In this chapter, we take stock of existing critiques of contemporary migration research and bring these debates into contact with ongoing debates among decolonial scholars and in feminist social epistemology. We illustrate how the ethical and epistemic concerns voiced by migration scholars in regard to the socio-epistemic functioning of their field can be understood using the conceptual apparatus that has been developed around the notions of epistemic injustice and oppression. In so doing, we illustrate the relevance and usefulness of both (...) feminist social epistemology and of decolonial theory for theorising the socio-epistemic challenges that migration scholars face. The conceptual framework of epistemic injustice and oppression not only offers clarity in what is at stake within migration studies both ethically and epistemically, but also elucidates moral and epistemic reasons for why these issues should be addressed. This framework both calls attention to issues of undue epistemic marginalisation, and centres these issues as a core concern as migration scholars critically reflect upon the knowledge production and dissemination practices of their field. Understanding the processes through which this happens, rather than just the epistemic outcomes, can help us to identify ways to address the structural inequalities with which the production of migration knowledge is often associated. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is a growing interest in using cognitive–behavioural therapy (CBT) with people who have Asperger syndrome and comorbid mental health problems.AimsTo examine whether modified group CBT for clinically significant anxiety in an Asperger syndrome population is feasible and likely to be efficacious.MethodUsing a randomised assessor-blind trial, 52 individuals with Asperger syndrome were randomised into a treatment arm or a waiting-list control arm. After 24 weeks, those in the waiting-list control arm received treatment, while those initially randomised to treatment were followed (...) up for 24 weeks.ResultsThe conversion rate for this trial was high (1.6:1), while attrition was 13%. After 24 weeks, there was no significant difference between those randomised to the treatment arm compared with those randomised to the waiting-list control arm on the primary outcome measure, the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety.ConclusionsTrials of psychological therapies with this population are feasible. Larger definitive trials are now needed. (shrink)

I address the questions of whether or not the very existence of heaven provides a motivation for killing. If universalism is true, then anyone killed will end up there, as will the killer. And given that heaven is infinitely better than earth, killing would be, on this view, the greatest gift possible to the “victim.” But if universalism is not true, there is perhaps an even greater incentive to kill one’s loved ones if one knows them to be (...) currently heaven-bound: that is, to save them from the risk of an infinitely terrible fate, that of somehow damning themselves between now and their natural death. This is an issue that we have all surely wondered about: if we’re going to heaven, what’s so bad about death that it must be condemned? But I think there is also a less-discussed problem raised by the very existence of heaven: that the existence of earth is thereby made redundant. What is earth but an annoying antechamber for heaven, one that we all wish we could bypass? I consider various attempts both to forestall the motivation for altruistic killing and to provide a justification for earth as more than a poor version of purgatory, and fail to find any that are truly compelling. I conclude that the existence of earth is therefore itself an argument against the existence of heaven. (shrink)

The goal of theodicy is to show how God could create our world with all its evil. This paper argues that the theodicist can achieve her goal only if she gives up one of these three propositions: (1) evil does not exist in heaven; (2) heaven is better than the present world; (3) heaven is a possible world. Second, it is argued that the theodicist can reject (3) without giving up her belief that heaven exists, so (...) that (3) is her best alternative. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Steven Cowan calls into question our success in responding to what we called the “Problem of Heavenly Free- dom” in our earlier “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven.” In this reply, we defend our view against Cowan’s criticisms.

The concept of service found in Christian theism and related religious perspectives offers robust support for a political defense of nonhuman animal rights, both in the eschaton and in the present state. By adapting the political theory defended by Donaldson and Kymlicka to contemporary theological models of the afterlife and of human agency, I defend a picture of heaven as a harmoniously structured society where humans are the functional leaders of a multifaceted, interspecies citizenry. Consequently, orthodox religious believers (concerned (...) with promoting God’s will “on Earth as it is in Heaven”) have a duty to promote and protect the interests of nonhuman creatures in the present, premortem state. (shrink)

Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary. But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfection of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work with them in purgatory to perfect their (...) own character. I argue that although both models can make sense of all human persons enjoying free will in heaven on various assumptions, the cooperative model allows all human persons in heaven to enjoy a greater degree of freedom. This consideration about the degree of heavenly freedom provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes an unnoticed connection between two lines in Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ.1, 1069a32, and Λ.2, 1069b26. It argues that the Greek text of the former has been obscured in standard editions by unnecessary emendation: if the reading of the mss. is preserved, the text here sets out a programme for research into the elements of heavenly bodies which is taken up in the second part of Λ.2. There, Aristotle distinguishes the matter of heavenly substance as if it were matter (...) in a certain sense only, and not sensu stricto: the only change it underlies is coming-to-be ποθέν ποι, ‘from one place to another’ . In Θ.8 as well, this is what allows Aristotle to deny that eternal things can have matter as an element of their substance. The reading argued for here may also explain how Aristotle can claim, by the end of Lambda, that he has succeeded in responding to an important aporia which was neglected by predecessors, namely ‘why some things are corruptible and other incorruptible’. (shrink)

Contrary to what several prominent scholars contend, a number of important early Confucians ground their ethical claims by appealing to the authority of tian, Heaven, insisting that Heaven endows human beings with a distinctive ethical nature and at times acts in the world. This essay describes the nature of such appeals in two early Confucian texts: the Lunyu (Analects) and Mengzi (Mencius). It locates this account within a larger narrative that begins with some of the earliest conceptions of (...) a supreme deity in China. The essay concludes by noting some similarities and differences between these early Confucian accounts and more familiar views commonly shared by monotheists. (shrink)

But our citizenship is in heaven. And we eagerly await a Savior from there, the Lord Jesus Christ, who, by the power that enables Him to subject all things to Himself, will transform our lowly bodies to be like His glorious body. – Philippians 3:20–21.

Sennett (1999) and Pawl & Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this essay I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl & Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken (...) to claim that the value of free choice depends on an agent retaining the ability to change their mind; in so doing I demonstrate that some choices which result in fixed outcomes - a feature of the choices leading to impeccability - can indeed be valuable even if they cannot be undone. (shrink)

In response to the problem of Hell, Buckareff and Plug (Relig Stud 41:39–54, 2005; Relig Stud 45:63–72, 2009) have recently proposed and defended an ‘escapist’ conception of Hell. In short, they propose that the problem of Hell does not arise because God places an open-door policy on Hell. In this paper, I expose a fundamental problem with this conception of Hell—namely, that if there’s an open door policy on Hell, then there should be one on Heaven too. I argue (...) that a coherent conception of Heaven cannot have such a policy. Hence, escapism is not an adequate response to the problem of Hell. (shrink)

It is widely accepted among Mencius scholars that for Mencius, the junzi 君子 is the kind of person who accepts Heaven’s will and never resents Heaven. There are, however, several passages where resentment seems to be presented as a quality that the junzi possesses. In particular, Mencius 2B13 has been the subject of much contention. In Section 1, I will discuss various interpretations of 2B13, building on and updating Philip Ivanhoe’s helpful 1988 survey. In Section 2, I will (...) present an argument for resentment against Heaven in the Mencius. I argue from passages in the Mencius and its relationship with the Shijing 詩經 that we have good reason to think that, under certain circumstances, the junzi ought to resent Heaven. In Section 3, I will develop a theory of resentment from the Mencius and demonstrate how 2B13 can be understood in the larger context of this theory. (shrink)

This essay is an overview of the role of Heaven in Daoist religious thought prior to the Tang Dynasty. Lao-Zhuang teachings portray Heaven as helper of the perfected person, who has parted with the human and thereby evinces a heavenly light. The Huainanzi compares possessing Heaven’s Heart to leaning on an unbudgeable pillar and drawing on an inexhaustible storehouse, enabling one to shed mere humanity as a snake discards its skin. The Heguanzi homologizes Heaven and Taiyi (...) and by the Six Dynasties period some Daoist canonical sources give the face of Laojun to Heaven/Taiyi, increasing the anthropomorphization of Heaven. (shrink)

Many theists believe both (1) that Heaven will be infinitely or maximally good for its residents and (2) that most humans will, eventually, reside in Heaven. Further, most theists believe (3) that human procreation is often all-things-considered morally permissible. I defend three novel arguments for the impermissibility of procreation predicated on the possibility of heavenly overpopulation. First, we shouldn’t be rude to hosts by bringing more people to a party than were invited, which we do if we continue (...) to procreate. Second, justice requires that the goods of Heaven be supremely good for those for whom heavenly existence is (even partially) compensatory, but if Heaven has a fixed and finite number of goods, each successful act (or enough acts) of procreation lowers the expected goodness for those persons and threatens to undermine justice. Third, we should choose the course of action with the least-worst outcome, and it would be worse to overpopulate Heaven than underpopulate it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Beyond Heaven and Earth: A Cognitive Theory of Religion by Gabriel LevyKevin SchilbrackBeyond Heaven and Earth: A Cognitive Theory of Religion. Gabriel Levy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2022. 249 pp. $45.00 paperback; open access.The interdisciplinary field of religious studies includes both the humanities and social sciences in a tricky detente. Some religion scholars focus on interpreting texts, teachings, and rituals in an effort to grasp (...) what religious practitioners understand themselves to be doing. Other scholars want to move beyond the the practitioners’ views to create explanatory accounts of religion in terms of social power, psychological benefits, and modules in the evolved brain—causal accounts of which the practitioners might not be aware or that they might deny. Gabriel Levy argues that to develop consilience between the divergent efforts of the humanities and the sciences, the academic study of religion would be well served by developing a more adequate metaphysics that can do justice simultaneously to human behavior as moved both by subjective reasons and by material forces. Specifically, he recommends the “anomalous monism” of Donald Davidson. [End Page 98]According to this view, there is only one kind of reality, and this is a monist metaphysics that includes no nonmaterial or supernatural entities. However, this one kind of reality is “anomalous” in that the world we experience together permits two irreducible vocabularies, one that is physical and deterministic and another that is mental and includes free will. Davidson considered this two-sided approach Spinozistic (169), and Levy notes its similarities to Thomas Nagel’s “neutral monism” (8, 35, 50–51). In short, then, Levy is proposing to scholars of religion a non-reductive but science-friendly “pragmatist monism” (8) that would be congenial to many readers of this journal. Such a metaphysics would also be in line with the methodological naturalism that, for many, defines the legitimate scope of the academy. We might therefore consider this book an example of a philosophy of religious studies, or even a metaphysics for religious studies.An important feature of Davidson’s approach is that, on his account, semantic content is necessarily intersubjective and therefore non-nomological and irreducible to the physical. Imagine a parent offering their prelinguistic child a doll while asking, “Do you want your doll?” or pulling the child away from a neighbor’s dog while telling them, “You have to be careful around dogs.” Davidson argues that human beings learn the meaning of words and sentences in social exchanges like these as the listener makes an educated guess about the entities to which the other person is referring, a process that Davidson calls “triangulation.” The generation of meaning on this model depends on the human capacity for shared intentionality about things in the world. Davidson argues that having meaningful thoughts, even when alone, then requires that one has had intersubjective, “triangulated” experiences like these. As Levy says, “semantic content arises in immanent, contextual, enacted dialogue and conversation with other agents” (182). It follows that this Davidsonian approach insists on irreducible, non-eliminable mental categories such as meaning, belief, and reasons, now recast in terms of practical engagement with things rather than inner representations of them. Many in religious studies are critical of the field’s focus on subjective categories like these, but, as Levy points out, the meaning-generating and reason-giving subject on a Davidsonian model is necessarily a socially embedded self and not the free-floating, disembodied, or ahistorical self that is critiqued by post-structuralists like Michel Foucault (169–70).Levy introduces this model (ch. 1) and then explores several topics in its light. He proposes that beliefs about religious entities are a subset of imagining fictional entities, so that Mickey Mouse, Santa Claus, and Zeus are in the same cognitive category (ch. 2). He argues that there is a continuum between the human ability to interpret language and the ability of human beings and [End Page 99] other animals to interpret information in their natural environments (ch. 3). In the last three chapters, he connects his discussion to the Sefer Yitzirah, a medieval Jewish mystical “book of creation” that describes the cosmos as structured by language (ch. 4), to... (shrink)

This is an unusual book, one that I admit to having had difficulty understanding. Part of my difficulty no doubt stems from the fact that Beyond Heaven and Earth is far outside my disciplinary expe...

Keeping Heaven on Earth. By Michael B. Hundley. Forschungen zum Alten Testament 2. Reihe, vol. 50. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011. Pp. xvi + 250. €99.

Excerpt from The Heaven of Invention My general purpose has been to indicate some of the questions which a critic should take into consideration before passing judg ment on either artistry or works of art and which, I feel, have been neglected by them. In two earlier books, A Primer for Critics and Wingless Pegasus, I tried to analyze some of these, though with no appreciable effect. Now some twenty years later I return to the problem and tackle it (...) from a somewhat different point of view. Whether this will prove to be an advantage or not remains to be seen, but I have been encouraged to re-enter the field by friends who seemed to be interested in my arguments. All that is needed for a man enamored of writing is but the slightest tap on the shoulder to send him back to his typewriter. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The concept of Heaven raises innumerable difficulties but is so attractive that many may wish to believe in the idea regardless of any arguments against it. Even though unreasonable, it might play a positive role in some lives.Export citation.

Between Heaven and Hell: Islam, Salvation and the Fate of Others. Edited by Mohammad Hassan Khalil. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xxii + 335. $99 ; $35.

Jerry L. Walls argues that the doctrine of heaven is ripe for serious reconsideration. He contends not only that the orthodox view of heaven can be defended from objections commonly raised against it, but also that heaven is a powerful resource for addressing persistent philosophical problems, not the least of which concern the ground of morality and the meaning of life. Walls shows how heaven is integrally related to central Christian doctrines, particularly those related to salvation, (...) and tackles the difficult problem of why faith in Christ is necessary to save us from our sins. In addition, heaven is shown to illumine thorny problems of personal identity and to be an essential component of a satisfactory theodicy. Walls goes on to examine data from near-death experiences from the standpoint of some important recent work in epistemology and argues that they offer positive evidence for heaven. He concludes that we profoundly need to recover the hope of heaven in order to recover our very humanity. (shrink)

One of the central themes of inquiry for Karl Barth, the twentieth-century Protestant theologian, was the notion of revelation. Although he was suspicious of natural theology, recent scientific advances and the flourishing modern dialogue between science and religion offer compelling reasons to revisit Barth’s thinking on the concept. We must again ask whether and how it might be possible to hold together the notion of revelation whilst employing reason and scientific evidence in the justification of belief. In The Heavens Declare, (...) author Rodney Holder re-examines Barth’s natural theology argument and then explores how it has been critiqued and responded to by others, starting with Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Wolfhart Pannenberg. Holder then considers the contributions of two notable British participants in the science-religion dialogue, Thomas Torrance and Alister McGrath, who, despite their repudiation of natural theology in the traditional sense, also provide many positive lessons. The book concludes by defending an overall position which takes into account the ideas of the aforementioned theologians as well as others who are currently engaged positively in natural theology, such as John Polkinghorne and Richard Swinburne. Holder’s new study is sure to be of interest to theologians, philosophers of religion, and all scholars interested in the science-religion dialogue, especially those interested in natural theology as an enterprise in itself. (shrink)

How would a liberation theologian respond to Marx’s famous critique that religious belief and, even more specifically, a hope for heaven is “the opium of the people”? I utilize the conceptual resources found within the work of liberation theologians Gustavo Gutiérrez, Enrique Dussel, and Jon Sobrino to argue that a belief in heaven is able to constitute a protest against oppressed persons’ present hell. To strengthen the connection between a believer’s heavenly hope and a commitment to worldly struggle, (...) I examine how the hope must be conceived as the completion and fulfillment of a process of temporal transformation. (shrink)

New Heaven, New Earth is a philosophical study ofAntony and Cleopatra. Showing that the play is as much a history play as a love story, it closely examines Shakespeare's presentation of the transition from the pagan to the Christian world—from the aftermath of the collapse of the Roman Republic and the decline of the pagan gods to the emergence of the Roman Empire and the conditions giving rise to Christianity.

The intent of this essay is to examine what most would call an essential component to the theistic notion of a perfected agent in heaven: impeccability. In Part 1 I will attempt to softly defend the Christian dependence on the doctrine of impeccability, followed by an examination of what I believe to be the two basic moral conditions for impeccability: the deontic condition and the virtue condition. In Parts 2 and 3, I will examine the coherence of each of (...) these conditions by proposing recently raised objections to both. Ultimately, my hope for this essay is to further the discussion concerning the theistic notions of a perfected agent, and the coherence of a heavenly afterlife for that perfected agent. (shrink)

Individual eschatological images are rarely a research subject that applies in-depth interviews and qualitative methods of analysis. Due to the use of simple questionnaire measures, knowledge about possible variations in personal images of heaven or hell is very poor. Furthermore, data concerning any connection between personality and eschatological images is scarce. The research project presented in the article was an attempt to apply a narrative method and to combine qualitative and simple quantitative methods to describe the wide variety of (...) individual views of heaven, hell, and purgatory. The relationship between individual eschatological images, denominational culture, and the chosen dimension of personality—i.e., hope understood in Erik Erikson's terms as a relatively stable conviction that the world is meaningful, ordered and friendly towards people—was also explored. The research was conducted among religiously engaged Christians from two denominational groups: Catholics and Lutherans. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Childhood and Christmas Heaven is at Stake Moving around the Spiral Hecate at the Crossroads It's Not about Me? It's Not Me or You: It's Hallmark Spiraling Around the Christmas Tree.

This article discusses the doctrine of hell. It covers traditional versus contemporary defences of hell, challenges to freedom accounts of hell, and the coherence of eternal hell. The article then argues that the doctrine of heaven has not received as much attention from philosophers as hell has and identifies some interesting challenges raised against the Christian hope of eternal joy.

Why do bad things happen to good people? Why isn’t good moral intention always rewarded? Franklin Perkins discusses these challenging questions about good and evil in his recent book Heaven and Earth Are not Humane: The Problem of Evil in Classical Chinese Philosophy. As the title suggests, Perkins focuses on the unique Chinese notion of heaven and its related philosophical issues of undeserved misfortune and limited moral efficacy. The subtitle of the book is equally intriguing. Perkins discusses these (...) philosophical issues from the perspective of the problem of evil. The problem of evil is the problem of the positive existence of evil and its seemingly random and arbitrary... (shrink)

A new translation of Emanuel Swedenborg's short work The New Jerusalem and Its Heavenly Doctrine. In it, Swedenborg discusses our inner natures, how we can develop as spiritual people, and the true meaning of observances like baptism and the Holy Supper.

Alchemical writings of Arabic origin introduced into the Latin natural philosophy of the twelfth century a cosmological issue that was at variance with Aristotelian cosmology: the idea of a subtle substance that stood at the origin of the four elements and encompassed heaven and earth. In this article, I consider the links of this notion with Hermetic and Stoic thought; its association with the technical process of distillation; its emergence in some philosophical texts of the early thirteenth century; and (...) finally its full development in two fourteenth century alchemical treatises, the Testamentum attributed to Raimond Lull and the Liber de consideratione quintae essentiae written by John of Rupescissa. (shrink)

This chapter shows how al-Kindī interweaves ideas from Greek cosmology to give a theory that can explain the efficacy of astrology and how God’s providence is dispersed by means of heavenly influence. A concrete example is found in al-Kindī’s works on meteorology, since he thinks that weather is produced by celestial causation. The mechanics of this causation are explained differently in different works, which leads to a consideration of the authenticity of On Rays, which is ascribed to al-Kindī, and its (...) place in his corpus. Finally, the chapter considers whether al-Kindī’s account commits him to determinism, and whether he thinks universal causal determinism is compatible with human freedom. (shrink)

In this essay I identify four different problems of heavenly freedom; i.e., problems that arise for those who hold that the redeemed in heaven have free will. They are: the problem arising from God's own freedom, the problem of needing to praise the redeemed for not sinning in heaven, the problem of needing to affirm that the redeemed freely refrain from sinning, and the problem arising from a commitment to the free will defence. I explore how some of (...) these problems vary depending on the notion of free will which is endorsed. And I suggest that because these differing problems arise from distinct theological and/or philosophical commitments, there is little reason to think that one and the same feature or property of an account of heavenly freedom will address them all. (shrink)

This new translation of _De Novo Hierosolyma Et Ejus Doctrina Coelesti_ by Emanuel Swedenborg presents the ideas of this Swedish visionary in simple, modern English. In the short work, Swedenborg discusses our motivations and inner natures, love and selfishness, and ways in which we can develop ourselves as spiritual people. He also covers different aspects of religion, such as the Bible, observances like baptism and the Holy Supper, the nature of heaven and hell, and how we can apply all (...) these ideas to our daily lives. (shrink)

There is no universally accepted definition of moral damages. The concept is usually understood in the context of torts that cause psychological harm to a person that are difficult to quantify. Heaven’s Chancellery uses a fictional narrative to describe difficulties of obtaining compensation for damages by victims of moral injustice.

From Carl Becker’s The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers to recent work on religion in the Enlightenment, it has been argued that the Enlightenment has significant religious elem...

The Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) was the first stable, long-lasting and politically powerful Chinese empire. This meant a formative period during which the administrative structure and political and cultural patterns that were largely followed by subsequent Chinese dynasties were established. Additionally, the conception of the world was developed and systematized which influenced not only the traditional but also the contemporary Chinese understanding of the world. Although it is a key period of Chinese history, the philosophy of the (...) Han dynasty, and thus its conception of the world, has not been sufficiently explored. As a contribution to the understanding of the thought of the period, this paper examines the philosophical reflection on the world focusing on the key texts of the Western Han period. The aim of this paper is to present the basic features of the conception of the world and to provide a hermeneutic framework for their explanation. It will be shown that the conception of the world in the philosophy of the Western Han dynasty is based on the conception of order and the categorical apparatus that supports it, which is the theory of correlativity, the principles of accumulation and radial order. This understanding of the world will have implications for the new place and role of man, his relationship with other living beings, as well as the ontological status of human work. Namely, man is assigned the role of the one who "completes" natural processes through moral and any other correct action, which opens up the possibility of realization "of great peace." This conception of the world manifests the language of incorporation and accommodation typical of the Han dynasty period, and can be understood as a result of the historical and social circumstances and cultural and philosophical tendencies of the first stable empire. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of essays analyzing different issues concerning the nature, possibility, and desirability of heaven as understood by the Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity. and Islam. Topics include whether or not it is possible that a mortal could, upon bodily death, become an inhabitant of heaven without loss of identity, where exactly heaven might be located, whether or not everyone should be saved, or if there might be alternative destinations (including some less fiery versions (...) of Hell). Chapter authors include believers and skeptics, well-known philosophers, and new voices. While some chapters are more challenging than others, all are written in a style that should be accessible to any interested reader. (shrink)

The Philosophical Forum, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 47-61, Spring 2022.

Traditionally, the Christian doctrine of heaven has implied that the human agents that exist there will be exceptionally moral. More than this, there appears to be a consensus that heavenly agents are so morally upright as to be considered morally perfect. However, there has been some kickback to this idea of moral perfection, and whether it is a possibility for contingently existing agents. The primary goal of this thesis is to defend the view that moral perfection in heaven (...) is possible if understood from an Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian virtue account. My secondary goals are to show that the process of perfecting agents requires some form of temporal extension, does not require a traditional form of character development to maintain the agent’s free will, and allows for the possibility of moral growth after the status of perfection has been attained. (shrink)