'What exactly is knowledge?' The Theaetetus is a seminal text in the philosophy of knowledge, and is acknowledged as one of Plato's finest works. Cast as a conversation between Socrates and a clever but modest student, Theaetetus, it explores one of the key issues in philosophy: what is knowledge? Though no definite answer is reached, the discussion is penetrating and wide-ranging, covering the claims of perception to be knowledge, the theory that all is in motion, and the perennially (...) tempting idea that knowledge and truth are relative to different individuals or states. The inquirers go on to explore the connection between knowledge and true judgement, and the famous threefold definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Packed with subtle arguments, the dialogue is also a work of literary genius, with an unforgettable portrait of Socrates as a midwife of wisdom. This new edition uses the acclaimed translation by John McDowell. It includes a valuable introduction that locates the work in Plato's oeuvre, and explains some of the competing interpretations of its overall meaning. The notes elucidate Plato's arguments and draw connections within the work and with other philosophical discussions. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

David Sedley, Lesley Brown; Plato Theaetetus 145–147, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 229–242, https://doi.org/1.

ON ITS surface the Theaetetus ends inconclusively. It has even been said to end in failure. Yet this dialogue is exceptionally full of promise. The speakers are singularly well disposed. Two of them are gifted and resemble one another in looks and interests. Inquiry progresses splendidly through most of a long conversation. Although Theaetetus's first two definitions have to be given up, he is in the process led through a meticulous survey of cognition. These and other circumstances are (...) too auspicious for the termination of the dialogue to be taken at face value. The present essay is meant to disclose a partly hidden successful ending. The latter has to be discovered by readers. However the dialogue itself licenses and encourages active interpretation. The last ten pages of discourse contain so many specific clues that the text can be read as a single development ending in an affirmative conclusion. There is indeed a way to construe "true opinion with logos" so it applies to a cognition worthy of the name "epistémé.". (shrink)

After some years (or millennia) most works would no longer be considered eligible for "review." But an exception is called for, if the thrust of an older work is closely paralleled in a much more modern piece, as is the case between Plato's Theaetetus and Richard Rorty's acclaimed, and more recent volume, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. To fully understand and appreciate Rorty 's contribution to the subjects he raises, one must study his book in conjunction with Plato's (...) Theaetetus-where very similar issues have been discussed before. Both works concern a central question for philosophy: "What is knowledge?" The discussants in Plato's dialogue the Theaetetus, never do succeed in finding a satisfactory definition for knowledge, yet they at least realize to avoid thinking they know about the subject when, in fact, they lack that knowledge. Since Rorty explores some new (and not so new) ideas on these topics, Plato's discussants ask him a few questions. (Reprinted from original in Antioch Review). (shrink)

This is an English translation of Plato's dialogue concerning the nature of knowledge. In this dialogue, Socrates and Theaetetus discuss three definitions of knowledge: knowledge as nothing but perception, as true judgment and as true judgment with an account. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato’s immediate (...) audience. (shrink)

M. J. Levett's elegant translation of Plato's _Theaetetus_, first published in 1928, is here revised by Myles Burnyeat to reflect contemporary standards of accuracy while retaining the style, imagery, and idiomatic speech for which the Levett translation is unparalleled. Bernard William’s concise introduction, aimed at undergraduate students, illuminates the powerful argument of this complex dialogue, and illustrates its connections to contemporary metaphysical and epistemological concerns.

Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist are two of his most important dialogues, and are widely read and discussed by philosophers for what they reveal about his epistemology and particularly his accounts of belief and knowledge. Although they form part of a single Platonic project, these dialogues are not usually presented as a pair, as they are in Christopher Rowe's new and lively translation. Offering a high standard of accuracy and readability, the translation reveals the continuity between these dialogues and others (...) in the Platonic corpus, especially the Republic. The supporting introduction and notes help the reader to follow the arguments as they develop, explaining their structure, context and interpretation. This new edition challenges current scholarly approaches to Plato's work and will pave the way for fresh interpretations both of Theaetetus and Sophist and of Plato's writings in general. (shrink)

Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist are two of his most important dialogues, and are widely read and discussed by philosophers for what they reveal about his epistemology and particularly his accounts of belief and knowledge. Although they form part of a single Platonic project, these dialogues are not usually presented as a pair, as they are in this new and lively translation. Offering a high standard of accuracy and readability, the translation reveals the continuity between these dialogues and others in (...) the Platonic corpus, especially the Republic. Christopher Rowe's supporting introduction and notes help the reader to follow the arguments as they develop, explaining their structure, context and interpretation. This new edition challenges current scholarly approaches to Plato's work and will pave the way for fresh interpretations both of Theaetetus and Sophist and of Plato's writings in general. (shrink)

Timothy Chappell’s new translation of the Theaetetus is presented here in short sections of text, each preceded by a summary of the argument and followed by his philosophical commentary on it. Introductory remarks discuss Plato and his works, his use of dialogue, the structure of the Theaetetus, and alternative interpretations of the work as a whole. A glossary and bibliography are provided.

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The Theaetetus is a remarkably rich dialogue that raises any number of important epistemological questions, and it rewards careful study. By systematically and thoroughly examining the text and by exploring the issues Plato raises in terms of modern epistemic concerns, Platos Theaetetus adds anew and helpful perspective to the ever growing body of scholarship on this pivotal dialogue.-Ancient Philosophy.

This paper argues that the Theaetetus establishes conditions on objects of knowledge which entail that only of Forms can there be knowledge. Plato's arguments for this are valid. The principles needed to make Plato's premises true will turn out to have deep connection with important parts of Plato's over-all theory, and to have consequences which Plato, in the middle dialogues, seems to welcome on other grounds as well.

This paper is a test case for the claim, made famous by Myles Burnyeat, that the ancient Greeks did not recognize subjective truth or knowledge. After a brief discussion of the issue in Sextus Empiricus, I then turn to Plato's discussion of Protagorean views in the Theaetetus. In at least two passages, it seems that Plato attributes to Protagoras the view that our subjective experiences constitute truth and knowledge, without reference to any outside world of objects. I argue that (...) these passages have been misunderstood and that on the correct reading, they do not say anything about subjective knowledge. I then try out what I take to be the correct reading of the passages. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of causes in Greek epistemology. (shrink)

The Theaetetus's midwifery metaphor is well-known; less discussed is the brief passage accusing Socrates of behaving like Antaeus. Are philosophers midwives or monsters? Socrates accepts both characterizations. This passage and Socrates's acceptance of the metaphor creates a tension in the text, birthing a puzzle about how readers ought to understand the figure of the philosopher. Because metaphors play a pivotal role in the dialogue's ethical project, the puzzle presents not simply a textual tension but a question of how and (...) why to be a philosopher. (shrink)

The Theaetetus’s midwife metaphor contains a puzzling feature, often referred to as the “midwife paradox”: the physical midwives must have first given birth to their own children in order to have the necessary experience to practice their art. Socrates, however, seems to disavow having any children of his own and thus appears to be unqualified to practice philosophical midwifery. In this paper, I aim to dissolve the midwife paradox by arguing that it rests on problematic assumptions, namely, that Socrates (...) never gave birth to a child at all or the child of wisdom in particular, and that he is primarily an intellectual midwife. I offer a new interpretation of Socratic midwifery, arguing that what Socrates may have birthed in the past which qualifies him for midwifery is his virtuous recognition of his ignorance, and that this “epistemic virtue” is also the proximate goal of Socratic midwifery. (shrink)

Theaetetus, asked what knowledge is, replies that geometry and the other mathematical disciplines are knowledge, and so are crafts like cobbling. Socrates points out that it does not help him to be told how many kinds of knowledge there are when his problem is to know what knowledge itself is, what it means to call geometry or a craft knowledge in the first place—he insists on the generality of his question in the way he often does when his interlocutor, (...) asked for a definition, cites instead cases of the concept to be defined. (shrink)

Two speeches in Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates' well-known description of himself as a midwife and the 'digression' in the middle of the dialogue, wherein Socrates contrasts the philosopher and the public orator, have apologetic dimensions; they are, in part, attempts by Socrates to account for, and hence correct, his and the philosopher's undeserved public reputation. A careful reading of these passages in their dramatic contexts as philosophical apologies reveals interesting parallels to the Apology, insights into some of the major themes (...) of the Theaetetus, and a fuller appreciation of Socratic philosophy as portrayed in Plato's dialogues. (shrink)

In the Theaetetus, Plato looks afresh at a problem to which, he now realizes, he had earlier given an inadequate answer: the problem of the nature of knowledge. What Plato has to say on this question is of great interest and importance, not only to scholars of Plato, but also to philosophers with wholly contemporary interests. This book is a sustained philosophical analysis and critique of the Theaetetus. David Bostock provides a detailed examination of Plato's arguments and the (...) issues that they raise. He adjudicates on rival interpretations of the text, and looks at the relations between this and other works of Plato. The book does not presuppose any knowledge of Greek. (shrink)

Section 1 contrasts the approaches to Plato of F.M.Cornford and Gilbert Ryle, two of the early twentieth century’s leading Plato interpreters. Then I trace and evaluate attempts to discern in Plato’s Theaetetus a recognition of the role of the proposition. Section 2 focuses on the hunting of the proposition in Socrates’ Dream in the Theaetetus. Ryle, inspired by Logical Atomism, argued that Plato there anticipated an insight about the difference between names and propositions that Russell credited to Wittgenstein. (...) I rehearse difficulties for understanding the logos of the Dream as a proposition, preferring a reading of logos there as something like definition: a reading Wittgenstein also adumbrated. Section 3 examines attempts by writers such as Burnyeat and Kahn to find Plato allocating a starring role to the proposition in the argument at Theaetetus 185–6: perception, since it cannot grasp being, cannot grasp truth and hence cannot be knowledge. On their reading a grasp of being is understood as a grasp of something propositional. Problems for the propositional reading include Socrates’ talk of grasping ‘the truth of something’ (alētheia tinos), and the way the dialogue develops after 186. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the dialogues between 'Protagoras', Theodorus and Socrates in "Theaetetus" 161-171 and emphasise the importance for this passage of a dilemma which refutation is shown to pose for relativism at 161e-162a. I argue that the two speeches delivered on Protagoras' behalf contain material that is deeply Socratic and suggest that this feature of the speeches should be interpreted as part of Plato's philosophical case against relativism, reflecting the relativist's own inability to defend his theory from (...) attempts to refute it. I then discuss Theodorus' role in the refutation of Protagoras and argue that his voice is needed to get relativism disproved in the self-refutation argument of 171a-c. I conclude with a brief discussion of the image of Protagoras at 171d. (shrink)

The Theaetetus is one of the most widely studied of any of the Platonic dialogues because its dominant theme concerns the significant philosophical question, what is knowledge? In this book Paul Stern provides a full-length treatment of its political character in relationship to this dominant theme. He argues that this approach sheds significant light on the distinctiveness of the Socratic way of life, with respect to both its initial justification and its ultimate character. More specifically, he argues that Socrates' (...) revolutionary decision to subject political life to philosophic reflection, the decision that leads directly to his trial and execution, is based on his awareness of the elusiveness of comprehensive knowledge and the implications of that elusiveness for the validity of philosophic inquiry. This view of Socrates' rationale has important consequences for our understanding of political philosophy and of the validity of the life of reason itself. (shrink)

This essay reinterprets Berkeley’s idealism as partially motivated by a need to overcome the Agrippan mode of relativity pressed by Pyrrhonists. It compares Berkeley’s solution to that of Protagoras as presented in Plato’s Theaetetus, and argues that Berkeley needed to depend on reason — intuition or demonstration — to avoid skepticism. In this interpretation, Berkeley is closer to the rationalist tradition than usually recognized.

Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate "cognition according to the definition and through the elements," and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is επιστημη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for επιστημη and the ways (...) that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius' reading of "Socrates' Dream," its place in the Theaetetus ' larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. (shrink)

I compare the two main readings of the argument against Protagorean relativism that 'Socrates' presents at Theaetetus 170-171, argue against both of them, and present a third alternative reading.

For Plato, the crucial function of human cognition is to grasp truths. Explaining how we are able to do this is fundamental to understanding our cognitive powers. Plato addresses this topic from several different angles. In the Cratylus and Theaetetus, he attempts to identify the elemental cognitions that are the foundations of language and knowledge. He considers several candidates for this role, most notably, perception and simple meaning-bearing concepts. In the first section, we will look at Plato’s worries about (...) semantic instability and its epistemic consequences. The central role of basic cognitions in Plato’s account of knowledge in the Theaetetus will be explored in the second section. In the final section, the relevance of Plato’s conception of cognition to modern discussions in the philosophy of language and epistemology will be noted. (shrink)

Three dialogues introducing the mathematical way of treating desire and belief, that is to say, the theory of probability interpreted as degree of belief, and decision theory in the way that Ramsey envisioned it being developed. Suitable as a textbook.

Originally published in 1990. This book discusses in a philosophically responsible and illuminating way the progress of the dialogue and its separate sections to improve our understanding of Plato’s work on Theaetetus. An early coverage of this dialogue, this investigation predated a surge in study of Plato’s piece which examined Socratic and pre-Socratic thought. The author’s argument is that the _Theaetetus_ engages in re-evaluation of earlier doctrines of middle-period Platonism as well as reaffirming theories about knowledge. An important work (...) in Platonic studies and epistemology. (shrink)

I argue that Plato's purpose in the discussion of false belief in the "Theaetetus" is to entertain and then to reject the idea that thinking is a kind of mental grasping. The interpretation allows us to make good sense of Plato's discussion of 'other-judging' (189c-190e), of his remarks about mathematical error (195d-196c), and most importantly, of the initial statement of the puzzle about falsity (188a-c). That puzzle shows that if we insist on conceiving of the relation between thought and (...) its objects on the model of holding or grasping something in our hands, we will be unable to account for the possibility of false identity judgments: For no one who is literally grasping two things in his hands would seriously entertain the idea that one of the things is numerically identical with the other. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of Plato's Theaetetus . I argue that the Theaetetus is fundamentally an extended reductio of a radical materialist view---the view that the only things that there are perceptible, material particulars with no properties or relations. Based on evidence from the Sophist---the sequel dialogue to the Theaetetus---I show that, according to Plato, this radical materialism results from ignoring the intelligible Forms and the participation of things in them. The radical materialist ontology also implies (...) a certain view of judgments and statements, essentially the view that judging or stating is naming or identifying the thing that is judged or stated. ;I read the discussion of the thesis that knowledge is true judgment in the second part of the Theaetetus as, first illustrating difficulties that the radical materialist view gives rise to in explaining the possibility of false judgment, but then indicating how false judgment can occur on that view, only to show that the radical materialist cannot give an account of simple arithmetical mistakes on his assumptions. ;The third part of Theaetetus, dealing with the thesis that knowledge is true judgment with an account, concentrates on the implications of radical materialism for the unity and complexity of objects; the radical materialist cannot give an account of how there can be a whole with parts. He also cannot explain the possibility of systematic knowledge and expertise in a field, such as arithmetic or grammar, because of his commitment to the particularity of what there is, and therefore, of what is known. (shrink)

The Theaetetus’ ‘secret doctrine’ and the Sophist ’s ‘battle between gods and giants’ have long fascinated Plato scholars. I show that the passages systematically parallel one another. Each presents two substantive positions that are advanced on behalf of two separate parties, related to one another by their comparative sophistication or refinement. Further, those parties and their respective positions are characterized in substantially similar terms. On the basis of these sustained parallels, I argue that the two passages should be read (...) together, with each informing and constraining an interpretation of the other. (shrink)

This famous passage has given rise to much discussion and some perplexity. Theodoras the mathematician is represented by Theaetetus as proving the irrationality of the square roots of the numbers from 3 to 17: ‘He took the separate cases up to the root of 17 square feet; and there, for some reason, he stopped.’ The passage is of great importance in the history of Greek mathematics for more than one reason. Theaetetus is said to have generalized the proof (...) of the irrationality of square roots of non-square integers; and thus his connexion with this passage is important because Plato here obviously implies that Theodorus was not giving a generalized proof—otherwise, why should he go up to 17 ? If Theodorus did not know the generalized proof, he clearly had to proceed by enumeration and proof of particular case. (shrink)

Most scholars agree that Plato’s concept of freedom, to the extent he has one, is ‘intellectualist’: true freedom is submission to the rule of reason through philosophical knowledge of rational order. Surprisingly, though, there are few explicit linkages of philosophy and freedom in Plato. Socrates is called many things in the dialogues, but not ‘free’. I aim to understand why by studying the Theaetetus, heretofore ignored in discussions of Platonic freedom. By examining the Digression and Socrates’ ‘dream’ about wholes (...) and parts, I show that describing freedom as ‘rule of reason’ simplifies what, for Plato, is a more tangled skein. In the Digression, philosophers are free in occupying a comprehensive standpoint transcending all limited and partial perspectives. Socrates’ dream, however, shows that logos cannot completely account for the knowledge of complex wholes or for itself as such a whole. Philosophical freedom cannot mean comprehensive discursive knowledge, then, since reason lacks a comprehensive grasp of itself. Socrates dreams of the rational whole, but is aware of why it remains only a dream, rather than wakeful knowledge. This awareness constitutes a freedom attained, not in total liberation from the confines of the partial human perspective, but within those confines. (shrink)

Plato's Theaetetus investigates the nature of knowledge. Socrates converses with two mathematicians, Theaetetus and Theodorus, who cannot arrive at the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. Theaetetus offers three definitions, none of which can withstand scrutiny. Most commentators on the Theaetetus examine the arguments put forward and, by constructing a definition of knowledge, attempt to complete what Plato began. But analysis of the various definitions offered is incomplete as an investigation of the dialogue. ;Before Socrates elicits (...) from Theaetetus the first definition of knowledge as perception, he characterizes himself as a midwife. And before readers are introduced to Socrates, we encounter Euclides as the alleged "author" of the dialogue. It is incumbent upon the reader to notice all the elements that Plato offers and to examine whether the dramatic setting of the arguments sheds light on their outcome. The inner frame of the dialogue reveals that the nature of Theaetetus's soul is under investigation as much as the nature of knowledge. The nature of writing and memory, discussed in the outer frame, are incorporated in the second definition of knowledge as opinion, and in the third definition as true opinion with logos. Logos is the unifying principle of the dialogue, in that Socrates' dissection of the three meanings of logos recapitulates the three definitions of knowledge. ;A rigorous reading, incorporating both the action and the speeches of the dialogue, shows that the Theaetetus exhibits the essential ingredients of knowledge. The lengthy examination of perception shows it as model for knowledge, in that an account is needed of both the knower and the known, before a complete definition is possible. Thus the Theaetetus is a guide on the way to knowledge. By the end we have a thorough understanding of both the need for a structure of soul and for the structure of that which is to be known, as well as the tool, logos, which would enable us to put the two together in a definition of knowledge. (shrink)

Plato's Theaetetus is an acknowledged masterpiece, and among the most influential texts in the history of epistemology. Since antiquity it has been debated whether this dialogue was written by Plato to support his familiar metaphysical doctrines, or represents a self-distancing from these. David Sedley's book offers a via media, founded on a radical separation of the author, Plato, from his main speaker, Socrates. The dialogue, it is argued, is addressed to readers familiar with Plato's mature doctrines, and sets out (...) to show how these doctrines, far from being an abandonment of his Socratic heritage, are its natural outcome. The Socrates portrayed here is the same Socrates as already portrayed in Plato's early dialogues. While not a Platonist, he is exhibited - to put it in terms of an image made famous by this dialogue - as having been Platonism's midwife. In a comprehensive rereading of the text, Sedley tracks the ways in which Socrates is shown unwittingly preparing the ground for Plato's mature doctrines, and reinterprets the dialogue's individual arguments from this perspective. The book is addressed to all readers interested in Plato, and does not require knowledge of Greek. (shrink)

_Theaetetus_, the _Sophist_, and the _Statesman_ are a trilogy of Platonic dialogues that show Socrates formulating his conception of philosophy as he prepares the defense for his trial. Originally published together as _The Being of the Beautiful_, these translations can be read separately or as a trilogy. Each includes an introduction, extensive notes, and comprehensive commentary that examines the trilogy's motifs and relationships. "Seth Benardete is one of the very few contemporary classicists who combine the highest philological competence with a (...) subtlety and taste that approximate that of the ancients. At the same time, he as set himself the entirely modern hermeneutical task of uncovering what the ancients preferred to keep veiled, of making explicit what they indicated, and hence...of showing the naked ugliness of artificial beauty."—Stanley Rose, _Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal_ Seth Benardete was professor of classics at New York University. He was the author or translator of many books, most recently _The Argument of the Action, Plato's "Laws," and Plato's "Symposium,"_ all published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)