḥukm of any madhhab as long as the ḥukm is in accordance with the evidence. As a matter of fact, one of the criticisms made in this respect is that they take the views from other madhhabs that suit them, and reject the others. The Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ of the first periods shaped their opinions on issues such as ijtihād, taqlīd, madhhab, ittibā‘, and ikhtilāf, based on the evidences used by the Ḥanbalī madhhab, Ibn Qayyim and especially Ibn Taymiyya. For this reason, it is not possible to say that they have a thought system of their own. Taking this fact into consideration, it seems possible to collect the approach of the method of almost all Wahhābī thinkers in issues that are the subject of this article under three items. First, the necessity of those with strength and ability to perform ijtihād to understand religious provisions; second, solving issues of dispute based on the Qur’ān and the sunna; and third, the presence of evidence overruling any kind of madhhab view. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

Religion, as a phenomenon that is as old as humanity, has continued to exist in one way or another wherever humans exist. At the core of religion are the principles of faith consisting of divinity, belief in the afterlife and belief in prophethood. When we look at the History of Religions, in almost all religions, when religion first emerged, there was no need for any institution to maintain religious life in a healthy way, but in later periods, protecting religion against (...) attacks from outside, responding to new demands, 'socialization', which are important tasks in social life. The need for institutional organization has emerged for reasons such as being able to fulfill issues such as 'distributing justice' and 'managing religious rites' in a regular and orderly manner, meeting the need to resolve disputes between people through religious means, increasing its followers and encountering different cultures by spreading over wide geographies. All religions have established some institutions to meet these needs. In today's Turkey, in order to respond to the religious needs of the Muslim community and to ensure continuity in religious services without creating any institutional gaps, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, today known as the Presidency of Religious Affairs, was established within the budget of the Prime Ministry and affiliated to the Prime Ministry, with Law No. 429. The Presidency of Religious Affairs has been fulfilling its duties related to the principles of worship, morality and belief, which are the three basic components of the Islamic religion, in line with the objectives specified in the law, without interruption since the day it was established. In the history of Islamic thought, sects are evaluated in two categories: fiqh-practical and religious-political. Firstly, sects whose religious aspects came to the fore were formed. The beginning of the formation of sects such as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali, which are called fiqh sects and talk about the rules and principles of worship and how to perform worship, coincides with the second century of Hijri and later periods. It is extremely important that religious officials who provide religious services to people of all ages and strata have a reasonable level of knowledge on theological issues as well as their knowledge of practical/fiqh sects. Religious officials, affiliated with DIB, provide multi-dimensional religious services in many different areas, especially mosques and Quran courses. In Turkish society, the most important source of information about religious issues for a large segment of the population is either the imam hatip or muezzin trustee in the neighborhood mosque, the Quran course instructor in the Quran course, or the preachers they reach through different channels such as 190 alo. In line with the information they receive, their religious perceptions are shaped and they continue their religious lives. In this study, it is aimed to reveal the basic views of religious sects and their knowledge levels of religious officials, who have a very important impact on shaping the religious lives of large masses of people. The study group of the research consists of religious officials working in the religious services class working under the Malatya provincial mufti between September 2020 and February 2021. The sample group of the research consists of 401 religious officials working as preachers, Quran course instructors, imam hatip and muezzin trustees under the Malatya provincial mufti's office. The method used in the research was simple random sampling, where each officer had an equal chance. The main purpose of simple random sampling is; The aim is to obtain more objective data by including each individual in the universe with an equal chance in the sample group. In the study, data was obtained with a two-part survey form prepared by the researcher by paying attention to all necessary stages. Both content analysis and descriptive analysis were used to analyze the data obtained. The data was collected by sending a survey link to the participants via Google form due to force majeure conditions arising from the pandemic. Additionally, official permissions were received from the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The collected data was transferred to the SPSS program and interpreted by subjecting it to various tests and was presented visually through tables. As a result of the study, the findings were interpreted by comparing them with similar and opposing studies, and at the end, some suggestions were given for both researchers and practitioners. At the end of the research, it was understood that the level of knowledge of the religious officials who participated in the research regarding the basic views of the theological sects, even if it was at an acceptable level for some sects, was generally not at the expected level and that they did not have sufficient bookish knowledge. (shrink)

In this article, I will examine Aristotle’s protreptic argument for the necessity of philosophy as it was deployed by Al-Kindi. I will show how a Muslim critic of philosophy, primarily one who is aligned with the theological outlook of Ibn Hanbal, can reasonably reject the protreptic argument as Al-Kindi presents it. The argument can, however, be reworked in a way to circumvent common criticisms of it presented by Hanbalī-style opponents of philosophy. Indeed, I will argue that, once the argument is (...) properly clarified with reference to what constitutes ‘philosophy’, its soundness is incontrovertible. In closing, I will briefly discuss why Muslim critics of philosophy need not see the protreptic argument as threatening, as the inevitability of philosophy does not necessitate a commitment to all sorts of philosophical positions, however problematic these may be for Islamic doctrine. (shrink)

Kin marriages have been a subject of literary, historical, sociological, religious, and medical studies from past to present. Such a marriage has been discussed within the science of fiqh in terms of religion. Ḥanafī and Mālikī mujtahids stated that this marriage is permissible. While Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī mujtahids did not recommend kin marriage by seeing it permissible. Based on the fundamental doctrines of Islamic law, they argued that marrying a foreign candidate is mustahabb and answered the related criticisms against their (...) fatwa. In scientific studies, genetic risks in kin marriages were found to be twice as high. Therefore, the kin marriage was not recommended and it is suggested that those who will marry with relatives should undergo carrier tests. In some contemporary religious studies, it has been argued that the families established by kin marriages are stronger, the genetic research does not have absolute precision, and it may be ideological in the form of weakening the family-society structure. Besides, the ijtihads distant to close kin marriage is weak in terms of evidence and opposing evidence has been put forward to defend kin marriage. On the other hand, in some sociological studies, it has been argued that kin marriage is predominantly caused by religion and that it wekaned the social solidairty. This study analyzes the classical and contemporary approaches to kin marriage in detail within the framework of thesis-antithesis in terms of fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, and evidence, and evaluates such studies from a fiqh point of view by including medical research results and some sociological studies on kin marriage. A generally accepted deterministic link cannot be established between kin marriage and genetic disorders. Because, the same risks are found in marriages with foreigners and also arise from harmful substance addiction. However, the genetic risk rate in marriage with close relatives is twice that of marriage with a foreign candidate. The least of the two possible losses is preferred. So it is very sensible that a marriage that is twice as likely to take such a risk should not be recommended by religion. Because, the main purpose of religion in marriage is to protect the generation and ensure its continuation. The fact that such a marriage is not religiously prohibited does not mean that it was recommended. Because it is left to individuals and public authority to limit the ibaha on the grounds of maṣlaḥa. On the grounds that the hereditary risk rate is high, kin marriage is not recommended in the fiqh and an effort has been made to prevent such a marriage from becoming widespread. Sociologically, marriages with a foreign candidate who is equivalent to a close relative are more appropriate in terms of strengthening the social organization. It is seen that Shafi'i and Hanbali ijtihad, which do not recommend close relatives marriage, are supported by current medical and genetic research. It is understood that the ijtihads that does not recommend marriage with close relatives is inaccurate in terms of evidence, and the views that argue that such marriages are stronger in terms of benefits are not in place. In general, it is seen that religion is distant from kin marriage, and such marriages are mostly caused by psychological, sociological, and cultural reasons. The fact that such marriages are common in areas belonging to the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools that do not recommend marriage with close relatives, on the other hand, the fact that marriages between close relatives are less in Hanafi regions, which state that the same marriage is only permissible, supports this. In this respect, some claims arguing that such a marriage stems from religion based on the understandings that refer to that kin marriage is recommended by religion, are not accurate. For this reason, it is difficult to establish a connection between the disintegration of social unity, the spread of hereditary diseases, and the claims that religion recommends consanguineous marriage. Today, enlightening the religious aspect of kin marriage will be beneficial in protecting society against hereditary risks. (shrink)

The absence of one single religious authority for the whole Muslim community in Britain results in the emergence of various religious authorities due to ethnic and sectarian differences. Muslim communities in Britain have generally been ghettoized around ethnic and sectarian identities, and thus establishing mosque and religious authority accordingly. This paper investigates what the sources of religious authority for British born young Sunnī Muslims are. The data was gathered via an ethnographic research made in Leeds, one of the most cosmopolitan (...) cities of Britain, interviewing young Sunnī British Muslims who are between 18 and 30 years old. The main aim of this study is to reflect on how and where these young Muslims get religious advice for their daily religious lives. This paper presents the preferences of the informants in seeking religious authority in the context of Britain. It is particularly significant to discover the orientation of British born Muslims from that aspect. Based on the preferences of young Sunnī Muslims in searching religious authority in Leeds, this paper initially introduces four mosque imāms, who lie at the centre of religious authority for ordinary Muslims. By dealing with them, I expose the role of mosque imāms in the life of Sunnī Muslims in Britain. The types of the questions raised by the mosque attendees and their methods in approaching the imāms are reported while each imām’s profile is examined. Then, I focus on two famous figures who issue religious rulings and have a special importance in the religious lives of Muslims in Leeds. Finally, the Internet is examined as a virtual platform in seeking religious authority for ordinary Muslims living in Britain. Thus, this study offers two main results: From different sectarian orientations, such as Deobandī, Barēlwī and Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, they generally admit that following a school of law (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī) in current is essential for a lay person. Therefore, the tendency among them in seeking religious guidance initially starts from local mosque imāms, and then widened with more expert ʿulamāʾ repudiated across their ethnic and sectarian oriented communities. (shrink)

In the ḥadīth sources it is being conveyed that the companions (ṣaḥāba) refrained from asking questions to the Prophet. This situation is generally associated with the verse of sūrat al-Māʾida 5:101. An-Navvās b. Samʿān (d. 50/670), Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī (d. 86/705) and Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/711-12) are among the companions who consider this situation as the ban on the asking questions. The concern that asking questions may cause additional obligations that were not presumed to be obligatory also attracts attention (...) in these records. Keeping all numerous questions addressed to the Prophet in mind we may ask if there is a Prophetic prohibition on asking questions. We will seek an answer to this question, which constitutes the main axis of this article, especially in the framework of the narrations mentioned among the reasons of the al-Māʾida 101. We will evaluate the information concerned in their historical context and internal coherence inductively. Our investigation differs in this respect from the investigations, which dealt with the disapproval of excessive and unnecessary questions. As a result of our research, we think that it is possible to talk about a ban on asking questions about religious issues in the last three years of the Medina period. We will first discuss the dating and nature of this ban, from which only Bedouin and visitors who come to Madina were excluded. Then, we especially will evaluate the theological consequences of answer of the Prophet, which mentioned in the same context, of whether the pilgrimage is religious duty for every year. In the last part of the article, the prohibition of asking questions will be discussed in the light of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s principle “Der hermeneutische Vorrang der Frage”, which deals with the effect of the questions on the direction and nature of the answer.Summary: It is reported in Qurʾān and Ḥadīth that the Prophet Muḥammad (PBUH) was asked a lot of questions and he responded based on the revealed knowledge or his own. He did not like the questions which remain outside of the daily religious life like the questions whether he is able to know the end of the world or to show miracle. There are some reports which covey that the Prophet frowned upon some questions because they could cause new assignments or lead to complicate the existing ones. The Companions like an-Nawwās b- Samʿān (d. 50/670), Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī (d. 86/705) and Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/711-12) have been describing this situation as the ban of asking of religious implications.This issue which companions formulated exactly as the ban of the asking questions was regarded in research until now just as the depreciation of the Prophet upon the unnecessary questions. In this interpretation the idea played a role that the ban of the asking may not conform to the religious pedagogic of the Prophet and the real existence of a lot of asked questions contradict that. Therefore the imperative “do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 (O believers, do not ask about things which, if made known to you, may vex you) were interpreted not as the prohibition of the asking questions in real sense, but as just the depreciation of the unnecessary questions.We argue that it is possible to talk about a prohibition of the asking questions in real sense. We are of the view that the asking to religious matters was prohibited in the last years of the Medina period. In a time of Madina period when the fundamental principles of Islam emerged the questions of companions let the Prophet think that they may lead to additional religious obligations. Therefore the Prophet warned his companions in these words: “Do not ask me about the details of the things which I do not mention to you” and “Allāh Taʿālā has remained silent about some things, out of compassion for you, not forgetfulness so do not seek after them.”The imperative “do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 has to been understood in the light of the Prophet’s advice as quoted above. According to the expressions of the companions reported in hadith collections, it is obvious that the imperative “do not ask” signifies not only “do not ask unnecessary questions”, but “do not ask questions related to theology matters in general”.Anas b. Mālik served the Prophet nine or ten years and was not criticised by the Prophet anytime. A companion like Anas cannot have refrained from the asking questions because they may be unnecessary. Anas interpreted “ do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 in words: “We were forbidden in the Qurʾān that we ask the Prophet anything". Anas’s observation reveals that the companions considered the “do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 as a general prohibition for the questions to religious issue.According to our research it seems this ban was promulgated in last three years of Medina Period, and Bedouin and visitors were excluded. Al-Nawwās b. Samʿān noticed that the ban of the asking questions was only for the residents in Medina: “I was in Medina one year. The reason why I did not stay in Medina was my wish to ask the Prophet a religious issue. So, whoever stayed in Medina was not permitted to ask the Prophet questions.” Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī interpreted the ban of the asking in al-Māʾida 5:101 as a general ban. He reported that the companions give a garment (burda) as gift to a Bedouin in order to let him ask the Prophet questions. The ban on asking questions in Medina was not related to unnecessary questions. It was indeed related to the questions that might have caused addition to already well-defined obligatory rulings in Islam. Accordingly, the questions became unnecessary because they were asked in the time of revelation. With the ban of the asking the Prophet questions accentuated that God and his Messenger are aware what necessary and what was not. It means that God can intervene if it is necessary. For that they do not need ask the Prophet. Aṭ-Ṭabarī, al-Qurṭubī, en-Nawawī, Ibn RaJab el-Ḥanbalī and Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī are the scholars who interpreted the ban of asking in this general sense.We especially will evaluate the theological consequences of the Prophet’s response, as reported in the sources: “ If I said yes, the pilgrimage will be a religious duty for every year.” Here one may not misconstrue that the Prophet could determine the religious obligations arbitrarily. He meant that the believers have to practice only that which were revealed to them. The Prophet wanted to teach his followers the principle that became essential rule of Islamic jurisprudence: “What is not forbidden is permitted”.The Prophet did not perform tarāwīḥ-prayer in congregation in the month of fasting due to the apprehension that it might become obligatory for the believers and they would not be able to follow it. In this human reaction of the Prophet we see that the Prophet did not consider himself as the founder of the Islamic norms. In this context the following questions are important: Does God consider the human questions when making something obligatory? Is God influenceable in terms of His orders? Ibn Ḥajar observes: The scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah accept the causality in terms of the Islamic norms. Accordingly something can become a religious norm because the humans asked about that. But God’s decision does not depend on the humans. God can consider human questions, if He so wills. (shrink)

A growing discourse in Europe and North America focuses on questions of the religious and political status of Muslim minorities. This essay tries to bring some historical perspective to current discussions, surveying the ways premodern Muslim jurists approached issues pertaining to Muslims living in non-Muslim territories. As the historical material indicates, Muslim juridical opinion on these matters is very diverse. Individual jurists, while working within one or another of the broad traditions of Islamic jurisprudence (Shafi'i, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, or (...) Shi'i), have felt free to craft opinions designed to fit specific situations. Given such variety, I conclude by echoing the judgment given by Rashid Rida earlier in this century: In the final analysis, specific Muslim minorities are the best judges of their own particular situations. (shrink)