This text represents our first attempting to offer a Metaphysic model to interpret the late modernity (which emerges in the middle of the 18th century and goes along until the end of the IIWW) through the concept of Teleontology. Thus, Teleontology means the procedure of the spirit of the late modern age to shift its paradigms from ontology (an investigation about the being as being, in which existence means an attribute) to teleology, in which essence must be conquered and revealed (...) in the final of a progressive process. Instead of Being, Man became the main object of this investigation; the question of the being as being has given way as to an enlightened concept of being-man (never reached) as also to the task to achieve this in order to satisfy what reason designed to human species. However, as this project of achieving the concept of Being-Man advanced, its true nature became clear: a unilateral and arbitrary colonial expansion, which forced everyone to follow Teleontological paradigms. Teleontology can demonstrate that Greek-Christian metaphysics means a particular element (never universal) submitted to a specific culture and, in this case, expresses the structure of Eurocentric thought that became global by way of the expanding of capitalism/colonialism. Specifically, in this text, we propose to investigate: 1 - what is Teleontology; 2 - what are its objects; 3 - what are its origins. (shrink)

Ensayo de acercamiento general al núcleo metafísico fundamental del pensamiento de Max Stirner, principalmente expuesto en 'El Único y su propiedad' y en el opúsculo de contrargumento a las respuestas crí-ticas a su obra titulado Recensores de Stirner.

In Proclus’Platonic Theology(V 17, 62. 22–63. 2) one can detect a clear recollection of the well-known and much discussed passage 1048b18–35 fromMetaphysicsIX 6. This passage is transmitted in only one branch of the manuscript tradition and some scholars maintain that it is not by Aristotle or that it does not belong to hisMetaphysics. On the other hand, Proclus’ testimony, supported by other passages by Neo-Platonic authors, provides an argument for the original location of the discussed section in Aristotle’sMetaphysics.

This paper regards Leonardo Polo’s motivation for his proposal of a new method in metaphysics, the science of being. It is presented a brief comparison with similar motivations in the area of Thomistic thought. The three main points of the proposal are: the problem of the mental limit, the notion of habitual knowledge, the distinction between metaphysics and the transcendental anthropology.

In this article I propose a unitary interpretation of Kant’s reflection on evil in Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1792–1794). This part of Immanuel Kant’s work often presents knotty interpretative problems because the author, while reaffirming the principle of the subject’s moral freedom as set forth in Critique of Practical Reason, seems actually to be showing this freedom as conditioned by a tendency toward evil that is so compelling that it blocks and undermines the subject’s autonomy. I give (...) an account of the coherence acquired by the Kantian notion of radical evil, defined as an axiological inversion of the order of the motives, once one grasps the defective character of the notion of freedom that the philosopher employs in the work and the metaphysical orientation that backs it up. (shrink)

Resumen: En Metafísica E 2 y 3 Aristóteles discute el problema de lo que es por accidente y sus causas, con el fin último de examinar si esto puede ser objeto de la filosofía primera. El resultado de esta discusión es, en este sentido, negativo. Sin embargo, la filosofía primera tiene algo que decir acerca del accidente, aunque solo sea mediante un discurso de segundo orden. La naturaleza de lo accidental es así explorada en estas páginas de la (...) class='Hi'>Metafísica para confirmar la imposibilidad de un estudio científico acerca de esta forma de ser y sus causas. La parte central de este artículo discute el complejo pasaje E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, donde Aristóteles presenta las causas de lo que es por accidente. Procuraré mostrar que las tres causas allí presentadas son no solo compatibles, sino también relevantes para la completa caracterización de lo accidental, en la medida en que pueden entenderse como la causa formal, eficiente y material de lo que es por accidente.: Aristotle’s Metaphysics E 2 and 3 are devoted to the discussion about accidental being and its causes, with the aim of assessing its credentials as a possible object of first philosophy. The result of this discussion is, in this sense, negative. However, first philosophy has something to say about accidental being, if only through a second order speech. The nature of the accidental is thus explored in these pages of Metaphysics, with the ultimate aim of confirming the impossibility of a scientific study about this way of being and its causes. The central part of this paper deals with E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, where Aristotle introduces the causes of accidental being. I endeavor to show that each of the three causes presented in these lines are compatible and relevant, as they can be understood, respectively, as the formal, efficient and material cause of what happens by accident. (shrink)

A ética do discurso justifica o conteúdo de uma moralidade que salienta a simetria entre os sujeitos e a solidariedade entre todos. Para Habermas “a solidariedade é a outra face da justiça” (1999, p. 42), ou seja, são duas faces da mesma moeda. Esta é uma afirmação chave em relação ao conteúdo cognitivo do âmbito moral. A validade das normas pressupõe uma fundamentação normativa estruturada linguisticamente, de forma a vincular a justiça com a solidariedade. A ênfase está em uma razão (...) prática capaz de fundamentar princípios igualitários e universalistas da moral e do direito (2009, p. 63). A legitimação do estado de direito deve preservar sua neutralidade ideológica, alicerçada em uma moral racional, isto é, laica (ou secular). Com isso, as exigências normativas devem ser aceitas por todos em uma sociedade pluralista, formada por cidadãos de diferentes credos e, inclusive, por não crentes (HABERMAS, 2009, p. 69). (shrink)

We offer a number of arguments for or against particular metaphysical theses. All of them are based in phenomena or results in mathematical logic, broadly conceived, and are offered as exemplification of the possibility of arguing in metaphysics from such results.

This article deals with Averroes’s interpretation of Metaph. Ε 1, where Aristotle discusses the nature and object of metaphysics, as well as its place in the hierarchy of sciences. Among Averroes’s predecessors, al-Kindī seems to see a coincidence between metaphysics and theology, since God can be described as the “first cause of everything”. However, al-Fārābī and Avicenna discovered that “first philosophy” could be conceived as an ontology distinct from theology; moreover, they considered theology to be only a part of metaphysics, (...) not even the most important one. In the Great Commentary on Metaphysics - where the Arabic translation of the work by the Jacobite monk Usṭāth is quoted, Averroes often just paraphrases the original passages. One may infer that theology in the strict sense is merely mentioned by way of example. In the Epitome of Metaphysics, the objects of metaphysics are “general” ones; metaphysics studies the “absolute being” and cannot be identified with theology as “pertaining to God”. (shrink)

Arguments on determinism and fate must be placed in human being's industry to over come life uncertainties. For a long time was regarded suitable to postulate an ontologi cal necessity to progress towards a more and more sure knowledge. Nowadays it is tended to believe that determinism is unacceptable either theoretical or practically. Nevertheless it does not mean that the notion of fate has to be legitimazed in all levels.

In delineating the idea of a teleological accord between theoretical possibility and practical reality of the supersensual, between what reason may think and what it gives the order to create, the postulates of pure practical reason become the voice of the eminently architectural sense of metaphysics as a science in which reason ultimately confronts herself, in a dialogue on whose success it wagers nothing less than the survival of its internal consistency, that is to say brings into play its very (...) nature as reason. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to argue against Alexander Bird‟s thesis (2001) that the law salt dissolves in water is metaphysically necessary. I briefly indicate Bird‟s argument for the necessity of such law, and then I provide a counter-argument to his thesis. In a general way, Bird wants to show that the existence of certain substances depends on the truth of certain laws, and that because of this the existence of such substances implies the existence of such laws. That would (...) make the laws existing at least while the substance it rules exists; what, for Bird, makes such laws metaphysically necessary. My counter-argument to Bird is that such conception apprehends just what we call “weak necessity”, and not the strong necessity we would like a metaphysically necessary law to have. (shrink)

Neste artigo, apresentamos a necessidade de se repensar o estilo de escrita da Filosofia a partir de uma mudança de paradigma conceitual. O que importa à Filosofia e à “forma tratado de ontologia” é encontrar uma forma de dizer a Verdade, de dizer aquilo que é invariável. Ao encontrar esta forma, busca-se criar uma hierarquia de estilos, começando por aquele que diz a Verdade que, de fato, seria a única forma de escrever sobre o Ser e a existência, indo até (...) os estilos que ocupam função política e retórica, até chegar à poesia, o discurso com menor comprometimento com a verdade e o bem comum. Se não defendemos mais a existência de uma verdade única e não pensamos mais a linguagem como instrumento para alcançar esta Verdad, que estaria Fora do Mundo, mas no lugar disso, pensamos a existência como singular-plural e toda “verdade” como um constructo de relações no interior de um mundo, que será sempre um mundo entre outros mundos, então a própria filosofia precisa repensar o seu estilo e a sua forma. Partindo desta demanda inelutável para um pensamento da diferença apresentaremos os argumentos de Jean-Luc Nancy que sustentam esta necessidade de repensar a escrita. (shrink)