This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume's Principle and Basic Law V with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The main results of this (...) paper are: (i) there is a consistent extension of the hyperarithmetic fragment of Basic Law V which interprets the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, and (ii) the hyperarithmetic fragment of Hume's Principle does not interpret the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, so that in this specific sense there is no predicative version of Frege's Theorem. (shrink)

The following essay reconsiders the ontological and logical issues around Frege’s Basic Law (V). If focuses less on Russell’s Paradox, as most treatments of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA)1 do, but rather on the relation between Frege’s Basic Law (V) and Cantor’s Theorem (CT). So for the most part the inconsistency of Naïve Comprehension (in the context of standard Second Order Logic) will not concern us, but rather the ontological issues central to the conflict between (BLV) and (CT). (...) These ontological issues are interesting in their own right. And if and only if in case ontological considerations make a strong case for something like (BLV) we have to trouble us with inconsistency and paraconsistency. These ontological issues also lead to a renewed methodological reflection what to assume or recognize as an axiom. (shrink)

It is argued that Convention T and Basic Law V of Frege’s Grungesetze share three striking similarities. First, they are universal generalizations that are intuitively plausible because they have so many obvious instances. Second, both are false because they yield contradictions. Third, neither gives rise to a paradox.

Michael Dummett; Discussions: Chairman's Address: Basic Law V*, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 243–252, https:/.

The paper challenges a widely held interpretation of Frege's conception of logic on which the constituent clauses of basic law V have the same sense. I argue against this interpretation by first carefully looking at the development of Frege's thoughts in Grundlagen with respect to the status of abstraction principles. In doing so, I put forth a new interpretation of Grundlagen §64 and Frege's idea of ‘recarving of content’. I then argue that there is strong evidence in Grundgesetze that (...) Frege did not hold the relevant sense-identity claim regarding basic law V. (shrink)

Abstractionism in the philosophy of mathematics aims at deriving large fragments of mathematics by combining abstraction principles (i.e. the abstract objects $\S e_1, \S e_2$, are identical if, and only if, an equivalence relation $Eq_\S$ holds between the entities $e_1, e_2$) with logic. Still, as highlighted in work on the semantics for relevant logics, there are different ways theories might be combined. In exactly what ways must logic and abstraction be combined in order to get interesting mathematics? In this paper, (...) we investigate the matter by deriving the axioms of second-order Peano Arithmetic from Frege's Basic Law V (the extension of $F$ is identical with the extension of $G$ if, and only if, $F$ and $G$ are extensionally equivalent) in the presence of a relevant higher-order logic. The results are interesting. Not only must we take on logic as true, and not only must we apply our logic to abstraction principles, but also we have to apply our theory of abstraction back to the logic in order to arrive at arithmetic. Thus, what Abstractionism gives us is not simply what we get from abstraction via logic, but also what we get from logic via abstraction. (shrink)

This paper dates from about 1994: I rediscovered it on my hard drive in the spring of 2002. It represents an early attempt to explore the connections between the Julius Caesar problem and Frege's attitude towards Basic Law V. Most of the issues discussed here are ones treated rather differently in my more recent papers "The Julius Caesar Objection" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 10". But the treatment here is more accessible, in many ways, providing more context and a (...) better sense of how this issue relates to broader issues in Frege's philosophy. (shrink)

We present a geometrical analysis of the principles that lay at the basis of Categorial Grammar and of the Lambek Calculus. In Abrusci it is shown that the basic properties known as Residuation laws can be characterized in the framework of Cyclic Multiplicative Linear Logic, a purely non-commutative fragment of Linear Logic. We present a summary of this result and, pursuing this line of investigation, we analyze a well-known set of categorial grammar laws: Monotonicity, Application, Expansion, Type-raising, Composition, Geach (...) laws and Switching laws. (shrink)

Are the laws of nature real? Do they belong to the world or merely reflect the way we speak about it? If they are real, what sort of entity are they? This study contributes to the ongoing discussion of these questions by emphasizing the importance of a cosmological perspective on them. I argue that the evidence coming from modern evolutionary cosmology presents difficulties for certain currently fashionable philosophical accounts of laws, in particular, for the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory. I defend, in light (...) of this evidence, the idea of laws as grounded in irreducible nomic properties of basic objects and examine its cosmological implications and consequences for the philosophy of modality. ;If the laws of nature are real, they must represent an integral aspect of the universe as a whole. From a cosmological point of view, these two totalities, the laws of nature and the universe, may be related. I begin by showing that a concern about the consequences of such possible relationship was an important factor in the historical rivalry between the steady-state and big bang cosmologies . ;The cosmological perspective on laws has still more striking implications in the context of the contemporary interplay between big-bang cosmology and high energy physics in the effort to understand the processes at work during the first moments of cosmic evolution. In a sense, the evolution of the physical state of the universe as a whole may have "carried" with it the evolution of certain nomic properties of matter. I contend that this poses problems for some nomic ontologies, such as the relations-between-universals theory, and favors the view of laws as grounded in causal powers of particulars. I show how the universe of causally powerful basic substances provides a natural framework for an interesting sense of modality characteristic of laws and how this illuminates the notoriously difficult problems of essential properties and natural kinds. (shrink)

Philosophy distinguishes life in general, inherent in all living things and social life – human life in a society. The last means the numerous relationships of man to nature, society, and all other people. To understand the social life, it should be considered at two levels: first, as everyday life, and, second, as «civilized», much higher according to its contents. The everyday life and the «civilized life» – are interconnected integrally with each other and at the same time are different (...) from each other. Note the primary differences in the most general aspect. The usual everyday life is characterized by thing that people do daily, constantly. It is real, practical, biological-social life of each person: whether a man or a woman, an ordinary man and an eminent person. «The civilized life» is a life of higher level; it is penetrated by the theory, more comprehended and systematized; it is based on scientific and legal laws, philosophical truth and moral categories. Therefore people, on the basis of philosophical and scientific laws, regularities, and tendencies know the ancestral life, evaluate correctly estimate the present life and are able to predict the future life. Laws of everyday and civilized human life have been formulated. (shrink)

The article discusses the affinity of the ideas of two prominent Russian scholars N.N. Moiseev and V.S. Stepin. This affinity of their ideas is above all expressed in the global scale of their thinking, in their orientation toward the search for the ways of mankind development. Both thinkers sought a way out of the limitations and crisis of technological civilization through the promotion of basic values of harmony in the evolution of society and the biosphere. They made an enormous (...) contribution to the development of both humanitarian and natural sciences areas of knowledge related to social management and development, techonology, economics, law, medicine, ecology, education, etc. They worked in an interdisciplinary areas and were successful integrators of natural science and humanities. Simultaneously with the scientific work, Moiseev and Stepin were excellent teachers and mentors of both young and mature researchers. They have created successful scientific schools that include many dozens of outstanding scientists. They devoted much attention and much time to social work, primarily in various structures of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The affinity of Moiseev’s and Stepin’s ideas is shown in four areas of their activities: overcoming the crisis of technological civilization and the limitations of the concept of sustainable development, research into socio-humanitarian cybernetics, development of advanced education models, implementation of successful scientific diplomacy projects. The author of this article participated in joint research projects with Moiseev and Stepin, the personal communication with them and their ideas significantly influenced author’s life path, interests and research results. (shrink)

_Purpose._ This article aims to provide a philosophical analysis of disharmonious relations between people in society, to reveal the causes of existing conflicts and to find ways to reduce the manifestations of chaos in human relations._ Theoretical basis _of the article is socio-cultural anthropology, the principles of the unity of the historical and logical, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, the unity of analysis and synthesis. To solve the tasks set, authors also used the principles of objectivity, systematicity, (...) and comprehensive development._ Originality._ The article goes beyond one-sided views on the relationship between people in society, reveals the causes of existing conflicts from a philosophical perspective and searches for ways to reduce chaosogenic manifestations in society. It is assumed that chaos and order in human relations arise not only due to the contradictory interaction between the fundamental components of the Universe – matter and energy, but also due to a lack of understanding of the laws of information use. Therefore, without the discovery and rational use of the basic laws and principles governing the functioning of information in the Universe, it is impossible to overcome chaos in human relations._ Conclusions._ Given the profound impact of information on human relations, it is possible to help reduce the manifestations of chaos in human relationships. The proper handling of information, along with the rational use of matter and energy, is crucial for overcoming the current state of disharmony and creating a more favourable and orderly future for humanity. Thus, the vector of harmonisation of human relations lies in the plane of comprehensive knowledge of mass-energy and information processes occurring in the Universe, focusing not on subjective, ill-considered short-term goals, but submitting to them for consistent inclusion in these processes. (shrink)

The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the fact of the (...) ontological presence of the individual in the world. The real extrapolation method is based on the available gnosiological content of a cognizing subject and on the use of a totality of the logical, gnosiological, epistemological, methodological, content-related and even psychological wealth of accumulated knowledge with the aim of its augmentation. The all-important aim of new gnosiology (theory of knowledge) should consist in studying permissible bounds of extrapolation, and in identifying basic laws of extrapolation of knowledge in two forms of its being as a necessary condition of their possible synthesis. (shrink)

What is disappointing of course is not the dispersion of psychology into so many diverse subjects, but their apparent lack of relation to a central core of laws and theories. The topics of psychology, such as sensation, perception, cognition and emotion, which are treated in the first section of the present book, do not appear to constitute a general base for the branches of psychology, for clinical psychology, nor for the so-called borderland subjects. The branch--Animal and Comparative Psychology--does not carry (...) over from general psychology a basic theory of learning, which it then adapts or applies to its own special field. On the contrary, contemporary theory of learning, or rather theories, have been largely evolved within this branch. Similarly, Psychometrics, Child Psychology, and Applied and Social Psychology have, to a great extent, developed their own principles and methods. (shrink)

When 47-year-old Simba Abalo, an unemployed retired soldier in Lomé, Togo, found out that he had AIDS in September 2007, he was unable to receive government-supplied antiretroviral drugs: “CAMEG [the state’s central medicines purchasing organization],” he said, “told me they were not taking any new cases for six months because they had run out of drugs.Stocks of antiretrovirals had become depleted after the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria suspended part of its grant to Togo in 2006 and (...) failed to approve a new grant request in 2007, reportedly because of oversight irregularities. “Even if they had the drugs,” said Abalo, “I could not have paid more than US$4 a month since I had just lost my job as a security guard earning US$70 a month.”. (shrink)

The main purpose of legal interpretation is to create conditions for the effective functioning of law and its components by clarifying their true content, which eliminates any doubts and ambiguities. The purpose of this article is: first, to analyze the provisions of current Ukrainian legislation for identifying the general approaches embodied in it and the principles for the implementation of legal interpretation activities by state power bodies; secondly: presentation on the basis of modern achievements and developments of legal science of (...) the system of measures for standardization of such activity, bringing it in line with the needs of law enforcement practice. The solution of the set tasks was carried out using the method of philosophical dialectics, a system of general scientific and special scientific methods of cognition, which are based on the principles of objectivity, comprehensiveness, complexity. Based on the analysis of the normative material, it is concluded that there is no single harmonized approach in the Ukrainian legislation on the procedure for providing clarifications of the content of normative-legal acts. The authors give arguments on the need to clarify and streamline the legal interpretation activity by state bodies and propose a number of measures to achieve this goal. Based on the conducted analysis of the normative material, the authors outline the main problematic issues of the legislative definition of the basics of legal interpretation and provide specific proposals for improving the current legislation in this area. (shrink)

Specific character of globalization can be understood only in connection with deep crisis of the nation-state and thus with sovereignty. The sovereignty organically includes territory. During globalization territory factor is not anymore the key principle of social and cultural life. Such phenomenon as Islamic fundamentalism (Islamism) fits quite well the structure of the theory of globalization in postmodernist interpretation. For Islamism as a subject of the world order the determining identity (as sets of the ontological aims determining its outlook and (...) purposes of political activity), i.e. determining, basic, fundamental to self-determination and activities is a creation of the Islamic world order, the world of Caliphate. Thus the Islamic fundamentalism focuses on universal nature of its identity. This activity ignores norms of international law and denies its key positions, such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, firmness of borders, etc. Tolerance is an integral feature of the sovereignty. Weakening of sovereignty in conditions of globalization causes danger of strengthening of intolerance. Recognition of uniqueness, peculiarity and other civilization identity is a key to peaceful settlement of problems in conditions of the new global order as well as to establishment of philosophy of tolerance. (shrink)

It is necessary to evaluate the next “thoughtless” instruction of the President to the Ministry of Education: to work for 1-2 months and introduce the lesson “Ethics of Faith” in schools from September 1. It requires an immediate reaction of the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, structures related to the education and upbringing of children, and the general public: in a veiled form, the Basic Law is grossly violated - the Constitution of the country, in particular, the second section (...) of Art. 32, where it is written in black and white: "... The church is separated from the state, and the school is separated from the church...". If the guarantor of the Constitution has forgotten about this, he needs to be reminded, and he must cancel his order. Otherwise, people, parents, and, most importantly, children, our younger generation, will be agitated. (shrink)

The article seeks to instantiate the distinctive features and basic research strategies in legal ontology as they are presented in the early works by the famous Oxford philosopher of law Herbert Hart, published before his major book The Concept of Law. The author tries to isolate the most salient aspects of the analytical legal tradition applicable to Russian legal theory, which can bridge the existing gap between these approaches despite considerable difference both in their background and methodology.

Purpose. The purpose of the study lies in critical reconstruction of Thomas Hobbes’s social contract theory as an important principle not only of modern political anthropology, but also of modern and postmodern social projects. As well as, in the unfolding of the fundamentally important both for the newest social-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological discourses of the thesis that each individual is the origin of both personal and institutional freedom and justice, making the contract first of all with himself, with his desires and (...) sorrows and then with other people and the state. Theoretical basis. The principle of social contract offered by Hobbes became a new social, methodologically significant and relevant principle of regulation of activity, which indicates essential for the modern political philosophy and the philosophy of law transition from teleological to legal ideas of justice. For an in-depth study of the philosophical and anthropological aspects of Hobbes’s contractualism, we used the historical-comparative and contextualization method, as well as the works of leading native and foreign researchers of Hobbes, who uphold the provisions on the organic affiliation of fundamental socio-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological questions about the nature of man, the relation of coercion, freedom and justice with the discourse of social contract. Originality. On the basis of a consistent analysis of the anthropological component of Hobbes’s theory of social contract, an in-depth understanding of modern contractualism and contemporary discussions in the field of its existential and anthropological component is offered, as well as the thesis that political anthropology is the core of the philosophical anthropology because it makes possible the methodologically important understanding of the basic problems of human existence – the interaction of justice and freedom, self-interest and public good, as well as it quite clearly outlines the ways to overcome the dilemmas of liberalism and communitarianism, individualism and holism. Conclusions. Political anthropology of T. Hobbes constructed in the context of a modern social project, justified the issue of interaction between freedom and justice, which is fundamentally important to nowadays, through the search for such a way of social relations, in which an individual, being in the realm of social existence, would seek to limit his own selfishness and freedom for the sake of the common will of the majority. Thanks to Hobbes, the idea of external humility in disobedience to the inner, of freedom of conscience as a "human and citizen", of an understanding of individual independence, which is not just a permissible but accepted by state power, has been acquired with exceptional theoretical and practical meaning. Thanks to Hobbes’s works, the essence was revealed by the relationship between the cooperative and the conflicted vision of man. (shrink)

Purpose. Based on the comparative analysis of the European and post-Soviet countries, the purpose of the article is to study one of the manifestations of gender discrimination, namely the problem of gender equality in the sphere of labor. It involves the consistent solution to the following tasks: a) to emphasize the basic principles of gender international and legal policy; b) to reflect the praxeological dimension of providing the equal social and economic opportunities for men and women at current level; (...) c) to emphasize the key criterion for ensuring the equality in socio-cultural sphere – equality in political life; d) to study the educational level of women and the possibility of self-realization in employment equal to men. Theoretical basis. The authors proceed from the standpoint that gender equality at the present stage has become a priority of legal policy and an important principle of the state of pro-European orientation. It is characterized in the legal plane, first of all, by the equality of the social roles of men and women, and the overcoming of the gender hierarchy of social ties, in which men are perceived as higher beings by their mental and physical abilities, and their activities are more significant and of priority in comparison with the activities of women. Originality. The authors have substantiated that in many economically developed countries the problem of providing a gender is still relevant, but most of the crisis problems in this area have found their legal regulation. The motivated position of the authors is that the level of education and professionalism of women cannot serve a reason for discrimination against women, which now exists in the economic and political sphere in the post-Soviet space. Conclusions. Gender stereotypes remain the priority in woman’s keeping family household, which creates significant inequalities of women and men at the labor market. Specialized regulatory acts in the field of gender declare the equality of men and women, while labor law defines a number of norms and guarantees that complicate the employment of women. In order to improve the situation we propose to implement a number of measures, such as, creation and financial support of the programs at the state level for supporting maternity, family and childhood; examination of all normative acts and concerning the issue of gender asymmetry, and especially the norms of labor law; introduction of state monitoring of employment and income of persons as to the complying with the principle of gender equality; introduction of quotas for women’s participation in political activities, in the work of the government and parliament, etc. (shrink)

In the article these are considered ethical and legal problems caused by the ongoing pandemic of the new coronavirus disease. New challenges for health care, economy, education not only revealed rather a high level of stability and mobility, but also showed a poor readiness of response to sudden risks, which had a certain impact on all spheres of life of the whole society. The authors have conducted a brief cross-cultural analysis of the issue basing on data quoted by the international (...) network of UNESCO chairs in bioethics, sessions of the Bioethics Committee within the RF Commission on UNESCO affairs, as well as official open sources of the health care system and judicial sphere of the Russian Federation. Strong reciprocal link of legal risks in the interdisciplinary field of medicine and law are made discernable: on the one hand, introduction of sanitary and hygienic regulations are aimed at the realization of the right of protecting the health, while on the other hand they represent a violation of basic human rights. Besides the theoretical approach to the problem of the observance of the constitutional rights of citizens in the pandemic conditions there exists a real threat of their violation due to absence of special mechanisms of their realization in frames of sanitary and hygienic measures with regard to the vulnerable and socially disadvantaged sections in the society. It is made conclusion about necessity of the international collaboration for the purpose of joint decision-making and action in the sphere of health care taking into account an international character of ethical and legal challenges triggered by COVID-19 pandemic, as well as national, economic, cultural and confessional peculiarities. (shrink)

The article focuses on methods of teaching commercial lawyers, whose native language is not English, some linguistic aspects of drafting a contract in English. The author, whose principal occupation is teaching legal English, has created a Course on Language Aspects of English Contract for in-service lawyers. The course is aimed at teaching learners to understand and interpret English contracts written in traditional legal English and help them develop some drafting and redrafting techniques taking into account the modern tendency growing in (...) English speaking common law countries towards simplifying traditional legal English. A number of contracts written in different styles have been analysed, basic contract categories each characterised by certain operative words and phrases, have been established and terminology glossary have been compiled. The purpose of this paper is to present the course’s syllabi, outline and teaching methods. (shrink)

The time-dependent Schrödinger equation has been derived from three assumptions within the domain of classical and stochastic mechanics. The continuity equation isnot used in deriving the basic equations of the stochastic theory as in the literature. They are obtained by representing Newton's second law in a time-inversion consistent equation. Integrating the latter, we obtain the stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The Schrödinger equation is a result of a transformation of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation and linearization by assigning the arbitrary constant ħ=2mD. An (...) experiment is proposed to determine ħ and to test a hypothesis of the theory directly. A mathematical apparatus is formulated from the Jacobian formalism to derive physical parameters from ψ(x, t) and to obtain operators for the boundary cases of the theory. The operator formalisms are compared by means of a well-known solution in the quantum theory. (shrink)

In Section One the automatic ratification of existing law as immediately self-validating is shown to undermine the very purpose of law - the surpassing of arbitrariness and of Czar-like ukases. In Sections Two and Three there is an attempt to explore the justification or grounding that can be given for the existing laws and civil disobedience, respectively. In both cases, the justification has been given in terms of fundamental human dignity which should never be violated by empirical laws. Only when (...) such a violation does occur can civil disobedience be justified. Therefore, the rationale for, and motivation of, both a legal system and civil disobedience are the same.However, one does not so easily resolve the opposition between the two. For the law itself is proclaimed apodictically, without the reservation that one may with impunity break the law and commit an act of civil disobedience whenever the law violates one's conscience. Otherwise, we do not have a rule of law but instead anarchy. For, as Jesus has said and Abraham Lincoln paraphrased it: “A kingdom divided against itself will not stand.” The law cannot declare that it is legal to break the law without incapacitating itself. The law must punish its violators to be a valid law; without powers of enforcing sanctions against violators the law is no law.However, we must not consider for this reason that those who are responsible for making, interpreting, and enforcing the law and those who are civilly disobedient are working at cross purposes. Both are concerned with justice. The civilly disobedient individual is concerned with improving the existing legal system. He envisions his role as therapeutic rather than destructive. He believes that the ideal of justice is being violated in some way in the existing laws. He therefore makes of himself a martyr, bearing witness to the truth, and hoping thereby to educate and enlighten and to move men of good will - in short, to effect a change in the law.Before an individual who respects the rule of law should be willing to be civilly disobedient he must be convinced of the violation of basic human rights in the law. He also must consider whether civil disobedience is the most effective means of producing the desired change. But beyond the pragmatic consideration of the most effective means to produce the desired end, there is also the question of what is most meaningful and suitable for him personally in living in conformity with the categorical imperative. Discussions of civil disobedience which limit themselves to questions of practical consequences do a great disservice to such actions. For, must we not admire those who resisted Hitler, even though they realized that their actions were futile in terms of changing the law and might even mean their deaths?In a free society, dedicated to the rule of law, all citizens are concerned with justice. Those entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the law obviously must do just that, so that violators of the law have to be punished. However, when legislators and judges notice that some of the most perspicacious and conscientious individuals are openly violating existing laws in the name of a higher law, they should also make a serious reappraisal of their positions, looking to see whether they may not have become morally insensitive or careless. Indeed, the real value of a free society is its flexibility and tolerance of dissent, even that of civil disobedience, which can serve to dramatize forcefully, deep-seated convictions concerning the injustice of certain laws on the books. It is true that fanatics from time immemorial have been willing to sacrifice much in the name of their cause. But whenever one finds that there is an individual who is willing to sacrifice much without the hope of personal advantage and who is also willing to provide arguments in defense of his position, society would do well to listen to his words and actions.Without the constant delving scrutiny and criticism of existing laws, there cannot be true legal responsibility. Therefore, the civilly disobedient individual, who is willing to put his head on the block in order to abrogate unjust laws, is in fact the legally responsible individual par excellence. (shrink)

Socialist society is a society whose basic economic law and goal is the fullest possible satisfaction of human needs. Proceeding from this, the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU set a course for a more profound turn in the economy toward solution of the various tasks related to improving the well-being of Soviet people, not only for the five-year plan period but also as the general orientation of the economic development of the country for the long term.

It has been apparent for at least a decade that liberal constitutional theory is in deep trouble. Of course there are many versions of liberal constitutional theory, but they have essentially no connection to existing practices of constitutional law, considering as practices of constitutional law all the activities of our institutions of government that implicate - interpret, advance, deal with, whatever - fundamental principle. Instead, liberal constitutional theory's vision of the future is nostalgia for the past. For liberal constitutional theorists (...) the Warren Court, or Justice Brennan, basically got everything right, at least in their approach to identifying constitutional law. True, they may have faltered sometimes in implementing constitutional principles, but all that needs to be done today is to appoint justices in the mold of Warren, Brennan, or Thurgood Marshall. And here I really do mean all that needs to be done: No rethinking of what constitutional law is all about seems needed to liberal constitutional theorists. (shrink)

The relevance of the research problem is due to the need for theoretical justification for determining the structure of the principles of legal responsibility. The purpose of the article is to clarify the structure of the principles of legal responsibility in Ukraine. The leading methodological approach of the research is the structural-functional approach, which allows to consider the principles of legal responsibility as elements of the normative part of the legal system, which have their own functional purpose. The article defines (...) the structure of the principles of legal responsibility; it was established that certain legal responsibility principles were considered as essential elements of the system of legal responsibility principles; the basic requirements for the structure of the legal responsibility principles, which make up its content, are revealed. (shrink)

On June 28, 1993, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the admissibility of expert scientific opinion and evidence in federal court cases. The importance of the case can be measured by the interest it stimulated. The scientific community turned out in particular force to register its views. At the heart of the controversy was a debate over the nature of scientific knowledge and its relation to law. More than any other Supreme Court case in recent memory, the amici seemed (...) to view the Daubert case both as posing a potential challenge to basic scientific premises and as an opportunity to reclaim a lost prerogative to determine how science is applied in courts. (shrink)

PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a predicative monadic second-order system which is aimed to derive second-order Peano arithmetic. It exploits the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which the infamous Basic Law V. In this paper, a model-theoretical consistency proof for the system PG is provided.

PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a predicative monadic second-order system which exploits the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which a formulation of the infamous Basic Law V. It is shown that second-order Peano arithmetic can be derived in PG. I also investigate the philosophical issue of predicativism connected to PG. In particular, as predicativism about concepts seems rather un-Fregean, I analyse whether there is a way to make predicativism compatible with Frege’s logicism.

Frege’s Basic Law V and its successor, Boolos’s New V, are axioms postulating abstraction operators: mappings from the power set of the domain into the domain. Basic Law V proved inconsistent. New V, however, naturally interprets large parts of second-order ZFC via a construction discovered by Boolos in 1989. This paper situates these classic findings about abstraction operators within the general theory of F-algebras and coalgebras. In particular, we show how Boolos’s construction amounts to identifying an initial F-algebra (...) in a certain category, we identify a natural coalgebraic dual to Boolos’s axiom which naturally interprets large parts of Aczel’s non-well-founded set theory via the construction of a certain terminal F-coalgebra, and we suggest a coalgebraic way forward for an abstraction-theoretic axiomatization of the real numbers. (shrink)

A famous passage in Section 64 of Frege’s Grundlagen may be seen as a justification for the truth of abstraction principles. The justification is grounded in the procedureofcontent recarvingwhich Frege describes in the passage. In this paper I argue that Frege’sprocedure of content recarving while possibly correct in the case of first-order equivalencerelations is insufficient to grant the truth of second-order abstractions. Moreover, I propose apossible way of justifying second-order abstractions by referring to the operation of contentrecarving and I show (...) that the proposal relies to a certain extent on the Basic Law V. Therefore,if we are to justify the truth of second-order abstractions by invoking the content recarvingprocedure we are committed to a special status of some instances of the Basic Law V and thusto a special status of extensions of concepts as abstract objects. (shrink)

Frege’s _Basic Law V_ is inconsistent. The reason often given is that it posits the existence of an injection from the larger collection of first-order concepts to the smaller collection of objects. This article explains what is right and what is wrong with this diagnosis.

In this book I have tried to develop an analysis of the concept of an empirical law, an analysis that differs in many ways from the alternative analyse's found in contemporary literature dealing with the subject. 1 am referring especially to two well-known views, viz. the regularity and necessity views, which have given rise to many interesting papers and books within the philosophy of science. In developing my own views, it very soon became clear to me that the mere restatement (...) of these alternative views, followed by a discussion of their defects and an explanation of my own view, would not suffice to show what 1 regard as basically unsound in these views. If we seriously consider the well-known difficulties facing the regularity view, we have to consider the possibility that the time has arrived to stop our attempts to solve, by means of patch-work additions, the fundamental problem of empirical laws within the traditional context of logical positivist doctrines. I have tried to find a solution which is based on a different philosophical context, the main incentive being that the discouraging results of the customary attempts to solve the problem might have been the outcome of the fundamental philosophical setting within which the problem had been formulated and within which everyone looked for a solution. The problem of empirical laws is not a problem existing by its own rights - it is shaped by an underlying point of view or theoretical framework. For this reason I have started with a brief sketch of the logical positivist context. However, I want to stress the fact that my intention was not to offer an historical exposition, but an exposition which becomes meaningful when related to the subsequent arguments concerning empirical laws. The notion of direct or theory-free observation has been taken as the fundamental characteristic of the logical positivist point of view. This view has been further characterised by means of five theses, among which is the thesis that observational terms are isolated or theory-independent units of extensional meaning. These terms are then supposed to be the starting-points of meaning and the end-points of confirmation, and these very characteristics mark the privileged position such terms have in a logical positivist philosophy. The post-positivist view, on the other hand, is characterised by the opposing notion of theory-loaded observation. This notion leads to other conclusions which radically oppose some of the theses of logical positivism. The notion of theory- loaded observation itself, although often clearly stated, has not yet been systematically elucidated, and I have made an attempt to do this in ch. I after my sketch of the logical positivist context. This seemed to me to be necessary in order to make my post-positivist point of view as clear as possible, before tackling the problem of empirical law itself. I have paid special attention to the lawlikeness of concepts and their confirmation and falsification. These epistemological issues are followed by a separate examination of Goodman's riddle in ch. II, because it lies somewhere between the lawlikeness of concepts and the lawlikeness of laws. If Goodman's riddle is taken as a serious problem, as I think it should, it is primarily a problem of concept or theory formation and not a problem of induction. In ch. III the regularity view has been examined and the well-known difficulties related to such a view are considered, assuming the knowledge gained in ch. I. This has led to some interesting results, especially in connection with the analysis of counterfactuals and the confirmation of 'normal' singular conditionals, to which I return in the last chapter. Three different views of the necessity view are briefly stated and investigated in ch. IV. RESCHER'S view is, I think, close to mine, which has been developed in ch. V. However, there are fundamental epistemological differences between our views. In the last chapter I have given my own analysis of the concept of an empirical law, which should not be taken as a synthesis of a regularity and a necessity view, but as opposed to both. It is, as far as particulars may count, the result of an analysis of the concepts 'regularity' and 'necessity'. I have tried to argue that the greatest shortcoming of the regularity view lies in the fact that the proponents of such a view have not been really concerned with the concept of 'regularity' itself. They usually take this concept to be intuitively clear enough to serve as basis for their analysis. Their attacks upon the necessity view are based on the reproach that 'necessity' is a very obscure concept, and that it should, therefore, be avoided in the philosophy of science. We could, however, reproach them in a similar way, since the concept of 'regularity' is anything but clear. One may say that an empirical law formulates a 'regularity in nature', but we can only do justice to the function a law has in science, if we are ready to view this regularity as a necessary connection, which does not exist in an observer-independent reality, but in a theoretically co-constituted empirical world. This investigation does not pretend to answer all questions concerning empirical laws. It should, therefore, not be regarded as complete, but neither should the arguments and suggestions be regarded as completely free from ambiguity. Much remains to be done in order to offer a generally acceptable theory and better understanding. (shrink)

In 1905 the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first state high court to recognize a freestanding “right to privacy” tort in the common law. The landmark case was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. Must it be a cause for deep jurisprudential concern that the common law right to privacy in wide currency today originated in Pavesich’s explicit judicial interpretation of the requirements of natural law? Must it be an additional worry that the court which originated the common (...) law privacy right asserted that a free white man whose photograph is published without his consent in a city newspaper is like a slave in bondage? I argue that the jurisprudence of Pavesich need not be troubling. Pavesich’s natural law argument was supplemented by several positive law arguments. The positive law arguments were a strong enough basis for finding a right to privacy in the common law, as indeed Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis had previously argued. The observation that the Pavesich court’s natural law argument ran alongside positivistic arguments suggests that the arresting, high-toned natural law and slavery appeals in Pavesich are inessential rhetorical throwaways. But I maintain that the natural law argument and slavery analogy features of Judge Andrew Jackson Cobb’s opinion extolling the “liberty of privacy” are (1) of critical importance to a full contextual understanding of the decision and (2) illuminate the contemporary case for recognizing invasions of privacy as civil injuries to freedom and self-determination. One can poke holes in the logic of Thomas Aquinas and John Locke as scholars have done for centuries. But one can as easily choose to celebrate the spirit of the natural law tradition. The natural law tradition represents efforts rhetorically, rationally, and intuitively to derive principles of justice and goodness from basic facts about human characteristics, needs, and desires, where otherwise binding sovereign law may fall short. (shrink)

PLV (Plural Basic Law V) is a consistent second-order system which is aimed to derive second-order Peano arithmetic. It employs the notion of plural quantification and a first-order formulation of Frege's infamous Basic Law V. George Boolos' plural semantics is replaced with Enrico Martino's Acts of Choice Semantics (ACS), which is developed from the notion of arbitrary reference in mathematical reasoning. ACS provides a form of logicism which is radically alternative to Frege's and which is grounded on the (...) existence of individuals rather than on the existence of concepts. (shrink)

Frege's definition of the real numbers, as envisaged in the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, is fatally flawed by the inconsistency of Frege's ill-fated Basic Law V. We restate Frege's definition in a consistent logical framework and investigate whether it can provide a logical foundation of real analysis. Our conclusion will deem it doubtful that such a foundation along the lines of Frege's own indications is possible at all.

Frege's definition of the natural number n in terms of the set of n-membered sets has been treated rudely by history. It has suffered not one but two crippling blows. The discovery of Russell's Paradox revealed a fatal flaw in the ‘naive’ conception of set. In spite of its intuitive appeal, Frege's Basic Law V turned out to be impermissible, leaving us only with the etiolated concept of set that survives in the axiomatic treatments initiated by Zermelo. The independence (...) results, however, of Godel and Cohen, concerning Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis, have left us adrift in choosing between Cantorian and non-Cantorian set theories, which has induced in some logicians a skepticism in regard to the very idea of set-theoretic platonism. (shrink)

Sections “Introduction: Hume’s Principle, Basic Law V and Cardinal Arithmetic” and “The Julius Caesar Problem in Grundlagen—A Brief Characterization” are peparatory. In Section “Analyticity”, I consider the options that Frege might have had to establish the analyticity of Hume’s Principle, bearing in mind that with its analytic or non-analytic status the intended logical foundation of cardinal arithmetic stands or falls. Section “Thought Identity and Hume’s Principle” is concerned with the two criteria of thought identity that Frege states in 1906 (...) and their application to Hume’s Principle. In Section “The Nature ofion: A Critical Assessment of Grundlagen, §64”, I scrutinize Frege’s characterization of abstraction in Grundlagen, §64 and criticize in this context the currently widespread use of the terms “recarving” and “reconceptualization”. Section “Frege’s Proof of Hume’s Principle” is devoted to the formal details of Frege’s proof of Hume’s Principle. I begin by considering his proof sketch in Grundlagen and subsequently reconstruct in modern notation essential parts of the formal proof in Grundgesetze. In Section “Equinumerosity and Coextensiveness: Hume’s Principle and Basic Law V Again”, I discuss the criteria of identity embodied in Hume’s Principle and in Basic Law V, equinumerosity and coextensiveness. In Section “Julius Caesar and Cardinal Numbers—A Brief Comparison Between Grundlagen and Grundgesetze ”, I comment on the Julius Caesar problem arising from Hume’s Principle in Grundlagen and analyze the reasons for its absence in this form in Grundgesetze. I conclude with reflections on the introduction of the cardinals and the reals by abstraction in the context of Frege’s logicism. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a formal recipe that Frege followed in his magnum opus “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik” when formulating his definitions. This recipe is not explicitly mentioned as such by Frege, but we will offer strong reasons to believe that Frege applied it in developing the formal material of Grundgesetze. We then show that a version of Basic Law V plays a fundamental role in Frege’s recipe and, in what follows, we will explicate what exactly this role is (...) and explain how it differs from the role played by extensions in his earlier book “Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik”. Lastly, we will demonstrate that this hitherto neglected yet foundational aspect of Frege’s use of Basic Law V helps to resolve a number of important interpretative challenges in recent Frege scholarship, while also shedding light on some important differences between Frege’s logicism and recent neo-logicist approaches to the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

Kripke’s notion of groundedness plays a central role in many responses to the semantic paradoxes. Can the notion of groundedness be brought to bear on the paradoxes that arise in connection with abstraction principles? We explore a version of grounded abstraction whereby term models are built up in a ‘grounded’ manner. The results are mixed. Our method solves a problem concerning circularity and yields a ‘grounded’ model for the predicative theory based on Frege’s Basic Law V. However, the method (...) is poorly behaved unless the background second-order logic is predicative. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that the more encompassing (...) Δ₁¹-comprehension schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case. (shrink)