The formation of public opinion in different countries of the world is important for the formation of global media discourse, since ambiguous opinions are produced in the Asian media, it is worth investigating and studying the linguistic nature of journalistic methods of influencing the audience and the peculiarities of communication with readers. The study aimed to decipher the explicit and implicit linguistic techniques employed to construct political narratives in the media domains of China and Japan, while also examining existing research (...) in the realm of media language. The methodological basis of the work is analytical-synthetic, comparative, contextual and lexical-semantic analysis, which were used in a complex. In this study, the peculiarities of the media discourse of China and Japan were determined based on the analysis of the objectivity of the depiction of events related to the war in Ukraine, and an idea was formed about the characteristics of the narratives that were laid at the level of explicit and implicit meanings, decoded using the study of linguistic means. Attention is focused on the contrast between the Chinese and Japanese positions regarding the war in Ukraine in the media discourse and the peculiarities of information coverage (neutrality or stylistic marking, the choice of lexical-semantic means, the level of artistic imagery). A contextual analysis of Chinese and Japanese online newspapers, which form the modern Asian media field, was carried out, which journalistic techniques are used and which linguistic means are used to achieve the basic communicative goal. This research can be used for further linguistic investigations regarding the formation of political narratives in different regions and countries of the world, in particular regarding the war in Ukraine, conducting a comparative analysis of the rhetoric of public opinion leaders and their influence on the general media discourse. (shrink)

This research aims to help create a systematic casualty recording database for the civilian casualties of the Russian aggression within Ukraine. It looks at the definitions surrounding casualty recording and human security to help create a baseline for the project. It examines the Register of the Holodomor Victims, the Bosnian Book of the Dead, the Kosovo Memorial Book, and the casualty recording of Iraq Body Count and the Bouderbala Commission, in terms of their recording systems and public databases. (...) The live project is also informed by the work of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), the United Nations, Children of War, and the Memorial Platform. (shrink)

The range of issues related to the origins of Christianity, the formation of its doctrine, and its existence in the early, pre-Conciliar period has always been of concern not only to Christian scholars, not only to those scholars who were in one or another way involved in these researches, but also to society as a whole. However, in Ukraine, and especially in academic circles, these issues are still not sufficiently studied. The article examines the reasons that led the official Church (...) to change the key provisions of Christian doctrine, including ideological positions about "this world," narratives about war, and the commandments "thou shalt not kill" and "love your enemies." The author argues that the final rejection of the original evangelical pacifism occurred after the conquest of Christianity by Emperor Constantine the Great, when the Church was transformed into an institution of secular power, changing its original status as the "Kingdom of God" to belonging to the "Kingdom of Caesar." Since the reign of Constantine, Christianity has essentially existed divided into two camps. – the first, to which belong all those who profess the church doctrine in its new, "conciliar" and different from the original form and who, in particular, has rejected Jesus' original idea of renunciation of earthly things and, accordingly, the pacifism and anti-militarism he proclaimed; the second camp are those who remained faithful to the apostolic tradition and who continued to practice Christianity according to the original New Testament standard. The latter camp today includes mostly Protestants, including in Ukraine. However, with the onset of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, their pacifist stance is changing. The solution of urgent socio-political issues and issues directly related to defense are increasingly leading Protestants in Ukraine to rethink their traditional pacifism, which may lead to a complete rejection of it in the future. The results obtained in the course of the study provide grounds to significantly adjust the current perceptions of Protestantism in Ukraine, in particular, its positive attitude to socio-political processes and active involvement in them. (shrink)

Today, there are several problems in the field of criminal law caused both by the emergence of new types of legal relations and by the imperfection of legislation. Due to the emergence of new challenges in the field of criminal law, many of them require theoretical understanding. Some of these challenges, generated in the light of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, revealed several reasons for discussion in the Ukrainian and international legal community. The purpose (...) of the study involves consideration of certain aspects of modern challenges in the field of criminal-legal relations, which arose against the background of the military aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The first part of the study is devoted to the question of the qualification of war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine as acts of genocide. The second part of the work is devoted to the issue of using existing international legal mechanisms to hold the Russian Federation accountable for war crimes. There are convincing reasons to say that the actions of the Russian Federation during the war in Ukraine have signs of the crime of genocide. Even though Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Ukrainian government can use another tool to bring the subjects of war crimes to justice, by creating a certain mixed investigative mechanism or a criminal tribunal that could deal directly with the crime of aggression. (shrink)

After the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, the flow of forced migration from Ukraine has significantly increased as people tried to protect their lives and find a safe place to live. Given that Ukraine shares the external border with the European Union, most people sought protection precisely in the Member States of the European Union. The study aims to analyze the features of the legal regulation of the provision of temporary protection in the European Union and (...) determine the reasons and conditions that led to its activation after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The leading method of the research was the method of systematic analysis, which helped define temporary protection as a multifaceted phenomenon and determine the reasons and conditions that led to its activation in the European Union after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In order to regulate the mass influx of Ukrainian displaced persons, the European Union has activated the mechanisms of temporary protection, which is an emergency mechanism introduced by a decision of the Council of the European Union. The status of a person with temporary protection provides certain rights analyzed in the article. Thus, the activation by the European Union of the Temporary Protection Directive is a justified and appropriate measure to protect the mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are (...) different. Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

The defeat of russia on the battlefield must be accompanied by the delegitimization of the “russian world”, that is, the loss of attractiveness for the russians themselves of the concept of the supremacy of everything Russian over everything non-russian. Cultivating russia’s greatness as a key task of “russian world” is one of the main reasons for the current Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, but also for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in the world in general. (...) The purpose of this article is to clarify the main features of the delegitimization of the “russian world” in the regime of social education. To do this, the definition of “russian world” as a special symbolic system, which the modern russian political regime is trying to adjust from the standpoint of aggressive russian geopolitical subjectivity, has been previously clarified. This leads to the performative selfdenial of the “russian world”, which can be traced at the level of the accumulation of symbolic capital, the establishment of political elites (the authorities and the opposition), as well as at the level of the development of civil society. Social learning involves the search at the level of civil society for new forms of communicative self-organization at various levels of collective formation. A way out for such performative self-denial is possible only through the ways of social learning, the search for a change in one’s own identity, and not through attempts at autistic self-affirmation characteristic of the modern russian political regime, as well as the destruction of all political and cultural alternatives to the stateapproved canon. Social education is a way of soft and non-violent delegitimization of the “russian world”, in contrast to rebellion and revolutions, which in russia traditionally only lead to the emergence of even more brutal forms of state dictatorship. The monologic nature of the russian political space provokes the reation of new forms of social consensus outside the russian political system – in the sphere of culture, counterculture, and subcultures. (shrink)

The first part of this evolutionary study of the persistence of the autocratic/oligarchic variety of personal rule in Russia provides a historical overview, followed by two theories explaining why it persisted, interrupted by brief “times of troubles,” for over 500 years. Edward Keenan, on the one hand, hypothesizes successful long-term adaptation to a demanding environment. Richard Hellie, on the other hand, develops a theory of service-class revolutions and a cyclical pattern based on the methods of Russian elites for overcoming (...) relative backwardness. Neither theory takes a neo-Darwinian approach.The second part examines neo-Darwinian evolutionary approaches. In the cosmic perspective of Big History, the human species in its relatively brief existence has had an accelerating impact on other species and the earth’s environment. Biologists modeling complex systems come to a similar conclusion. Agent-driven history, as modeled by demographer Noël Bonneuil, raises questions about the adequacy of the historian’s traditional single-trajectory narrative approach to “the time of human history” and also critiques the biases built into the mathematical models of many evolutionary thinkers. An evolutionary approach to human history does not restrict itself to organic replication, but takes into account populations of evolving human skills and also group projects that act as evolutionary forces as well as units of selection, and outlive generations of organic populations.The third part applies this approach to the Russian tradition of state power by showing how group projects operate as evolutionary forces in a variety of modern power systems. The “parable of the tribes” avers that the aggressive agent in any given power system—ideological, economic, social, military, or political—dictates the dynamics of the system. The “braided stream” approach shows, however sketchily here, how agent-driven modern power systems interact, coevolve, and produce hybrid forms. The Russian tradition is highlighted in this evolutionary context. (shrink)

The academic community in the West tends to be suspicious of Russian philosophy, often relegating it to another category, such as “ideology” or “social thought.” But what is philosophy? There is no simple universal definition, and many thinkers consider it impossible to formulate one. The most credible attempt is nominalistic: philosophy is the practice in which Plato and Aristotle were involved. As Alfred North Whitehead wrote, “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of (...) a series of footnotes to Plato.”If so, then Russian thought needs to be understood as an important part of the Western philosophical heritage, given that it offers perhaps the most elaborate set of footnotes to Plato's most mature and comprehensive dialogues: the Republic and the Laws. The status of ideas in Russian philosophy mirrors Plato's vision of them as ontological and political entities, “laws,” or ideal principles—as distinct from mere epistemic units or tools of cognition. The Platonic tendency to integrate and implement religious, philosophical, and political teachings culminated in twentieth-century Russia. In the Soviet state, perhaps more than anywhere else in history, philosophy became a supreme legal and political institution, acquiring the power of a suprapersonal, universal reason. Hence thought itself, in the moment of its triumph, became a prisoner in the social structures that Soviet ideocracy erected on a philosophical foundation. In discussing Russian philosophy, we inevitably consider the practical application of Platonic conceptions by the Soviet ideocracy to a state in which philosophy was called upon to rule.According to Sergei Averintsev, the emphasis on Platonism in the Russian intellectual tradition is nothing to be proud of; it should rather be lamented and repented. Despite the obvious Platonic preferences of Russian thinkers (from Ivan Kireyevsky to Aleksei Losev), Averintsev asks whether even now we might be able to reorient the tradition toward Aristotle instead—toward a more secular, tolerant, and analytic philosophy of human nature. “If Plato is the first utopian,” Averintsev writes, “Aristotle is the first thinker to look the spirit of utopia right in the eye and overcome it.... Aristotle's technique of thought is more neutral toward religion than is Plato's ecstasy.” Characteristically, the name index to the Palgrave Handbook of Russian Thought contains almost twice as many mentions of Plato as of Aristotle.Each national tradition has its own “strange attractor,” as they say now in complexity theory. English empiricism, French rationalism, German Idealism, American pragmatism... However stereotypical these generalizations are, they help to clarify the nations’ distinctive contributions to philosophy. Where does Russia stand in this row? I think that Caryl Emerson is correct to pinpoint, among the most distinctive features of the Russian intellectual tradition, the striving for “wholeness” (tselostnost’). Many Russian thinkers seem to evade definitive and particular “isms,” preferring to find ways of complementing (and thus diluting) those that are on offer. Faced with the claims for rationalism, for example, the Russian response tends to be that true rationality is or should be coupled with fullness of feeling. The characteristic Russian “ism” is at best “holism,” at worst “totalitarianism,” and is usually directed against Western thought. Kireyevsky declares: There [in the West] is a bifurcation [razdvoenie] of the spirit, a bifurcation of thoughts, a bifurcation of the sciences, a bifurcation of the state, a bifurcation of estates, a bifurcation of society, a bifurcation of family rights and duties, a bifurcation of morality and the heart.... In Russia, on the contrary, there is a predominant tendency toward the wholeness of the inner and the outer, of public and moral being.Vladimir Solovyov held that the goal of all knowledge was to comprehend “total unity” and to overcome all kinds of unilateralism, which he referred to as “abstract elements” (otvlechennye nachala). These one-sided elements included Realism, rationalism, empiricism, and positivism, all of which had been advanced by Western philosophical movements.Reading the Handbook, I was struck by how steadily, from one thinker to another, the concept of “unity” is reiterated in various synonyms and contexts: “all-unity,” “wholeness,” “totality,” “integrity,” “edinstvo,” “tsel'nost,’” “tselostnost,” “sobornost,” and so forth. Russian thinkers endeavor not to create something original and special but to unify everything that has already been done and known. Consider opponents, like the Slavophiles and Westernizers; take Petr Chaadaev and Vissarion Belinsky, Kireyevsky and Alexander Herzen, Dostoevsky and Solovyov—all are united by this “super-idea,” proclaiming its embodiment to be the all-embracing vocation of the Russian people. At the same time, they sharply reject all “private principles” and “trashy certainty” (Belinsky's driannaia opredelennost’)—anything that restricts and divides individuals or nations. All these forms of privacy and particularity must be overcome on the way to a universal whole that is even greater in scale than Western Catholicism. According to this logic of totality, we would be better off left with nothing than to be content with the particular and the limited. The first original Russian thinker, Chaadaev (1794–1856), makes the salto mortale of declaring Russia a country that has given nothing to the world, then proclaiming that Russia's destiny is to rise above the rest of the world and resolve all its contradictions. From nothing to everything: such are the philosophical foundations for the totalitarian aspiration of Russian thought, which eventually expressed itself in the revolutionary movements and communist experiments of the twentieth century.As is well known, Russian literature is considered in the West a far more powerful and original expression of philosophical ideas than Russian philosophy as such. Characteristically, then, almost half of the Handbook, its entire second part, is devoted to the dialogue of Russian philosophy with literature and art. As M. N. Forster remarks in the Handbook's concluding essay: “It is natural to wonder why this striking asymmetry between relatively modest achievements in pure philosophy and spectacularly high achievements in literature came about.” To the literary focus of Russian philosophy, we can add a political focus. At least a third of part one of the Handbook is devoted to Russian political and revolutionary philosophy, to Lenin and other Marxists, to Ivan Ilyin, and so on. In this context, both literature and politics assumed philosophical dimensions, often overshadowing philosophy itself.Bertrand Russell lamented that the system of philosophical categories in the West featured mostly nouns (being, consciousness, idea, matter, substance, and so forth), omitting adjectives, verbs, prefixes, and other parts of speech. This criticism should be applied to the category philosophy itself. Why the noun philosophy rather than the adjective philosophical, which can be applied to many areas of activity and creativity, including literature and politics?In Russian intellectual history, the philosophical, rather than philosophy, is the predominant category. The state, ideology, economics, politics and geopolitics, literature, art, warfare, space exploration—all these spheres in Russia and the USSR have been and remain abundantly philosophical, subordinated to certain philosophical tasks, though philosophy as such has never been as developed and sophisticated as in the West. As a discipline, Western philosophy “outsourced” itself to Russian disciples, leaving it to Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, Lenin and Trotsky, to test in literary and political practices a host of Western philosophical ideas, from those of Plato, Rousseau, and Hegel to those of Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche.Likewise, the verb to philosophize is used in ways unusual and awkward in the West. “It is characteristic of the Russian people to philosophize [filosofstvovat'],” as Nikolai Berdyaev observed: “An illiterate Russian peasant likes to pose questions of a philosophical nature—about the meaning of life, about God, about eternal life, about evil and untruth, about how to realize the Kingdom of God.” The philosophical and philosophizing, as attributes and actions of the state and society, overpowered philosophy as a noun—as an academic discipline, if you will. Russian philosophy has had a very modest impact on the West, but the impact of the philosophical has been immense. Nineteenth-century Russian literature influenced Western culture with its philosophical interrogations and existential dilemmas, just as, in the twentieth century, the USSR influenced the West with the philosophical ideas (Marxism, materialism, dialectics, collectivism, socialism, communism) that determined Soviet ideology, politics, and economics.In the USSR of the 1920 and 1930s, for instance, philosophy as an independent academic subject was in a subdued position, as a servant of party ideology. But, meanwhile, the sphere of the philosophical spread to such distant domains as theater (Stanislavsky), physiology (Pavlov), and agriculture (Michurin), with all such activities glorified and sponsored by the state as “philosophically correct”—as faithful to “materialism” and “Realism.” Paradoxically, in the quintessentially philosophical state that was the USSR, the state of philosophy, with the repression of all independent thought and thinkers, was miserable. The fateful and often disastrous originality of Russian philosophy consisted precisely in its dissemination to other areas, in an act of kenosis or self-transcendence that can be viewed both as an aggressive philosophical appropriation of politics, economics, ideology, and literature—and as philosophy's sacrificial devotion to the world beyond its professional boundaries.So there are three features that make Russian thought relevant and dangerous: its Platonic utopian aspiration; its spirit of totality; and its tendency to transcend the boundaries of academic philosophy and to philosophize society, politics, and life in general. Russian philosophy has not been as good at explaining the world as at changing it, sometimes ethically and poetically, sometimes violently and aggressively. Teachers and students of Russian culture should be deeply motivated to draw more attention to the philosophical in Russia and to raise its status in the Western academy. In my view, we would do better service to Russian philosophy if we are frank enough to qualify it as dangerous, sometimes very toxic and addictive, fraught with totalistic tendencies. This philosophy is the voice of the “underground,” both in the Dostoevskian and Leninist senses.At the same time, however, the antidotes concocted in the Russian metaphysical laboratory are of enormous value: the Russian versions of personalism, existentialism, secular and religious liberalism, neorationalism, culturology, conceptualism, and postmodernism. These movements, which counteract totalization, need to be studied precisely because they were cooked up and tested under the same extreme conditions in which the most dangerous intellectual poisons have been produced. (shrink)

The present paper is devoted to the relation between changing historical identity of Russian Formalists in the second half of the 1920s and their individual evolution — as writers, members of society, figures of culture. Formalists with their aggressive inclination to modernity are opposed here to structuralists, the bearers of a conservative, traditional ideology (relating to the idea of Revolution). It could be explained by the specific “romantic” identity of Russian Formalists whose purpose was to appropriate cultural values (...) renamed and renewed by their revolutionary theory. As a revolutionary ideology, formalism was imported from the West. But the Stalinist “Renaissance” made the idea of Revolution both in mind and society senseless at the end of the 1920s. That is why Russian Formalism lost its mainstream positions and began to work out a new, adapted form of intellectual resistance (private life, domestic literature) in the next decade. (shrink)

The article proposes to deepen and expand the classical methodological approaches formulated at the beginning of the 21st century within the framework of academic religious studies. Based on the methodological works of the founder of modern Ukrainian religious studies, Prof. Kolodnyi, who first clearly defined the principles of the scientific study of religion, in particular objectivity, historicism, worldview neutrality, pluralism, etc., the authors justify the need for contextualization as one of the main methodological approaches in the study of current religious (...) processes. They insist on rethinking not only the universality and effectiveness of some methodological principles in new circumstances — the Russian-Ukrainian war, but also on the actualization of new ones, critically rethinking their neglect in the pre-war period. It is proved that in the hierar- chy of religious principles, the principle of contextuality becomes a particularly sought-after re- ality of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Even the concepts that researchers use describing a new religious situation must be contextualized. The authors remind about those contextual dangers for the life world of Ukraine that exist in its religious segment, highlighting external and internal factors that cannot be ignored when analyzing the contemporary religious situation in Ukraine and in the world. Analyzing the current reality, the authors conclude that contextuality as a methodological approach in religious studies should consider: 1) The event context — Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine — as a condition for the manifestation of religion, which determines its functional and substantive features; 2) Features, depth and intensity of research’s contextual inclusion/exclusion. Tragic changes in the context of the life of Ukrainians — linguistic, cultural, informational, religious, etc. necessarily correct expert neutrality, objectivity, non-involvement. According to the authors, the war situation liberates from an unbiased, out-of-contextual analysis. The admis- sibility of such contextualization is a matter of debate. (shrink)

Language has traditionally been an important marker of Ukrainian identity which, due to a lack of independent statehood, has been ethnic rather than civic. The contradictory policies of the Soviet regime produced a large discrepancy between ethnocultural identity and language use. In independent Ukraine this discrepancy persisted, as increased identification with the Ukrainian nation was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the use of the Ukrainian language, even though the latter was predominantly valued as a symbol of nationhood. The (...) Euromaidan and the subsequent Russian aggression further detached language use from national identity, as many Russian speakers came to identify strongly with the inclusive Ukrainian nation without abandoning their accustomed language or even adding Ukrainian as an active part of their communicative repertoire. The post-Maidan leadership refrained from an active promotion of Ukrainian for fear of provoking alienation among Russian speakers, but this policy exacerbates the disadvantaged position of the titular language in various domains and causes discontent among those viewing it as a crucial component of national identity. (shrink)

Today in education as well as in a society suppression and aggression reveal itself very actively. The word "suppression" in a modern society is used in many meanings; it includes all forms of physical, psychological and economic suppression. There is no system or mechanism to oppose it, to protect the education area of suppression and aggression, they are not outworked. Philosophy of education considers non-aggressive activity as a modern trend in Russian education, which developing non-aggressive relations as (...) a standard of social life will help the society to overcome the revealed suppression and aggression. Non-suppression is a principle, action, position. Non-suppression is an ideological, ethic and vital principle, which is based on recognition of all living, a man and his life, rejection of suppression as a way of relation of a man with the world, the nature and other people. There are many methods of non-suppressedactivity in education. First of all, it is a refusal of force; non-suppressed action as a collaboration, joint activity; non-suppressed action as a help; non-suppressed action as a reduction of aggressive value of opposite side. (shrink)

The article defines the nature of the Russian war against Ukraine in the context of social and state transformations of the 20th — 21st centuries. It is emphasized that this is a war of different worlds, mentalities, worldviews, ways of life, values, etc., which has been going on for many centuries in various forms (direct and mediated, open and veiled, hot and cold). The role of the religious-legal factor in the Russian war against Ukraine at various stages of (...) Ukrainian state formation (periods of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Soviet, modern) is revealed. It is emphasized that it was during the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic that the legal basis for the organization of the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, confessional differentiation and the establishment of freedom of conscience and interconfessional tolerance in Ukrainian society was created. Emphasized attention is paid to the fact that in the Soviet period, the Russian war against Ukraine continued in a new, veiled, hidden, invisible (at first glance) form with the active use of the religious factor. The results of this period have been determined, namely: rampant militant/ scientific atheism, radical extermination, Russification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, etc. Special attention is paid to the Soviet secular/political religion (Marxism-Leninism) as a key basis for the implementation of an aggressive policy regarding the historical memory and cultural identity of the Ukrainian people and a manipulative tool for the destruction of Ukrainian history, culture, worldview, nation, state and law in the information, hybrid, total, full-scale and other Russia’s wars against Ukraine. The article substantiates that improved legislation with an effective legal mechanism for its implementation, a strong civil society with developed institutions, including the institution of religion (church), adequate guarantees of religious rights and freedoms are important factors in ensuring state, national, religious security and victory of Ukraine (at the current stage) in the war waged against it by the Russian Federation. (shrink)

The phenomenon of information culture in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war is analyzed. It has been proven that changes in the priorities of the development of information culture during the war are determined by the course of spiritual confrontation with the enemy, accelerated transformations of public consciousness, the peculiarities of state information policy, and the urgent need to protect the country’s information sovereignty. It is argued that under the influence of the war in Ukraine, including in the spiritual (...) and informational space, all components of information culture are being transformed, particularly its core - the information worldview. The features of the development of the information worldview as a fundamental component of information culture are identified. It is noted that living in an information society without possessing the necessary information culture poses a danger of getting lost in both virtual and real worlds simultaneously. Personal mastery of information culture in modern society is based on theoretical knowledge about the essence, content, features, and regularities of its functioning in societies with different levels of informatization. The negative impact of informational aggression on the formation of the information culture of modern youth is demonstrated. During the war, the information culture of youth is formed and changed at an accelerated pace due to the increase in information flows of both negative and positive nature and under the influence of new information technologies. One of the main problems in the process of forming the information culture of youth in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war is mastering methods of countering enemy propaganda, developing critical attitudes towards information, and having a value-based worldview barrier to countering fake and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The role of knowledge and the education system in the formation of the information culture of Ukrainian society is revealed. (shrink)

The leadership of the Russian Federation made visible organization and invested significant financial resources in support of the Russian Orthodox Church, making the latter a cementing ideological component of the Moscow government, its various aggressive policy. So, since 2012, the state support for the 2016 year celebration of the "1000th anniversary of the Russian presence on Athos" has begun. On this occasion, a special order of Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, 2012 for №468-rp "On (...) creation of working groups...". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine appealed to the Specialized Department of the Department of Religious Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine with a request to comment on the next aspiration of the Russian Federation to steal Ukrainian history, attributing to itself what the Muscovites do not have any direct relation to. (shrink)

The articles intention is to construct a possible minimal response to violence, that is, to describe what would be justified противонасилие. This argument is built on reviving several important philosophical texts in Russian of the first half of the twentieth century as well as on going beyond that historical moment. Starting with the reconstruction of Tolstoys criticism of any use of violence, it is then shown that, paradoxically, resistance to Tolstoys or pseudo-Tolstoys teachings ends up incorporating Tolstoys thematization of (...) counter-violence into various theories, which sought to legitimate the use of force. In particular, Tolstoys discovery of a force, which, on the one hand, is not grounded in violence and, on the other hand, which is capable of countering violence, becomes fundamental in reasoning about the just use of force. The connection is made between Tolstoy and Petar II Petrović Njego, who also thematizes the use of force in Christian perspective. In his view, justice, blessed by the Creators hand, has the capacity to protect from violent force. Any living thing defends itself from what endangers it by means Creator bestowed it with. Living force and protective use of force are conceptually linked in Njegos reasoning. Thus, only protective force can defeat aggressive force. This is shown to be Njegos contribution to the Orthodox Christian discourse on violence. If a force can be counter-violent, the next step in our argument would be to search for a protocol that should have universal validity, that is, it has to be valid for all conflicting sides, The protocol of counter-violence requires that, firstly, it is a response to violence; secondly, it interrupts violence and forestalls any possible future violence ; thirdly, it is subject to verification, it addresses those who are a priori against any response to violence. Finally, it is shown that state power does not create law, but it is being right that makes law or gives life to social order, and thereby can authorize the use of force. This is the innovation in the histories of justification of force, absent in the West. Aggressive violence can necessarily be opposed only in the way that implies the possibility of constituting law and order. (shrink)

I am reading an April 4 issue of the newspaper "Day" in an interview with the Director of the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate Anthony. It reminds me of a well-known Ukrainian national comparison: it is yorking like a scar on a skillet. The Bishop's questions sound clear: Does your Church condemn the aggression of Russia and its annexation of Crimea? Why did not you condemn the aggressive actions of Russia Your Moscow Patriarch Kirill? No answer. The Church of (...) the Kyiv Patriarchate or the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the mouth of its predecessors has clearly said: We have aggression against Muscovy, we condemn it. Even my fellow countryman, the Cherkasy eparch of the UOC MP Metropolitan Sofroni called Putin a bandit. And Bishop Antony spoke so much that the elephant could be wrapped up in his printed interview, but the conqueror of the invader still failed. Therefore, the authorities of the Orthodox Church of Moscow jurisdiction do not hear the Ukrainian people, which all are inclined to go to the ranks of the National Guard to defend our independence. Even I in my 77 agreed to this. (shrink)

In justifying Russian aggression against Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin asserts that Ukraine is neither a distinct nation nor a viable state. In response, this essay will establish a Christian account of Ukraine’s right to self-defense not only via just war criteria but also in relation to its purpose theologically as a nation-state. This essay, after reviewing Christian ethical positions that either reject or embrace the nation-state, draws on the Niebuhr brothers and Karl Barth to develop key theological criteria (...) for judging whether particular nation-states are true to their divine purpose. While affirming the role of the nation-state in protecting a people’s distinct identity, Christians will call on the nation-state to direct its people outward, toward their shared humanity with the world’s other nations. The essay concludes that the Ukrainian nation-state is fulfilling these criteria, whereas the Russian nation-state is not. (shrink)

Since the outbreak of the war in the Ukraine, realism has made a comeback in public discourses but it is not clear what realism actually means as it seems to stand for everything: from supporting the Ukraine against Russian aggression to the war is the West’s fault. This is the result of decades of not distinguishing between neorealism and classical realism and implicitly acknowledging neorealist storytelling of having systematized classical realist thought. The present paper is a further intervention (...) to carefully distinguish between both theoretical perspectives to uncover what they can add to current world political problems. It finishes by asking if neorealist scholars like John Mearsheimer have a point that it is the West’s fault and a diplomatic solution needs to be found. They often refer to Hans Morgenthau not least because he was one of the most outspoken critics of the Vietnam War. (shrink)

Ukraine has always had a special place in Canadian foreign policy. Currently, Canada is deeply engaged in supporting Ukraine to restore political and economic stability and to implement democratic reforms. The Government in Ottawa has condemned Russian aggressive policy and the illegal military occupation of Crimea and has taken a variety of steps and initiatives since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 including imposing sanctions, economic and military assistance, and supporting of NATO measures.

After the American elections of 2016, an upset occurred with the victory of Donald Trump as the president of United States of America. From day one, he was in lime light due to his controversial polices and extremist behaviour towards Muslims and other countries of the world. Similarly, he had a very odd behaviour towards European Union and its member countries or in other words it would be accurate to say that he wanted to demolish European Union. In current scenario, (...) EU is facing multidimensional problems in the form refugee crisis from many parts of the world, Russian aggressive policies towards EU, ethnic movements in Europe, and above all critical elections in Italy, France and the Netherlands. Currently, it seems that the whole Europe is at stake and all these circumstances are leading EU towards a huge crisis. It seems that EU is facing the most difficult time period since its emergence. Critics are clearly indicating that EU could only survive with the active participation of France and Germany and that Europe needs serious changes by hearing the voice of the people and can gain its strength back by solving the major issues such as immigration problems and increased terrorism. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the roots of the developments that have taken place in Ukraine since Autumn 2013 and up to the Russian invasion. It stresses the historical differences between Ukraine and Russia, presents the international milieu of Ukrainian independence in the years 1991–2013, and ends with a description of the nature of the Maidan revolution and the pan-European challenge created by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The main thesis is that the struggle for Ukraine ends (...) the post-Cold War epoch marked with an illusion of eternal peace in Europe and with the groundless hope for Russian imperialism to expire. (shrink)

The article’s reasoning is based on the definition of the nature of the war in Ukraine, which, following the Russian aggression on February 24, 2022, escalated into a full-scale conflict: this war has gradually acquired features of the total wars of the 20th century and transformed into a war of attrition, which could last for a considerable period of time. If such a war does not end with the capitulation of one of the parties, the most likely outcome (...) would be a peace agreement involving third parties, which would take the form of a compromise and involve a renunciation by the participating parties of complete victory in the war. Given the just nature of Ukraine's war against Russian aggression, the author raises the question of whether a peace can be considered just without a complete victory over the aggressor and without the full restoration of justice disrupted by the aggression. Drawing on the classical work of M. Walzer, the author concludes that renouncing complete victory and halting hostilities at a point when the conflict can be resolved through political means fully aligns with the concept of a just war as a limited war. To establish the moral principles and possible limits of compromises in wartime, the author turns to A. Margalit’s concept, which, in his view, continues Walzer’s reasoning by outlining the possibility of compromises for the sake of peace. Drawing on contemporary research on political compromises, the author analyzes possible configurations of compromises in wartimes, their differences from political compromises in peacetime, and other potential outcomes of a war of attrition, including scenarios such as the capitulation of one of the parties or a modus vivendi. The article develops on the ideas of M. Walzer and A. Margalit, emphasizing that limiting the war and reaching a compromise for peace make necessary to clarify the requirements of justice. This, in turn, necessitates that the party engaged in a just war be guided by the ethics of responsibility when determining war aims, while also adhering to the fundamental distinction between good and evil in order to avoid "rotten" compromises. (shrink)

The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the crucial role of technology in modern warfare. The use of digital networks, information infrastructure, space technology, and artificial intelligence has distinct military advantages, but raises challenges as well. This essay focuses on the way it exacerbates a rather familiar challenge: the “civilianization of warfare.” Today's high-technology warfare lowers the threshold for civilian participation in the war effort. A notable example is the widespread use of smartphone apps by Ukrainian civilians, who thereby help the armed forces (...) defend against Russian aggression. Through the lenses of international humanitarian law, conventional just war theory, and revisionist just war theory, this essay evaluates the normative dimensions of such civilian participation. The analysis shows that civilians can lose their legal protections when they use these apps to directly participate in hostilities, and this loss of immunity can be justified by Michael Walzer's conventional just war theory. Revisionism, however, puts the justness of the war at the forefront, and so sheds doubt on the moral liability of Ukrainian civilians. Considering the broader implications, including the blurring combatant-civilian distinction, indicates that such civilianization of warfare should not be welcomed; the risks will often outweigh the benefits. At a minimum, states ought to exercise restraint in mobilizing civilians and inform them of the implications of their actions. (shrink)

The fragility of the post-war international order is threatened not only by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but even more tellingly, by the decisions that Western nations, the European Union, and NATO make in response to Russian aggression. This paper frames Western responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine within what Reinhart Koselleck calls ‘the sediments of time’ or Zeitschichten that contain different temporalities, speeds, and directions. Koselleck’s approach of parsing the ‘sediments of time’ is a heuristic device for (...) understanding how Western responses to the war in Ukraine are framed by very different historical markers. Just as one might parse the grammatical components of a sentence in order to understand its meaning, so one might parse Western responses within different historical timescales that include Zeitenwende, déjà vu, interregnum, and Never Again. (shrink)

In today's conditions, the heavy resistance of Ukrainians to Russian aggression, which is carried out, with the exception of the military, by way of information and economic methods, and now also through a non-gossip "hybrid" confrontation, it is very important to properly evaluate and play an appropriate role in this religious and religious factor. "Russian World" is no less effective weapon of the Moscow Church in the war with Ukraine than the military aid of the Russian (...) state to the separatists.. Religious communities have their potential in educating citizens - patriots of their homeland, or else. Different aspects of the problem of the role of religious-church factors in patriotic education of Ukrainians have long been in the zone of justified attention of domestic secular scholars and representatives of the Churches, among them: A. Kolodny, L. Filippovich, V. Shevchenko, P. Pavlenko, O. Sagan, C. Zdioruk, M. Cherenkov, O. Tuyeshin and others. Particular attention of the RCC and Protestant Churches in this regard was given by P. L. Yarotsky. (shrink)

The article analyzes the historical experience of creation and development of military medical aircraft in Ukraine from the 1920s. to the present. In particular, reviewed the activity of Design Bureaus of K. Kalinin and O. Antonov. Special attention is paid to the creation of military medical aircraft after Ukraine gained independence in 1991 and their application to evacuate the wounded during Armed conflict in the east of Ukraine in 2014-2016. The first attempt of creation a sanitary aircraft were made in (...) Ukraine back in the 1920s under the leadership of Konstantin Kalinin. In a qualitatively new level was realized military medical aircraft designed by bureau Oleg Antonov, created in the second half of 1970s aircraft emergency resuscitative-surgical care An-26M "Spasatel'" Accumulated experience allowed at the beginning of 2000s a similar purpose for the An-26 "Vita" for the Air Force of Ukraine. Over a longer time, he reminded to be the only one military medical aircraft in Ukraine. Plans of creating mixed air-transport unit air ambulance were not implemented. Successful use of the An-26 "Vita" to evacuate the wounded during repel of Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine helped to intensify work in the field of military medical aircraft.In2015 inmedical version were rebuilt two more An-26. One of them joined the Air Force, and the second - Natinal Service of Emergencies in Ukraine. All three aircrafts are different composition of medical equipment and ability to provide medical care. Their purpose is evacuation of the wounded from the airfield vicinity of the battle area to military medical institutions. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the analysis of modern approaches to the definition, conceptualization, and interpretation of happiness to outline the conditions of a happy life for Ukrainians (Ukrainian happiness). This is important for the development of a vision of a post-war future, the definition of the integral goal of post-war development, and the role of the policy of happiness in it. The article considers subjective and objective, internal and external conditions of happiness, including the dependence of happiness on both (...) economic and environmental conditions in their interconnectedness. The relevance of such an analysis is conditioned by the global situation (the global environmental crisis, growth of the environmental threats and challenges, diminishing of the total natural capital, etc.) and the national reality (environmental damage as a result of Russian aggression and the challenges of post-war restoration). Special attention is paid to the non-linear influence of material well-being and its effect on happiness, as well as the dependence of happiness on the quality of the environment. The analysis of this issue is based on the consideration of: 1) Easterlin paradox; 2) Layard’s “The Big Seven factors affecting happiness” (family relationships, financial situation, work, involvement in the community and friendship, physical and mental health, personal freedom and personal values); 3) the methodology of “conversion” of natural capital into a long, comfortable, and happy life for people (Happy Planet Index); 4) hypothesis of biophilia as the evolutionarily determined psycho-emotional connection of man with nature and as a precondition of well-being and happiness (E. Wilson, S. Kellert). It is concluded that for Ukraine it is important not only to estimate the economic and environmental losses caused by Russian aggression but also the economic and environmental cost of post-war reconstruction. A strategy for harmonizing economic, social, and environmental policies as components of an integral policy of happiness should be worked out. Nature should be considered not only as a source of economic growth but also as a basis for satisfying non-material human needs and feelings of biophilia. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas has defended Germany’s cautious support for Ukraine against the ongoing Russian invasion. Instead of trying to defeat Russia on the battlefield, he argued that Western nations should seek a compromise with the attacker. Critics worried that this would lead to more suffering than the war, encourage further Russian aggression, and ignore the concerns of the Ukrainian population. However, one question that has not been addressed is if Habermas’s pleas are part of a wider pacifist commitment—and (...) if so, what kind of pacifist he is. Examining Habermas’s writings on the Ukraine War, his cosmopolitan views and his idea of a “constitutionalization of international law,” I argue that Habermas can be called a political pacifist—someone who seeks to abolish the institutions that provide the ultimate causes of war. While one can still criticize his vision, it deserves to be taken seriously as a pacifist account. (shrink)

A series of conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union culminated in the war in Ukraine waged by Russia in 2014. The international community was taken by surprise, and its reactions to the Russian aggression were often confused and inadequate. Even more confused and inadequate were the responses from global Christianity. Russian propaganda often renders the aggression against Ukraine as a quasi-religious conflict: a “holy war” against the “godless” or “heterodox” West. It would be (...) natural, therefore, for the Christian churches worldwide to loudly condemn both propaganda and aggression. However, in most cases, their response was silence. Such reactions came from most local Orthodox churches, the Roman Catholic church, and international ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches. An exception was the reaction from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which decided to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The article argues that the Tomos for autocephaly was, among other reasons, a reaction to the war in Ukraine. The responses of other local Orthodox churches to the Tomos also indicate their attitude to the war in Ukraine. These reactions have demonstrated a profound crisis in inter-Orthodox solidarity and social ethics. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the problems of European political identity and European identity as a whole conception and as a foundation for European integration. Before 24 February 2022, European political identity had been in crisis. The contradictions between the EU member states seemed to be hardly resolvable. The Russian aggression against Ukraine gave a strong impetus to the formation of European identity. However, it is still a negative incentive for unity and solidarity rather than cohesion around positive (...) values, as well as from the outset the European integration was caused by devastating World War II as a negative experience, which should never be repeated. The text makes use of methods peculiar to the philosophical sciences, i.e. critical textual analysis, historical-analytical and comparative methods. (shrink)

This article seeks to historicize both the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the debate on realism occasioned by Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Using the research of Gerard Toal on Russia’s construction of its security interests in the post-Soviet spaces that include Ukraine, the article argues that neorealist geopolitical explanations fail to do justice to the roles of contingency and culture in setting Russia’s so-called ‘red lines.’ It also identifies an agency problem in realism: (...) realists not only fail to do justice to the agency of small states like Ukraine in this conflict but elide the moral and practical agency of decisionmakers like Russian President Vladmir Putin. The article also suggests that the current realism debate is the tip of an iceberg: realism has long had a problem specifying the relation of its theory to its practice. The article concludes by discussing the long shadow of 19th century imperial history over contemporary discussions of spheres of influence and great power status. (shrink)

_Purpose__._ The basis of the presented study is a methodological and human-centred analysis of the philosophy of education of the outstanding Ukrainian educator Vasyl Sukhomlynskyi as a relevant anthropological-intellectual strategy for understanding and comprehending the educational process in the context of civilisation challenges. This implies a sequential solution to the following tasks: 1) to review the conceptual content and human-centred load of Vasyl Sukhomlynskyi’s pedagogical position in the discourses of philosophical anthropology and social philosophy; 2) to analyse the theoretical knowledge (...) of the anthropo-existential concept of the outstanding teacher in the context of the transformation of Ukrainian education; 3) to determine the main parameters of the cognitive field of Sukhomlynskyi’s philosophy of education in the development of values of patriotic education of young people. _Theoretical__ basis__._ The dynamic process of Ukraine’s unfolding struggle for the preservation of its nation and territorial integrity brings Sukhomlynskyi’s philosophy of education to a new level of understanding of human life and society. The human-centred dimension in interaction with the philosophy of education allows us to define Sukhomlynskyi’s pedagogical concept in the fullness of its metaphilosophical, existential and axiological content. The relevance of the problem under study is due to the crisis of values in the situation of civilizational transformations, which, as a result of information and digital technologies, have a cumulative impact on all spheres of people’s life and their attitude to the world. In the process of implementing the educational ideas of the Ukrainian teacher, the development and transformation of the individual’s self-awareness takes place in accordance with the intellectual challenges of the modern socio-cultural environment. _Originality._ It is substantiated that the philosophy of education of Vasyl Sukhomlynskyi largely determines the strategy for the transformation of Ukrainian education both in the context of digitalisation of the educational space and in the situation of a full-scale war against Russian aggression, which opens up new prospects for the implementation of identity dimensions in interaction with a qualitatively different level of national subjectivity. _Conclusions__._ The approval of the conceptual provisions of Sukhomlynskyi’s philosophy of education gives rise to a new type and method of paradigm of thinking and cognition in the implementation of strategies for the transformation of modern education, which determine the qualitative theory of the educational process in the context of human-centrism. It is characterized by the level of modern philosophical reflections, which allows preserving and at the same time changing the system of education and upbringing of the young generation in the context of universal values. On this basis, the philosophy of education of the prominent Ukrainian educator appears as a way of renewing all aspects of human life, which deconstructs itself in the situation of a human-centric dimension. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The authors of this paper seek to comprehend, on the basis of ethics of discourse and communicative philosophy, the dimensions of human existence in times of war. This involves solving the following research tasks: to show the importance of moral and ethical norms in the structure of human existence and to emphasize the need for their observance by a person in the realities of war; to find out what the role of responsibility and co-responsibility is in preserving the space (...) of human existence in times of war; to explore the influence of discourse on the establishment of rational and social dimensions of human existence, formation of communicative space of understanding. _Theoretical basis._ The ideas of communicative philosophy and principles of discourse ethics, focused on the problems of substantiating ethical norms and values in their relationship with the human life world, and its activities are underlying the research. The analysis of human existence in times of war was carried out considering the theoretical and methodological foundations of philosophical anthropology. _Originality._ It is substantiated that the recognition of the universality of moral norms and values, and the productive power of communication contribute to deepening the understanding of the complexity and versatility of human existence in times of war. It has been determined that human existence’s rational and moral dimensions acquire particular significance in the context of russian aggression against Ukraine. The role of discourse was defined for affirming the humanistic foundations of human existence, in achieving cohesion, interaction, social solidarity, which is a condition for human development as a collective and unique being. It is noted that in war conditions the value of individual forms of human existence is complemented by the obligatory responsibility and co-responsibility for a person, awareness of the significance of coexistence in a situation where there is a threat to human life. _Conclusions._ The study of human existence involves the use of the methodological potential of discourse ethics, the significance of the ideas of which is increasing in the modern world because of the dangers caused by russian aggression against Ukraine. The recognition of the power of universal moral norms and the productive power of communication results in the affirmation of the humanistic foundations of human existence, the formation of the communicative space of understanding and consent necessary for a person. In times of war, the need for communicative rationalization of human existence, awareness of the value of morality and human humanity becomes obvious. (shrink)

The text treats the theme of cruelty starting from how it appears in the everyday dominant ideology. If we want to feel the pulse of our modern ideological landscape, we cannot ignore the fact that it has recently been severely shaken by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has repeatedly been called cruel, and cruelty in general is today unanimously seen as something reprehensible and repulsive. But the same is true of torture, which, although in (...) principle prosecuted, is carried out in secret. And if every war is cruel, what does the statement “the war in Ukraine is cruel” mean? In what contexts does it fit? The text explores this question on several levels, beginning with modern understandings of war and cruelty, moving to the broader historical context in which the statement is made, and finally asking whether it means that we still have one foot in the 20th century in some sense. Following Badiou’s work _The Century_, which emphasises the role of the passion of the real, war (which is intended to end all wars), and cruelty in the twentieth century, this statement also means that the twentieth century is not (yet) over in a sense, and that this century may be settling accounts with itself (again) with the war in Ukraine. (shrink)

Following their violent suppression of the Indian Revolution of1857, the British founded and consolidated their secular empire in the IndianSubcontinent, which marginalized and bypassed religion as far as possible,particularly Islam, which had been the official religion of the Mughal ancienrégime. Contemporaneous Ottoman efforts to counter European imperialism ledto Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s policy of pan-Islamism, particularlythe call for Islamic unity against the Russian aggression against Turkey in1877. It was at this critical juncture that some Indian Muslim scholars gallantlyvolunteered (...) to counter this threat, and to preserve the Islamic faith and heritageworldwide, despite the severe problems faced by the Muslims in India itself.This study highlights the role of an eminent scholar in this movement, namelyAllama Shibli Nu’mani, who in 1914 conceived the idea offounding the world-famous Islamic research institute Darul Musannefin ShibliAcademy in his home town of Azamgarh, Uttar Pradesh, India. Shibli was veryactive and instrumental in collecting donations from the wealthy landowners among the Muslim elite in his hometown of Azamgarh for theOttoman cause, raising 3,000 rupees, which was handed to Husain HasibAfendi, the Ottoman Consul in Bombay in 1877. Furthermore, his eloquentpoetry rallied Muslims across India to support the valour and heroism displayedin the jihad by Ghazi Usman Pasha against the Russians. Shibli travelled toIstanbul in 1892 and met with the Pasha, on whose efforts Tamgha-i Majidi was granted to Shibli on 13th Muharram, 1310/7th August, 1892.This article is based on Shibli’s major works in Urdu, particularly his arousingeulogies, Turkish archival reports, newspapers and magazines, andsecondary sources in Urdu and English. (shrink)

Ukrainian revolution of 2014 discovered the courage of Ukrainian nation to the whole world, as well as its unity and goal to renovate the country. Ukrainians have shown the world that they are a self-sufficient nation that wants to become a full-fledged part of European civilization as soon as possible. Ukrainian religion and spirituality also become open to the world. Thus, religion played a major part during the Revolution of dignity, and it is still of primary importance in the war (...) in Donbas. Ukrainian Pentecostalism is an inherent part of the processes which took place on Maidan Nezalezhnosti and are now taking place within the anti-terrorist campaign. Pentecostals are actively helping Ukrainians to fight against the Russian aggression and pro-Russian separatism in Eastern Ukraine. Despite the variety of movements and unions of Ukrainian Pentecostals, most of them took the side of the Ukrainian people. Today Pentecostal provide humanitarian aid for both residents of Donbas and the Ukrainian soldiers as well. Therefore, it is important to investigate the role of Ukrainian Pentecostals and Neo-Pentecostals in the events, which took place throughout November 2013 and February 2014 on Maidan in Kyiv, and which are happening now in Eastern Ukraine. (shrink)

Aleksandr Dugin proclaims Martin Heidegger as the “last God” of Western philosophy and seeks to assume a similar role in an other beginning for Russian philosophy. This paper examines Dugin’s extensive interpretation of Heidegger specifically in the context of the philosopher’s task as the one who rejects all conventions, who ventures beyond beings to Being itself. The philosopher in this sense begins anew, creating a philosophy of nothingness or “chaos” that Dugin derives as much from Heidegger as from an (...) intriguing reading of what Dugin calls “open” Platonism. This philosophy of chaos is, in Dugin’s terms, genuine Russian philosophy and a philosophy of inclusion. The paper then examines the practical implications of this philosophy of inclusion, as reflected in Dugin’s theory of “multipolarity,” in the context of the Ukrainian war where Dugin’s advocacy of Russian aggression appears baldly to contradict his philosophy of inclusion. Is Dugin’s advocacy a mask, a pose behind which stands the philosopher, beyond good and evil? Is Dugin a philosopher, idealogue, or malign jester? (shrink)

Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity,” spanning both the 2013–2014 protests in Kyiv’s city center and the mass mobilization of grass-roots resistance against Russian aggression in 2014–2015 and thereafter, manifest new interpretations of ideas and philosophical concepts. In the first part of the article we unravel the meaning of the Ukrainian word hidnist – a moniker of the revolution whose significance remains underestimated. In the second part we situate Ukraine’s revolution within a broader context of “modernity” and suggest its individualist (...) foundation may be replaced by a form of “personalism” – an ethic that echoes that of Ukraine’s revolutionaries. In the third part of the article, we delve into the substance of the revolution’s agenda: its protagonists’ promise to build a non-hierarchical community of “fairness”. In the fourth and final section, the main argument of the article is summarized, namely: that the shift from individualism to personalism in social interaction and the transition from hierarchy to heterarchy in power relations, particularly with respect to institutionalizing “fairness,” embodied in the various structures and organizations formed during Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity, may have been reflective of more comprehensive trends in ideational change affecting European civilization. (shrink)

У статті розглядаються витоки та початок україно-російського конфлікту на сході України у 2014 р. Визначені умови виникнення цього протистояння, доведено провідну роль Росії як організатора та основного виконавця війни проти України. Указано на недостатню роль Заходу в протистоянні російській агресії.

The article offers to look at modern political processes through the prism of the participation of the religious factor in them. Considering the current Russian-Ukrainian war as a kind of trigger that launched global changes in the system of international relations, burying its previous bipolar model, the authors analyze the changes that have taken place in Ukraine, in its religious segment. Ukraine is turning from a little-known part of the world religious space into an active reformer of this space. (...) At a certain moment, it becomes the center of a global confrontation between three main religious points - Constantinople, Rome and Moscow, reformatting the usual Christian landscape of the world. The given quantitative and qualitative indicators of the presence of Ukraine as a religious entity in the European and world space demonstrate both its enrichment and problematic conflict. The war revealed latent inter-denominational confrontations in Ukraine and in the world. Such a powerful tool of ideological influence as religion/church is used by conflicting parties to justify and sanctify aggression and protect against it. The authors focus their attention on Ukrainian Orthodoxy, on its role in reformatting the religious space. Ukrainians put an end to the unlimited dominance of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ecumenical Orthodoxy, which affected other Christian communities. The absence of Ukraine in the geopolitical space, which lasted due to historical circumstances, has been overcome. Now it is subjectively present in the worldwide religious community and is there as an independent spiritual and organizational force that will only increase its potential. The former world security system has collapsed, and the old levers of restraining the aggressive and dangerous intentions of individual countries do not work. So, it is suggested to think about new forms of geopolitical coexistence. In the constructive solution of controversial issues, the human community must accumulate the efforts of all possible participators of the democratic alliance, including such a powerful religion, which over the millennia of its spiritual and practical activity has developed its own specific methods of peacemaking. (shrink)

Ukraine's war of self-defense against Russia is one of the clearest examples of a nation fighting a just war in recent history. Ukraine is clearly entitled to defend itself, and Russia is clearly obligated to cease hostilities, withdraw troops, and make repair. In light of this, some of the most salient moral questions related to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine involve the international community; namely, what moral duties it has toward Ukraine, especially in light of Russia's extreme and (...) pervasive human rights abuses. The first section of the essay argues that there is a pro tanto moral duty to intervene militarily in Ukraine to stop Russian human rights abuses and ensure that Ukraine achieves a military victory. This duty is grounded in duties of rescue, promissory obligations, and reliance obligations, as well as duties to nations’ own citizens and to the international community. The second section of the essay argues that the most relevant consideration in determining whether there is an all-things-considered duty for the international community to intervene militarily in Ukraine is Russia's nuclear coercion and the associated risk of nuclear war. This section highlights the nuclear risks involved in compliance with Russian nuclear coercion, which I argue have been neglected in prominent discussions. The moral stakes involved in this determination are very high, and succumbing to Russian nuclear coercion in the face of massive human rights violations would set a dangerous precedent. Any course of action should be guided by a thorough analysis of all the risks involved, both nuclear and moral. (shrink)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was met with condemnation from the European Union and the United States as an "unprovoked and unjustified military aggression" that undermines the liberal international order. However, some international relations scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that Russia had genuine security concerns with regard to Ukraine and that the invasion was a response to the threat of NATO membership for Ukraine. Both liberal and realist perspectives on the invasion rely on the assumption (...) of rational, cost-benefit calculations by actors, but cultural factors and irreconcilable non-material interests may also be at play in shaping the actions and motivations of states. Understanding the cultural and national identity factors at play in the invasion of Ukraine is complex and difficult, but they cannot be ignored in attempting to understand and address the conflict. (shrink)

The aggressive foreign policy of the Soviet Union and insufficient dynamic development of Soviet culture of the late 70's of XX century led to a slowdown in the British-Soviet cultural relations, including the prohibition of exchange visits between Ministers of Culture of both countries and bilateral tours of theatre, ballet and opera groups. In order to otrengthen cultural relations between the UK and the Soviet Union, the leadership of both countries established centers of cultural developments like the British Association "Great (...) Britain - USSR" and the Soviet Society "USSR - United Kingdom ". Top priority areas of bilateral relations between the leadership of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were literary industry which included publishing scientific literature, expansion of book exchange between Soviet and British libraries, exhibitions of works of literature, such as the exhibition of the works of British authors, published on the territory of the Soviet Union in 1984; theatrical sphere, which included exchange visits of the UK and the USSR theater personalities to study the trends of Performing Arts and review of countries' repertoire; contacts in the field of historical sciences by creating among States bilateral commission of historians of the USSR and the UK; research work done by Soviet specialists in the territorial waters of the United Kingdom with the permission of the British government; cooperation in the field of cinema presented directors and actors exchange visits of both countries carrying out the Soviet television Week in 1984 in the National theater of Great Britain; and constructive cooperation in the field of music, which demonstrated the International Music Festival in May 1981 in Moscow and performances of the Moscow Philharmonic, "Music of Russian rites and festivals" and "Tradition of ancient Russian music" in the early 1980's in UK. British-soviet system of contacts in the sphere of culture was a tool for establishing successful diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. (shrink)

У статті досліджується аксіологічне значення діяльності традиційних українських церков у контексті сучасних геополітичних та соціальних викликів, зокрема в умовах російської агресії, та їх роль у зміцненні суспільної єдності й духовної стійкості. Розглянуто, як українські церкви реагують на виклики війни, зокрема питання збереження морального авторитету релігійних інституцій, протидії ідеям секуляризації та інформаційним маніпуляціям, пов’язаним із суперечливими заявами релігійних лідерів. Особливу увагу приділено дипломатичній позиції Ватикану, яка викликає неоднозначне сприйняття в українському суспільстві. Метою дослідження є аналіз діяльності українських церков як активних суб’єктів (...) соціального служіння, їх внеску в підтримку внутрішньо переміщених осіб, протидію релігійним переслідуванням і адвокації на міжнародній арені. Також досліджується роль Всеукраїнської Ради Церков і релігійних організацій у приверненні уваги до гуманітарних викликів в Україні. У статті підкреслено ключову роль християнських церков (ПЦУ, РКЦ в Україні, УГКЦ) у соціально-політичному житті країни та просуванні принципів справедливого миру. Проаналізовано суспільні реакції на заяви папи Франциска, які впливають на імідж Ватикану, а також труднощі українських релігійних лідерів у поєднанні пояснення позиції Апостольського Престолу з підтримкою національного спротиву. Акцентовано на важливості протидії інформаційним маніпуляціям і на значенні збереження релігійної ідентичності в умовах війни. (shrink)

The paper looks into the phenomenon of criticism of the Russian World concept in contemporary Ukrainian religious, political and social discourses. It is shown that the propagandistic ideological narrative model, developed according to numerous historical analogs, is becoming a subject of critical analysis by specialists in many scientific areas. Experts' views coincide in many respects but there are also different stances on some disputable issues. The historical aspiration of Russia for domination and substantiation of its unique nature is considered (...) the root of the concept. This explains the use of such narrative constructs as "Moscow is the third Rome", "specific civilization" etc. Based on evidence of competent authorities, the author proves that the concept was most likely developed by a group of leading Russian ideologists in the late 20th century. It acquired the modern conservative and nationalist form only after it had become an object of interest of Russian clerical circles and started spreading through church resources. The symbolic figure in this respect is the current Moscow Patriarch Kyrylo who has been an active promoter of the Russian World concept from the early 21st century. After he had been voted into the Patriarch office, Kyrylo turned the Russian World into the leading church and political narrative. The wide use of the concept for political purposes was consistently criticized for undisguised militarism, aggressive and nationalistic ideas underpinning the Russian World. According to numerous experts, these ideas have no common root with Christianity, sometimes being in open contradiction with the latter. Critical studies also indicate that the basis of the Russian World is the belief that the Russian culture and language are culturally superior to historical achievements of numerous other peoples, including the Ukrainians. As historical experience shows, the use of such ideological concepts as the Russian World results in consolidation of society around one national idea and expansion of aggressive state policy to neighboring countries. (shrink)

He is the author, among other books, of The Politics of Assimilation: French Jews at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair, Vichy France and the Jews (with Robert Paxton), The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, The Holocaust in History, Mr. [...] I am grate- ful as well to the Ford Foundation, which supported a series of seminars on the subject of apologies I organized at the Munk Centre for International Studies of the University of Toronto during the academic (...) year 2004-2005, and to the two anonymous reviewers. [...] Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice Thus, despite requests to do so, Soviet and later Russian leaders have never apologized for the massacre of thousands of Polish officers in the forest of Katyn in 1940; the Israelis refused the invitation of Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in 1968 to apologize for their "aggression" the year before; American historian Eugene Genovese f [...] The apologies considered here are for wrongs that are historic in two 15 respects: first, through the gravity of the wrongdoing in the conscious- ness of the victims and their successors; and second, through the wrongdoing having occurred in the historical past, often the distant past, usually considered out of reach of criminal proceedings or other conventional modes of dispute resolution. [...] Because of the historic nature of the grievances, there is an element of the extraordinary in the acknowledgement of the wrong committed, the acceptance of responsibility, the expression of remorse, and the commitment to set the matter to rest. (shrink)

The article deals with the little-studied but actual problem of loneliness of an outstanding creative personality as a consequence of stereotypical understanding of his works and activity. The cultural and philosophical meaning of Ivan Turgenev’s motif of loneliness is that he was a lone creator, recognized by Russian critics and historians of literature only in the context of the activities of other recognized great writers: Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov. The problem of loneliness is revealed through the paradoxical statement (...) by Turgenev on the question about strange loners and aggressive crowd. The paper presents the loneliness of I.S. Turgenev as a rejection of the understandable and normality among the non-understandable and weirdness. In Russian literatury critical and historico-cultural tradition, during the discussion of Russian classics, the general opinion has been formed: Turgenev is apparently non-Russian author, moreover he is not a classic writer indeed. (shrink)