This paper explores the relationship between the principle of academic freedom and religiously-affiliated higher education. The arguments advanced are based on a general theory concerning the role of universities in a democratic society, and as such they are intended to apply to any such society, irrespective of the particulars of religious higher education in a specific national context. The article looks at three classes of arguments advanced against a “secular” standard of academic freedom: arguments on the (...) nature of academic disciplines in religious colleges; arguments concerning the relationship between the institutional mission of religious universities and academic freedom; and arguments from democracy and religious freedom. The paper concludes that none of these arguments are successful in claiming a different standard of academic freedom for religiously-affiliated universities; and that, further, a “secular” standard leaves such institutions adequate room to express their religious dimension. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Conceptions of Academic Freedom Tenure and Institutional Neutrality Academic Freedom and Codes Prohibiting Hate Speech Critical Inquiry and Its Critics Concluding Comments.

There is a tension between the preservation of academic freedom and the economic context in which the university currently finds itself. This tension embodies serious threats to global health as a result of three overlapping phenomena which impede the production and diffusion of valuable knowledge about health. These phenomena, the privatisation, commercialisation and instrumentalisation of knowledge are identified and examined in this paper in relation to human rights and international morality.

Academic freedom can be defined as immunity against adverse reactions from the general public, designed to keep scholars unintimidated and productive even after they have published controversial ideas. Francesca Minerva claims that this notion of strict instrumental academic freedom is supported by Ronald Dworkin, and that anonymity would effectively defend the sphere of immunity implied by it. Against this, I argue that the idea defended by Minerva finds no support in the work by Dworkin referred to; (...) that anonymity would not in most cases effectively protect the kind of immunity sought after; and that in some cases it would not even be desirable to protect scholars from public reactions to their controversial claims. (shrink)

The belief that we are living in a post-truth age raises a number of complex, paradoxical questions. Does it suggest, for example, that truth no longer matters? Or, that the idea of truth no longer exists? The university, of course, has long been associated with the interests of truth – not only in searching for truth, but in telling the truth. This is made evident in its emphasis on logic, rationality, deliberation, debate, reason, contemplation, reflection and academic freedom. (...) Truth, and its ensuing perspectives, perceptions, agreements and conflicts, are what makes a university what it is. As such, the university is as enmeshed in versions of truth, as it is in versions of power – which serves only to confirm the necessity for a continuous interrogation of these truths, and hence, power. In principle, academic freedom infers that both members of staff and students at universities have the right to engage in intellectual engagement and debate, without fear of censorship. In practice, however, when we take stock of academic freedom in spaces of higher education, we see growing patterns of shutting down, and closing off, rather than opening up. The interest of this article, therefore, is to consider how the university can remain discursively open to that which is new, unfamiliar and unpopular, while simultaneously, doing no harm – either to itself or its students. (shrink)

Recent events in the United Kingdom have focused attention on the protection at law of academic freedom. Institutional academic freedom may be defined as the freedom of a university to determine its scholarly agenda and system of governance, notwithstanding dependence on external support. Individual academic freedom may be similarly defined as the freedom of individual university members to determine their own scholarly agenda, including how to pursue and present their research, notwithstanding dependence (...) on institutional support. While such freedoms sit in tension, they share a basis in the liberal ideal of the pursuit of truth through teaching, discussion and scholarly research. (shrink)

Academic freedom is often regarded as an absolute value of higher education institutions. Traditionally, its value is related to such topics as tenure, and the need for academic work to be free from undue political influence and other pressures that can challenge time-consuming research processes. However, when an analysis of student freedom begins with arguments about free research and free speech, undergirded as they generally are by liberal political philosophy, other considerations, related to broader views of (...) freedom, can slip through the cracks. In this essay, I want to take a step back from typical discussions of academic freedom, to take a broader perspective, before considering how freedom relates to student experience. The first part of this essay explores diverse elaborations and defences of freedom: How it is upheld in the liberal philosophy of Kant, the critical pedagogy of Freire, existentialism, and the capabilities approach to development. Exploring the often contrasting insights and implications of these views, I then connect relevant theoretical understandings derived from them to an exploration of the experience of freedom and of students. This essay thus considers how student freedom, and student academic freedom, are more precarious concepts than typically assumed. (shrink)

Discussions about freedom of speech and academic freedom today are about the limits to those freedoms. However, these discussions take place mostly in the higher education trade press and do not receive any serious attention from academics and educationalists. In this paper several key arguments for limiting academic freedom are identified, examined and placed in an historical context. That contextualisation shows that with the disappearance of social and political struggles to extend freedom in society (...) there has come a narrowing of academic life and a new and impoverished concept of 'academic freedom' for a diminished idea of the human subject, of humanity and of human potential. (shrink)

Universities can and have existed without academic freedom and academic tenure. But academic freedom is necessary for a university dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in a democratic society. Both academic freedom and academic tenure are not only rights but also carry with them moral obligations. Furthermore academic tenure is the best defense of academic freedom that American universities have found. Academic tenure can be successfully defended from the (...) many contemporary attacks to which it is being subjected only insofar as it is necessary to defend academic freedom, and only if all involved in the system of tenure observe the ethical requirements that the system demands. (shrink)

Academic freedom does not refer to freedom to engage in any speech act, but to freedom to hold any belief and espouse it in an appropriately academic manner. This freedom belongs to certain institutions, rather than to individuals, because of their academic nature. Academic freedom should be absolute, regardless of any offence it may on occasion cause.

Sketched in somewhat general terms, there are two basic ways of going about teaching ethics: the moral indoctrination approach, which is essentially a rote learning exercise; and the moral engagement approach, which emphasizes listening to others in an open-minded manner and coming to carefully considered conclusions only after thoughtful reflection about differing views concerning matters of controversy. For reasons both practical and philosophical, the second approach, which emphasizes the development of critical thinking skills, is vastly preferable. If the moral engagement (...) approach is to work, however, it is essential that academic freedom for students in the classroom be ensured, for developing critical thinking skills is not possible if there is not freedom to think.The professor has the primary responsibility for maintaining a classroom environment in which students are comfortable giving expression to their views and for assisting students in the development of their critical thinking skills. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Intellectual leadership indicates the informal leadership of professors based on aspects such as knowledge production and dissemination, institutional services, and public engagement. Academic freedom is considered as the overarching condition for individual academics to develop intellectual leadership. Against the backdrop of internationalisation and globalisation of higher education, academics face enormous pressures to produce measurable research outputs, deliver high-quality teaching and meet all kinds of institutional requirements. In modern universities, women scholars, as the non-traditional participants in academia, must tackle (...) with multiple obstacles and bias brought by gender intertwined with academic discipline features, higher education institutions, and sociocultural characteristics. How do women professors protect, negotiate, or strive for academic freedom? Situated in higher education in Hong Kong, this article aims to explore how epistemological norms, institutional management, and gender influence women scholars’ academic freedom. The author has analysed how sixteen established women professors in humanities and social sciences (HSS) augmented freedom using the cumulative advantage theory. The study finds that women scholars in different sub-groups within HSS had mixed views about freedom and developed diverse patterns to seek freedom for intellectual leadership. (shrink)

I argue that Azerbaijani universities are a façade masking an ulterior motive. I examine the difficult relationship between authoritarian power and the university in Azerbaijan through the study of coercive policies put in place by university administrators preventing free thought and hampering the freedom of academics. My central thesis is that the university is a place where researchers should be able to teach and conduct their research freely, without any hindrance from their administrators. However, in authoritarian countries, such as (...) Azerbaijan, academic freedom suffers from regular interference and restrictions on the part of those administrators who, arguably due to the nature of the regime, assume that academics are not supposed to criticize the society, politics or universities in which they work. These administrators, who are often academics themselves, mistakenly believe that university priorities should be at the service of the regime at the expense of knowledge. I submit that the rigid discipline of Azerbaijani universities and the unfree relationship between high-ranking administrators and scholars – a relationship based on the domination of the former over the latter – do not only stymie academic discussions and development, but also squelch the liberty and creativity of scholars. (shrink)

The fact that a right is unlikely to be exercised by most members of a group does not mean it has lost its social and justice-defending utility. Current attitudes can be revealed by a questionnaire, but the value of a tradition must be assessed in the light of history. Historically, academic freedom and tenure are inseparable and mutually reinforcing. (Published Online February 8 2007).

I argue that Azerbaijani universities are a façade masking an ulterior motive. I examine the difficult relationship between authoritarian power and the university in Azerbaijan through the study of coercive policies put in place by university administrators preventing free thought and hampering the freedom of academics. My central thesis is that the university is a place where researchers should be able to teach and conduct their research freely, without any hindrance from their administrators. However, in authoritarian countries, such as (...) Azerbaijan, academic freedom suffers from regular interference and restrictions on the part of those administrators who, arguably due to the nature of the regime, assume that academics are not supposed to criticize the society, politics or universities in which they work. These administrators, who are often academics themselves, mistakenly believe that university priorities should be at the service of the regime at the expense of knowledge. I submit that the rigid discipline of Azerbaijani universities and the unfree relationship between high-ranking administrators and scholars – a relationship based on the domination of the former over the latter – do not only stymie academic discussions and development, but also squelch the liberty and creativity of scholars. (shrink)

The standard view of academic freedom and free speech is that they play complementary roles in universities. Academic freedom protects academic discourse, while other public discourse in universities is protected by free speech. Here I challenge this view, broadly, on the grounds that free speech in universities sometimes undermines academic practices. One defense of the standard view, in the face of this worry, says that campus free speech actually furthers the university’s academic aims. (...) Another says that universities have a secondary democratic function, which cannot be fulfilled without free speech on campus. I identify shortcomings in both types of arguments. (shrink)

Academic freedom is an important good, but it comes with several responsibilities. In this commentary we seek to do two things. First, we argue against Francesca Minerva's view of academic freedom as presented in her article ‘New threats to academic freedom’ on a number of grounds. We reject the nature of the absolutist moral claim to free speech for academics implicit in the article; we reject the elitist role for academics as truth-seekers explicit in (...) her view; and we reject a possible more moderate re-construction of her view based on the harm/offence distinction. Second, we identify some of the responsibilities of applied ethicists, and illustrate how they recommend against allowing for anonymous publication of research. Such a proposal points to the wider perils of a public discourse which eschews the calm and careful discussion of ideas. (shrink)

This paper describes a global pattern of declining academic freedom, often driven by powerful political interference with core functions of academic communities. It argues that countering threats to academic freedom requires doubling down on ethics, specifically standards of justice and fairness in pursuing knowledge and assigning warrant to beliefs. Using the example of the selection of a Qatari university to host the 2024 World Congress of Bioethics, the authors urge fairness towards diverse groups over time (...) and efforts to counter injustices that conferences generate. (shrink)

Academic freedom is seriously under threat. Here I will consider how the marketisation of Higher Education has exacerbated the decline of ‘academic freedom’. While the effects of a ‘cancel culture’ on university provision are difficult to ignore, threats to academic freedom raise a number of questions, such as: ‘who is allowed to speak on campus?’, ‘to whom?’, and ‘about what?’. These questions are fundamental to the academic profession, and therefore have clear implications for (...) teaching and learning in Higher Education. Through an analysis of Netflix’s The Chair (2021), and drawing on the works of Martin Buber, I argue that academics’ freedom to teach is implicitly constrained by student-consumer desires, and in turn this reduces the space for genuine dialogue on university campuses. Rather than closing down debate and the discussion of ‘controversial’ topics, universities instead need to cultivate a climate of trust, openness, and reciprocity on campuses, such that genuine staff-student dialogue can flourish. University campuses are precisely the places where academics should be able to engage in scholarly debate on matters of importance – where students may be exposed to radically different viewpoints and perspectives – and film and TV series can be used to initiate such conversations. (shrink)

Academic freedom and tenure, both cherished institutions of higher education, are currently under attack by many both outside and within the academy. Richard DeGeorge argues that they can be defended on ethical grounds only if they are joined with appropriate accountability, publicly articulated and defended standards, and conscientious enforcement of these standards by academic institutions and the members of the academic community.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 619-630, May 2022. This article deals with the question of how academic freedom can be conceptualized and justified. First, I analyze two conceptions of academic freedom: institutional autonomy and intellectual and professional autonomy. I claim that institutional autonomy is a limited way to conceptualize academic freedom because there is no guarantee that institutions always favor freedom of intellectuals. In line with this, I argue that (...) academic freedom as intellectual and professional autonomy should be the prior, if not the only, conception of academic freedom. Second, I examine critically different justifications of academic freedom that provide us with reasons to attach high protection to academic freedom as a particular right. I contend that the justification of the university as a realm of discovery of truth and independent knowledge production has to be complemented with the justifications of the university as a realm of democratic free debate and the autonomy of academics to speak freely. This is because, the discovery of truth argument alone does not require us to accept any moral principle other than skepticism about our own beliefs, which is not a strong ground for free speech on its own. Third, I argue that equal autonomy provides a good reason for academic freedom by emphasizing the rights of academics to speak in line with what they believe is true and only in this way can they contribute to the democratic debate in academia. This line of reasoning endorses the value of the search for truth and knowledge too since it is only possible for academics to perform the profession of search for truth when they are able to speak, write and research freely. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The tension between freedom of speech and academic freedom results from the contradiction between democracy and expertise, resulting in a rhetorical “gray zone” that stymies faculty appeals to due process and constitutional protection. It’s not so much that certain “uncivil” words and utterances cannot be said in this gray zone; it’s that such words, when said, require one’s ejection from the demos. In an examination of the case of Steven Salaita, I’ll show how the tyranny of (...) the demos, in the guise of “civility,” “community standards,” or “institutional values,” trumps academic freedom, and how the commonplace of democracy—understood as public opinion—can and does compel faculty silence. (shrink)

JOHNSTONE M‐J. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 107–115 [Epub ahead of print]Academic freedom and the obligation to ensure morally responsible scholarship in nursingAcademic freedom is generally regarded as being of critical importance to the development, improved understanding, and dissemination of new knowledge in a field. Although of obvious importance to the discipline of nursing, the nature, extent and value of academic freedom and the controversies surrounding it have rarely been considered in the nursing literature. It is (...) a key aim of this paper to redress this oversight by providing a brief examination of: (i) the principle of academic freedom; (ii) the distinction between academic freedom, freedom of speech, and the academic freedom to publish; (iii) the problem of ideological judgments being dressed up as scientific or discipline judgments to supports ‘bad’ conclusions; and (iv) the standards that might otherwise be appealed to for determining whether maverick manuscripts supporting morally abhorrent conclusions should be accepted for publication. It is suggested that the tenets of academic freedom require robust international debate, with due attention being given to such issues as the development of an international declaration on academic freedom to publish in nursing, how to ensure a robust rebuttal system in nursing journals to counter specious scholarship, and how to better promote the letters pages of nursing journals as a venue for facilitating debate on controversial issues. (shrink)

It is argued that university education has a moral and social function in society. Its purpose is to provide a liberal education , the development of new knowledge and the provision of trustworthy, disinterested research. To serve society in this way safeguards are necessary: a separation from the state, giving institutional autonomy and academic freedom in teaching and research. With the rise of extreme free market capitalism and the "knowledge society", these safeguards are being eroded: national governments, partly (...) through the ramifications of the Bologna convergence... process, are in the process of moulding universities to the needs of the market, and now see the accommodation of students to the workplace as the principal, or indeed only, objective for a university education. Example of the consequences of these changes are discussed, including the corruption of research integrity and erosion of individual liberties. (shrink)

Historically, academic freedom is a concept aimed at resolving conflicts about the relationship between power and knowledge, politics and truth, action and thought by positing a sharp distinction between them, a distinction that has been difficult to maintain. This paper analyzes those tensions by looking at early statements of the founders of the American Association of University Professors , by exploring the paradoxes of disciplinary authority which at once guarantees and limits professorial autonomy, and by examining several cases (...) in which the question of the meaning of academic responsibility was in dispute. It argues that because the tensions are not susceptible to final resolution, the principle of academic freedom must be preserved in order to mediate them. (shrink)

The legacy of totalitarianism thwarts discourse and practice of academic freedom in post-Soviet universities. For legacy-holders, “academic freedom” causes disorientation, irresponsibility, demoralization and inequity. They see more threats than benefits from empowering decision-makers who are non-compliant with local bureaucracy. For innovators, freedoms enhance flexibility and creativity. However, granting such freedom also reinforces value clashes on campuses and tends to intensify feelings of guilt and shame in regard to actions which show a disrespect of authority and (...) tradition. While both legacy-holders and innovators endeavour to redefine their practices and norms in their teaching, they appear to still struggle to shed their predispositions to a paternalistic and colonial philosophy of education. Presumably curative, their engagement with international networks of scholarship exposes their particular positions of vulnerabilities to that end. Both groups continue to push patriotism and cultural idiosyncrasy in order to hedge their power and status in the global marketplace of ideas. As in the past, a discourse of anti-westernization prevails, shoring up legacies of regulative thinking, indoctrination, and insularity. Progressive academics succeed primarily by taking bold steps to go above and beyond the dominant discourses and norms within their universities and policy-building communities. This article explicates why, in turn, a “surrogate academic freedom” tends to emerge as a conundrum across the post-Soviet higher education space. (shrink)

Reprint of an article published in the Journal of Philosophy of Education (2010) about the tension between a right to academic freedom and a responsibility to promote public goods, discussed largely in the African context.

Anthony O'Hear; Academic Freedom and the University, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 13–21, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

This paper explores the conceptual history of academic freedom and its emergence as a substantive right that pertains to either the academic or the university. It is suggested that historical reconceptualisations necessitated by contingent circumstance may have led to academic freedom being seen as a form of protection for those working within universities whose national legislation recognises the right to teach and research without external interference, rather than as a responsibility to the wider society or (...) to peers in other parts of the world, who do not enjoy the privilege of that right. I explore the value of academic freedom as both right and responsibility, particularly taking into consideration the ethical implications for both at the international level in higher education. (shrink)

There is a current debate about the extent to which Academic Freedom should be permitted in our universities. On the one hand, we have traditionalists who maintain that Academic Freedom should be unrestricted: people who have the appropriate qualifications and accomplishments should be allowed to develop theories about how the world is, or ought to be, as they see fit. On the other hand, we have post-traditional philosophers who argue against this degree of Academic (...) class='Hi'>Freedom. I consider a conservative version of post-traditional philosophy that permits restrictions on Academic Freedom only if the following conditions are met, Condition 1: The dissemination of the results of a given research project R must cause significant harm to some people, especially to people from oppressed groups. Condition 2: Condition 1 must possess strong empirical support, and which accepts the following assumptions: (1) there is a world of objective facts that is, in principle, discoverable, (2) rational means are the means of discovering it and, (3) rational means requires strong empirical support. I define strong empirical support for an hypothesis h on evidence e in probabilistic terms, as a ratio of posterior to prior probabilities substantially exceeding 1. I now argue in favour of a research policy that accepts unrestricted Academic Freedom. My argument is that there is a formal and general quandary that arises within the standard theory of probability when we apply this account of empirical support to a set of possible causal hypotheses framed in such a way that the “reverse probabilities”, pr(e/h) are 1. I consider various possible ways to escape this quandary, none of which are without difficulties, concluding that a research policy allowing for unrestricted Academic Freedom is probably the best that we can hope for. (shrink)

Recent years have seen growing concerns about threats to academic freedom in light of the changing norms of and demands on the university. This volume brings together contributions from leading philosophers about the latest issues - ranging from safe spaces to social media controversies - and traditional challenges for academic freedom.

Philosophical arguments regarding academic freedom can sometimes appear removed from the real conflicts playing out in contemporary universities. This paper focusses on a set of issues at the front line of these conflicts, namely, questions regarding sex, gender and gender identity. We document the ways in which the work of academics has been affected by political activism around these questions and, drawing on our respective disciplinary expertise as a sociologist and a philosopher, elucidate the costs of curtailing discussion (...) on fundamental demographic and conceptual categories. We discuss some philosophical work that addresses the conceptual distinction between academic freedom and free speech and explore how these notions are intertwined in significant ways in universities. Our discussion elucidates and emphasises the educational costs of curtailing academic freedom. (shrink)

Recently academic freedom and academic tenure have been in the media spotlight because of concerns that academic freedom is being misused and that academic tenure provides job security to a select few. First, this paper provides a brief history of these two institutions and follow with an analysis using Stone’s (2002) policy analysis format. Second, this paper examines the university through two lenses: (a) an economic market lens; and (b) a community lens. These two (...) lenses offer contrasting views of the university and help explain the different views of academic freedom and tenure. The authors suggest that faculty make use of the economic model to increase their chances of maintaining tenure in a university atmosphere frequently characterized by a business approach rather than a collegial one. Recommendations for future research are also provided. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This paper examines the compliance of universities in the European Union with the UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher–Education Teaching Personnel, which deals primarily with protection for academic freedom. The paper briefly surveys the European genesis of the modern research university and academic freedom, before evaluating compliance with the UNESCO recommendation on institutional autonomy, academic freedom, university governance and tenure. Following from this, the paper examines the reasons for the generally low level of (...) compliance with the UNESCO Recommendation within the EU states, and considers how such compliance could be improved. (shrink)

Anthony O'Hear; Academic Freedom and the University, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 13–21, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

ABSTRACT Academic freedom is typically understood as a means of protecting faculty rights against the violence—physical or intellectual—of the state or of the institution’s administration. This article argues that academic freedom may be seen as a form of violence, insofar as it is potentially threatening to the methodological and institutional stasis of colleges and universities.