In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Chinese Buddhism and the Threat of Atheism in Seventeenth-Century EuropeThierry MeynardWhen the Europeans first came to Asia, they met with the multiform presence of Buddhism. They gradually came to understand that a common religious tradition connected the different brands of Buddhism found in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Japan, and China. I propose here to examine a presentation of Buddhism written in Guangzhou by the Italian Jesuit Prospero Intorcetta (1626-1696) around (...) the year 1668. This text was later edited by the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet (1623-1693) and published in Paris in 1687, within an encyclopedia on Chinese thought titled Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (The Chinese Philosopher Confucius, hereafter called CSP).In the first part of this study, I shall introduce the background of the Jesuit encounter with Buddhism, first in Japan and then in China, as well as their literary production on the subject. Then, I shall examine Intorcetta's presentation of Chinese Buddhism, especially his understanding of the two faces of Buddhism: Pure Land Buddhism, which he categorized as superstition, and Chan Buddhism, categorized as atheism. These two notions of superstition and atheism seem contradictory, but in fact they are derived from Intorcetta's interpretation of the Buddhist theory of the "two truths." I shall conclude with an evaluation of Intorcetta's account. Because this early presentation of Buddhism exists only in Latin, I have inserted excerpts that I have translated.Historical Background of the Encounter with BuddhismSince the sixteenth century, missionaries have traveled to different regions of Asia and collected information about the religions they encountered, including Buddhism. They also exchanged information among themselves, asking questions of colleagues in order to confirm and complete information. The missionary reports were sent to Europe for their superiors and were sometimes published as such, but more often incorporated into larger works. [End Page 3]The First Encounter, from Japan to ChinaAmong the first reports reaching Europe about Buddhism were the letters of the Spanish Jesuit Francis-Xavier (1506-1552), who drew information from Yajiro, a Japa nese he met in Malacca in 1547. During his own stay of more than two years in Japan, in 1549-1551, Francis-Xavier had exchanges with monks and could progress in his understanding of Buddhism. His letters were very influential among the network of Jesuit schools in Europe, being copied and read at many venues.1 Other missionaries in Japan, like Cosme de Torres (1510-1570), Luís Fróis (1532-1597), and Baltasar Gago (1515-1583), went further in understanding Buddhism.Also, when, at the end of the sixteenth century, the Jesuit missionaries approached Buddhism in China, their understanding was already shaped by fifty years of knowledge gained in Japan. Just as in Japan, the China Jesuits were interested in Buddhism because it provided them with an indigenous vocabulary in which to express Christian ideas. Thus, the missionary was perceived as a kind of Buddhist monk. The symbolic identification with Buddhism went even further than in Japan, because for more than ten years in Guangdong, from 1579 to 1595, they adopted Buddhist dress and shaved their heads.However, as the missionaries deepened their understanding of the Buddhist doctrine, they realized that many tenets could not be reconciled with Christianity. Since they were greatly concerned about disseminating the orthodox faith and avoiding dubious theories, which they believed to be the tricks of the devil, they distanced themselves from Buddhism and became closer to Confucianism, whose discourse, which focused on moral life in the present world, did not directly conflict with the supernatural truths of Christianity. While Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) had initially started interacting with Chinese culture by using Buddhism, later on Ricci abandoned this approach and started to use Confucianism as the main medium. In the Tianzhu shiyi (True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven), Ricci wrote for his Chinese readers a strong refutation of the Buddhist doctrine from the standpoint of Aristotelian philosophy.2 He criticized the concept of selflessness (wuwo) on metaphysical grounds, writing that everyone should draw their existence from an ultimate origin. In his Della entrata della Compagnia di Gesù e Christianità nella China (Entry of the Society of Jesus into... (shrink)

In The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing explains how bare land is formed. Capitalism produces ‘ruins’ by stripping living beings of the capacity to form their own ecological relations, a necessary condition for the reproduction of life. Contemporary capitalism alienates living beings from ecological relations, i.e. capitalism generates “the ability to stand alone, as if the entanglements of living did not matter. Through alienation, people and things become (...) mobile assets; they can be removed from their lifeworlds in distance-defying transport to be exchanged with other assets from other life worlds, elsewhere” (Tsing 2021, 5). Cutting the threads of the web of life through capitalist alienation, however, produces bare land as a side effect, infertile waste deprived of the means to reproduce itself without capitalist support. Alienation is the deracination of living beings from their lifeworld, transforming them into passive cogs for capitalist accumulation. However, Tsing upholds matsutake mushrooms, rare fungi popular among Japa- nese foodies, as exemplars of the resilience of ecological relations. Even amidst ruins, matsutakes successfully form beneficial relations with other living beings, like pine trees, other fungi and human beings. The insistent capacity to regenerate ecological relations is the ineluctable means of reproduction for the matsutake mushroom. Even at the end of the world, the matsutake persists by perpetually co-producing new lifeworlds for itself and fellow living beings (see also Haraway 2016). I claim that Tsing’s approach to capitalist alienation is descriptively convinc- ing but lacks the affective force for ecological class consciousness. Tsing surveys the web of life from the perspective of living beings quite distant from humankind, articulating a theoretical diagnosis rather than a political exhortation. On an affective level, it is challenging to generate ecological class consciousness among the (presumably) human readers of my chapter if they are presented with only the biographies of mushrooms growing far beyond my home. As Chantal Mouffe (2018, 72) argues, the construction of an emphatically political identity requires an appeal to the affects, like hope, indignation or compassion. Latour and Schultz also stress that ecological politics currently suffers from an affective misalignment, with people failing to identify with the fate of their increasingly inhospitable environments (2022, 47). Why would European humans care about these unknown fungi? The reproduction of our CO2-intensive livelihoods largely depends on the emission of bare land elsewhere, so in the short run, we stand to benefit more from putting our heads in the sand. I employ Chakrabarty’s (2021) suggestion of grounding post-humanist politics first in strategic anthropocentrism to subsequently push for a post-humanist expansion of our human understanding. One must first feel personally interpellated by the crisis of the global means of reproduction before one can grasp the need for an ecological class politics beyond human confines. I turn to John Steinbeck’s 1939 novel The Grapes of Wrath as a kindred spirit with more mobilising potential. Steinbeck tells the story of a family of impoverished farmers from Oklahoma, the Joads, travelling to California in pursuit of a better life, yet only encountering more poverty, exploitation and anti-immigrant racism. Steinbeck describes in detail the environmental and social devastation, but he focuses on the commodified labour power of migrant farmers rather than commodified mushrooms. Steinbeck’s main characters are also uprooted from their entangled histories in the land and community of rural Oklahoma, but they present a more familiar face of the ecological class deprived of the means of reproduction. Steinbeck’s outcry against alienation-as-deracination is clear, but the shift in perspective facilitates the empathetic outrage required for building ecological class consciousness. Steinbeck’s strategic anthropocentrism helps human readers understand why alienation-as-deracination is a concern. (shrink)

There is a strong moral presumption against the use of coercion, and those who are coerced seem to be less responsible for the actions they were coerced to perform. Both these considerations seem to reflect the effect of coercion on the victim’s choice. This paper examines three ways of understanding this effect. First, I argue against understanding victims as unable to engage in genuine action. Next, I consider the suggestion that victims are unable to consent to participate in the coercer’s (...) plan. Although this suggestion is promising, I argue that the inability to consent reflects a more basic problem. Victims are unable to exercise what I call ‘normative authority’: they are unable to make discretionary changes in the permissions and obligations that they and others have. This final account yields a compelling understanding of why coercion is impermissible when it is and reveals a unique way in which impermissible coercion affects the responsibility of victims. (shrink)

Kant's Formula of Humanity famously forbids treating others merely as a means. It is unclear, however, what exactly treating someone merely as a means comes to. This essay argues against an interpretation of this idea advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O'Neill. The essay then develops a new interpretation that suggests an important connection between the Formula of Humanity and Kant's political philosophy: the content of many of our moral duties depends on the results of political philosophy and, indeed, on (...) the results of actual political decision making. (shrink)

Psychedelic or ecodelic medicines (e.g., psilocybin, ayahuasca, iboga) for the care and treatment of addiction, post‐traumatic stress disorder, cancer, cluster headaches, anxiety, and depression have surged to the forefront of discussions about mental health in the US, leading to the emergence of well‐capitalized biotech companies offering multimillion‐dollar IPOs. Venture capital website Pitchbook reports “continuing investor interest and growing acceptance of what until recently was seen as a fringe area of medicine.” As scholars, activists, and practitioners who have been healed by (...) these medicines and applaud the recent wave of decriminalization after a long, strange trip of mass incarceration and widespread dangerous misinformation, we look forward to a culture that makes these medicines available in a safe and affordable way that respects the lineages of the knowledges that are essentially and not accidentally bundled with these plants—Indigenous and counterculture wisdoms for whom these medicines were never “fringe,” but always foundational. In place of corporadelia's pursuit of standardization, we emphasize the care and wisdom of the Indigenous and countercultural teachings—traditions that have made psychedelics available to the emerging corporate/research partnership in the first place. These knowledge traditions offer foils to the ongoing translation of university peer‐reviewed research into market copy, technical articles, and IPOs, and the concomitant emergence of psychedelic pundits. In particular, we examine instances where prominent researchers have overstated the findings of existing clinical trials in public‐facing representations of the field. We argue that these corporate priorities and tactics are being aided by a new wave of psychedelic “thought leaders” who seek to delegitimize non‐hierarchical approaches to knowledge production and community support within a psychedelic commons. While prominent psychedelic psychiatrists and behaviorists are focused on rooting out and transforming individual habits of mind, we argue that there is another, latent potential for psychedelics to draw attention to—and transform—the invisible, hegemonic infrastructures and ideologies that subtly naturalize and perpetuate deeply unequal societies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:While the literature on psychedelic medicine emphasizes the importance of set and setting alongside the quality of subjective drug effects for therapeutic efficacy, few scholars have explored the therapeutic frameworks that are used alongside psychedelics in the lab or in the clinic. Based on a narrative analysis of the treatment manual and post-session experience reports from a pilot study of psilocybin-assisted treatment for tobacco smoking cessation, this article examines how therapeutic frameworks interact with the psychedelic substance in ways that can (...) rapidly reshape participants' identity and sense of self. We identified multiple domains relating to identity shift that appear to serve as smoking cessation mechanisms during psilocybin sessions, each of which had an identifiable presence in the manualized treatment. As psychedelic medicine becomes mainstream, consensual and evidence-based approaches to psychedelic-assisted identity shift that respect patient autonomy and encourage empowerment should become areas of focus in the emergent field of psychedelic bioethics. (shrink)

Democratic theories of free speech hold that the right to free speech is grounded in the nature of collective self-governance. The legitimacy of imposing laws on those who disagree with them depends on giving all citizens an equal right to participate in the lawmaking process, including the right to express their opposition. Ronald Dworkin argues that views of this kind are in tension with hate speech regulation. If we forbid the expression of prejudice, we undermine the legitimacy of laws protecting (...) minority groups. The aim in this chapter is to diffuse the tension Dworkin sees between a democratic justification of the right to free speech and hate speech regulation. This is done by developing an account of how our bodily rights constrain the right to free speech. (shrink)

On August 9, 2024, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) declined to approve Lykos Therapeutics’ application for MDMA-assisted therapy (MDMA-AT), in alignment with the recommendation of its i...

The way in which consent to sexual interactions is understood in the US is undergoing a transformation. Many universities, sometimes at the behest of lawmakers, are moving to adopt ‘affirmative consent’ policies, which define consent in terms of affirmative behavior that goes beyond mere silence or lack of resistance. Although these policies are a move in the right direction, I argue that their content has not been properly understood. In particular, the circumstances in which nonverbal behavior may communicate consent are (...) more limited than might be apparent. And even though these circumstances can be abstractly identified, it is difficult to give people adequate guidance about when some of them obtain. Moreover, I argue that no matter how the allowance for nonverbal behavior is construed, affirmative consent policies unnecessarily prohibit interactions that people may have reason to engage in. I propose an alternative policy that remedies these problems with the affirmative consent policies that are currently being implemented. And I note that the justification for this alternative policy does not turn on any special features of the university setting. Instead, the account I give suggests grounds for reforming the law as well. (shrink)

This paper argues that one’s authority to issue advance directives governing one’s medical care is limited in ways that have not been appreciated. It focuses on advance directives issued by people who go on to suffer from dementia. An adequate account of decision-making for those with dementia should be able to do justice to two related aspects of that condition. First, for practical purposes, sufferers of dementia both are and are not the same people they were before. Second, the “otherness” (...) of the demented self reflects an unraveling rather than a becoming. The demented self is not a new self but rather the same old self in the process of disintegrating. The paper suggests that Christine Korsgaard’s treatment of personal identity provides a helpful framework for understanding these aspects of dementia. It also gives an account of decision-making for those with dementia that is sensitive to these aspects of dementia. (shrink)

The prohibition on lying is often thought to be very stringent. Some have even been tempted to think that it is absolute. In contrast, the prohibition on other forms of deception seems to be looser. This paper explores the relationship between the duty not to deceive and the duty not to lie. This discussion is situated in the context of a broadly Kantian account of morality. Kant himself infamously claimed that one ought not lie to a murderer at the door (...) about the location of his intended victim. This paper aims to explain how a broadly Kantian view can endorse a distinctive duty not to lie without thereby being committed to this kind of conclusion. (shrink)

Political liberalism holds that some kinds of disagreement give rise to a duty of restraint. On this view, citizens ought to limit the considerations they invoke in political advocacy to those that meet a certain kind of publicity requirement. Many of the arguments for political liberalism's duty of restraint contain a grain of truth. But properly understood, these arguments instead support the duty of responsiveness, which directs citizens to respond to disagreement in a very different way than the duty of (...) restraint recommends. (shrink)

In his Critical corpus, Kant makes two seemingly inconsistent claims concerning the highest good and its relation to the postulates of immortality and God. On the one hand, he argues that the highest good is a duty to be promoted that must therefore be possible by human powers (‘ought implies can’). On the other hand, he asserts that the highest good is an “unconditioned object” of practical reason that can only be attained on the ground of the postulates of immortality (...) and the aid of God. In order to resolve this apparent conflict in Kant’s claims, I intend to argue in this paper that Kant implicitly classifies the highest good as a wide obligation (imperfect duty), which is to be promoted in the world by human agency but goes beyond the limits of human powers and must be assisted and complemented by the postulates of immortality and God. To do so, I argue that the highest good stems from the moral law since the moral law embodies the ground of absolute goodness and holiness that is never fully achievable by rational agents and thus can generate duties that are impossible to attain. In parallel, I argue that two of the components of the highest good, namely moral worthiness and distribution of happiness, are classified as wide obligations that the moral law commands us to pursue infinitely and with the aid of God. In sum, I try to resolve the initial conflict by suggesting that the highest good as an infinite progress towards the holiness demanded by the moral law signifies a wide obligation, which is not achievable merely by human agency but fundamentally requires the postulates of immortality and the existence of God as a complementing and assisting ground. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant proclaims that the ‘transcendental logic’, the form of logic that he uniquely offers, aims at laying out the necessary laws and principles of nature on the basis of the synthesis of the a priori concepts of understanding and the a priori elements of intuition. In this regard, logic, in Kantian sense, is directed towards the knowledge of the nature which he identifies as the phenomenal world (appearances). The noumenal world (transcendental concepts of God, immortality and freedom), on the (...) other hand, is acclaimed to extend beyond the boundaries of logic. Likewise, Ludwig Wittgenstein points to the boundaries of logic. In his view, logic is limited to the states of affairs in the world (the whole reality). In other words, Wittgenstein argues that one can logically think and talk about merely the facts in the world. The transcendental concepts like logical form, philosophy, aesthetic and ethics, on the other hand, are offered to be beyond the boundaries of logicality. Hence, my aim in this study will be to embark on the boundaries and the legitimate use of logic in Kant and Wittgenstein in parallel to each other. (shrink)

An individualized and coherent life story has been described as the form of identity that is required by highly mobile individualistic Western societies, whereas more family-oriented, traditional societies require more role-based, synchronic identities. Therefore entire life narratives can be expected to be more coherent and to contain more autobiographical arguments that contribute to life narrative coherence in individualistic cultures. This cultural group difference is expected to be mediated by individuals’ conformity to their respective cultural normative concept of biography. We tested (...) these expectations by eliciting entire life narratives and cultural life scripts from students of technical universities from provincial and metropolitan Turkey, as well as from students with a Turkish migrant and a German background in urban Germany (N= 96). Expectations were confirmed for global life narrative coherence and autobiographical arguments with self-event connections. Conformity with a normative concept of biography indeed mediated cultural influences on life narrative coherence. Life narratives from Turkey also contained more family-related events and, unexpectedly, were more negative. Thus creating a coherent life narrative is more typical for cultures that require autonomous, individualized selves rather than for cultures requiring more related selves, reflecting the life story’s suitability for expressing individualized identities and its lesser suitability for expressing interdependent identities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Psychedelics have again become a subject of widespread interest, owing to the reinvigoration of research into their traditional uses, possible medical applications, and social implications. As evidence for psychedelics' clinical potential mounts, the field has increasingly focused on searching for mechanisms to explain the effects of psychedelics and therapeutic efficacy of psychedelic-assisted therapy (PAT). This paper reviews three general frameworks that encompass several prominent models for understanding psychedelics' effects—specifically, neurobiological, psychological, and spiritual frameworks. Following our review, the implications of each (...) framework for ethics and professional competencies in the implementation of psychedelics as medicines are explored. We suggest that interdisciplinary education may be necessary to improve communication between researchers, develop models that effectively incorporate multiple levels of analysis, and facilitate collaboration between professionals with diverse backgrounds in the implementation of psychedelic medicines. We also address pitfalls associated with overemphasis on neuro-mechanisms, risks associated with instigating vulnerable states of consciousness, and hurdles associated with the integration of spiritual frameworks in medicine. Ultimately, as psychedelics push the boundaries of explanatory frameworks focused on one level of analysis, developing new and more useful models to reflect knowledge being produced in this field should be a central aim of psychedelic science going forward. (shrink)

In this article I examine how a teleological (or purposive) reading of Spinoza’s conatus shapes the ethical framework of his philosophy. I first introduce Spinoza’s criticism of teleology and argue contra many critics that Spinoza has a mild approach to human teleology. On the basis of this idea, I develop the claim that the human conatus includes purposive elements such that it is envisioned as a purposive being that is oriented towards the adequate knowledge of Nature or God, the conceptions (...) of wisdom, love and joy and the notion of an ideal human nature. From the teleological reading of human conatus, I draw the conclusion that Spinoza’s ethics is inclusive of objective, humanistic, and essentialist elements in the sense that it situates human agents as directed towards ethical ends to be pursued through their conative activity. In this sense, throughout this paper, I take issue with the anti-teleological reading of conatus that is predominantly related to the subjectivistic, anti-humanistic, and non-essentialist interpretation of Spinoza’s ethics. In doing so, I argue that Spinoza’s ethics is not entirely free from objective, humanistic and essentialist elements, by putting a particular emphasis on the distinguishing character of the purposive essence of his human conatus. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 7, July 2024, Page 6-12.

This essay examines the aims, labor regime, and workers of the St. Vincent botanic garden to highlight differences in the infrastructure of government‐funded botany across the British empire. It argues that slavery was a foundational element of society and natural history in the Anglo‐Caribbean, and the St. Vincent botanic garden was both put into the service of slavery and transformed by it. When viewed from the Caribbean context and the perspective of enslaved workers, the St. Vincent garden's affiliation with imperial (...) improvement becomes less salient than its support of the status quo of slavery as a system and labor regime. The garden was dependent on enslaved laborers, yet the conditions of work and contemporary prejudices led superintendents to see them as undifferentiated labor. The politics of the archive make it impossible for historians to reconstruct the experiences of the garden's enslaved workers as individuals, including the specific labor that they performed or skills that they possessed. Plantation slavery's appropriation of and influence on the infrastructure of colonial botany through the St. Vincent botanic garden suggests that historians should center the local logics of the societies where scientific knowledge making took place to reveal the many meanings of science. (shrink)

Research suggests that people tend to overweight arguments accompanied by neuroscientific terminology, which is dubbed as the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations (SANE) in the literature. Such an effect might be of particular significance when it comes to physicians and mental health professionals (MHP), given that it has the potential to cause significant bias in their understanding as well as their treatment approaches toward psychiatric symptoms. In this study, we aimed to test the SANE effect among Turkish medical students, and (...) assess its uniqueness by comparing it with a discipline that still maintains an important role in contemporary psychiatric training in Turkey: psychoanalysis. 109 medical students with a basic level of knowledge of psychiatry and clinical neuroscience were asked to rate the credibility of explanations of differing quality (good vs. circular) for psychological phenomena, followed by three types of information: none, neuroscientific (SNI) or psychoanalytical (SPI). Our findings showed that SNI significantly increased the judged quality of explanations for both conditions with the effect being more prominent for circular explanations. On the other hand, SPI had no effect on good explanations but enhanced the judged quality of circular explanations in a level comparable to that of SNI. For the first time, the SANE effect was replicated among medical students and provided preliminary data in favor of a similar effect for psychoanalytically oriented information. (shrink)

La microfísica del poder –de la qual Michel Foucault esdevé el principal exponent– emergeix com un efecte del panorama que segueix el Maig del 68, en el qual sorgeix un cicle de noves lluites centrades en el reconeixement i el desenvolupament de nous tipus de subjectivitat. Ara que han passat trenta anys des de la mort de l’autor, defensaré la necessitat d’aplicar la microfísica del poder a una realitat que ja no pot respondre a unes anàlisis fonamentades en paràmetres estrictament (...) econòmics i que demanda, en canvi, eixamplar el camp de visió per incloure-hi el paper que juga el poder en la producció de les subjectivitats. (shrink)