Over the past three years or so, Telos and New German Critique have opened a debate in which Habermas's theory of communicative rationality has been counterposed to the ‘aesthetic-sensual forms of subjectivity’ advocated by certain French theorists, who have come to be known as the ‘post-structuralists’. Among the latter, the most significant figures are Michel Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. This confrontation between theories of desire and theories of communicative rationality is perhaps only (...) just beginning, but already it has made a creative contribution to the development of social theory, and more importantly, it has helped — in conjunction with the new social movements (feminism, the peace movement, the ecology movement) — to clarify some practical issues involved in the task of building a new political culture. (shrink)

It is demonstrated that Maxwellian electrodynamics was created as a result of the old pre-Maxwellian programmes’s reconciliation: the electrodynamics of Ampère–Weber, the wave theory of Young–Fresnel and Faraday’s programme. Maxwell’s programme finally superseded the Ampère–Weber one because it assimilated the ideas of the Ampère–Weber programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programmes of Young–Fresnel and Faraday. Maxwell’s victory became possible because the core of Maxwell’s unification strategy was formed by Kantian epistemology. Maxwell put forward as a basic synthetic principle (...) an idea that radically differed from that of rival approaches by its open, flexible and contra-ontological character. “Action at a distance”, “incompressible fluid”, “molecular vortices” were contrived analogies for Maxwell, capable only of directing the researcher to the “right” mathematical relations Kantian epistemology subsequently enabled Helmholtz and Hertz to arrive at a version of Maxwell’s theory that served as a heuristical basis for the discovery of radio waves. Finally, though neither of Einstein’s relativistic ideas came directly from Kant, they were made possible by the Kantian worldview that had permeated Einstein’s thinking. The Maxwellian revolution can be described in terms of Habermas’s communicative rationality encouraging the establishment of mutual understanding between the various scientific communities. Maxwell’s programme constituted a progressive step in respect to its rivals because it constituted a basis of communication and interpenetration between the main paradigms of 19th century physics. (shrink)

This article outlines how conceptual spaces theory applies to modeling changes of scientific frameworks when these are treated as spatial structures rather than as linguistic entities. The theory is briefly introduced and five types of changes are presented. It is then contrasted with Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantian account that seeks to render Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” as a communicatively rational historical event of conceptual development in the sciences. Like Friedman, we refer to the transition from Newtonian to relativistic mechanics as an example (...) of “deep conceptual change.” But we take the communicative rationality of radical conceptual change to be available prior to the philosophical meta-paradigms that Friedman deems indispensable for this purpose. (shrink)

The idea of rational understanding lays very close to the heart of Professor Janusz Kuczyński, an advocate of universalism as well as dialogue between diverse philosophical schools and worldviews, and doctoral advisor to the present paper’s author. This idea’s theoretical conceptualisation—a conceptualisation that has proven to be convincing and adequate to the conditions of the modern world—was developed by Professor Jürgen Habermas, whose ideas and theories were also the subject of a doctoral thesis written by this paper’s author in the (...) latter half of the 1970s under Professor Kuczyński’s tutelage. The author shares some grateful memories of his doctoral tutor, and also sets his one-time attempts to apply the theory of communicative action to two experiences of the real socialism era in Poland against his efforts to analyse contemporary Polish realities through the prism of the communicative rationality conception. This comparison shows that the application of a conception of rationality funded by communicative action to the turbulent transformations under real socialism was to a certain extent naïve—though not devoid of critical significance—and also reveals the preconditions for the implementation of the rules of communicative rationality in social and political reality.The paper is in part dedicated to the memory of Professor Kuczyński, therefore it contains a somewhat extensive account of the circumstances which led the author to study the thought of Habermas under Kuczyński’s tutelage, as well as the consequences of this choice, which proved of considerable significance for his further life. However, the main themes are, first, the validity of applying a conception of rationality funded by communicative action to two significant experiences of the real socialism era, and, secondly, the need—revealed by diagnosing contemporary Polish reality with the help of the communicative rationality conception—for certain preconditions enabling the implementation of this type of rationality in social and political reality. One such precondition is the transition of sufficiently broad parts of society from thinking in terms of worldviews to post-metaphysical thinking in terms of the “lifeworld”. (shrink)

The difference between a scientific system and the non scientific system is only a matter of forms of rationality: so also the difference between empirical system and non empirical system explainable in terms of the kinds of rationality systems in their structures. Similarly, the classification of civilized cultures and primitive cultures or the black civilization and western civilization is all about forms of rationalizations. That is because the form of explanation of European Society is different from the form (...) of explanation of the Black African animistic society. However, structural functionalism is an attempt on a large scale to combine the methods of both functionalism and structuralism which is not only extant in African philosophy but also embedded in the practice of tradition. Indeed Theistic Panpsychic rationality is culturally structural and functional thereby qualifying to be described as structural functional Panpsychic communicative animism. (shrink)

Special Relativity and the Early Quantum Theory were created within the same programme of statistical mechanics, thermodynamics and maxwellian electrodynamics reconciliation. I shall try to explain why classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics were “refuted” almost simultaneously or, in more suitable for the present congress terms, why did quantum revolution and the relativistic one both took place at the beginning of the 20-th century. I shall argue that quantum and relativistic revolutions were simultaneous since they had common origin - the clash (...) between the fundamental theories of the second half of the 19-th century that constituted the “body” of Classical Physics. The revolution’ s most dramatic point was Einstein’s 1905 photon paper that laid the foundations of both Special Relativity and Old Quantum Theory. Hence the dialectic of the old theories is crucial for theory change. Modern physics began with Einstein’s reconciliation of electrodynamics, mechanics and thermodynamics in 1905 and his unification of Special Relativity and Newtonian Theory of Gravity. Or, in more general social context: progressive scientific change can be described not in Weberian terms of zweckrational action forcing out all the other forms of action only but in terms of Habermas’s communicative rationality encouraging the establishment of mutual understanding between the various scientific communities also. Einstein’s programme constituted a progressive step in respect to its rivals not because it could explain more “facts” or was more “mathematical”. It was high than its rivals because it constituted a basis of communication and interpenetration between three main paradigms of 19-th century physics. Of course in the long run it resulted in empirical successes. Key words: Einstein, scientific revolution, communicative rationality. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to demonstratethat Special Relativity and the Early Quantum Theory were created within the same programme of statisticalmechanics, thermodynamics and maxwellianelectrodynamics reconciliation. I shall try to explainwhy classical mechanics and classicalelectrodynamics were ``refuted'''' almost simultaneouslyor, in more suitable terms for the present congress,why did the quantum revolution and the relativisticone both took place at the beginning of the 20-thcentury. I shall argue that the quantum andrelativistic revolutions were simultaneous since theyhad a common origin -- the (...) clash between thefundamental theories of the second half of the 19-thcentury that constituted the ``body'''' of ClassicalPhysics. The revolution''s most dramatic pointwas Einstein''s 1905 photon paper that laid thefoundations of both Special Relativity and OldQuantum Theory. Hence the dialectic of the oldtheories is crucial for theory change. Modern physicsbegan with Einstein''s reconciliation ofelectrodynamics, mechanics and thermodynamics in 1905and his unification of Special Relativity andNewtonian Theory of Gravity. Or, in a more generalsocial context: progressive scientific change can bedescribed not in Weberian terms of zweckrationalaction forcing out all the other forms of action onlybut in terms of Habermas''s communicative rationalityencouraging the establishment of mutual understandingbetween the various scientific communities also.Einstein''s programme constituted a progressive stepwith respect to its rivals not because it couldexplain more ``facts'''' or was more ``mathematical''''. Itwas better than its rivals because it constituted abasis of communication and interpenetration betweenthree main paradigms of 19-th century physics. Ofcourse in the long run it resulted in empiricalsuccesses. (shrink)

The article studies two especific forms of social interaction, linguistically mediated: promises and threats. Two pregnant theoretical accounts are to be considered here. Firstly, the analysis propounded within the framework of Game Theory, assuming an intentionalist account of human agency and an instrumentalist concept of rationality; and secondly, the attempt carried out by Speech Acts theorists. In the first case, it can be shown that the theoretical premisses are insufficient to offer a proper account of such basic forms of (...) social interchange. This result gives indirect support, so it is argued, to the second theoretical framework considered. Yet some of the solutions offered seem to be also unsatisfactory. Reasons are given of why it is so, and an attempt of solution, within the same theoretical framework, is suggested. (shrink)

In this book Joseph Heath brings Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action into dialogue with the most sophisticated articulation of the instrumental conception of practical rationality-modern rational choice theory. Heath begins with an overview of Habermas's action theory and his critique of decision and game theory. He then offers an alternative to Habermas's use of speech act theory to explain social order and outlines a multidimensional theory of rational action that includes norm-governed action as a specific type.In the (...) second part of the book Heath discusses the more philosophical dimension of Habermas's conception of practical rationality. He criticizes Habermas's attempt to introduce a universalization principle governing moral discourse, as well as his criteria for distinguishing between moral and ethical problems. Heath offers an alternative account of the level of convergence exhibited by moral argumentation, drawing on game-theoretic models to specify the burden of proof that the theory of communicative action and discourse must assume. (shrink)

This is a constructive critique of Habermas’s account of rationality, which is central to his political theory and has sparked theoretical and empirical research across academia. Habermas and many critical theorists caricature means-ends rationality (the ability to pick good means to ends), e.g. by wrongly depicting it as egocentric. This weakens Habermas’s attempt to distinguish means-ends rationality from his hugely important and influential idea of communicative rationality (roughly, the rationality of genuine discussion). I suggest (...) that sincerity and autonomy, rather than non-egocentrism, are the key distinguishing features of communicative rationality. This shows that communicative rationality actually overlaps with means-ends rationality. Indeed, means-ends rationality is needed by critical theorists, as I exemplify by showing its use in deliberative democracy. Moreover, means-ends rationality will be present in discourse ethics, as I show with the example of moral discourse about gay marriage. My article thus challenges decades of what Habermas and critical theorists have written on means-ends and communicative rationality, but I stay broadly true to – and hopefully improve – Habermas’s account of rationality. (shrink)

Since the advent of a post-structuralist ethos, the assertion of a notion of truth, conceived as an infallible point d’appui from which a given social order could be evaluated as ideological or non-ideological, seems no longer possible. As Rorty has pointed out ‘[we can now] see ourselves as never encountering reality except under a chosen description as…making worlds rather than finding them’. However, we could still legitimately ask whether or not an inevitable condition of the ‘post-modern world’, that is, a (...) world deprived of a manifest intrinsic meaning, is the renouncement of the assumption of a certain notion of an objective truth for a critique of ideology. I will suggest in this essay that a way to respond to this question is by revisiting Habermas's theory of communicative action, viewed through the lens of the theory of ideology formulated by Slavok Žižek. Furthermore, the main thesis of this work is that by using the notion of the Real or ‘primordial repressed’ taken from a Žižekian reading of Lacan, it would allow the production of a critique of ideology in which the truth — the unmasking of the extra-ideological place — becomes possible as a hypothetical objective category. (shrink)

In what follows I wish to raise and eventually to suggest an answer to the following question: What is the rationality of human communication? Why should we ask this question? By way of a first approach I would place the problem within the context of the so called “pragmatic turn” of analytic philosophy, i.e. within a context in which the concept of the rationality of logical syntactics and logical semantics of language systems has been integrated into, or superseded (...) by, the rationality concept of the human use of language—say, e.g., of arguments. (shrink)

Summary Critics have said that Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions represents them as subjective and irrational processes, in which mystical conversions and community pressures rather than good reasons determine choices between theories. Kuhn rejects the charge, insisting that there is partial communication among proponents of competing paradigm candidates and their arguments are rational though not coercive. The critics reply that in fact Kuhn's position entails total non-communication and irrationality. A Kuhnian account of partial communication is thus necessary. Kuhn's attempt to (...) give one, based on the notion that the good reasons advanced in paradigm debates function asvalues, fails. But a more satisfactory account can be given if it is recognized that paradigm-debaters will, in one or both of two ways, share paradigmsother than the ones at issue. Further, Kuhn's position both should and can accommodate a notion of theory reduction; his unqualified rejection of reduction is an unnecessary weakness, even apart from questions about the rationality of revolutions. The paper concludes with a brief examination of the contrast between Kuhn's and Feyerabend's strategies for the advancement of science. (shrink)

As a response to the common criticism that phenomenology is handicapped by its descriptive faith, this article outlines a program for showing what a rational justification can be from a phenomenological perspective. The phenomenological position defended here stands between Rorty's thesis of objectivity in solidarity and Habermas's view of rationality through universal claims. In the first part of the article, I show how a justification of a stance, an action, or a behavior can only make appeal to standards and (...) criteria which derive from a culture; in the second part, I argue that, since justification involves the making of claims, a claim makes both its author and its community accountable and liable for what is claimed; the third part shows how the encounter between cultures and communities exerts a greater scrutiny on claims made in one culture or community, thereby leading to progress in the justification process. Key Words: deconstruction • justification • phenomenology • relativism • validity claims. (shrink)

The problem of the theoretical reconstruction of the process of scientific paradigm change is by no means a new one in the philosophy and sociology of science. Nevertheless, one cannot say that its investigation has reached the point at which an overwhelming majority of specialists would agree at least about exactly how and in what directions it is necessary to move forward. Notwithstanding this circumstance, one can specify a certain set of basic questions that are recognized as such by the (...) scholarly community of specialists in the field of the sociology and philosophy of science. This set includes such problems as the interaction of the empirical and the theoretical, of the rational and the irrational, of the individual and the social and, of course, the problem of the interaction of cognitive and social factors in the process of paradigm change. The last problem is a kind of focus, at which various approaches converge in order to engage in harsh criticism of one another. Despite the fact that everyone agreed long ago that the logico-empiricistic model of the development of scientific knowledge is inadequate and one-sided, the approaches proposed during the last ten to fifteen years-especially those belonging to the "strong program of the sociology of science"-are also subject to serious criticism. The observer cannot but form the impression that researchers, disillusioned with the extremes of the logicist approach, have turned to a no less one-sided and extreme sociocultural approach that leads to a boundless relativism that is extremely vulnerable in respect of methodology . In particular, the latter approach relies on the well-known Kuhn-Feyerabend thesis concerning the incommensurability of successive paradigms, which presents in a provocatively irrational light the behavior of specialists in the mathematically most developed and rationally most elaborated fields of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Communication can mean many different things. As far as Communicative Action is concerned, here we distinguish between Communication Attempts, Successful Communicative Action and Understood but Unsuccessful Communicative Action, as well as whether the respective actions already have a regular meaning. What are the respective rationality presuppositions? This is resolved for all the above concepts of Communicative Action. As is the case for all actions, Communicative Actions also require us to differentiate between various rationality (...) types: action rationality, the reasons behind an action, and situation-relative personal rationality. (shrink)

This section of the conference addressed a series of interdisciplinary themes on the issues of rational incommensurability, ethical perspectives and strategies for existential communication. Rather than attempting to answer a set of specific questions presenters were asked to provide a series of meditations on the three themes. Seven presenters provided deeply interesting and varied perspectives on the topics and their inter-relations from multi-disciplinary perspectives. There was considerable time given over to discussion and this proved especially fruitful and enlightening.

This study is an attempt to examine the relationships between religious belief and the humanism of the Enlightenment in the philosophy of Hegel and of a group of thinkers who related to his thought in various ways during the 1840's. It begins with a study of the ways in which Hegel attempted to evolve a genuinely Christian humanism by his demonstration that the modern understanding of man as a free and rational subject derived its strength and validity from the union (...) of God and human existence in the incarnation. The rest of this study is con cerned with two different forms of opposition to Hegel: first, the criti cal discipleship of the Young Hegelians and Moses Hess, who insisted that Hegel's notion of Christian humanism was false because religious belief was necessarily inimical to a clear consciousness of social evil and the determination to abolish it; second, the religious opposition to the Enlightenment in the thought of Schelling and Kierkegaard, which emphasized God's transcendence to human reason and the insig nificance of secular history. In the years leading up to the revolution of 1848, Hegel's synthesis was rejected in favour of the assertion of atheistic humanism or religious otherworldliness. Chapter One, after discussing the young Hegel's critique of the social and political effects of Christianity, examines the union of religi ous belief, speculative philosophy and the rational state in Hegel's mature system. (shrink)

Here, for the first time in English, is volume one of Jurgen Habermas's long-awaited magnum opus: The Theory of Communicative Action. This pathbreaking work is guided by three interrelated concerns: to develop a concept of communicative rationality that is no longer tied to the subjective and individualistic premises of modern social and political theory; to construct a two-level concept of society that integrates the 'lifeworld' and 'system' paradigms; and to sketch out a critical theory of modernity that (...) explains its sociopathologies in a new way. Habermas approaches these tasks through a combination of conceptual analyses, systematic reflections, and critical reconstructions of such predecessors as Marx and Weber, Durkheim and Mead, Horkheimer and Adorno, Schutz and Parsons. Reason and the Rationalization of Society develops a sociological theory of action that stresses not its means-ends or teleological aspect, but the need to coordinate action socially via communication. In the introductory chapter Habermas sets out a powerful series of arguments on such foundational issues as cultural and historical relativism, the methodology of Verstehen, the inseparabilty of interpretation from critique. In addition to clarifying the normative foundations of critical social inquiry, this sets the stage for a systematic appropriation of Weber's theory of rationalization and its Marxist reception by Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno. This is an important book for degree students of philosophy, sociology and related subjects. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new account of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and Kant’s philosophy of right. I reject the claim of some philosophers that Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals cannot offer a foundation for Kant’s philosophy of right. While I agree that the basic principles of Kant’s philosophy of right cannot be deduced from Kant’s ethical Categorical Imperatives, I try to show that we find in Kant’s Groundwork the normative resources for grounding his philosophy of right. My (...) thesis is that Kant’s conception of a realm of ends, as he develops it in the Groundwork, provides a common normative source for Kant’s ethical Categorical Imperatives, on the one hand, and the Universal Principle of Right, on the other. Agreement on common universal principles, which is crucial for Kant’s notion of a realm of ends provides, I will argue, a justification of the ethical Categorical Imperatives and the Universal Principle of Right. (shrink)

Certification for biofuels has been developed to ensure that biofuel production methods adhere to social and environmental sustainability standards. As such, requiring biofuel production to be certified has become part of EU policy through the 2009 renewable energy directive, that aims to promote energy security, reduce emissions and promote rural development. According to the EU RED, in 2020 10 % of our transport energy should come from renewable sources, most of which are expected to be biofuels. In this paper I (...) examine what biofuel certificates are, what they can achieve and what their limitations are. Methodologically, I will evaluate them using the standards of instrumental, practical and communicative rationality. With regard to instrumental rationality, I conclude that the EU RED makes an important but unjustified assumption in demanding certified biofuels for its target: that if biofuel production is sustainable, then biofuel use is too. I also argue that, where the EU assumes that biofuel certification is a sufficient means to achieve the EU RED’s goals, it is at best an insufficient means and at worst not a means at all towards achieving these goals. With regard to practical rationality, I argue that more attention needs to be paid to trade-offs between different goals in the EU RED, particularly with regard to providing investor security and not capping transport energy consumption. With regard to communicative rationality, I argue that the policy-making process of the EU RED has been seriously flawed, and that certification development processes also can improve significantly. (shrink)

How might a theory of communicative rationality be applied to policymaking to secure the morally justifiable administration of public education? In answer, Darron Kelly uses conceptual resources found in Habermasian practical discourse to outline development of a survey instrument. The survey is designed to measure constituent satisfaction with actual conditions of educational policymaking. To do this, the survey operationalizes and quantifies the epistemic conditions of inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and noncoercion. Once captured, analysis of these conditions in actual cases (...) of policymaking further provides for assessment of the degree of communicative agency and rational trust experienced by educational constituents. The instrument, as such, offers a standard gauge of the higher-level intersubjectivity of institutional communication in education — a necessary measure for constructing morally justifiable policies. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present a case for the value of argumentation as an instrument of rational persuasion in doctor-patient (and general health professional–patient) communication. By doing so, I also emphasize the value of argumentation theory—as a body of knowledge devoted to the study of argumentation—both to enrich the study of doctor-patient communication and to enhance its quality by contributing to dedicated training courses for health professionals and patient education interventions. Argumentation is used in health professional–patient interactions, (...) and its significance in this context has been acknowledged in recent literature (see the collection of articles in Rubinelli and .. (shrink)

Contractarian theories are meant to settle the issue of when political authority meets the conditions of rational legitimacy. The author addresses the same issue, but using different premises and a different conceptual frame. He takes as his point of departure the two basic problems which rational collective will‐formation refers to ‐ conflict‐resolution and goal attainment. He then introduces the codes of law and power, with which such will‐formation can be institutionalized. The legitimation gap that then still remains open can be (...) filled by a practical reason which is not limited simply to morality but also permeates the procedures of law application, policy‐formation and legislation. These preliminary considerations remain within the limits of a thought‐experiment. (shrink)