‘Unfair to Facts’ is a follow-up on Ch. 5, addressing objections Peter Strawson raised against Austin’s view of truth as a description of the conditions that must be satisfied if we are to say of a statement that it is true. Austin addresses the objection that his description of these conditions is due to a misunderstanding about the use of ‘fact’, arguing, against Strawson, that facts are not pseudo-entities and that the notion of ‘fitting the facts’ is not a useless (...) notion. (shrink)

_The Foundations of Arithmetic_ is undoubtedly the best introduction to Frege's thought; it is here that Frege expounds the central notions of his philosophy, subjecting the views of his predecessors and contemporaries to devastating analysis. The book represents the first philosophically sound discussion of the concept of number in Western civilization. It profoundly influenced developments in the philosophy of mathematics and in general ontology.

Austin takes on the problem of other minds, of how to respond to the question ‘how do you know?’, if this question is raised with regard to the thoughts, feelings, sensations, minds of other creatures. This problem has traditionally been understood as the problem of justifying our belief in the existence of other minds. Austin argues that believing in other persons, in authority and testimony, is an essential part of the act of communicating, and as such is an irreducible part (...) of our experience. While we can state certain advantages of communicative performances, there is no justification for our doing them as such. (shrink)

Deals with the question of whether there is a use of ‘is true’ that is the primary or generic name for that which at bottom we are always saying ‘is true’. Austin discusses the views that truth is primarily a property of beliefs and of true statements. He goes on to argue that the word ‘true’ denotes the validity of an intended correspondence between a representation and what it represents, and dismantles confusions about the meaning of the words that underlie (...) such a view, such as ‘fact that’ and ‘corresponds’. (shrink)

‘Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle’ is a response to an article on the meaning of Agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, published by H. A. Pritchard in 1935. In this paper, Pritchard argued that Aristotle regarded Agathon to mean ‘conducive to our happiness’ and, consequently, that he maintained that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire to become happy. Austin finds fault with this view: first, Agathon in Aristotle does not have a single meaning, and a (...) fortiori not the one Pritchard suggested; secondly, if one had to summarise the meaning of ‘being agathon’ in one phrase, then ‘being desired’ cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides τό άγαθόν. (shrink)

Addresses Bedford’s attack on appeals to introspection in the identification of emotions, which lead him to raise the question of how to draw the line between genuine and pretended anger. Austin demonstrates, through a close examination of the speech acts of ‘pretending’ and ‘really being’, that none of the supposed conditional relations between these two notions actually holds. The essay further introduces Austin’s distinction between ‘pretending to do’ and ‘pretending to be’ and emphasises the complex and diverse forms speech acts (...) involving ‘pretending’ can take. (shrink)

Austin discusses the existence, origin, and resemblance of concepts, primarily by discussing the meaning of ‘concept’ and ‘universal’. He argues that, although sometimes it may not be harmful to talk about concepts, we neither understand the meaning of ‘concept’, nor the meaning of ‘acquiring and possessing concepts’, nor a view of concept resemblance as non-sensuous acquaintance or awareness, challenging philosophers who couch their theories in such terms to illuminating them first.

A reconstruction based on previously unpublished notes, of Austin’s views of the Line and Cave allegories in Plato’s Republic. In these drafts, Austin discusses the prominent issues that arise in the context of Plato’s Line allegory, e.g. the questions of division and continuity, and shows how the different stages in the Cave allegory correspond to individual sections of the Line.

Picks up on a previous discussion of responsibility, freedom, and excuses, in which Austin argues that, in order to discover whether someone acted freely, we must discover whether certain excuses relevant to the situation at hand are acceptable. The notion of freedom, according to this view, is intractably linked to the notion of responsibility. Chapter 12 refines the previous discussion, by illuminating the differences between the notions of purpose, intention, and deliberation in a variety of speech acts.