This paper deals with the two notions of aition or aitia and prophasis in the Greek medical texts and asks the question of whether these words are synonymous or not. Therefore, it explores their different meanings in different contexts both in the Hippocratic and in the Galenic corpus. It also investigates how Galen understands these two notions when he reads them in the Hippocratic treatises and how he explains them in his commentaries to Hippocrates, and in particular, if he (...) gives the same meaning to these words in his own treatises or if he uses them in a different way. (shrink)

L’article analyse la fête béotienne des Daidala dont Pausanias a conservé le souvenir (IX, 2, 7–3, 8). Tant l’aition (introduit pour expliquer pourquoi l’Héra de Platées porte l’épithète de Nympheomene) que la description de la fête dans sa double forme de Petits et Grands Daidala présentent des aspects qui méritent l’attention. Le texte présente un scénario rituel assez complexe, probablement le fruit d’une longue stratification d’éléments d’origine diverse. La description de la fête que fournit Pausanias pose une série de (...) questions touchant au statut de l’image cultuelle, aux rites pré-matrimoniaux, à l’existence d’un cycle mythique d’Héra lié aux transformations physiologiques de la parthenos, à la signification politique de la fête pour les communautés béotiennes. (shrink)

The article argues that the famous story about the strike, exile and return of the Romanaulosplayers, which is recorded in the sixth book of Ovid'sFastiand referred to by other Latin and Greek sources, is based on a narrative model that already existed in Greece in the Archaic period. The study draws parallels between the tale of the pipers and the myth of the return of Hephaestus to Olympus, suggesting that, apart from similar plots, the two stories share many motifs, such (...) as references to themes derived from comedy and satyr drama. Searching for a possible channel of transmission of the story from Archaic Greece to Augustan Rome, the study explores the presence of satyric motifs in Etruscan vase-painting and Roman processional rites. It is furthermore emphasized that many of these motifs, which also appeared in lost satyr-plays, are echoed in Augustan poetry. (shrink)

This paper examines Plato's ideas on cause-effect relations in the "Phaedo." It maintains that he sees causes as things (not events, states of affairs or the like), with any information as to how that thing brings about the effect relegated to a strictly secondary status. This is argued to make good sense, so long as we recognise that aition means the "thing responsible" and exploit legal analogies in order to understand what this amounts to. Furthermore, provided that we do (...) not pre-suppose that we already know what can and what cannot count as a cause, Plato proves to have an attractive case for his principle that all causation is a matter of like causing like. Once we appreciate this, we are a little closer to understanding his more idiosyncratic principle, which although puzzling is ubiquitous in his writings and often invoked as a premise in key arguments, that opposites cannot cause opposites. The last part of the paper turns to formal causes, defending Plato's advocacy of them, and examining their role in the "Parmenides'" Third Man Argument. The main proposal is that Plato's conception of Forms as causes opens the door to a better version of that argument's "Non-identity" premise than those currently available. (shrink)

One of the most striking innovations in Aristotle’s philosophical writing is also one of its most characteristic features. That feature is Aristotle’s idea that terms central to philosophy, including ‘cause’ [aition], ‘good’, and even the verb ‘to be’, are, as he likes to put it, “said in many ways.” To be sure, philosophers before Aristotle give some evidence of having recognized the phenomenon of being said in many ways. Plato, in particular, suggests that things in this world that we (...) call “just” are only namesakes of the Just Itself. But, beyond that, homonymy seems to have been, even for Plato, no more than a source of ambiguity for wordplay. Aristotle is apparently the first philosopher to propose a taxonomy of homonymy and to view the identification and analysis of homonymies as a genuinely philosophical project. (shrink)

In courses in the twenties and early thirties, Heidegger argues that in Aristotle the question of the being of beings (ontology) and that of the unity of beings (theology) are distinct. Although he treated the two questions as part of one science, prôtē philosophía, Aristotle did not, in Heidegger's view, discuss the way in which these questions belong together. Being is determined theoretically as presence; and God, the first mover, is an aítion, an explanatory ground of motion in sensible ousía. (...) God is required as a ground for the presence of beings as a whole. Heidegger no longer seeks explanatory grounds, nor does he prioritize theory. Rather, he inquires into the essence of ground, and the poietical involvement of Dasein in understanding being. The unity of Aristotle's questions is found in a groundless ground: Dasein as transcendence. The metaphysical god is thus no longer required in Heidegger's phenomenology. (shrink)

AT POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 1.1.71B15 AND FOLLOWING, Aristotle identifies six characteristics of the first principles from which demonstrative science proceeds. These are traditionally grouped into two sets of three: group A: ex alêthôn, prôtôn, amêsôn; group B: gnôrimôterôn, proterôn, and aitiôn. The characteristic, which I believe has been underrated and somewhat misinterpreted by scholars and commentators from Philoponus to the present day, is the characteristic of truth. In this paper I propose to present a textually based interpretation of truth that shows (...) the following: that truth is necessarily linked to being. The example given of nonbeing, the commensurability of the diagonal with the sides of a square, suggests more than simple truth is required for first principles and premises of demonstrative science; and that Aristotle later in the APo changes this characteristic to necessary truth, for he recognizes that truth alone is an insufficient basis for scientific demonstration. The referents of necessary truth are eternal being, and the need for eternal being demands that universals exist extramentally for Aristotle. Finally, one of the important ways that universal genera and species exist for Aristotle are as real, causal principles. (shrink)

The importance of determining the exact origin of the trial of Orestes before the Areopagus at the end of Aeschylus's Eumenides has not been fully acknowledged by modern scholars. Through a close scrutiny of the surviving evidences concerning the genealogical book of Pherecydes, the aition of the Choes-festival and the roll of the Twelve Gods in the sphere of mythic history, this article suggests that there is no reason to accept the widespread belief that Aeschylus was the heir of (...) some pre-existent attic tradition. The trial of Orestes before the Athenian court turns out to be Aeschylus' own innovation, used by the poet to convey his new vision of justice. (shrink)

Myth and the spatial organization of the City: The case of Tanagra. How does Myth participate in the shaping of the different kinds of space constituing a city, whether it be in the definition of its eschatiai or in the determination of the many internal relations that link together its centre, its chora and its limits? I propose here a case study focussed on Pausanias’ description of Tanagra in Boiotia, locating the descriptive content of the text within its wider generic (...) logic. Pausanias’ panhellenic, if not “oikoumenic”, understanding of Myth is active in producing specific memorial topographies. In the case of Tanagra, the text reconstructs the space of the city from a selection of schematized epichoric traditions, outlining the ways in which local myths embody the city’s cohesion on the grounds of the diverse categories of space implied in the narratives. The discrepancies between what the myths are telling and the effective ritual practices call into question the partaking of Myth and Rite in the structuring of civic space.Comment le mythe contribue-t-il à organiser les espaces différenciés d’une cité, le statut de ses eschatia, les rapports entre centres, chora et limites ? L’œuvre de Pausa­nias, entre témoignage et logique périégétique, propose une certaine pratique du mythe, panhellénique sinon « oikouménique », qui produit des topographies mémorielles spécifi­ques. Elle reconstruit l’espace d’une petite cité béotienne, Tanagra, à partir de traditions épicho­riques dont elle schématise les structures, laissant transparaître les manières dont le mythe articule la relation entre la cité, ses dieux et son territoire, dont il définit les qualités des espaces qu’il met en jeu, montagne, littoral, remparts… Entre ce que « disent » les mythes – l’aition d’une fête par exemple – et ce qu’opère la pratique rituelle, des écarts se font jour qui obligent à interroger la part respective du mythe et du rite dans la structuration de l’espace. Cette étude de cas vise à montrer la valeur opératoire de la notion de mythe au sein des processus par lesquels une cité grecque, communauté d’hommes et de dieux liés par des rites, s’approprie symboliquement l’espace sur lequel elle est établie. (shrink)

Normal.dotm 0 0 1 444 2534 MM 21 5 3111 12.0 0 false 18 pt 18 pt 0 0 false false false Este artigo tem por objetivo abordar a teodiceia platônica, sintetizada pela célebre expressão theòs anaítios , à luz da gênese do mundo sensível descrito por Platão no Timeu . O significado desta expressão em Platão é claro: a responsabilidade pela escolha do gênero de vida e suas consequências é da alma ( psych é ), e não do deus. (...) Mas o que é a alma? Partiremos da definição clássica da alma em Platão como princípio de movimento e sede de conhecimento, mas não nos deteremos nela. Qual seria a origem da alma? Com base na cosmogênese relatada pelo Timeu , tentaremos evidenciar que a formação e a autonomia da alma humana são afetadas de forma determinante pelas condições demiúrgicas: pela existência de elementos alógicos pré-cósmicos, pela interferência na regularidade dos ciclos cósmicos da Alma do Mundo, pela atividade mimética dos deuses secundários e, principalmente, pela presença de um desígnio inteligente ( nous ) que atua teleologicamente. A leitura do Timeu, além de justificar cosmologicamente a questão da justiça divina em Platão, apresentará um admirável modelo ético baseado nas noções de ordem e proporção a orientar as escolhas humanas, reforçando o pressuposto platônico da inevitável responsabilidade que os seres humanos têm sobre seu destino. Palavras-chave: theòs anaítios , inteligência ( nous ), alma ( psych é ), causa/ responsabilidade (aítia/aition), proporção ( symmetría) ABSTRACT This article aims to approach platonic theodicy, synthesized by the renowed expression theòs anaítios , in light of the genesis of sensible world described by Plato in Timeu . The meaning of this expression in Plato is clear: it is soul's ( psych é ), not god's the responsibility to choose a kind of life and its consequences. But, what is this, the soul? We start with that classic definition of soul in Plato, as moving principle and site of knowledge, but will not stop in it. What would be soul's origins? Based upon cosmogony refered to in Timeu , we shall attempt to evidence that formation and autonomy of human soul are affected by, or determined by demiurgical conditions: by existence of alogic precosmic elements, by interference in the regularity of cosmic cycles of the World Soul, by mimetic activity of secondary gods; and, above all, by the presence of an intelligent design ( nous) which operates in a teleological manner. Timeu's reading, besides explaining by cosmology the question of divine justice in Plato, will present an admirable ethical prototype, based upon notions of order and proportion to guide human choices, reinvigorating the platonic presupposition of the unavoidable responsibility that human being has about his fate. Key-words: theòs anaítios , intelligence ( nous ), soul (psych é ), cause, responsibility (aitia, aition), proportion (symmetría). (shrink)

Aeneas' encounter with Deiphobus forms a critical juncture in Vergil's "Aeneid". In the underworld Aeneas retraces his past to its beginning; so too Vergil's audience returns to its starting point: the fall of Troy. Deiphobus himself is a metonym of Troy, embodying her guilt and punishment. But Aeneas is frustrated in his attempt to reconcile himself to this past. Aeneas attempts the Homeric rites of remembrance-heroic tumulus and epic fama-but these prove to be empty gestures. The aition of Deiphobus' (...) tomb is revealed to have miscarried. Rhoeteum was known as the tomb and shrine of Telamonian Ajax, not Deiphobus, and Octavian's recent restoration of the Rhoetean memorial would have strengthened the already close association between Rhoeteum and Ajax in the mind of Vergil's audience. Vergil exploits Rhoeteum's resonance with Telamonian Ajax and Odysseus, Antony and Octavian, to reflect on the process of constructing national memory, a process of which epic is an integral part. Vergil suggests that one hero's memorial frequently involves the appropriation and effacement of another. In a similar vein, the heroic fama of Deiphobus which Aeneas had heard in Troy is proven false. Deiphobus' narrative of his death is replete with Odyssean allusions which critique both Homeric heroism and Homeric kleos. Evocative allusions to Catullus' laments for his brother suggest eternal elegiac mourning as an alternate generic model for memorial and reconciliation with the past. But Aeneas is denied this option. At the center of the epic, at high noon, on a cosmic crossroads, Aeneas is poised between past and future, between mourning and hope, between Deiphobus and Deiphobe, between epic and elegiac. The Sibyl interrupts and moves Aeneas forward. Aeneas is not purged of his past, but rather denied the opportunity for true reconciliation, which is bestowed not by forgetting but by remembrance. (shrink)

The episode related by Herodotus (III 48) of the three hundred young Corcyreans saved from being castrated by the Samians is obviously the aition of a Samian festival in honour of Artemis. One has only to translate the elements of the account in terms of ritual to obtain a precise picture of this festival: altar robbery with fighting. A compari- son with Spartan flagellation at the altar of Artemis Orthia supports the initiatory cha- racter of this ritual, which was (...) equally modelled on a real practice, that of bomolochia. A more hypothetical explanation can be given for the presence in the aition of the Corcyreans, Corinthiens and Lydians. (shrink)

An interest in causation and explanation, as these concepts pertain to action, production and agency, is a characteristic of Hellenistic philosophy, and the Stoics are typical in this respect; a cause, or aition, for the Stoics, is something that actually does something. In this chapter, Hankinson discusses Stoic materialism with its distinction between Active and Passive principles, and discusses in detail the Stoic analysis of causation, which is conceived as corporeal and transmitted by contact. Hankinson shows that, while the (...) Stoics embrace determinism to a greater degree than any of their predecessors, they nevertheless retain a genuine possibility of human freedom of action, with emphasis upon the notion of Fate and responsibility. The Stoics’ thoroughly materialistic view of the world does not rule out the presence of intelligence; intelligence, or pneuma, is itself also a material substance, which is identical with God. (shrink)

In elegy 4.9, Propertius connects the story of Hercules' transvestism to some of Rome's most ancient and venerable sites: the Ara Maxima, the subject of the poem's aition, and the sanctuary of the Bona Dea, where the poem's action takes place. These locations resonate with Rome's traditional gender roles and with the Augustan urban renovation. This essay argues that Propertius' use of monuments in 4.9 responds to and challenges the Princeps' use of Roman places as a means to solidify (...) his position in the new Rome, thereby establishing the poet as the Princeps' rival in creating urban meaning. (shrink)

This article argues that Vitruvius’ description of Julius Caesar's ‘discovery’ of the larch (larix, De arch. 2.9.15–16), previously read as a journalistic account of the author's first-hand experience in Caesar's military entourage, should instead be interpreted as a highly crafted morality tale illustrating human progress thwarted. In the passage, the use of larch wood to construct a defensive tower renders the Alpine fortress at Larignum impregnable to assault by fire; only the fear aroused by siege provokes the inhabitants to surrender (...) to Caesar and his troops (2.9.15–16). Nevertheless, the outcome of this discovery is not a complete victory, because the logistics of importing this remarkable timber to Rome are as yet insurmountable (2.9.16). Once the siege of Larignum is recognized as a diptych to Vitruvius’ narrative of the origins of civilization, in which fire and wood likewise play essential roles (2.1.1–7), and compared with similar aitia and source histories across the De architectura, it becomes clear that Larignum and its resources emblematize obstacles to a Vitruvian conception of imperial success, in which the city of Rome catalogues and indexes architectural knowledge amassed throughout the empire. (shrink)