Through a discussion of Hugo Grotius’ conception of just war, this essay shows that within his critique of liberalism, Schmitt clashed with the very intellectual tradition he claimed to represent. Both historically and philosophically Schmitt's concept of the Ius Publicum Europaeum was a mirage. Indeed, his concept of the political was a rejection of the moral and civil philosophy that sees politics as the world of active citizens and commonwealths arguing with each other about fundamental questions of justice (...) and equity. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that sportspersonship is a means of performing fundamental sociality; it is about the conversion of a foe (inimicus) into an enemy (hostis). Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s distinction between enemy and foe – inimicus and hostis – as well as his discussion of the ius publicum Europaeum, I suggest a model of sportspersonship that sees it as expressing the competitive relations between equals that undergird the most minimal form of sociality; relations that any deeper (...) union takes as its foundation. It is the performance of this fundamental sociality, I argue, that grounds the value of sport in general (though this does not mean that there cannot be other, contingent values in sport). (shrink)

Carl Schmitt’s conceptual history of war is routinely invoked to comprehend the contemporary mutations in the concept and practice of war. This literature has passively relied on Schmitt’s interpretation of the nomos of the Ius Publicum Europaeum, which traced the transition from early modern ‘non-discriminatory war’ to the US–American promotion of discriminatory warfare as a new category in liberal international law. This chapter provides a critical reconstruction of Schmitt’s antiliberal narrative of war and argues that his polemical mode (...) of concept formation led to a defective and, ultimately, ideological counterhistory of absolutist warfare, designed to denigrate liberalism’s wars as total while remaining silent on Nazi Germany’s de facto total wars. The historical critique is supplemented by an interrogation of his theoretical presuppositions: decisionism, the concept of the political, and concrete order thinking. It shows that Schmitt’s history of warfare is not only empirically defective but also theoretically unsecured by a succession of arbitrarily deployed and hyperabstract theoretical registers. At the center of Schmitt’s work yawns a huge lacuna: the absence of social relations as a category of analysis for the history of war and international relations. (shrink)

All geopolitical change represents the creation of a new order and this entails the alteration of the spatial conditions and, therefore, the modification of the way of understanding borders. Carl Schmitt, especially in his last stage, aimed at delineating a new international configuration made up of large spaces (Grossräume), once the time of sovereignties typical of the Ius publicum europaeum was over. The goal of this study is to analizy to which extent and how Schmitt 's analytical tools (...) around borders can be useful to understand the current state of globalization. Todo cambio geopolítico representa la creación de un nuevo orden y ello conlleva la alteración de las condiciones espaciales y, por tanto, la modificación de la manera de entender las fronteras. Carl Schmitt, especialmente en su última etapa, apuntó al delineamiento de una nueva configuración internacional conformada por grandes espacios (Grossräume), una vez que el tiempo de las soberanías propias del Ius publicum europaeum había terminado. El objetivo de este estudio es analizar hasta qué punto y de qué manera las herramientas analíticas de Schmitt en torno a las fronteras pueden ser útiles para comprender el estado actual de la globalización. (shrink)

Silete theologi in munere alieno! As Schmitt observes in Der Nomos der Erde, this was Alberico Gentili's battle cry to remove theologians from discussion of politics and to rescue a non-discriminatory concept of war. According to Schmitt, it became the slogan of an epoch — the epoch of the ius publicum Europaeum. The turn to the modern age in the history of international law was accomplished by a dual division of two lines of thought inseparable in the Middle (...) Ages — moral-theological from juridical-political arguments and the question of iusta causa, grounded in moral arguments and natural law, from the typically juridical-formal question of iustus hostis. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta poner de manifiesto el papel que jugó el “mar” en el desarrollo de un derecho moderno con pretensiones cada vez más universales.

This chapter describes the process of institutionalization of natural law at the University of Pisa, essential to interpreting the conditions in which the first public law chair of Italy was founded. The study of legal education in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century will allow a more in-depth understanding of both the development of natural law in teaching practice throughout the long eighteenth century, and the features of the two processes of reception, respectively for educational and political purposes. In (...) fact, although both processes were founded on appreciation of the centrality of Roman law and philosophy in the construction of doctrines by the so-called ‘modern natural law school’, and developed through mediation of traditional Roman legal culture of the Pisan ‘historical-critical school’, there were some differences. In this initial phase, the didactic reception was indirect, although not entirely implicit, whereas the political reception was direct and explicit. (shrink)

Longtemps attendu, l'ouvrage restitue, pour la première fois en langue française, l'exégèse et l'interprétation complètes de l'œuvre publiée par Carl Schmitt de son vivant, dans ses champs et ses séquences, avant et après 1945. La première partie concerne la philosophie schmittienne du droit et sa fondation théologique: le 'décisionnisme' et 'l'institutionnalisme' ou 'pensée de l'ordre concret.' La deuxième partie porte sur la théorie du droit constitutionnel sous la République de Weimar, puis sous le IIIe Reich, ainsi que les commentaires sur (...) la Loi Fondamentale de Bonn. Autant d'éléments d'une analyse critique renouvelée de l'État de droit démocratique, parlementaire et pluraliste. La troisième partie traite du concept du politique, point d'articulation fondamental entre le droit constitutionnel et la théorie de l'État d'une part, le droit international et la théorie de la guerre d'autre part. La quatrième partie porte sur la doctrine du droit international sous Weimar, puis sous le IIIe Reich, enfin après 1945, dont la rétrospective du jus publicum europaeum. Une somme objective, exposant l'ensemble, donnant à chacun la possibilité de savoir, puis laissant à chacun le soin de juger."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

A propósito da comemoração do bicentenário da obra de Kant Rumo à paz perpétua, Habermas apresenta uma proposta de reconstrução discursiva do cosmopolitismo que contesta a renovação das objeções realistas de Carl Schmitt, segundo a qual só o retorno ao jus publicum Europaeum possibilita a limitação das guerras, enquanto o universalismo moral, conduziu a uma confusão dos valores do político com os da moral e serviu de fundamento para que a organização cosmopolita transformasse os interesses particulares de uma (...) das partes em valores universais da humanidade e os negasse a outra parte, provocando a criminalização do inimigo e originando as guerras totais. Contudo, Habermas observa que este fundamentalismo dos direitos humanos somente pode ser evitado por uma reconstrução discursiva que mostra que os direitos humanos não são direitos morais e que a formação de uma democracia cosmopolita, é a única capaz de permitir uma aplicação procedimental dos direitos humanos. (shrink)

The article analyses some aspects of Schmitt’s theories on international law, in particular the notion of Gro ß raum. The assumption is that with this notion Schmitt tries to re-think politics and international relations beyond the classical categories of the State. From this point of view, there is an essential affinity between the concept of politics explained in the homonymous essay published in 1927 and the concept of Gro ß raum. After the Second World War, Schmitt distances himself from the (...) notion of Gro ß raum, too close to the nazi theories, and focuses on that of nomos, explained in Der Nomos der Erde, and on the crisis of the Jus publicum europaeum. However, Schmitt fails to define which system of international relations should follow the Jus publicum europaeum and the same notion of nomos remains rather undefined. In the last part of the paper the author compares Schmitt’s theories about international law and some theories of Kelsen, with particular reference to the theory of bellum justum. (shrink)

L’obiettivo di questo saggio è duplice: da una parte, riconsiderare in quali termini la figura di Carl Schmitt possa essere considerata quella di un «pensatore europeo»; dall’altra, mettere in luce la particolare idea di Europa che agita molti degli scritti schmittiani dagli anni venti del Novecento fino al secondo dopoguerra. Tutto lascia supporre Schmitt sarebbe un fiero critico dell’assetto politico europeo attuale. Il problema colto da Schmitt è la frizione tra una costruzione giuridica meramente formale e una entità giuridicamente definita (...) ma dotata anche di vitalità politica. Lontana dall’essere il luogo per eccellenza della decisione, Schmitt intuisce che l’Europa comunitaria sarà un burattino, formalmente perfetto e tuttavia privo di quella vita che soltanto il «politico» è capace di donare. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HOMOGENEOUS OR HETEROGENEOUS DEVELOPMENT? BRIAN T. MULLADY, 0.P. Holy Apostles College and Seminary Cromwell, Connecticut 0 NE OF THE most difficult questions to confront those who hold for a natural-law conception of Catholic moral teaching which does not change with the development of the times is the area of the freedom of religion in the political order. The traditional teaching on this subject is expressed in many (...) places. The most difficult locus for anyone who wants to defend the traditional opinion is found in The Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX. In this document, the following canons are explicitly enumerated : 77. In this age of ours it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be the only religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other cults whatsoever. 78. Hence in certain regions of Catholic name, it has been laudably sanctioned by law that men immigrating there be allowed to have public exercises of any form of worship of their own. 79. For it is false that the civil liberty of every cult, and likewise, the full power granted to all of manifesting openly and publicly any kind of opinions and ideas, more easily leads to the corruption of the morals and minds of the people, and to the spread of the evil of indifferentism.1 1 " 77. Aestate hac nostra non amplius expedit, religionem catholicam haberi tamquam unicam status religionem, ceteris quibuscumque cultibus exclusus. 78. Hine laudabiliter in quibusdam catholici nominis regionibus lege cautum est, ut hominibus illuc immigrantibus liceat publicum proprii cuiusque cultus exercitium habere. 79. Enimvero falsum est, civilem cuiusque cultus libertatem, itemque plenam potestatem omnibus attributam quaslibet opiniones cogitationesque palam publiceque manifestandi conducere ad populorum mores animosque facilius corrumpendos ac indifferentismi pestem propagandam." Denizinger -Schonmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 1777-1779 (2977-2979), hereafter refered to as DS. 93 94 BRIAN T. MULLADY, O.P. In this text, freedom of religion is clearly condemned. Yet one finds about one hundred years later the issue of religious freedom discussed by Vatican II. Here the conclusion reached seems quite different. The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in associations with others. The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom must be given such recognition in the constitutional order of society as will make it a civil right.2 These two documents seem to represent a significant change in the teaching of the church. Beyond the obvious change in attitude towards religious freedom, many moral theologians also see another change : the very language of the decree signals a departure from the traditional basis of the law of nature by a reference to the dignity of the human person. One example will suffice: It may also be a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional concept of ' nature ' which has contributed in recent years to the focus of moral attention moving from ' human nature ' to ' human person ' 2 " Haec Vaticana Synodus declarat personam humanam ius habere ad libertatem religiosam. Huiusmodi libertas in eo consistit, quod omnes homines debent immunes esse a coercitione ex parte sive singulorum sive coetuum socialium et cuiusvis potestatis humanae, et ita quidem ut in re religiosa neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur, quominus iuxta suam conscientiam agat privatim et publice, vel solus vel aliis consociatus, intra debitos limites. Insuper declarat ius ad libertatem religiosam esse revera fundatum in ipsa dignitate personae humanae, qualis et verbo Dei revelato et ipsa ratione congnoscitur. Hoc ius personae humanae ad libertatem religiosam in iuridica societatis ordinatione ita est agnoscendum, ut ius civile evadat." Vatican II, Declaratio de Libertate Religiosa: Dignitatis Humanae, n. 2. Translations are taken from Vatican Council II, The Conciliar and Post Conciliar... (shrink)

The public banquet category, which opposed convivium privatum and convivium publicum, existed in Roman society. Contrary to popular belief, the Latin term epulum did not always and, not only, refer to the public banquet, because the words convivium and cena could also be used. Originally, public banquets – ritual banquets or investiture banquets for priests and magistrates (cena aditialis) – concerned only priests and magistrates, sometimes senators (Epulum Iovis). These participants had the epulandi publice ius. In 217, the Saturnales (...) banquet was opened to the populus but this case remained isolated in the ritual setting. On the other hand, from the beginning of the 2nd century, nobles made it a habit to offer banquets to the people at their family funerals, then in the 1st century, the imperatores did so first during the Tithe of Hercules and then during their triumphs. In these circumstances, the convivium publicum then became the epulum populi romani and the epulandi publice ius concerned the members of the populus, probably listed. Such an evolution shows that the presence of the populus was not consubstantial, under the Republic, at the public banquet. It also shows that the public character of a banquet was not determined by the status of the donor or the origin of the funds but by the status of representatives of the city of the beneficiaries (magistrates, senators or citizens), as well as by its location in a public place. (shrink)

Background: The risk of surgery in eloquent areas is related to neuropsychological dysfunctions. Maximizing the extent of resection increases the overall survival. The onco-functional balance is mandatory when surgery involves cognitive areas, and maximal information on the cognitive status of patients during awake surgery is needed. This can be achieved using direct cortical stimulation mapping and, in addition to this, a neuropsychological monitoring technique called real-time neuropsychological testing. The RTNT includes testing protocols based on the area where the surgery is (...) performed. We reported on tests used for left temporal lobe surgery and our RTNT decision tree.Case Report: We reported our RTNT experience with a 25-year-old right-handed man with 13 years of schooling. He reported daily partial seizures. MRI revealed the presence of a low-grade glioma involving the temporo-insular cortex. The neuropsychological status presurgery which was within the normal range was combined with functional magnetic resonance imaging and diffusion tensor imaging information. Awake surgery plus RTNT was performed. Direct electrical stimulation during object naming elicited a motor speech arrest. Resection was continuously accompanied by the RTNT. The RTNT provided enriched information to the surgeon. Performance never dropped. A slight decrement in accuracy emerged for pseudoword repetition, short-term memory and working memory, phonological processing, and verbal comprehension. Total resection was performed, and the histological examination confirmed the nature of the lesion. Immediate postsurgery performance was within the normal range as it was the fMRI and DTI assessment.Conclusion: The RTNT provides essential information that can be used online, during surgery, for clinical aims to provide the surgeon with useful feedback on the cognitive status of patients. (shrink)

The paper examines Thomas Hobbes’s theory of the state and representation in light of the historical development of the idea of the people as a corporation and its use in late-medieval and early-modern theories of resistance. Consequently, it is argued that Hobbes’s use of a corporate metaphor for the state embodied a rejection of the ius gentium reading of the people as a corporate body that legitimised the right of resistance to the sovereign power. By incorporating the state, not the (...) people, and championing a single covenant of a dissociated multitude that leads to its generation, Hobbes undermined the basis on which advocates of popular sovereignty justified opposition to the sovereign; a prerogative derived in their eyes from a covenant between the people and the ruler. (shrink)

Según la noción clásica el derecho es el objeto de la justicia; también clásicamente se dice que el ius es lo justo, lo debido. Según esto, el ius naturale es lo justo que se funda en la naturaleza y es lo debido por naturaleza. Frente a estas nociones clásicas Thomas Hobbes define al ius naturale como la libertad que cada hombre tiene de usar su propio poder como quiera, para la conservación de su propia naturaleza, es decir, de su vida. (...) También podemos marcar la diferencia entre la concepción clásica de la ley natural como dictamen de la razón práctica que ordena al hombre hacia el fin inscripto en su naturaleza, permitiendo reconocer el bien y el mal afin de realizar el primero y evitar el último, de la noción moderna hobbesiana que concibe la lex naturalis como norma general que obliga a realizar lo que preserve mejor su vida u omitir lo que pueda destruirla o privarle de los medios de conservarla. El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar cómo y porqué se llega a estas diferencias tan marcadas. (shrink)

This paper seeks to challenge the long-standing interpretation of the ius vitae necisque as a formal legal right of Roman fathers. It offers a review and critique of the evidence upon which the claim of ancient origin is founded and highlights the consequent problems in comprehending late Republican and Imperial references to the killing of sons by fathers. An alternative and more satisfactory understanding is to be found in sociological thinking and it is argued that the comprehension of the ius (...) vitae necisque as a formal right is not only invalid but obscures the real significance of its promotion as a political phenomenon in the age of Augustus and the early emperors of Rome. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia críticamente el concepto de Ius Constitutionale Commune Latinoamericanum como fenómeno de judicialización de la política a nivel regional. Partiendo de la afirmación de que el derecho constitucional es político, se analizan algunos rasgos del ICCAL como la ideología que lo inspira, la teoría en que se apoya el concepto y el arreglo institucional que lo sostiene, para problematizar su carácter "común". Bajo el entendido que cualquier proyecto constitucional está indisolublemente ligado a un diseño institucional que lo lleva (...) a cabo, se critica la apuesta por un modelo juricentrista, anclado en la interpretación que la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos hace de los derechos reconocidos como universales, para proponer un sistema basado en procedimientos deliberativos e igualitarios que fortalezcan la democratización de la región. This article critically examines the concept of Ius Constitutionale Commune Latinoamericanum as a phenomenon of judicialization of politics at the regional level. To problematize its "common" character and based on the assertion that constitutional law is political, some features of the ICCAL are analyzed: the ideology that inspires it, the theory in which the concept is supported and the institutional arrangement that sustains it. Under the understanding that every constitutional project is inextricably linked to an institutional design that carries it out, the commitment to a jury-centered model, anchored in the interpretation that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights makes of the rights recognized as universal is criticized. Proposing, in contrast, a system based on deliberative and egalitarian procedures that strengthen the democratization of the region. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ius Gentium as Publicly Articulated Moral ScienceMatthew K. MinerdAmong the various types of law discussed in St. Thomas's theological "treatise on law"—questions 90–108 of Summa theologia [ST] I-II—the classification known as the "law of nations" (ius gentium) holds an ambiguous epistemological position. Marking a kind of halfway point between the natural law and civil law, it seems to straddle both domains. In fact, in a particularly important text dedicated (...) to this topic in the ST (I-II, q. 95, a. 4), Aquinas classes the ius gentium as being closely connected to the natural law, though in a way that is somewhat derivative, not as immediately flowing from human nature (especially in its animality) as does the natural law, but also not as marked by human contingency as is human civil law.As was recently discussed in a well-documented and insightful article by Barrett H. Turner in The Thomist, there have historically been two main lines of Thomist interpretation concerning the exact character of the "law of nations." Very broadly stated, what he refers to as the "Salamancan" line, indebted to Francisco de Vitoria, "interprets Thomas's doctrine of the ius gentium as a body of universal positive institutions (that is, specifications, determinationes) added to the natural law by agreement of the human race."1 [End Page 1043] This position, which would be common for several centuries among members of the Thomist school, would locate the law of nations essentially in the domain of nearly universally adopted customs and institutions, not strictly deduced from the natural law, but rather grounded on "the quasi-political authority of the entire human race, which promulgates the ius gentium by customs whose utility for attaining the ends of the natural law under a certain set of social conditions is easily recognized by rational creatures."2Turner calls the other line of thought "Maritain's Neo-Thomist Line,"3 an outlook that would be shared with various nuances by thinkers like Jean-Marie Aubert, Yves Simon, Marie-Michel Labourdette, John Finnis, and others. Setting aside my qualms about his appellation "neo-Thomist," which does more to obscure than to illumine (for it covers a host of Thomistic figures who have significantly different views on what constitutes "Thomism"), Turner does fairly lay out the major lines of Jacques Maritain's position, which is most directly articulated in Man and the State and La loi naturelle ou loi non-écrite.4 Basing himself on his particular view of knowledge of the natural law through connaturality,5 Maritain contrasted this sort of moral cognition with that which develops in the line of conceptual articulation, thus having a different "gnoseological" character from our knowledge of the natural law, while nonetheless still sharing the same "ontological" foundation. Such conceptually articulated law would be the ius gentium.Rather than add my voice to the dialectic of the various thinkers arrayed by Turner into the two aforementioned camps, I would like to propose a slightly different approach to the "moral epistemology of the law of nations," though one that I believe lies in line with the best aspects of Maritain's approach. Continuing a series of reflections that I have undertaken [End Page 1044] concerning moral epistemology during the past few years,6 I propose that it is most helpful to consider the "law of nations" as being a form of reasoning pertaining to what Scholastic vocabulary would refer to as "moral science,"7 namely discursive philosophical reasoning concerning the essences, properties, effects, and various other essential relationships that belong to a human acts, morally considered (the principal subject of moral philosophy), along with other subjects that are studied in relation to this principal subject (e.g., the principles of human acts, most particularly, the structure of human acts and the moral virtues). Moral science is the activity of reasoning that can be undertaken by knowing agents living together in community, seeking to discursively articulate and explain the moral truth that forms the essential basis for the contingent determinations that will then be codified in particular civil laws, the latter of which are not concerned with questions like "what are the ultimate foundations for property... (shrink)

Philosophical debates on punishment mainly - and exhaustively - revolve around the traditional dipole “retribution - deterrence”; or, lately, seek for some alternative counterproposal (e. g. the contemporary topic of “restorative justice”). In all sides of the debates, Kant is standardly depicted as the advocate of a traditional, outmost punitive theory of justice; the kind of heritage modern-day “retributivists” seek to reassess, while “preventive” or “restorative” justice defenders aim to abandon. In the present paper, we intend to scrutinize Kant’s own (...) views on crime and punishment, as an integral part of his overall legal-practical philosophy; and, by doing so, to address that Kant is not at all the blind retributivist the above theorists perceive; what is more, he sets a philosophical framework that is able to overcome the flaws of all three, standard conceptions of criminal justice (retributive, preventive and restorative). Finally, in the light of the above, we bring forth the aspects of this Kantian framework, that are useful in assessing current legal systems and required legal reforms. (shrink)

Taking hints from the Italian writer and comedian Paolo Villaggio’s works having the unlucky-to-the-utmost accountant Fantozzi as their hero, the essay tackles the issue of the role, and the possible foundations, of the law in the theoretical scenario of a perfectly deterministic world, where everything is determined by pre-set nexuses of cause-and-effect. Fantozzi is condemned by such an inescapable law of causation (Fate) to meet constant failure, in a social context structured along stiff hierarchies which are completely independent from individual (...) merits, where law enforcement always sides with the lucky ones. Within such a context, the law cannot be grounded on rational foundations-thinking, since the only possible rational conclusion is that the law is completely useless. At the same time, the law cannot be considered an outcome of power, since any power different from that of Fate is mere illusion. The essay wonders whether, in such a theoretical setting, there is the possibility of finding an alternative foundation for the law on non-objectifying thinking, starting from imagination and the idea of justice. Is it possible to imagine reliable rules based on imagination? (shrink)