Results for ' INDUCTION'

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  1. Mark Siderits deductive, inductive, both or neither?Inductive Deductive - 2003 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 31:303-321.
     
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  2. Wesley C. salmon.Inductive Logic - 1970 - In Carl G. Hempel, Donald Davidson & Nicholas Rescher (eds.), Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht,: D. Reidel. pp. 24--47.
  3. Bruno de finetti.I. Inductive Reasoning - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 3.
  4. Jaakko Hintikka.Inductive Generalization - 1975 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist: materials and perspectives. Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co.. pp. 73--371.
     
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  5. Richard C. Jeffrey.Carnap'S. Inductive Logic - 1975 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist: materials and perspectives. Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co.. pp. 73--325.
     
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  6. Ian I-iacking.Linguistically Invariant Inductive Logic - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel.
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  7. Isaac Levi.Comments on‘Linguistically Invariant & Inductive Logic’by Ian Hacking - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel.
     
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  8. Induction, explanation, and natural necessity.John Foster - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:87-101.
    I want to examine a possible solution to the problem of induction-one which, as far as I know, has not been discussed elsewhere. The solution makes crucial use of the notion of objective natural necessity. For the purposes of this discussion, I shall assume that this notion is coherent. I am aware that this assumption is controversial, but I do not have space to examine the issue here.
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  9.  65
    VI*—Induction, Explanation and Natural Necessity.John Foster - 1982 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):87-102.
    John Foster; VI*—Induction, Explanation and Natural Necessity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 87–102, https://d.
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  10.  96
    Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom?Markus Dressel - 2022 - Theoria 37 (2):181-207.
    The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that (...)
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  11.  56
    Induction and other minds.Michael Anthony Slote - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):341-60.
    In "Induction and Other Minds," Plantinga casts the Argument from Analogy in the form of an inductive argument in the following way.
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  12.  47
    The implications of induction.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1970 - London,: Methuen.
    Originally published in 1973. This book presents a valid mode of reasoning that is different to mathematical probability. This inductive logic is investigated in terms of scientific investigation. The author presents his criteria of adequacy for analysing inductive support for hypotheses and discusses each of these criteria in depth. The chapters cover philosophical problems and paradoxes about experimental support, probability and justifiability, ending with a system of logical syntax of induction. Each section begins with a summary of its contents (...)
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  13. Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.
    Inductive methods can be used to estimate the accuracies of inductive methods. Call a method immodest if it estimates that it is at least as accurate as any of its rivals. It would be unreasonable to adopt any but an immodest method. Under certain assumptions, exactly one of Carnap's lambda-methods is immodest. This may seem to solve the problem of choosing among the lambda-methods; but sometimes the immodest lambda-method is λ =0, which it would not be reasonable to adopt. We (...)
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  14. Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered (...)
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  15. Induction and Natural Kinds Revisited.Howard Sankey - 2021 - In Stathis Psillos, Benjamin Hill & Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), Causal Powers in Science: Blending Historical and Conceptual Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 284-299.
    In ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I proposed a solution to the problem of induction according to which our use of inductive inference is reliable because it is grounded in the natural kind structure of the world. When we infer that unobserved members of a kind will have the same properties as observed members of the kind, we are right because all members of the kind possess the same essential properties. The claim that the existence of natural kinds is (...)
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  16.  7
    Induction.Rafal Urbaniak & Diderik Batens - 2012 - In Sven Ove Hansson & Vincent F. Hendricks (eds.), Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 105-130.
    Inductive reasoning, initially identified with enumerative induction is nowadays commonly understood more widely as any reasoning based on only partial support that the premises give to the conclusion. This is a tad too sweeping, for this includes any inconclusive reasoning. A more moderate and perhaps more adequate characterization requires that inductive reasoning not only includes generalizations, but also any predictions or explanations obtained in absence of suitable deductive premises. Inductive logic is meant to provide guidance in choosing the most (...)
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  17. Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties.K. Brad Wray - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):61-73.
    The pessimistic induction plays an important role in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. But there is some disagreement about the structure and aim of the argument. And a number of scholars have noted that there is more than one type of PI in the philosophical literature. I review four different versions of the PI. I aim to show that PIs have been appealed to by philosophers of science for a variety of reasons. Even some realists have (...)
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  18.  78
    Inductive parsimony and the Methodological Argument.Carolyn Suchy-Dicey - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.
    Studies on so-called Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness have been taken to establish the claim that conscious perception of a stimulus requires the attentional processing of that stimulus. One might contend, against this claim, that the evidence only shows attention to be necessary for the subject to have access to the contents of conscious perception and not for conscious perception itself. This “Methodological Argument” is gaining ground among philosophers who work on attention and consciousness, such as Christopher Mole. I find (...)
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  19. Induction and the Glue of the World.Harjit Bhogal - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):319-333.
    Views which deny that there are necessary connections between distinct existences have often been criticized for leading to inductive skepticism. If there is no glue holding the world together then there seems to be no basis on which to infer from past to future. However, deniers of necessary connections have typically been unconcerned. After all, they say, everyone has a problem with induction. But, if we look at the connection between induction and explanation, we can develop the problem (...)
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  20. Induction and knowledge-what.Peter Gärdenfors & Andreas Stephens - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):1-21.
    Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and (...)
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  21.  63
    Finitary inductively presented logics.Solomon Feferman - manuscript
    A notion of finitary inductively presented (f.i.p.) logic is proposed here, which includes all syntactically described logics (formal systems)met in practice. A f.i.p. theory FS0 is set up which is universal for all f.i.p. logics; though formulated as a theory of functions and classes of expressions, FS0 is a conservative extension of PRA. The aims of this work are (i)conceptual, (ii)pedagogical and (iii)practical. The system FS0 serves under (i)and (ii)as a theoretical framework for the formalization of metamathematics. The general approach (...)
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  22.  70
    Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - MIT Press.
    Hilary Kornblith presents an account of inductive inference that addresses both its metaphysical and epistemological aspects. He argues that inductive knowledge is possible by virtue of the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of the world. Kornblith begins by developing an account of natural kinds that has its origins in John Locke's work on real and nominal essences. In Kornblith's view, a natural kind is a stable cluster of properties that are bound together in nature. The (...)
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  23. Inductive risk and the contexts of communication.Stephen John - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):79-96.
    In recent years, the argument from inductive risk against value free science has enjoyed a revival. This paper investigates and clarifies this argument through means of a case-study: neonicitinoid research. Sect. 1 argues that the argument from inductive risk is best conceptualised as a claim about scientists’ communicative obligations. Sect. 2 then shows why this argument is inapplicable to “public communication”. Sect. 3 outlines non-epistemic reasons why non-epistemic values should not play a role in public communicative contexts. Sect. 4 analyses (...)
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  24.  17
    Induction and justification.Frederick L. Will - 1974 - Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press.
  25. Analogy, induction and other minds.Theodore W. Budlong - 1975 - Analysis 35 (3):111-112.
    Alvin plantinga and michael slote, Following ayer, Have attempted to formulate the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds as an enumerative induction. Their way of avoiding the 'generalizing from a single case' objection is shown to be fallacious.
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  26.  9
    Inductive Knowability of the Modal.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):151-178.
    This paper scrutinises the limits of a posteriori induction in acquiring modal knowledge. I focus on my similarity-based account (Roca-Royes [2017]); an inductive, non-rationalist epistemology of modality about concrete entities. Despite the explanatory merits of the account in relation to a vast range of modal claims, this inductive epistemology has been found incapable of yielding knowledge of a certain, other range of modal claims. Here, two notions of knowability are distinguished which reveal some of these limitations to be not (...)
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  27.  17
    Inductive Inference in Hume's Philosophy.Louis E. Loeb - 2008 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 106–125.
    This chapter contains section titled: Some Context The Traditional Interpretation Disarming the Evidence for the Traditional Interpretation Evidence that Hume Considers Inductive Inference Justified The Traditional Interpretation Revisited Hume's Epistemic Options Applications to Extended Objects and Belief in God Limitations on Enumerative Induction Acknowledgments References.
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  28.  3
    Induction.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - In Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Broadly taken, the term “induction” denotes our whole nondeductive procedure of acquiring, maintaining, and discarding beliefs about what is so far unobserved or undetected or unknown. In this chapter, I examine induction from the perspective of my account of warrant. I first take up what is now referred to as “the old riddle of induction,” rejecting David Hume's claim that inductive reasoning is not rationally justified and defending the view that beliefs formed on the basis of inductive (...)
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  29.  16
    (1 other version)Pure Inductive Logic.Jeffrey Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2011 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Alena Vencovská.
    Pure Inductive Logic is the study of rational probability treated as a branch of mathematical logic. This monograph, the first devoted to this approach, brings together the key results from the past seventy years, plus the main contributions of the authors and their collaborators over the last decade, to present a comprehensive account of the discipline within a single unified context.
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  30. Unified Inductive Logic: From Formal Learning to Statistical Inference to Supervised Learning.Hanti Lin - manuscript
    While the traditional conception of inductive logic is Carnapian, I develop a Peircean alternative and use it to unify formal learning theory, statistics, and a significant part of machine learning: supervised learning. Some crucial standards for evaluating non-deductive inferences have been assumed separately in those areas, but can actually be justified by a unifying principle.
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  31.  62
    An Inductive Model of Collaboration From the Stakeholder’s Perspective.Kenneth D. Butterfield, Richard Reed & David J. Lemak - 2004 - Business and Society 43 (2):162-195.
    This work emerged from funded research examining collaboration among stake-holder organizations present at three U.S. nuclear weapons complex sites. The authors examine issues such as how and why stakeholder groups form collaborative alliances when dealing with the target organization, what leaders of stakeholder organizations actually think about when collaborating to deal with the target organization, and what outcomes result from the collaboration process. Drawing on stakeholder theory and research in interorganizational collaboration, the authors used an inductive, interview-based methodology to build (...)
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  32.  12
    Inductive Knowledge and Theoretical Inference.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2015 - CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
    According to David Hume, the concept of causation and probability are to be understood in terms of the concepts of similarity and repetition. In this book, it is shown that they are to be understood in terms of the concept of continuity. One corollary is that there is no legitimate basis for skepticism concerning the legitimacy of inductive inference. Another is that anti-realism about theoretical entities is misconceived.
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  33. Induction and inference to the best explanation.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.
    In this paper I adduce a new argument in support of the claim that IBE is an autonomous form of inference, based on a familiar, yet surprisingly, under-discussed, problem for Hume’s theory of induction. I then use some insights thereby gleaned to argue for the claim that induction is really IBE, and draw some normative conclusions.
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  34. Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
    In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between (...)
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  35. Spielman and Lewis on inductive immodesty.David Lewis - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (1):84-85.
    An inductive method Cλ in the λ-system of Carnap [1] is immodest, on evidence e, iff its estimate, on e, of its own accuracy is higher than its estimate, on e, of the accuracy of any rival method Cλ′. Immodesty seems to be a condition of stable trust: if you trusted a modest Cλ, you should start by trusting its advice to replace it by a rival that it estimates to be more accurate. One might guess that any Cλ would (...)
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  36. Inductive Reasoning Involving Social Kinds.Barrett Emerick & Tyler Hildebrand - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (4):675 - 694.
    Most social policies cannot be defended without making inductive inferences. For example, consider certain arguments for racial profiling and affirmative action, respectively. They begin with statistics about crime or socioeconomic indicators. Next, there is an inductive step in which the statistic is projected from the past to the future. Finally, there is a normative step in which a policy is proposed as a response in the service of some goal—for example, to reduce crime or to correct socioeconomic imbalances. In comparison (...)
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  37. (1 other version)Historical inductions, Old and New.Juha Saatsi - 2015 - Synthese:1-15.
    I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
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  38. Explication of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):593 - 616.
    Inductive probability is the logical concept of probability in ordinary language. It is vague but it can be explicated by defining a clear and precise concept that can serve some of the same purposes. This paper presents a general method for doing such an explication and then a particular explication due to Carnap. Common criticisms of Carnap's inductive logic are examined; it is shown that most of them are spurious and the others are not fundamental.
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  39. Backwards induction in the centipede game.John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):237-242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y (...)
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  40. Induction in the Socratic Tradition.John P. McCaskey - 2014 - In Paolo C. Biondi & Louis F. Groarke (eds.), Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 161-192.
    Aristotle said that induction (epagōgē) is a proceeding from particulars to a universal, and the definition has been conventional ever since. But there is an ambiguity here. Induction in the Scholastic and the (so-called) Humean tradition has presumed that Aristotle meant going from particular statements to universal statements. But the alternate view, namely that Aristotle meant going from particular things to universal ideas, prevailed all through antiquity and then again from the time of Francis Bacon until the mid-nineteenth (...)
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  41. Backward-induction arguments: A paradox regained.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):114-133.
    According to a familiar argument, iterated prisoner's dilemmas of known finite lengths resolve for ideally rational and well-informed players: They would defect in the last round, anticipate this in the next to last round and so defect in it, and so on. But would they anticipate defections even if they had been cooperating? Not necessarily, say recent critics. These critics "lose" the backward-induction paradox by imposing indicative interpretations on rationality and information conditions. To regain it I propose subjunctive interpretations. (...)
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  42. Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.
    The current state of inductive logic is puzzling. Survey presentations are recurrently offered and a very rich and extensive handbook was entirely dedicated to the topic just a few years ago [23]. Among the contributions to this very volume, however, one finds forceful arguments to the effect that inductive logic is not needed and that the belief in its existence is itself a misguided illusion , while other distinguished observers have eventually come to see at least the label as “slightly (...)
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  43.  48
    Backward induction: Merits and flaws.Marek M. Kamiński - 2017 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 50 (1):9-24.
    Backward induction was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats. BI can be also extended to solve complex games that include an infinite number of actions or an infinite number of periods. However, some more complex empirical or experimental predictions remain dramatically at odds with theoretical predictions obtained by BI. The primary example of such (...)
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  44. Induction, Experimentation and Causation in the Social Sciences.Lars-Göran Johansson - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (4):105.
    Inductive thinking is a universal human habit; we generalise from our experiences the best we can. The induction problem is to identify which observed regularities provide reasonable justification for inductive conclusions. In the natural sciences, we can often use strict laws in making successful inferences about unobserved states of affairs. In the social sciences, by contrast, we have no strict laws, only regularities which most often are conditioned on ceteris paribus clauses. This makes it much more difficult to make (...)
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  45. Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):59-68.
    In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that (...)
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  46.  60
    The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.
    The inaugural title in the new, Open Access series BSPS Open, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a (...)
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  47. Revisiting Inductive Confirmation in Science: A Puzzle and a Solution.Alik Pelman - 2024 - Philosophies 9 (171):1-7.
    When an empirical prediction E of hypothesis H is observed to be true, such observation is said to confirm, i.e., support (although not prove) the truth of the hypothesis. But why? What justifies the claim that such evidence supports the hypothesis? The widely accepted answer is that it is justified by induction. More specifically, it is commonly held that the following argument, (1) If H then E; (2) E; (3) Therefore, (probably) H (here referred to as ‘hypothetico-deductive confirmation argument’), (...)
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  48. Induction, Simplicity and Scientific Progress.Nicholas Maxwell - 1979 - Scientia 114 (14):629-653.
    In a recent work, Popper claims to have solved the problem of induction. In this paper I argue that Popper fails both to solve the problem, and to formulate the problem properly. I argue, however, that there are aspects of Popper's approach which, when strengthened and developed, do provide a solution to at least an important part of the problem of induction, along somewhat Popperian lines. This proposed solution requires, and leads to, a new theory of the role (...)
     
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  49.  35
    Inductive Inferences in CL Diagrams.Jens Lemanski & Reetu Bhattacharjee - 2022 - In Matthias Thimm, Jürgen Landes & Kenneth Skiba (eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Foundations, Applications, and Theory of Inductive Logic (FATIL2022). deposit_Hagen. pp. 70-73.
    CL diagrams – the abbreviation of Cubus Logicus – are inspired by J.C. Lange’s logic machine from 1714. In recent times, Lange’s diagrams have been used for extended syllogistics, bitstring semantics, analogical reasoning and many more. The paper presents a method for testing statistical syllogisms (also called proportional syllogisms or inductive syllogisms) by using CL diagrams.
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  50.  43
    Lewis on immodest inductive models.Stephen Spielman - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (3):375-377.
    In a recent paper [2] David Lewis offered an extremely interesting and, if correct, important solution to the main unsolved problem of Carnap's program for inductive logic—the choice of an appropriate C-function. The gist of Lewis' solution is to first obtain a pilot sample from the target population and then select, on the basis of this sample, from among the immodestλ-methods. An immodest inductive method is one which estimates that the mean squared error of its estimates of population relative frequencies (...)
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