This chapter contains sections titled: Three Arguments.

Leibniz argued that in natural world, only intra-substantial or immanent causation is possible— the causation that takes place within an individual, when an individual brings about a change in itself. In this dissertation, I address issues arising from Leibniz’s arguments against the rival view that posits a world of causally interacting substances and issues pertaining to Leibniz’s own positive metaphysics of immanent causation and change. -/- Chapter 1 is devoted to stage setting for the remainder of the dissertation. I first (...) offer a historically informed overview of efficient causation and change before introducing Leibniz’s novel views, including his criticisms of competing accounts and his own positive account. After presenting a detailed roadmap of my project, I articulate the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz assumed in this dissertation, where the only genuine substances are simple monads. Finally, I articulate the methodological approaches I employ. -/- In Chapters 2 and 3, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s most frequent argument against transeunt causation (the causation that occurs when a substance produces a property in a numerically distinct substance), what I call the “Transference Argument.” Leibniz argued that a created substance’s causing an accident in a numerically distinct substance is possible only if the agent transfers the accident from itself to the patient, where upon transference the agent no longer possesses the accident it transferred. Call the transeunt causal requirement that the agent transfer the accident produced from itself to the patient the “Transference Condition.” -/- Chapter 2 is devoted to two problems with Leibniz’s transference condition. First, Leibniz stated the transference condition throughout his career, but offered little argument for it. Second, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s metaphysics yet God’s causation does not consist in transference. Thus, Leibniz needs a principled way to require transference for creaturely causation while denying that divine transeunt causation consists in transference. Finally, I close off chapter 2 by drawing attention to an important weakness with the transference condition that has not yet been recognized by Leibniz scholars. -/- In Chapter 3, I argue that there is nothing in Leibniz’s ontology that could be transferred from the cause to the recipient of the effect. I first argue that Leibniz’s ontology consists of simple non-corporeal substances and their modifications. Second, I present and articulate a number of important theses Leibniz affirmed about substances and their modifications, which entail that neither could be transferred. I also show that most of these theses were not unique to Leibniz, but were in fact widely endorsed by his predecessors who defended the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation. -/- In chapter 4, I continue the study of the nature of Leibnizian accidents, shifting the focus from their role in Leibniz’s critique of creaturely transeunt causation to their positive role in change and as causal relata, where such accidents are the effects of immanent causation. I shall argue that Leibniz’s thesis that accidents are modifications or limitations allowed him to posit mereologically simple substance that have a multitude of accidents at a time and change accidents over time. -/- In Chapter 5, I address an issue that has divided Leibniz scholars concerning the precise relata in Leibnizian immanent efficient causation. In many passages, Leibniz writes as if it is the substance or individual itself that efficiently causes its later properties or accidents. Call this the “Efficacious-substance” account. The efficacious-substance account is difficult to reconcile with Leibniz’s requirements that change be intelligible and deterministic. In plenty of other passages, he writes as if it is the substances earlier properties or accidents that cause its later accidents. Call this the “Efficacious-accident” account. The efficacious-accident account explains how change is intelligible and deterministic but it faces a “plurality of agents” objection. If a substance’s accidents are the efficient causes of later accidents, then prima facie there is a plurality of efficient causal agents in a substance. This view is incompatible with Leibniz’s requirement that substances be simple, unified entities. -/- Drawing upon a Scholastic distinction made between two kinds of efficient causes— principle quod efficient causes and principle quo efficient causes, I shall argue that for Leibniz, substances are principle quod efficient causes and their appetitions are principle quo efficient causes. This interpretation combines the strengths of the Efficacious-substance and Efficacious-accident accounts while overcoming their weaknesses. There is just one causal agent, the substance, but change is both intelligible and deterministic because as what an agent produces is explained by its appetitions. (shrink)

Robert M. Adams claims that Leibniz’s rehabilitation of the doctrine of incomplete entities is the most sustained effort to integrate a theory of corporeal substances into the theory of simple substances. I discuss alternative interpretations of the theory of incomplete entities suggested by Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister. Against Rozemond, I argue that the scholastic doctrine of incomplete entities is not dependent on a hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances, and therefore can be adapted by Leibniz. Against Phemister, I claim (...) that Leibniz did not reduce the passivity of corporeal substances to modifications of passive aspects of simple substances. Against Adams, I argue that Leibniz’s theory of the incompleteness of the mind cannot be understood adequately without understanding the reasons for his assertion that matter is incomplete without minds. Composite substances are seen as requisites for the reality of the material world, and therefore cannot be eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper presents and discusses unpublished notes written around 1703 in which Leibniz defends a dual-aspect theory of modification against the common interpretation that force alone is sufficient to account for change. Leibniz’s analysis of the different abstract elements of modification implies a rethinking of what permanence is, what force or an act is, and what a subject is. I show that the conceptual resources developed in these notes provide the means for thinking about the abstract but real (...) constituents of the monad. I argue that active force is only a real abstract, and I defend against certain deflationary readings the notion of primary matter as representing the series of limitations of an entelechy, which is precisely instantiated by the series of perceptions and appetites in a monad. Given this groundwork, the paper finally offers a reconciliatory reading of the different monadic inventories, which present different real abstracts of the monad with varying degrees of logical abstraction. (shrink)

This is an abridgement of the complete translation of the New Essays, first published in 1981, designed for use as a study text. The material extraneous to philosophy - more than a third of the original - and the glossary of notes have been cut and a philosophical introduction and bibliography of work on Leibniz have been provided by the translators. The marginal pagination has been retained for ease of cross-reference to the full edition. The work itself is an acknowledged (...) philosophical classic, in which Leibniz argues point by point with Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The result is the single most important confrontation between the philosophical traditions of rationalism and empiricism. It makes an extremely suitable focus for the study of Leibniz's thought and of those two traditions in relation to one another. (shrink)

Introduction Conatus is a specific concept within Descartes’s physics. In particular, it assumes a crucial importance in the purely mechanistic description of the nature of light – an issue that Des- cartes considered one of the most crucial challenges, and major achievements, of his natural phil- osophy. According to Descartes’s cosmology, the universe – understood as a material continuum in which there is no vacuum – is composed of a number of separate yet interconnected vortices. Each of these vortices consists (...) in a set of bands rotating around their centres. The bands are com- posed of corpuscles of the three elements, each distinguished on the basis of their different shapes and sizes. The small globules of the second element, although impeded by the other parts of heaven, strive to move away from the centre of the vortex around which they revolve, thus exerting a certain force against the surrounding bodies. This striving or conatus, though a mere force rather than a genuine motion, is transmitted instan- taneously and along straight lines from body to body. According to Descartes, then, the nature of light consists in this striving alone. This account must be understood as strictly connected to the fundamental laws that regulate the Cartesian world. It is particularly important to recall that for Descartes the centrifugal force exerted by a rotating body is understood to be a consequence of the intrinsic rectilinearity of every motion. As the second of the three Laws of Nature set forth in Book II of the Principles of Philosophy establishes, “all motion is in itself rectilinear; and hence any body moving in a circle tends to move away from the centre of the circle which it describes as proved by the fact that a stone rotating in a sling tends to move centrifugally along the tangent of each point described by a circle.1 Similarly, each of the globules of the second element “strives to recede with a great force from the centre of the vortex in which it rotates; it is in fact prevented by the other globules placed all around, not differently than a stone in a sling”. Within this framework, as I show later, conatus occurs when a body’s intrinsic tendency to rectilinear motion is impeded by an external constraint. As Stephen Gaukroger notes, the use of the term conatus in the Principles – like “vis” and “ action ” – shows that Descartes “cannot avoid dynamic terminology”, despite his declared intent “to construe motion in a purely kinematic way”. Indeed, Gaukroger observes that the notions of force action and striving are systematically employed in the Principles – appearing 290, 59 and 8 times, respectively. Also noteworthy, conatus was – together with the more familiar concepts of actio and vis – a significant element of the conceptual apparatus of Scholastic natural philosophy. As will be seen later – and this is the first goal of this paper – here the concept of conatus had a very specific function. Indeed, it was a central part of the Aristotelian- Scholastic account of gravitation. Conatus was used to refer to the striving of a body to move towards its natural place – especially in cases where its natural motion was hindered or impeded by an external mover. This specific use of the concept of conatus can be found in texts on natural philosophy from the end of the sixteenth through the late seventeenth century. Notably, it occurs in some of the late -Scho- lastic texts which held special significance for Descartes’s thought. Therefore, Descartes introduces conatus in a context in which this concept already had a very specific meaning, and one of which he was very probably aware. The possible relations between these two apparently very different con- cepts have therefore to be scrutinized. I thereby propose to undertake a comparison between the Scho- lastic and the Cartesian conceptions of conatus. I hope to show that certain traits of the former are indeed echoed by the latter, although adapted to the much changed physical paradigm of Cartesian physics. In fact, Descartes’s conatus, though sharing some important similarities with the old one, underwent significant transformations in terms of both its meaning and its application. However, I hope to show that these concepts are both used to describe the behaviour of bodies in relation to their intrinsic motive tendency, and in particular when this tendency is impeded or prevented. Such a reconstruction offers two main areas of interest. On an immediate level, it furthers the general efforts of scholars over the past decades to reconstruct the full extent of the relations between Descartes’s thought and Scholastic philosophy. However, there is another significant reason for taking an interest in the ties between the Scholastic and the Cartesian conceptions of conatus. Indeed, the Cartesian conatus must be seen as crucial to a proper understanding of the broader, diverse conceptualization that this idea enjoyed in the thought of many of the most important philosophers of the early modern period, namely Spinoza, Hobbes and Leibniz. In particular, Spinoza, were directly influenced by Descartes in their unique formulations of conatus. Thus a reconstruction of the context in which Descartes formulated his conatus and of its relations to a pre-existing Scholastic conception will enable us to better reconstruct the history of this idea in the early modern period. The paper is structured as follows: in the first part, I provide a thorough review of the Scho- lastic employment of the concept conatus – both its meaning and the extent of its usage. I then show that it occurs in some of the most prominent Cartesian sources. Finally, I shall provide an account of Descartes’s theory of circular motion and conatus with the specific aim of empha- sizing the elements of both continuity and discontinuity that justify the claim that Descartes’s con- ception of conatus is reminiscent of the Scholastic one. (shrink)

Prized Attic honey is an often-neglected topic in studies of Athenian productions, despite the considerable spread of production, as attested by archaeological finds of terracotta beehives throughout the territory. Literary sources also frequently mention honey produced in Attica, especially the most famous and prized variety from Mount Hymettus. In this paper, after a mention of the peculiarity of the traditions about honey in the classical world, the importance and fame of the Attic product is emphasised. The sources that praise the (...) product are here classified in three groups, namely the authors who focus on its sweetness and fragrance, the ones who describe Attic honey generically in relation to its prestige and the sources which compares it to honey from other regions. Afterwards, my further goal is to assess the possible connection between honey and the funerary sphere in Attica. This relation is explored also through the reanalysis of some interpretations proposed for a fictile group of geometric Attic models. (shrink)

This article examines the fundamental ontological significance that the category of perception has in philosophy of G.W. Leibniz, and establishes the connection between the category of perception and modern panpsychism. There is a problem of definition of protopsychic properties in modern panpsychism. The problem is expressed not only in the absence of such a definition, but also in the absence of a good strategy for finding possible candidates for the role of protopsychic property. To solve this problem, the author considers (...) the status of the monad as the center of perception in Leibniz’s monadology, as well as the question of the relation of different monads to each other. Based on Leibniz’s ideas, the following modifications for modern panpsychism have been proposed, among others. First, it was proposed that protopsychic properties be viewed as properties that represent all reality in some vague way, preventing the emergence of high-level psychic properties. Second, it was proposed that mental properties be viewed not as a combination of protopsychic properties, but as state of protopsychic properties. This means that to form high-level mental properties, protopsychic properties must not only form some system, but must also be partially blocked. The author also considers the question of whether it is possible to borrow the proposed ideas in modern panpsychism. The problem for this is the ontological differences between modern naturalistic panpsychism and Leibniz’s classical panpsychism. The article proposes three different strategies for dealing with this problem related to three interpretations of Leibniz’s philosophy. First, it is possible to limit ourselves to considering physics as a set of structural phenomena derived from the activity of monads. Second, it is possible to try to show that there is some other, non-causal, type of relationship between the monads. Third, it is possible to consider this system as naturalistic pantheism and assume that God is a mediator and a common non-spatial coordinate system through which the monads agree with each other. (shrink)

Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) ranks among the greatest scholars and thinkers of the Renaissance. He secured lasting fame for his brilliant critical skills, most famously in his exposure of the “Donation of Constantine,” the forged document upon which the papacy based claims to political power. Lesser known in the English-speaking world is Valla's work in the philosophy of language—the basis of his reputation as the greatest philosopher of the humanist movement. Dialectical Disputations, translated here for the first time into any modern (...) language, is his principal contribution to the philosophy of language and logic. With this savage attack on the scholastic tradition of Aristotelian logic, Valla aimed to supersede it with a new logic based on the actual historical usage of classical Latin and on a commonsense approach to semantics and argument. Valla provides a logic that could be used by lawyers, preachers, statesmen, and others who needed to succeed in public debate—one that was stylistically correct and rhetorically elegant, and thus could dispense with the technical language of the scholastics, a “tribe of Peripatetics, perverters of natural meanings.” Valla's reformed dialectic became a milestone in the development of humanist logic and contains startling anticipations of modern theories of semantics and language. Volume 1 contains Book I, in which Valla refutes Aristotle's logical works on the categories, transcendentals, and predicables, with excursions into natural and moral philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Brentano is perhaps most famously renowned for his re-deployment of Scholastic terminology of ‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’ in the elaboration of his novel science of ‘descriptive psychology’ in the mid-1870s and 1880s. In this re-deployment, however, Brentano adapted the original Scholastic meanings of both of these terms. Thus Brentano advanced not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality.1 These theses, however, are often not properly distinguished, and consequently they are more often confused. Nevertheless, once the two theses (...) are distinguished, Brentano’s basic descriptive-psychological tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is more readily understandable on its own terms. Whether Brentano’s descriptive-psychological tenet is entirely acceptable philosophically, or not, of course, is another matter but this presupposes understanding in a straightforward sense what Brentano’s doctrine is. In this article, I will be concerned mainly with Brentano’s re-introduction of ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874),2 even though it is Brentano’s (second) thesis on ‘intentional act’, one that he developed after his 1874 publication, that is more generally well known and examined. While acknowledging that many versions of ‘Brentano’s thesis’, as it is usually (and loosely) referred to by commentators today, have been re-worked in modern philosophy of mind, this article focuses attention on some of the main points of convergence and deviance between the original Scholastic concept and Brentano’s ‘new’ concept of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article traces the considerable development of a language of representation derived from Cicero's De officiis from late antiquity into early modern scholastic political thought. Cicero turned to the term persona, which signified the mask worn by actors of ancient theatre, to describe the particular duty of a magistrate who was understood ‘to bear the person of the city [se gerere personam civitatis]’. Thomas Hobbes's reliance on this terminology for his theory of the state in Leviathan is well (...) known, and we are now increasingly aware of its centrality before Hobbes in parliamentary and humanist discourse. What we have yet to register, however, is the extent and depth of scholastic appropriations and refashionings of this vocabulary. Cicero's language of representation is persistently at work in scholastic writing, from Augustine and Aquinas to Suárez and Bellarmine, and it functions in ways that reveal remarkable continuities and discontinuities with respect to its classical origins. The first task of this article is to expose this neglected channel through which this language was transmitted into early modernity. The second is to begin illuminating the early stages of political representation in the ‘second scholastic’ with an analysis of Francisco de Vitoria's De potestate civili (1528). (shrink)

This note argues that the appearance of Virtus at the outset of Menoeceus’ sacrifice in Statius’ Thebaid (10.610–80) is modelled on Virgil's Fama (Aen. 4.173–97).

The article dwells on human problems in the English postmodernism prose. A non-classical character of the 20th century literature is discussed. Postmodernism prose is described as a modern modification of the classical psychological novel. The author considers that the main theme in this prose is revealing a dramatic man'€™s position in front of a spiritless and senseless practice of modern society. The major components of the psychological novel poetics as a hero, plot, composition and psychologism are determined. The author (...) analyzes J. Barnes'€™ "€œTaking it over"€, "€œEngland, England"€, "€œLove, etc"€ and J. McEwan'€™s "€œOn Chesil Beach"€. (shrink)

In his book Appearances of the Good, Sergio Tenenbaum has offered an impressive new defence of a classical account of practical reason, which marks him as heir to a philosophical tradition going back to Aristotle and Kant or, more recently, to Anscombe and Davidson. This account has come under heavy attack in the past twenty years, and it would be no exaggeration to say that it is now a minority view. This is at least so if one counts the number (...) of living philosophers who deny that strict akratic action is possible. Tenenbaum claims that, minimally, his aim is to show that what he calls after Kant “the scholastic view” still merits a place in the philosophical landscape, and in this respect, it is clear that his enterprise is a success. (shrink)

Excerpt from Leibniz Erkenntnistheoretischer Realist: Grundlinien Seiner Erkenntnislehre Jansen, Bernhard, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. Zum 200. Gedenktag seines Todes (14. Nov. Stimmen der Zeit, 92. Bd (1916) S. 160 - 177 Freiburg i. Dr. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present (...) in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Leibniz sometimes tells us that there are only two fundamental types of mental states: perceptions and appetitions, that is, mental representations and desire-like states. While this may sound like an overly sparse ontology of mental states, the philosophy of mind that Leibniz builds from these elements is surprisingly nuanced and powerful. What makes this possible is that he distinguishes different sub-types of these mental states. Leibniz famously differentiates between unconscious and conscious perceptions, which gives him an advantage over philosophers like (...) Descartes, for whom all perceptions are conscious. He also distinguishes between reflective and unreflective perceptions, as well as between degrees of perceptual distinctness. Leibniz furthermore follows scholastic thinkers like Thomas Aquinas in distinguishing different types of appetitions. Uncovering what those are and what roles they play in Leibniz’s philosophy of mind are the central aims of this chapter. (shrink)

In his article, Florian Vermeiren attributes to Leibniz – like other interpreters before him – the distinction of two different kinds of relations: 1) relations in the proper sense of the word as, for example, the fatherhood subsisting between Sophroniscus and Socrates, which Leibniz considers situated ‘outside the subjects’ involved; 2) relational properties, such as being a father, inherent in Sophroniscus. The distinction is clearly present in Leibniz’s writings. According to Vermeiren, Leibniz considers ‘purely mental’ only the relations ‘out of (...) the subjects’ and not the relational predicates, by means of which, on the other hand, the individuals of the Leibnizian world would be truly related. In this sense, therefore, Leibniz would admit the reality of relations, which would play an important role in his ontology. At least since 1686 (the year in which he wrote the Discourse), however, Leibniz states that the world is made only of individuals with their internal modifications: just as there are no properties with a leg in one subject and a leg in another, there are no individuals bound together by any kind of material nexus or ‘real’ ties. Thus, if we make a list of all fathers on the one hand and sons on the other, there remains the problem of how to properly connect the fathers exactly with their sons. Attributing to each of two related individuals a relational property is not enough to connect them. Being a father in David must necessarily refer in some way to Solomon as a son. Leibniz is aware of this, as his attempts to analyze relational propositions in his essays on rational grammar show. Given the sentence ‘Cajus is killed by Titius’ for example, Leibniz attempts to reduce it to an inference between a pair of categorical sentences, each of which attributes a relational predicate to the subject. Relations (and relational properties) result from the substances and their modes, “without producing any change” of themselves but only in virtue of a consequence, that is of a logical inference. The image of the world derived so from the Monadology and other Leibnizian writings is that of a world composed of a collection of isolated individuals, independent of each other and lacking mutual connections. Relational properties correspond to internal modifications of each individual: the second term, in the case of binary relations (the ‘external’ one: Helen, if Paris loves Helen) is resolved into an internal representation (of Paris, in this case). It is God who coordinates the various representations of individuals with each other, to result in a harmonious whole. Since relations are a consequence of the existence of the individual substances with their intrinsic properties, God himself can be said to be the creator of relations, in so far as he calls the individuals into existence. And this is exactly what Leibniz states, in his commentary on Temmik’s book. (shrink)

Leibniz sometimes tells us that there are only two fundamental types of mental states: perceptions and appetitions, that is, mental representations and desire-like states. While this may sound like an overly sparse ontology of mental states, the philosophy of mind that Leibniz builds from these elements is surprisingly nuanced and powerful. What makes this possible is that he distinguishes different sub-types of these mental states. Leibniz famously differentiates between unconscious and conscious perceptions, which gives him an advantage over philosophers like (...) Descartes, for whom all perceptions are conscious. He also distinguishes between reflective and unreflective perceptions, as well as between degrees of perceptual distinctness. Leibniz furthermore follows scholastic thinkers like Thomas Aquinas in distinguishing different types of appetitions. Uncovering what those are and what roles they play in Leibniz’s philosophy of mind are the central aims of this chapter. (shrink)

At the end of the 1960s, in Japan grows up an artistic trend whose theorist, Ufan Lee, attributes the name of Mono-Ha, usually translated as a “school of things”. The theoretical and poetic assumptions of this tendency combine, as the essay intends to demonstrate, concepts and elements drawn from both the zen and the phenomenology, also because of the dialogue that these two models of thought seem to be able to establish. Through the voices of scholars who have dealt with, (...) the essay identifies the similarities between the statements of the Moho-Ha’s artists and Husserl and Heidegger’s thoughts, authors who in the 1960s found great success in Japanese philosophy. (shrink)

Central to this volume are two philosophical powerhouses of the early modern period: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Pierre Bayle. Born in, respectively, 1646 and 1647, both made for an astonishing career in a variety of scholarly disciplines and reached, if not equal, then certainly comparable fame in the course of their lives. Nowadays, Bayle's reputation is eclipsed by that of Leibniz, who is the focus of yearly conferences and libraries of scholarship, while Bayle had to await the later twentieth century (...) to be rediscovered. He has since been at the center of a quickly expanding body of scholarship, which continues to be sharply divided over the vexed question how to interpret his religious stance.This imbalance... (shrink)

In the Monadology Leibniz has us imagine a thinking machine the size of a mill in order to show that matter can’t think. The argument is often thought to rely on the unity of consciousness and the notion of simplicity. Leibniz himself did not see matters this way. For him the argument relies on the view that the qualities of a substance must be intimately connected to its nature by being modifications, limitations of its nature. Leibniz thinks perception is not (...) a modification of matter because it is active and matter is passive. At the same time, there are traces in Leibniz of a different argument that relies on the notion of internal action, which may involve the notion of simplicity. Critics have sometimes charged that the Mill Argument is an argument from ignorance, but Leibniz was aware of this problem and made clear that he did not make that mistake. (shrink)

It is well known that Leibniz advocated the actual infinite, but that he did not admit infinite collections or infinite numbers. But his assimilation of this account to the scholastic notion of the syncategorematic infinite has given rise to controversy. A common interpretation is that in mathematics Leibniz’s syncategorematic infinite is identical with the Aristotelian potential infinite, so that it applies only to ideal entities, and is therefore distinct from the actual infinite that applies to the actual world. Against (...) this, I argue in this paper that Leibniz’s actual infinite, understood syncategorematically, applies to any entities that are actually infinite in multitude, whether numbers, actual parts of matter, or monads. It signifies that there are more of them than can be assigned a number, but that there is no infinite number or collection of them, which notion involves a contradiction. Similarly, to say that a magnitude is actually infinitely small in the syncategorematic sense is to say that no matter how small a magnitude one takes, there is a smaller, but there are no actual infinitesimals. In geometry one may calculate with expressions apparently denoting such entities, on the understanding that they are fictions, standing for variable magnitudes that can be made arbitrarily small, so as to produce demonstrations that there is no error in the resulting expressions. (shrink)

Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.

Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.

Leibniz repeatedly states that there is a very close connection between reflection and rationality. In his view, reflective acts somehow lead to self-consciousness, reason, the knowledge of necessary truths, and even to the moral liability of the respective substances. Whereas it might be relatively easy to see how reflective acts lead to self-consciousness, it is much harder to understand how they are connected to rationality. Why should a substance which is able to produce reflective acts therefore be rational? How can (...) the having of reflective acts be responsible for the substance’s ability to reason correctly and to acquire knowledge of necessary and eternal truths? The aim of my paper is to understand better the required mechanisms and to make thus conceivable Leibniz’s bold claim that reflective acts lead to rationality. In order to accomplish this, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will specify what kind of self-consciousness is, according to Leibniz, produced by reflective acts. A substance must recognize itself as a unitary substance bearing perceptions. Second, I will argue that this type of self- consciousness can be seen as the basis for the ability to form judgments. This is possible because the subject-predicate structure of judgments is mirrored by the ontology of substances and their modifications. Third, I will point out that, together with the idea of identity (which we also acquire by reflection), the combination of judgments allows us to make inferences. This ability, in turn, is sufficient for rationality. Thus, I can explain how reflective acts and rationality are connected with each other. (shrink)

A fresh translation and in-depth commentary of Leibniz's seminal text, the Monadology. -/- Written in 1714, the Monadology is widely considered to be the classic statement of Leibniz's mature philosophy. In the space of 90 numbered paragraphs, totalling little more than 6000 words, Leibniz outlines - and argues for - the core features of his philosophical system. Although rightly regarded as a masterpiece, it is also a very condensed work that generations of students have struggled to understand. (...) -/- Lloyd Strickland presents a new translation of the Monadology, alongside key parts of the Theodicy, and an in-depth, section-by-section commentary that explains in detail not just what Leibniz is saying in the text but also why he says it. The sharp focus on the various arguments and other justifications Leibniz puts forward makes possible a deeper and more sympathetic understanding of his doctrines. (shrink)

The category of metaphysical evil introduced by Leibniz appears to cast a sinister shadow over the goodness of creation. It seems to imply that creatures, simply in virtue of not being gods, are to some degree intrinsically and inescapably evil. After briefly unpacking this difficulty and outlining a recent attempt to deal with it, this paper returns to the texts to propose a novel and multilayered understanding of Leibniz’s category of metaphysical evil by reading it against the backdrop of the (...) traditional typologies of evil with which he was unquestionably familiar. It comes to the conclusion that metaphysical evil plays two key roles for Leibniz. First, it captures what Aquinas and especially Suarez meant by ‘natural evil’. Contrary to the common assumption that it is Leibniz’s category of physical evil that holds the place of natural evil, the paper shows that Leibniz’s physical evil corresponds to Augustine’s category of evil of punishment for sin whereas natural evil – intended as a kind of evil which is not related to moral responsibility -- is subsumed under metaphysical evil. Secondly, the category of metaphysical evil covers also the notion of original creaturely imperfection. In classifying creaturely limitation as a kind of evil Leibniz breaks from the Augustinian-Thomist-Scholastic tradition and its distinction between negatio and privatio. On the other hand, notwithstanding this important break, Leibniz’s notion of metaphysical evil is intended to account for something which is firmly within the broadly Augustinian-Scholastic tradition, namely the ascription to all creatures of a limitation that stems from their being created ex nihilo. Finally, the paper returns a verdict of non-guilty to the charge that Leibniz’s metaphysical evil implies that creatures qua creatures are to some extent necessarily intrinsically evil. More generally, in typical Leibnizian fashion, the notion of metaphysical evil will appear to be a complex mix of indebtedness to tradition and bending of received doctrines into something significantly different. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz and Bayle: Manicheism and Dialectic DAVID NORTON LEIBNIZ' CLAIM that this is the "best of all possible worlds" has seemed so prima facie absurd that his critics have often considered the assertion adequately refuted by their pointing to things which are clearly "bad" and which might conceivably be "better." The paradigm case is Voltaire's Candide, which is certainly an effective refutation of Leibniz' claim at this level. We (...) can, however, by taking another point of view find what appear to be other absurdities in Leibniz' metaphysics. The point of view I wish to take, or attempt to take, is that of Pierre Bayle. I wish to suggest some objections to Leibniz which Bayle may have felt, but which he did not make explicit. Such an undertaking will, hopefully, add to our understanding of both Leibniz and Bayle. I What I propose to do is unorthodox, or at least unusual, and for that reason it is extremely important that the reader have from the very outset a clear idea of what is being undertaken. I can best clarify my aims, I think, by first attending briefly to some historical matters. Between 1695 and 1699 Bayle and Leibniz carried on a lively controversy over the latter's metaphysical views, though the debate was limited almost entirely to the notion of pre-established harmony. This controversy is well enough known that we need not stop over its details; in summary, Bayle first admits delight at what appears to be a new metaphysical explanation of the union of mind and body, but then goes on to argue that, after all, Leibniz' system is either no more than a reformulation of occasionalism, or impossible, since it violates clear and accepted metaphysical canons? Now, so far as we know, Bayle did not comment further on Leibniz' metaphysics, though the latter was * I wish to thank Prof. Harry M. Bracken, Arizona State University, and Prof. Richard H. Popkin, University of California, San Diego, for the suggestions and criticisms which they made of an earlier form of this paper. Their suggestions were all enlightening, if not all adopted-meaning, of course, that they would probably not agree with all that I here suggest. x Pierre Bayle, Dictionaire historique et critique, 5=. 6dition, revue, corrig6e, et augment6e, avec la vie de l'auteur, par Mr. Des Maizeaux, 4 tomes (Amsterdam, Leide. La Haye, Utrecht: 1740), article "Rorarius," reins. H. and L. For a fuller account of the Bayle-Leibniz controversy, see Austin Farrer, "Editor's Introduction," in G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, ed. Austin Farrer, trans. E. M. Huggard (London: 1951), pp. 7-47, esp. pp. 33-47. 24 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY eager to continue the controversy, and did so, his final effort being a gigantic one, the Essais de Thdodicde. Unfortunately, Bayle died before the Thdodicde was published and was deprived accordingly of any opportunity to reply to it. Bayle did, however, leave in the Dictionaire historique et critique a number of arguments against various metaphysical positions. The point of my paper is to show that certain of these arguments are applicable to Leibniz' system, and that applied to that system they reveal features of it which we might otherwise have overlooked. Bayle adduces arguments which seem with only slight modification to point directly at Leibniz--though without indicating that he has Leibniz in mind. I hope first of all to show what these arguments are and in what sense they refute Leibniz. I have said that Bayle gives no indication that these arguments of his apply to Leibniz; strictly speaking, this is correct. This does not mean, however, that I am understaking an unjustified wild goose chase through the Dictionaire : Bayle himself offers the motivation which has led to this study when he says in "Rorarius" (rem. L) that he has withheld some objections to Leibniz' opinions on the ground that these are no more objections to Leibniz than to certain other philosophers: "Je m'abstiens aussi de toutes les Objections qui ne sont pas plus contraires ~t son sentiment qu'~t celui de quelques autres Philosophes." In one sense then this paper can be thought of as my speculations of what these waived objections are... (shrink)

As an idealist, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz could not recognize anything corporeal as substantial. However, under the influence of Cartesian terminology, he devoted considerable effort to analysing the corporeal world, while not recognizing its real substantiality of course. Leibniz took the concept of substance from Plato, Aristotle and the scholastics, but developed it in two ways. It is a well-known fact that Leibniz introduced the term ‘corporeal substance’ in his letter to Antoine Arnauld dated to October 1687. In the letter, Leibniz (...) understands an object of nature, like an animal or a plant, as ‘corporeal substance’. In the very same letter, Leibniz introduces the terms ‘indivisibility’ and ‘phenomenon’. Every corporeal substance can be real only as a unity, i.e. by being indivisible. Such entity must have a soul or at least an entelechy. In an opposite case, that entity would not be a real unity but just a phenomenon. No corporeal entity is indivisible and therefore not a substance. The paper aims at introducing Leibniz’s distinction between substances and phenomena and taking a closer look at the historicalphilosophical influences Leibniz experienced while developing his views of the corporeal world. Aristotle and Descartes will receive most of the attention, of course, as the concepts of ‘entelechy’ and ‘hylomorphism’ were introduced by the former, and the understanding of corporeal substance as determined by extension alone is part of the latter. The core of the original critique by Leibniz takes off from the properties of the continuum as well as the nature of shape, motion and extension. The case of continuum will receive special attention. It is analysed with the help of the novel approaches by Samuel Levey and Vassil Vidinsky. Leibniz was critical about our poor understanding of the continuum but his own interpretation of it was not fully consistent either. Although the new developments enable us to take a fresh look that has not been possible so far, the issue remains open for further study. (shrink)

The paper examines three essays that Leibniz wrote in 1688, immediately after the composition of the Discourse on Metaphysics, one of his most organic philosophical works. The main topics which emerge from these essays are: the relationship between substance and accidents; the nature of accidents; and, more generally, the nature of abstract entities. Given that accidents' nature is that of changing, Leibniz sees how hard it is to give an account of the relationship between substance and accidents that does not (...) imply any change in the substance, when its accidents undergo a change. To find a way out of this problem, Leibniz assumes that abstract terms (whiteness, wisdom, etc.) do not name real properties or real parts of substances, and that any sentence containing real abstract terms can be rephrased as a sentence containing logical abstract terms, which do no imply any commitment to the existence of real properties. Coherently with this nominalistic attitude, Leibniz ends up, in the Theodicy and in his correspondence with Des Bosses, considering accidents as modes or internal modifications of the substance. (shrink)

In his lectures from 1987, Deleuze draws an analogy between Michelangelo's figures and Leibnizian substances by claiming that neither are essences but rather sources of modifications or manners of being. The best way to explore this analogy, I argue, is by focusing on Michelangelo's preference for serpentine shapes. By putting key passages from The Logic of Sensation, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque and What is Philosophy? in resonance with the Leibnizian accounts of corporeal aggregates and possible worlds on the (...) one hand and art history on the other, I will try to develop a Deleuzian concept for the typically Mannerist ideal of the serpentine figure. Although Deleuze usually prefers to speak in musical terms of refrains and counterpoints by which various blocs of sensation resonate with each other, in the visual arts it is the serpentine figure that renders visible sensory becoming as a rhythmic counter-positioning of possible worlds within a single body without organs. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes as if (...) primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

Yet, about his profound, nay decisive indebtedness to Plato there can be no doubt. This influence efficiently directed his thought not only during his formative years but even more so during a later epoch, in part conveyed through the Augustinian preoccupations of the friends he made during his sojourn in Paris, and in part as a consequence of the increasingly mathematical orientation of his philosophy, which naturally approached him of the Platonic tradition and partially eclipsed the Aristotelian facet of his (...) thought produced by his scholastic education. (shrink)

In 1682, Leibniz published an essay containing his solution to the classic problem of squaring the circle: the alternating converg-ing series that now bears his name. Yet his attempts to disseminate his quadrature results began seven years earlier and included four distinct approaches: the conventional (journal article), the grand (treatise), the impostrous (pseudepigraphia), and the extravagant (medals). This paper examines Leibniz’s various attempts to disseminate his series formula. By examining oft-ignored writings, as well as unpublished manuscripts, this paper answers (...) the question of how one of the greatest mathematicians sought to introduce his first great geometrical discovery to the world. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was a universal genius, making original contributions to law, mathematics, philosophy, politics, languages, and many areas of science, including what we would now call physics, biology, chemistry, and geology. By profession he was a court counselor, librarian, and historian, and thus much of his intellectual activity had to be fit around his professional duties. Leibniz’s fame and reputation among his contemporaries rested largely on his innovations in the field of mathematics, in particular his discovery of the (...) calculus in 1675. Another of his enduring mathematical contributions was his invention of binary arithmetic, though the significance of this was not recognized until the 20th century. These days, a good proportion of scholarly interest in Leibniz is focused on his philosophy. Among his signature philosophical doctrines are the pre-established harmony, the theory of monads, and the claim that ours is the best of all possible worlds, which forms the central plank of his theodicy. For Leibniz, philosophy was not the discovery of deep truths of interest only to other philosophers, but a practical discipline with the means to increase happiness and well-being. Philosophical truths, he believed, revealed the beauty and rational order of the universe, and the justice and wisdom of its creator, and accordingly could inspire contentment and peace of mind. Leibniz’s other intellectual projects were likewise geared toward the improvement of the human condition. He lobbied tirelessly for the establishment of scientific societies, devised measures to improve public health, and was actively engaged in projects to unite the churches and so end the religious strife that marred the Europe of his day. He was also engaged in politics for much of his career, and often took on a diplomatic role, sometimes officially and other times not. In the political sphere, Leibniz did not wield true power but was a man with influence, obtained in no small part by his cultivation of relationships with leaders and sovereigns both inside and outside Germany. The sheer range of Leibniz’s interests, projects, and activities can make him a difficult figure to study, and the vast quantity of his writings only compounds the problem (around fifty thousand of his writings survive). Nevertheless, even a sampling of Leibniz’s work is enough to get a sense of his vision, originality, and intellectual depth, and good secondary literature will only enhance this. The items in this bibliography were chosen with this in mind. (shrink)

Many of the problems traditionally related to the interpretation of Leibniz' theory of relations may be seen in a better light considering essentially two factors: 1) the different plans (ontological, metaphysical, psychological and logical-linguistic) implied by Leibniz reflections on the subject; 2) the reference to scholastic and late-scholastic texts read or consulted by Leibniz. Relations for Leibniz are, from a metaphysical point of view, denominations only seemingly external, they are in reality denominationes intrinsecae, and are founded on the (...) general connection of all things. From a psychological point of view they are abstract entities that our mind builds by resemblance. From an ontological point of view they are individual accidents inherent to the substances. From a logical-linguistic point of view they are abstract structures that connect the one to the other at least two subjects. The propositions in which they appear, as for example the proposition “Paris loves Helen” are transformed by Leibniz in equivalent propositions joined by operators, which in medieval logic were known as termini reduplicantes (terms which define mostly intensional contexts). This may be seen with sufficient clarity examining the last part, until now inedited, of the famous passage about Paris and Helen published by Couturat in his Opuscules. (shrink)

This book offers a sustained re-evaluation of the most central and perplexing themes of Leibniz's metaphysics. In contrast to traditional assessments that view the metaphysics in terms of its place among post-Cartesian theories of the world, Jan Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne examine the question of how the scholastic themes which were Leibniz's inheritance figure - and are refigured - in his mature account of substance and individuation. From this emerges a fresh and sometimes surprising assessment of (...) class='Hi'>Leibniz's views on modality, the Identity of Indiscernibles, form as an internal law, and the complete-concept doctrine. As a rigorous philosophical treatment of a still-influential mediary between scholastic and modern metaphysics, their study will be of interest to historians of philosophy and contemporary metaphysicians alike. (shrink)

Fecal microbiota transplantation has demonstrated efficacy and is increasingly being used in the treatment of patients with recurrent Clostridium difficile infection. Despite a lack of high-quality trials to provide more information on the long-term effects of FMT, there has been great enthusiasm about the potential for expanding its applications. However, FMT presents many serious ethical and social challenges that must be addressed as part of a successful regulatory policy response. In this article, we draw on a sample of the scientific (...) and bioethics literatures to examine clusters of ethical and social issues arising in five main areas: informed consent and the vulnerability of patients; determining what a “suitable healthy donor” is; safety and risk; commercialization and potential exploitation of vulnerable patients; and public health implications. We find that these issues are complex and worthy of careful consideration by health care professionals. Desperation of a patient should not be the basis for selecting treatment with FMT, and the patient's interests should always be of paramount concern. Authorities must prioritize development of appropriate and effective regulation of FMT to safeguard patients and donors, promote further research into safety and efficacy, and avoid abuse of the treatment. (shrink)

For most early Medieval and Scholastic philosophers working in the Aristotelian tradition, knowledge of any specific subject is knowledge of its causes and principles. Knowledge of individuals was no exception. As Jorge Gracia has written "To know individuality [for early Medieval and Scholastic philosophers] is to be able to determine the causes and principles that are responsible for it."1 The achievement of such ability is also known as the problem of individuation. This paper will be concerned with the (...) solution to the problem suggested by Leibniz’s writings and how it relates to the contemporary metaphysical debate. In the first section I introduce the problem of individuation along with the solution Leibniz proposed during the latter part of his life. The second section analyzes Leibniz’s solution in a contemporary perspective. I argue that, unlike during the Medieval and early Modern periods, today the epistemic side of the problem of individuation plays a major role in the debate. In this light, Leibniz’s proposal that humans cannot grasp what the individuality of an individual consists in seems problematic. I show, however, that Leibniz’s proposal can stand on its feet also nowadays, provided we are willing to give up the pretenses that there is a definitive count of individuals and that re-identifying individuals across time and space is part of the problem of individuation. (shrink)

In this article it is exposed the influence that the so-call master argument has in Leibniz. It is emphasized the classic influence that has one of the central subjects of his philosophy as it is the matter of the freedom and the destiny. Leibniz avoids the necessity alluding to the free will and above all to the will of God.

Fecal microbiota transplantation is reportedly the most effective therapy for relapsing Clostridium Difficile infection and a potential therapeutic option for many diseases. It also poses important ethical concerns. This study is an attempt to assess clinicians’ perception and attitudes towards ethical and social challenges raised by fecal microbiota transplantation. A questionnaire was developed which consisted of 20 items: four items covered general aspects, nine were about ethical aspects such as informed consent and privacy issues, four concerned social and regulatory issues, (...) and three were about an FMT bank. This was distributed to participants at the Second China gastroenterology and FMT conference in May 2015. Basic descriptive statistical analyses and simple comparative statistical tests were performed. Nearly three quarters of the 100 respondents were gastro-enterologist physicians. 89% of all respondents believed FMT is a promising treatment modality for some diseases and 88% of whom chose clinical efficacy as the primary reason for recommending FMT. High expectation from patients and pressure on clinicians was reported as the most frequent reasons for not recommending FMT. The clinicians who had less familiarity with FMT reported significantly more worry related to the dignity and psychological impact of FMT compared to those who have high familiarity with FMT.More than half of the respondents were concerned about the commercialization of FMT, although almost one in five respondents did not see this as a problem. We found most respondents have positive attitudes towards FMT but low awareness of published evidence. Informed consent for vulnerable patients, privacy and protection of donors were perceived as the most challenging ethical aspects of FMT. This study identified areas of limited knowledge and ways of addressing ethical issues and indicates the need to devise the education and training for clinicians on FMT. (shrink)

An admirable work in philosophical scholarship. As indicated in the title, the book's emphasis is on the logical and metaphysical aspects of Leibniz's philosophy. The consideration of the relationship between the two constitutes the basis for Martin's final evaluation of Leibniz, namely that Leibniz was in error in so far as he tried to bring the same precision to metaphysics as he did to mathematics. Martin develops his interpretation in the perspective of Russell's and consciously notes his agreements and (...) differences with the latter. The author's comprehensive knowledge of the history of philosophy is reflected in his seeing the problems Leibniz dealt with as continuous with the tradition extending back through the Scholastics to Plato. Martin concentrates on the systematic rather than the historical development of Leibniz's own thought. His carefulness in developing his interpretation, together with the clarity of his writing, has resulted in a splendid treatment of a complex subject.—L. W. (shrink)

How to reconcile monadic simplicity with the successive plurality of the monadic states ? The doctrine of continued creation seems to entail the existence of independent temporal parts and thus lead to the thesis that the world contains only transitory things. I try to show how Leibniz has the resources to get out of this quandary. The analysis of the concept of extension shows that a plurality of states does not constitute a divisible aggregate. Then I examine the Leibnizian interpretation (...) of continued creation, by com- paring it to the scholastic and Cartesian Background. From thence I conclude that Leibniz’s final thesis is that monads are wholly present at each moment of their duration. (shrink)

We analyze the degree-structure induced by large reducibilities under the Axiom of Determinacy. This generalizes the analysis of Borel reducibilities given in Alessandro Andretta and Donald A. Martin [1], Luca Motto Ros [6] and Luca Motto Ros. [5] e.g. to the projective levels.

The main purpose of the article is to get clear what Leibniz's concerns about relations were. His: I do not believe that you will admit an accident that is in two subjects at the same time. My judgement about relations is that paternity in David is one thing, sonship in Solomon another, but that the relation common to both is a merely mental thing whose basis is the modifications of the individuals is best seen as akin to: Father is (...) true of David. Son is true of Solomon. But Being a father of is not true of any individual. Leibniz, like modern nominalist Nelson Goodman, could not allow the ordered pair . To establish this I must argue against Hidé Ishiguro's claim that Leibniz should have straightforwardly constructed a logic of relations, and Jaakko Hintikka's claim that Leibniz could have allowed the use of relational predicates in such forms as (Ex) Rax and (Ey) Ryb. I must also argue that what they say about the windowlessness doctrine (especially the as if formulation) is beside the point. (shrink)

In this Introduction, we begin with two relatively uncontroversial matters: the broad contours of the history of discussion of ontological arguments, and the major topics that require discussion in connection with ontological arguments. We then move on to consideration of the much more difficult task of the characterisation of ontological arguments—i.e. the task of saying exactly what ontological arguments are and explaining how they differ from, say, cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments for the existence of God—and then the equally contested (...) question of the provision of general objections to ontological arguments, including, in particular, attempts to show that there could not possibly be a successful ontological argument. Finally, we consider some often-neglected questions about how to assess the merits of arguments, with a particular eye on the assessment of the merits of ontological arguments. (shrink)

Leibniz’s ‘new science of dynamics’ is typically taken to have been completed in the late monadological metaphysics. On this view, stemming from Martial Gueroult and continuing in the recent interpretations of Robert Adams and Pauline Phemister, Leibniz accomplished his dynamics in his later account of physical forces as merely phenomenal modifications of monadic, metaphysical forces. This paper argues, by contrast, that Leibniz considered the dynamics to be an unfinished project: this is evident in statements from throughout his mature period until (...) his final months. Two possible reasons for the non-completion of the dynamics are discussed. The first is that his encounter with the superior physics of Newton’s Principia caused Leibniz to continually defer his own contribution. I argue, however, in favour of a second reason: that there are philosophical difficulties inherent in the science of dynamics that prevented its completion. These difficulties are found in the relation of dynamics to metaphysics, and in the more fundamental split within dynamics, into the doctrine of primitive and derivative forces. Through three late exchanges with de Volder, Wolff and Des Bosses, I show that the relation of primitive and derivative forces remained an unsolved – although not in principle unsolvable – problem for Leibniz. (shrink)