The ideal world semantics of standard deontic logic identifies our obligations with how we would act in an ideal world. However, to act as if one lived in an ideal world is bad moral advice, associated with wishful thinking rather than well-considered moral deliberation. Ideal world semantics gives rise to implausible logical principles, and the metaphysical arguments that have been put forward in its favour turn out to be based on a too (...) limited view of truth-functional representation. It is argued that ideal world semantics should be given up in favour of other, more plausible uses of possible worlds for modelling normative subject-matter. (shrink)

The Ideal Worlds objection is an objection that purports to identify a potentially fatal flaw in some of our most influential moral theories: including, among others, rule consequentialism, Kant's Law of Nature Formula of the Categorical Imperative and Scanlonian contractualism. In this article, I offer an account of the objection, a survey of some of the ways defenders of affected theories have sought to avoid it, and the problems that those responses can encounter.

The celebrated free-will defence was designed to show that the ideal-world thesis presents no challenge to theism. The ideal-world thesis states that, in any world in which God exists, He can actualize a world containing moral good and no moral evil. I consider an intriguing two-stage argument that Michael Bergmann advances for the free-will defence, and show that the argument provides atheologians with no reason to abandon the ideal-world thesis. I show next (...) that the existence of worlds in which every essence is transworld untrustworthy provides atheologians with no better reason to abandon the ideal-world thesis. I conclude that neither the free-will defence nor Bergmann's revised free-will defence is a convincing response to the atheological challenge. (Published Online February 17 2004). (shrink)

The Ideal Worlds Account of Desire says that S wants p just in case all of S’s most highly preferred doxastic possibilities make p true. The account predicts that a desire report ⌜S wants p⌝ should be true so long as there is some doxastic p-possibility that is most preferred. But we present a novel argument showing that this prediction is incorrect. More positively, we take our examples to support alternative analyses of desire, and close by briefly considering what (...) our cases suggest about the logic of desire. (shrink)

Ideal theory faces a paradox. The ‘capacity of guidance’ is an important feature of most normative theories, but ideal principles of justice are not well suited to guide action in non-ideal circumstances. This charge presses us to seek plausible avenues to connect ideal values with the non-ideal realisation of justice. The objective of this paper is to introduce an analytical framework and present a case study in support of what I call the ‘reflective integration thesis’. (...) The thesis states that: if we wish to formulate principles of justice that can guide action in non-ideal circumstances, we need to integrate ideal and non-ideal theory, and the way to integrate ideal and non-ideal theory is by seeking reflective equilibrium between these levels. Taking climate justice as a model, this paper will explore the features of a non-ideal theory of justice, thereby providing insights about the structure of an action-guiding theory. It will show that, in order to guide action, our ideal principles of climate justice need to be reformulated in the light of real-world considerations, which we only obtain by integrating the relevant empirical work on the matter. (shrink)

RESUMO:A hipótese desenvolvida nos leva a confrontar três textos do corpusrousseauísta: o Segundo Discurso, Júlia ou A Nova Heloísa e o extrato do Primeiro Diálogo, em que há a ficção do mundo ideal, textos que, apesar do seu estatuto genérico diferente, estão em coerência e convergência teórica. Desejamos evidenciar um aspecto da unidade problemática do pensamento de Rousseau concernente à abordagem crítica da sociedade de seus contemporâneos e sua concepção do papel das Letras e dos Espetáculos. A preocupação do (...) filósofo é de refundar a natureza humana, a fim de lançar as bases de uma nova organização social. Nessa empreitada, a ficção desempenha um papel crucial, o prefácio do Segundo Discurso o comprova: para bem conhecer o homem atual, deve-se supor o que ele não é mais. O homem do estado de natureza, ser de ficção, cujas paixões são retas e naturais, é o modelo teórico que reativa a sociedade dos seres ideais de Júlia. Dessa forma, a ficção é chamada a desempenhar um papel referencial fundamental para o pensamento social e político de Rousseau, aparecendo como um poderoso meio de ação sobre o público. O romance pode reeducar os povos corrompidos, pois, assim como o teatro, como denuncia a Carta a d’Alembert, possui os meios para perverter uma sociedade tida como virtuosa. ABSTRACT:The hypothesis that we will develop leads us to confront three texts of Rousseau’s corpus: the Second Discourse, Julie, and the extract of the First Dialogue that speaks of the pedagogical fiction of the ideal world. These three texts, despite their different types, are theoretically coherent and convergent. We intend to highlight an aspect of the problematic unity of Rousseau’s thought, an aspect which concerns his contemporaries’ critical approach to society and Rousseau’s conception of the role of letters and spectacles. Rousseau’s concern is to refound human nature in order to lay the basis of a new social organization. In this effort, fiction plays a decisive role, as the preface to the Second Discourse affirms: in order to know modern man, we must consider a hypothesis about what he no longer is. Man in the state of nature, a fictional being whose passions are right and natural, is the theoretical model that reactivates the society of ideal beings in Julie. For Rousseau, fiction is called upon to play a fundamental referential role for social and political thought, and it appears as a powerful means of action on the public. The novel can reeducate depraved peoples, because, like the theater, it also has the means to pervert a so-called virtuous society. (shrink)

Traditional approaches to animal ethics commonly emerge from one of two influential ethical theories: Regan’s deontology (The case for animal rights. University of California, Berkeley, 1983) and Singer’s preference utilitarianism (Animal liberation. Avon Books, New York, 1975). I argue that both of the theories are unsuccessful at providing adequate protection for animals because they are unable to satisfy the three conditions of a minimally decent theory of animal protection. While Singer’s theory is overly permissive, Regan’s theory is too restrictive. I (...) argue that a minimally decent animal ethic requires a framework that allows for context-dependent considerations of our complex human–animal relationship in a non-ideal world. A plausible theory which exemplifies this new ethic is virtue ethics. (shrink)

I introduce a new formulation of rule consequentialism, defended as an improvement on traditional formulations. My new formulation cleanly avoids what Parfit calls “ideal world” objections. I suggest that those objections arise because traditional formulations incorporate counterfactual comparisons about how things could go differently. My new formulation eliminates those counterfactual comparisons. Part of the interest of the new formulation is as a model of how to reformulate structurally similar views, including various kinds of contractualism.

Can we formulate a moral theory that captures the moral significance of patterns of group behaviour we cannot affect through our own action while at the same time avoiding the so-called ‘Ideal Worlds’ objection? In a recent article, Caleb Perl has argued that we can. Specifically, Perl claims that one view that does so is his Patterned View: roughly, you ought to act only in accordance with that set of sufficiently general rules that has optimal moral value (Perl 2021: (...) 98). The Patterned View undoubtedly constitutes a welcome contribution to our existing set of moral theories. However, does it avoid the Ideal Worlds objection? In this article, I argue ‘no’. (shrink)

In common treatments of deontic logic, the obligatory is what is true in all deontically ideal possible worlds. In this article, I offer a new semantics for Standard Deontic Logic with Leibnizian intensions rather than possible worlds. Even though the new semantics furnishes models that resemble Venn diagrams, the semantics captures the strong soundness and completeness of Standard Deontic Logic. Since, unlike possible worlds, many Leibnizian intensions are not maximally consistent entities, we can amend the semantics to invalidate the (...) inference rule which ensures that all tautologies are obligatory. I sketch this amended semantics to show how it invalidates the rule in a new way. (shrink)

Our evidential environments are reflections of our social contexts. This is important because the evidence we encounter influences the beliefs we form. But, traditional epistemologists have paid little attention to the generation of this evidential environment, assuming that it is irrelevant to epistemic normativity. This assumption, I argue, is dangerous. Idealizing away the evidential environment obscures the ways that our social contexts distort its contents. Such social distortion can lead to evidential oppression, an epistemic injustice arising from the ubiquity of (...) ideologically-inflected portrayals of oppressed social groups. In some cases, this distortion can be so pervasive as to create a skeptical pothole in agents' epistemic environments---a limited region in which a skeptical scenario obtains. The skeptical challenge of social distortion is important because it suggests that prejudice and irrationality alone may not be enough to explain many harmful beliefs. Where justified belief is merely a matter of responding well to one's evidence, the ubiquity of ideologically-inflected evidence may impel a matching doxastic state, even for exemplary epistemic agents. Nevertheless, there is an asymmetry in blameworthiness between the Cartesian victim and someone laboring under evidential oppression. This asymmetry reveals the need for distinctively non-ideal epistemic norms. I offer a characterization of one such norm: the internalist practice of self-stewardship. (shrink)

What might the project be of lyric poetry in late global capitalism in the early years of the new millennium which acknowledges both a post-romantic and modernist lineage, and which faces the critical challenge of postmodernist theorizing? This paper endeavors to respond to this question forwarding the Adorno-inspired viewpoint that the praxes of individual lyric poems reveal orientations of affirmation or negation be they intended or not. The thesis is stated that the “arguments” of modern poets are creative litigations posing (...) counter-worlds, constituting anti-worlds, and projecting ideal worlds. The philosophical anthropology that informs this thesis focuses on the homo duplex conception of man as a double being—as a unique human individual and as members of thehuman species socialized into the social life-world. Thus a counterworld privileges the human subject in society as homo externus, whereas an anti-world centers on the human subject as homo internus opposed, at odds, or turned away from the external social life-world. These reflections finally concentrate on Northrop Frye’s idea of a “third order of experience” that, in his words, contrasts with “an existing world and a world which may not exist but is pointed toby the articulate orders of experience... this world is frequently called… an unborn world, a world that never quite enters existence.”. (shrink)

연암 박지원은 유교적 독서인이었음에도 도가적 세계관을 통한 이상세계의 대안을 모 색한 특징이 있다. 이 글은 이 점에 초점을 맞추어 연암의 한문소설 에서 발견되 는 도가적 이상세계상에 대한 몇 가지 주제적 검토를 수행해 본 것이다. 이 글은 먼저 연암이 바라본 섬과 육지의 공간적 은유를 통해 드러나는 개방과 폐쇄의 특성을 살펴봄으로써, 육지의 인위적인 폐쇄성과 대비되는 섬의 존재적 개방성의 측면을 확인해 보았다. 그리고 이러한 문제의식의 연장선상에서 섬으로의 공간적 이주의 의의를 검토해 보았으며, 이와 더불어 연암 당시에 혼란을 야기하던 도적 집단의 해소방편으로 섬 으로의 공간적 (...) 이주가 어떠한 의미를 갖는지 살펴보았다. 또한 연암이 허생을 통해 섬에 이식한 이상세계상이 존재론적 덕론에 기초한 도가적 특성을 갖는다는 점을 밝힘과 동시 에 그것이 새로운 타자적 존재의 상정을 용인하는 하나의 실험적 사유의 성격을 띤다는 점 을 구명하였다. 연암이 도가적 이상세계에 대한 현실개혁의 대안 모색을 통해 드러내고자 한 것은 인간 을 강제하는 구조에 대한 정확한 인식과 이를 통한 극복의 방안을 마련하는 현실적 노력의 중요성이었다. 이러한 점에서 연암이 모색한 도가적 이상세계상은 하나의 절대적 대안으 로서보다는 지금-여기의 문제 상황을 진단하고 반성케 하는 타자적 의미의 현실 보완적 모델의 성격을 띤다고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Faik Kurtulmuş’s exploration of the epistemic basic structure (EBS) invites us to think about the generation, dissemination, and absorption of knowledge in a society, emphasizing the role of institutions in determining epistemic outcomes. Moreover, Kurtulmuş—in joint work with Gürol Irzık—offers a normative take on the EBS from the viewpoint of the theory of justice and does not shy away from drawing specific policy recommendations. Thus, a powerful, innovative concept is used to extend an influential theory and draw out its practical (...) implications. What more is there to wish for? A project of such ambition inevitably faces serious challenges. I address the issue of the alignment between the ideal and non-ideal elements of Kurtulmuş’s theory with an eye toward the practicalities of social reform. My central claim is that the philosophers striving to promote distributive epistemic justice need to think carefully about whom they intend to address with their proposals and how to persuade such addressees. I also maintain that emphasis on a holistic approach to social reform represents a major hindrance to its pragmatic success. (shrink)

In this article, I explore some advantages of viewing well-being in terms of an individual's health status. Principally, I argue that this perspective makes it easier to establish that rich countries at least have an obligation to transfer 1 percent of their GDP to poor countries. If properly targeted at the fundamental determinants of health in developing countries, this transfer would very plausibly yield a disproportionate `bang for the buck' in terms of individual well-being. This helps to explain how the (...) obligation can be both light enough in its burden on the rich to avoid being `too demanding' and yet also bountiful enough in its effects to be worthy of the status of a `minimum obligation'. The advantages I enunciate are particularly relevant to establishing an obligation in the context of a non-ideal theory of international justice, which aims to set interim targets for practical action before an ideal theory has been settled. Key Words: health • international justice • foreign aid • determinants of health • non-ideal theory. (shrink)

I analyze Casey Johnson’s “care-based epistemology” in terms of four concepts—“epistemic need,” “relational epistemic obligations,” “epistemic labor,” and “epistemic reproduction”—that she derives from the relational framework of care. I first discuss how these notions reconfigure epistemic normativity as crafting healthy communities that satisfy epistemic needs of its members. Then I point to two theoretical resources that could strengthen this thesis but which Johnson either ignores or explicitly rejects. While Johnson is interested in drawing out the implications of care ethics for (...) a theory of knowledge, there is much in her discussion to suggest that a care-based epistemology can loop back to enrich care ethics itself—indicating a tighter connection between good caring and good knowing. (shrink)

Abstract:Analyzed here are the virtue-theoretic and feminist arguments for moral anger as appropriate in response to injustice. A Buddhist response is offered to these accounts and it is argued that Buddhist ethics neither obligates nor forbids anger on moral grounds, but instead characterizes anger as an affliction of the mind that should be overcome for the sake of the agent's own well-being. It is argued that compassion can offer some of the same moral benefits we expect from moral anger without (...) compromising well-being, and this leaves open the possibility that there are other similarly non-destructive and morally efficacious attitudes toward injustice. (shrink)

The realisation of justice in the real world requires moral principles and political action. This book offers a roadmap for these two notions to connect.

Climate change confronts humanity with a challenge it has never faced before. It combines issues of global justice and intergenerational justice on an unprecedented scale. In particular, it stands to adversely affect the global poor. So far, the global community has failed to reduce emissions to levels that are necessary to avoid unacceptable risks for the future. Nor are the burdens of emission reductions and of coping with climate impacts fairly shared. The shortcomings of both political and individual climate action (...) thus seem like a paradigmatic case for non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory can be understood as a form of political theorising that compares different responses to (i) failures of agents to comply with the demands of justice and (ii) unfavourable circumstances. Insofar as non-ideal theory also aims to be action-guiding, it asks normative theorists for a more thorough engagement with the empirical context so as to arrive at practical recommendations for the ‘here and now’. This volume examines the normative issues that become relevant when the non-ideal circumstances of the climate context are fully taken into account. It is comprised of three parts: The first collects chapters that reflect on general issues in responding to the shortcomings of current climate action. Chapters in the second part propose more specific practical reforms. The third part examines how moral values ought to be brought into the scientific, political, and public debates under the non-ideal circumstances of this world. (shrink)

From Plato to the present day, political theorists have used models of idealistic societies to think about politics. How can these idealistic models inform our thinking about political life in our non-ideal world? Not, as many political theorists have hoped, by providing normative guidance -- by showing us how things should be or where we should go. Even still, we can use these models to interpret the concepts we depend on to explain and evaluate political behavior and institutions, (...) thereby sharpening our explanations of how things work and our estimations of how to make things better. Seeing idealistic models in this light reveals a promising route to a form of political inquiry that integrates our explanatory aims and our normative aspirations. -/- (Updated: October 2024. The book is in production for publication by Oxford University Press, to appear in the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics series. I have uploaded the table of contents, chapter 1, and the bibliography.). (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Many agents have failed to comply with their responsibilities to take the action needed to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. This pervasive noncompliance raises two questions of nonideal political theory. First, it raises the question of what agents should do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities. (the Responsibility Question) In this paper I put forward four principles that we need to employ to answer the Responsibility Question (Sections II-V). I then illustrate my account, by outlining four kinds of (...) action that should be undertaken (Section VI). Pervasive noncompliance also raises a second question: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? (the Governance Question). The paper briefly outlines a methodology for addressing this question and outlines what a nonideal response to the existing institutional structures would be (Section VII). It does so with reference to the Paris Agreement, and in particular the creation of a "global stocktake" (Article 14, Paris Agreement) and the "facilitative dialogue" (paragraph 20 of the ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’). The aim, then, is to set out an account of a nonideal theory of climate justice. (shrink)

Discussions of non-ideal theory as philosophical methodology have recently entered the philosophy of language. In this chapter, the authors take stock of the academic movement that has begun to gather under the banner of ‘non-ideal philosophy of language,’ exploring what it means to idealize discursive phenomena, and how such idealizations impede our inquiry into politically significant speech. In doing so, they aim to draw attention to a certain pernicious ideal that distorts the theorist’s own relationship, qua theorist, (...) to the discursive practices they seek to theorize. This is the methodological ideal of normative neutrality, which ties the rigor of the theorist’s conceptual toolkit to its impartiality in the face of a non-ideal world full of non-neutral speech. The authors make the case that non-ideal philosophers of language ought to reject this ideal, lest they deprive themselves of the resources to register the political significance of their target phenomena. To acknowledge our need for normatively non-neutral methods, the authors argue, is to imagine a philosophy of language that might itself take the shape of discursive resistance against our target phenomena. They conclude by considering how philosophers could do such things with their words. (shrink)

This paper seeks to exhibit and explain, by way of comparison, two ideal kinds of knowledge: knowledge based on classifications according to genera and species, as in Aristotelianism and common sense, and scientific knowledge based on the application of laws of nature. I will proceed by attempting (1) to determine the role that presuppositions play in knowledge in general by means of the distinction between content and form; (2) to describe and explain the main features of both ideal (...) forms of knowledge; and, finally, (3) to analyze the relation between these two forms of knowledge as it is presented in Eddington's celebrated discussion of the “two tables”. I will be critical of the widespread view that modern science is the correct form of knowledge, and that common sense is merely an illusion. (shrink)

Many people in the developing world access essential health services either partially or primarily through programs run by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Given that such programs are typically designed and run by Westerners, and funded by Western countries and their citizens, it is not surprising that such programs are regarded by many as vehicles for Western cultural imperialism. In this chapter, I consider this phenomenon as it emerges in the context of development and humanitarian aid programs, particularly those delivering (...) medical treatment, nutrition and access to clean water. I argue that in order to avoid contributing to cultural imperialism, INGOs have a duty to ensure that they do not offer services in a way that requires their beneficiaries to choose between accessing essential health services and violating or otherwise undermining traditional norms and practices which have significance for their beneficiaries. Following Onora O'Neill, I argue that offers requiring such a choice are effectively “unrefuseable” and so coercive. INGOs therefore, must avoid making such offers, and can accomplish this by means of an iterated process of reciprocal negotiation under conditions of equality, in which both the INGOs’ and the beneficiaries’ deep values and concerns play a role. In essence, I claim that employing such a process is a requirement of procedural justice, given the non-ideal conditions in which INGOs must operate. (shrink)

Joseph Heath (2014) argues that the contribution of competitive markets to Pareto-efficiency generates moral constraints that apply to business managers. Heath argues that ethical behavior on the part of management consists in avoiding profit-seeking strategies which, under conditions of perfect competition, would decrease Pareto-efficiency. I argue that because (1) such conditions do not obtain; and (2) the most efficient result – under imperfect conditions – is not achieved by satisfying the largest possible set of the remaining conditions; it is (3) (...) impossible to draw any substantive ethical guidelines from Heath’s approach. (shrink)

What are appropriate criteria for assessing a theory of morality? In Ideal Code, Real World, Brad Hooker begins by answering this question, and then argues for a rule-consequentialist theory. According to rule-consequentialism, acts should be assessed morally in terms of impartially justified rules, and rules are impartially justified if and only if the expected overall value of their general internalization is at least as great as for any alternative rules. In the course of developing his rule-consequentialism, Hooker discusses (...) impartiality, well-being, fairness, equality, the question of how the 'general internalization' of rules is to be interpreted by rule-consequentialism, and the main objections to rule-consequentialism. He also discusses the social contract theory of morality, act-consequentialism, and the question of which moral prohibitions and which duties to help others rule-consequentialism endorses. The last part of the book considers the implications of rule-consequentialism for some current controversies in practical ethics. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary book is a contribution to the history of ideas that tries to locate and assess the causes for the large gap between Enlightenment hopes for the future and present realities.

One of the most troubling features of international trade is that it often involves exchange between individuals facing dramatically different life circumstances, who therefore derive different levels of benefit from the exchange. Most obviously, wages are extremely low in underdeveloped countries. However, the principle underlying these wages is the same as the one the dictates wage levels in wealthy countries. It is, therefore, difficult to criticize the wages paid to ?pauper labor? without at the same time criticizing the way that (...) capitalism functions as a whole. For those who would like to question aspects of globalization, without simply repeating the standard moralizing critique of capitalism, this poses particular difficulties. This paper offers some suggestions on how egalitarians can approach this issue. The central piece of conceptual apparatus introduced, in the service of this aim, is the distinction between a ?first-best?, a ?second-best?, and an ?nth best? set of normative principles. It is then suggested, first, that capitalism is acceptable to egalitarians only within a third-best framework, and second, that this low level of idealization imposes real constraints on how far one can go in criticizing trade practices at the global level. (shrink)

Recent developments in epistemology have shifted away from idealised perspectives on knowledge acquisition towards an examination of the myriad of ways in which our epistemic practices go astray. This evolution has given rise to the field of non-ideal epistemology, which explores the realities that emerge when individuals and communities falter in their epistemic practices (Barker et al. 2018; Bernecker et al. 2021; Mckenna 2023). This focus extends across various dimensions of applied and social epistemology, addressing issues such as bad (...) epistemic characters, the erosion of trust, epistemic injustice, ignorance, fake news, and corruption. A significant manifestation of this recent shift in non-ideal epistemology is evident in the burgeoning field of vice epistemology. Epistemic vices are dispositions, attitudes and ways of thinking that make us bad thinkers, in so far as they prevent us from acquiring and sharing knowledge, manifest bad motives, and desires, or disrupt both individual and collective epistemic functioning (Kidd et al. 2020). These vices are harmful to the vice-bearer in so far as they distort and impair cognitive faculties, leading to flawed reasoning, and biased judgement, hindering the attainment of epistemic goods such as genuine understanding and knowledge (Cassam 2019a; Medina 2012, 2020; Priest 2020). These harms also extend beyond the individual, contributing to the perpetuation of misinformation and the erosion of trust within social networks and communities (Baird and Calvard 2018; Fricker 2020; Medina 2020; Sullivan and Alfano 2020). The acknowledgement of the social nature of epistemic vices is being increasingly recognised. This recognition underscores that epistemic vices can extend beyond individuals and be held by collectives, including educational institutions, online environments, and prisons (Kidd 2019, 2020; Fricker 2020; Medina 2020; Tanesini 2021). In light of the harms arising from these bad epistemic practices, inquiries into how to respond to and address these wrongs have been crucial. This has led to considerations of responsibility and ameliorative solutions, seeking to rectify these adverse effects (Cassam 2019a; Holroyd 2016; Sherman and Goguen 2019; Tanesini 2021). These ameliorative solutions also extend beyond individual-based strategies to include structural and social solutions. This thesis contributes to these growing debates by focusing on the harms associated with epistemic vices and exploring ways to address them. In Chapters 2 and 3, I focus on some foundational aims in vice epistemology, evaluating three prominent accounts of epistemic vice: obstructivism, motivationalism and personalism (Battaly 2016a, 2018a; Cassam 2016, 2019a; Tanesini 2018, 2021). Within these chapters, I also focus on the harmful nature of epistemic vices and whether vice-bearers should be held responsible for their vices, and if so, what form this responsibility would take. In Chapter 4, I evaluate the role of blame as a response to vice more closely, focusing on its epistemic and ameliorative nature. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I turn to assess themes in applied epistemology. Still focusing on the harms of epistemic vices and possible solutions, I examine whether epistemic nudging, a paternalistic method of nudging individuals towards epistemically desirable outcomes, may assist in the mitigation of epistemic vice (Adams and Niker 2021; Grundmann, 2021:213; Miyazono 2023:2). I then focus on how epistemic vices are manifested in online environments, particularly those where information disorder is present (Wardle 2019). Finally, I conclude with an examination of institutional vices, which I argue can act as indicators of institutional trustworthiness. (shrink)

In this paper, I will explore the relationship between ideal and nonideal theories and bioethics. I explore the challenges we face in their implementation in the real world. I argue that there is no sole theory that can guide the multiplicity of real world cases and policies. If we consider there are a variety of possibilities, we should ask several questions: When should we use NITs and when should we opt for ITs? Are there appropriate criteria for (...) making these decisions? Which are the valid uses or justifications for NITs? Is there a way to guide the decision-making process in real world contexts? This paper will try to answer the above questions. In the first part of this paper, I make some distinctions to present the theoretical arena and debate, and I propose five criteria that can help our decision making process. In the second part, I introduce two cases focused on reproductive rights-related problems in order to apply the decision-making process developed in the first part. The first one examines conscientious objection in the case of legal abortion in Argentina and the second one analyzes the case of research with pregnant women in countries where abortion is illegal. In one case, I argue that we ought to follow NIT, while in the other we should follow IT. (shrink)

Reconciling theories of intelligent institutional systems in experimentalist open democracy and pluralist liberalism, Institutional Epistemology and Extreme Inequality argues that protecting freedom from poverty and limiting private wealth are the necessary conditions for reliable social learning and problem-solving.

Idealization is a necessity. Stripping away levels of complexity makes questions tractable, focuses our attention, and lets us develop comprehensible, testable models. Applying such models, however, requires care and attention to how the idealizations incorporated into their development affect their predictions. In epistemology, we tend to focus on idealizations concerning individual agents' capacities, such as memory, mathematical ability, and so on, when addressing this concern. By contrast, this dissertation focuses on social idealizations, particularly those pertaining to salient social categories like (...) race, sex, and gender. In Chapter II, Privilege and Superiority, we begin with standpoint epistemology, one of the earliest efforts to grapple with the ways that social structures affect our epistemic lives. I argue that, if we interpret standpoint epistemologists' claims as hypotheses about the ways that our social positions affect access to evidence, we can fruitfully employ recent developments in evidence logic to study the consequences. I lay the groundwork for this project, developing a model based on neighborhood semantics for modal logic. Adapting this framework to standpoint epistemology helps to clarify the meaning of terms like "epistemic privilege" and "superior knowledge" and to elucidate the differences between various accounts of standpoint epistemology. I also address a longstanding criticism of these views: Longino's (1990) bias paradox, which suggests that there is no objective position from which to judge the goodness of a particular standpoint. Chapter III, Evidence in a Non-Ideal World, turns to the broader social context, looking at how ideology affects the availability of evidence. Throughout the chapter, I take the formation, justification, and maintenance of racist, sexist, and otherwise oppressive beliefs as a central case. I argue that these beliefs are, at least sometimes, formed as a result of evidential distortion, a structural feature of our epistemic contexts that skews readily available evidence in favor of dominant ideologies. Because they are formed this way, such beliefs will appear justified on prominent accounts of justification, both internalist and externalist. As a result, epistemic norms that fail to account for such non-ideal conditions will deliver verdicts that are not only counter-intuitive, but also morally unpalatable. This, I argue, reveals a kind of structural epistemic injustice, especially where oppressive ideology is involved and suggests the need for epistemic norms that are sensitive to agents' social contexts. Much of the discussion in Chapters II and III depends on social categories like race and gender, arguing that they have a distinctive influence on our epistemic lives. In Chapter IV, I Know You Are, But What Am I?, my co-author and I focus on social categories themselves, distinguishing between self-identity, social identity, and social role. We self-identify as gay or straight, men or women, couch-potatoes or gym rats. Sometimes, these identities affect our social roles---the way we are perceived and treated by others---and sometimes they do not. This relationship between our internal identities and our preferred public perceptions begs for explanation. On our account, this relationship is captured by what we refer to as 'social identity'---roughly, internal identities made available to others. We argue that this account of social identity plays an illuminating role in structural explanation of discrimination and individual behavior, dissolves puzzles surrounding the phenomenon of 'passing', and explains certain moral and political obligations toward individuals. (shrink)

The article examines the transformations of the philosophical concept of world as it appears in the cosmopolitan tradition of political thought and its relation to the problem of the border. It focuses particularly on how world is understood as either lost or multiplied in the contexts of modernity, globalisation, and migration. The article discusses postcolonial conceptions of cosmopolitics and the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt to show how the universal ideal of the world is replaced by (...) singular constructions of worlds in terms of the experience of migrants and refugees or the phenomenological horizon of political action. I conclude by suggesting that Jacques Rancière’s understanding of politics as a conflict of worlds can take us beyond the traps of both cosmopolitan universalism and the phenomenological singularity of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

Worldly Virtue discusses individual virtues in new ways, drawing from faith traditions, feminist analyses, and social science. The book addresses traditional virtues like honesty and generosity and articulates new virtues like those required in aging.

Book Information Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. By Brad Hooker. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xiii + 213. Hardback, 25.