In the United States, judicialrulings that unrealistically addressed the complexityof cases and demonstrated limited understanding ofprinciples, helped to create a legal quagmire whichlegislatures had to confront. Moreover, thelegislative response was often slow and inadequate interms of both the scope and clarity of the laws. However, since the 1970s, progress has been made onmany fronts, particularly in regard to advancedirectives dealing with end-of-life decisions. Thedebate over physician-assisted suicide has spawned arepetition of moral and legal arguments. Thoseagainst legalization have (...) failed to make a realisticappraisal of the dilemmas facing patients and theirfamilies in an age of technological medicine deliveredin the context of the marketplace. The underlyingproblem is a system in dire need of reform that willno longer treat health care as a commodity of themarketplace and provide universal health care. Terminal care as an integral part of health care willsubstantially benefit from such reforms because amajor obstacle to comprehensive palliative care is thecondition of the present system. (shrink)

A review of the literature was conducted to better understand the (potential) role of mental health professionals in physician-assisted suicide. Numerous studies indicate that depression is one of the most commonly encountered psychiatric illnesses in primary care settings. Yet, depression consistently goes undetected and undiagnosed by nonpsychiatrically trained primary care physicians. Noting the well-studied link between depression and suicide, it is necessary to question giving sole responsibility of assisting patients in making end-of-life treatment decisions to (...) these physicians. Unfortunately, the use of mental health consultation by these physicians is not a common occurrence. Greater involvement of mental health professionals in this emerging and debated area is advocated. Beyond describing mental health professionals' role in the assessment of patient competency or decision making capacity, other areas of potential involvement are described. A discussion of ethical principles relevant to this area follows, along with comments on the training necessary to adequately serve patient needs. (shrink)

BackgroundRelatives have no formal position in the practice of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EAS) according to Dutch legislation. However, research shows that physicians often involve relatives in EAS decision-making. It remains unclear why physicians do (not) want to involve relatives. Therefore, we examined how many physicians in the Netherlands involve relatives in EAS decision-making and explored reasons for (not) involving relatives and what involvement entails.MethodsIn a mixed-methods study, 746 physicians (33% response rate) completed (...) a questionnaire, and 20 were interviewed. The questionnaire included two statements on relatives’ involvement in EAS decision-making. Descriptive statistics were used, and multivariable logistic regression analyses to explore characteristics associated with involving relatives. In subsequent interviews, we explored physicians’ views on involving relatives in EAS decision-making. Interviews were thematically analysed.ResultsThe majority of physicians want to know relatives’ opinions about an EAS request (80%); a smaller group also takes these opinions into account in EAS decision-making (35%). Physicians who had ever received an explicit EAS request were more likely to want to know opinions and clinical specialists and elderly care physicians were more likely to take these opinions into account. In interviews, physicians mentioned several reasons for involving relatives: e.g. to give relatives space and help them in their acceptance, to tailor support, to be able to perform EAS in harmony, and to mediate in case of conflicting views. Furthermore, physicians explained that relatives’ opinions can influence the decision-making process but cannot be a decisive factor. If relatives oppose the EAS request, physicians find the process more difficult and try to mediate between patients and relatives by investigating relatives’ objections and providing appropriate information. Reasons for not taking relatives’ opinions into account include not wanting to undermine patient autonomy and protecting relatives from a potential burdensome decision.ConclusionsAlthough physicians know that relatives have no formal role, involving relatives in EAS decision-making is common practice in the Netherlands. Physicians consider this important as relatives need to continue with their lives and may need bereavement support. Additionally, physicians want to perform EAS in harmony with everyone involved. However, relatives’ opinions are not decisive. (shrink)

In a recent article Joshua James Hatherley argues that, if physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is morally permissible for patients suffering from somatic illnesses, it should be permissible for psychiatric patients as well. He argues that psychiatric disorders do not necessarily impair decision-making ability, that they are not necessarily treatable and that legalising PAS for psychiatric patients would not diminish research and therapeutic interest in psychiatric treatments or impair their recovery through loss of hope. However, by erasing (...) distinction between somatic and psychiatric disorders on those grounds, he also erases distinction between healthy adults and patients (whether somatic or psychiatric) essentially implying that PAS should be available to all, for all reasons or, ultimately no reason. Furthermore, as psychiatric patients are much more likely to be a source of usable organs for transplantation, their broad inclusion would strengthen the link between PAS/euthanasia and organ donation, potentially undermining both as well as diminishing already declining general trust in medical authorities and professionals and public health authorities and activists. (shrink)

Discussions in Germany regarding appropriate end-of-life decision-making have been heavily influenced by the liberalization of access to physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia in the Netherlands and Belgium. These discussions disclose conflicting moral views regarding the propriety of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, threatening conflicts within not only the medical profession, but also the mainline churches in Germany, whose membership now entertains views regarding end-of-life decision-making at odds with traditional Christian doctrine. (...) On the surface, there appears to be a broad consensus supporting the hospice movement and condemning physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. The German Supreme Court has held that treatment decisions should, in absence of known patients’ wishes, be made in light of commonly shared values, unless these violate the principle of “in dubio pro vita”. The Roman Catholic church and the Evangelical Lutheran church in Germany have developed an advance directive for treatment choices at the end of life, while condemning physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. This stance is in tension with the strong emerging support for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, a development that promises to open up foundational disagreements within mainline German Christianity regarding the appropriate approach to intentionally terminating human life. (shrink)

Although we should respect the autonomy of our patients and engage in shared decision-making with them, the debate over Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS) has not given sufficient attention to other principles that need to be addressed in these discussions. In trying to offer a sound ethical analysis of this movement, we must weigh consequences that go beyond the individual patient and the physician. Concerns about the unintended consequences of PAS to the social dimension of (...) human life are explored in this paper. (shrink)

Advocates of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) often argue that, although the provision of PAS is morally permissible for persons with terminal, somatic illnesses, it is impermissible for patients suffering from psychiatric conditions. This claim is justified on the basis that psychiatric illnesses have certain morally relevant characteristics and/or implications that distinguish them from their somatic counterparts. In this paper, I address three arguments of this sort. First, that psychiatric conditions compromise a person’s decision-making capacity. Second, that (...) we cannot have sufficient certainty that a person’s psychiatric condition is untreatable. Third, that the institutionalisation of PAS for mental illnesses presents morally unacceptable risks. I argue that, if we accept that PAS is permissible for patients with somatic conditions, then none of these three arguments are strong enough to demonstrate that the exclusion of psychiatric patients from access to PAS is justifiable. (shrink)

Family members do not have an official position in the practice of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide in the Netherlands according to statutory regulations and related guidelines. However, recent empirical findings on the influence of family members on EAS decision-making raise practical and ethical questions. Therefore, the aim of this review is to explore how family members are involved in the Dutch practice of EAS according to empirical research, and to map out themes that could (...) serve as a starting point for further empirical and ethical inquiry. A systematic mixed studies review was performed. The databases Pubmed, Embase, PsycInfo, and Emcare were searched to identify empirical studies describing any aspect of the involvement of family members before, during and after EAS in the Netherlands from 1980 till 2018. Thematic analysis was chosen as method to synthesize the quantitative and qualitative studies. Sixty-six studies were identified. Only 14 studies had family members themselves as study participants. Four themes emerged from the thematic analysis. 1) Family-related reasons to request EAS. 2) Roles and responsibilities of family members during EAS decision-making and performance. 3) Families’ experiences and grief after EAS. 4) Family and ‘the good euthanasia death’ according to Dutch physicians. Family members seem to be active participants in EAS decision-making, which goes hand in hand with ambivalent feelings and experiences. Considerations about family members and the social context appear to be very important for patients and physicians when they request or grant a request for EAS. Although further empirical research is needed to assess the depth and generalizability of the results, this review provides a new perspective on EAS decision-making and challenges the Dutch ethical-legal framework of EAS. Euthanasia decision-making is typically framed in the patient-physician dyad, while a patient-physician-family triad seems more appropriate to describe what happens in clinical practice. This perspective raises questions about the interpretation of autonomy, the origins of suffering underlying requests for EAS, and the responsibilities of physicians during EAS decision-making. (shrink)

Background: Issues concerning legislation and regulation with respect to the role of nurses in euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide gave the Minister for Health reason to commission a study of the role of nurses in medical end-of-life decisions in hospitals, home care and nursing homes.Aim: This paper reports the findings of a study of the role of nurses in euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, conducted as part of a study of the role of nurses in medical (...) end-of-life decisions. The findings for hospitals, home care and nursing homes are described and compared.Method: A questionnaire was sent to 1509 nurses, employed in 73 hospitals, 55 home care organisations and 63 nursing homes. 1179 responses were suitable for analysis. The questionnaire was pilot-tested among 106 nurses, with a response rate of 85%.Results: In 37.0% of cases, the nurse was the first person with whom patients discussed their request for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. Consultation between physicians and nurses during the decision-making process took place quite often in hospitals and nursing homes and less frequently in home care situations . In some cases , nurses administered the euthanatics.Conclusions: The results show substantial differences between the intramural sector and the extramural sector , which are probably linked to the organisational structure of the institutions. Consultation between physicians and nurses during the decision-making process needs improvement, particularly in home care. Some nurses had administered euthanatics, although this task is by law exclusively reserved to physicians. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that depression and suicide are natural kinds insofar as they are classes of abnormal behavior underwritten by sets of stable biological mechanisms. In particular, depression and suicide are neurobiological kinds characterized by disturbances in serotonin functioning that affect various brain areas (i.e., the amygdala, anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus). The significance of this argument is that the natural (biological) basis of depression and suicide allows for reliable projectable inferences (i.e., predictions) to (...) be made about individual members of a kind. In the context of assisted suicide, inferences about the decision-making capacity of depressed individuals seeking physician-assisted suicide are of special interest. I examine evidence that depression can hamper the decision-making capacity of individuals seeking assisted suicide and discuss some implications. (shrink)

This article explores the use of empirical data when considering whether to legalize physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and voluntary euthanasia. In particular, it focuses on the evidence available to the Select Committee for the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill on whether or not covert euthanasia is taking place in the UK under the current prohibition of PAS and voluntary euthanasia. The article shows that there is an insufficient evidentiary basis to make any claims about the (...) extent of covert euthanasia within the UK, although there is sufficient evidence to conclude that instances of covert euthanasia do happen. The article also calls for more research to be conducted in order to determine the rate of covert euthanasia in order to inform debate about the legalization of end-of-life decisions such as PAS and voluntary euthanasia. (shrink)

Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of providing an important contribution to the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS should be guaranteed as a right to make decisions in accordance with the conception of the good the individual formulates as a rational being. This defense is supported, therefore, by a Kantian premise. But it is also possible to oppose this kind of proposal by relying on differentaspects of Kant’s theory, i.e. on some variant of the famous argument (...) against suicide based on the means/end formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I try to show that these attempts are not well founded, and that the Rawlsian appeal to the Kantian tradition divulges better perspectives. I also try to add considerations inspired by contextualist epistemology to the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens ofjudgment. (shrink)

Euthanasia and physician assisted-suicide are terms used to describe the process in which a doctor of a sick or disabled individual engages in an activity which directly or indirectly leads to their death. This behavior is engaged by the healthcare provider based on their humanistic desire to end suffering and pain. The psychiatrist's involvement may be requested in several distinct situations including evaluation of patient capacity when an appeal for euthanasia is requested on grounds of terminal somatic (...) illness or when the patient is requesting euthanasia due to mental suffering. We compare attitudes of 49 psychiatrists towards euthanasia and assisted suicide with a group of 54 other physicians by means of a questionnaire describing different patients, who either requested physician-assisted suicide or in whom euthanasia as a treatment option was considered, followed by a set of questions relating to euthanasia implementation. When controlled for religious practice, psychiatrists expressed more conservative views regarding euthanasia than did physicians from other medical specialties. Similarly female physicians and orthodox physicians indicated more conservative views. Differences may be due to factors inherent in subspecialty education. We suggest that in light of the unique complexity and context of patient euthanasia requests, based on their training and professional expertise psychiatrists are well suited to take a prominent role in evaluating such requests to die and making a decision as to the relative importance of competing variables. (shrink)

If the Supreme Court affirms either Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington or Quill v. Vacco, state legislatures will be presented with a new and unwelcome task: regulating physician-assisted suicide. This article focuses on the states task of specific policy making in light of the due process reasoning in Compassion in Dying and the equal protection reasoning in Quill. Policy makers must try to predict whether a particular regulation would in practice achieve its intended objective. (...) They must also try to predict whether the regulation would survive constitutional review if challenged. Finally, they must consider the extent to which they could, or should, maintain two different regulatory regimes: a more permissive one for decisions to forgo life-sustaining medical treatments, and a more restrictive one for decisions to obtain a prescription for a lethal dose of medication. This last issue will be especially challenging if the equal protection analysis in Quill prevails. (shrink)

This article presents the attitudes of nurses towards three issues concerning their role in euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. A questionnaire survey was conducted with 1509 nurses who were employed in hospitals, home care organizations and nursing homes. The study was conducted in the Netherlands between January 2001 and August 2004. The results show that less than half of nurses would be willing to serve on committees reviewing cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. More than (...) half of the nurses found it too far-reaching to oblige physicians to consult a nurse in the decision-making process. The majority of the nurses stated that preparing euthanatics and inserting an infusion needle to administer the euthanatics should not be accepted as nursing tasks. The findings are discussed in the context of common practices and policies in the Netherlands, and a recommendation is made not to include these three issues in new regulations on the role of nurses in euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. (shrink)

This article presents the attitudes of nurses towards three issues concerning their role in euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. A questionnaire survey was conducted with 1509 nurses who were employed in hospitals, home care organizations and nursing homes. The study was conducted in the Netherlands between January 2001 and August 2004. The results show that less than half (45%) of nurses would be willing to serve on committees reviewing cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. More (...) than half of the nurses (58.2%) found it too far-reaching to oblige physicians to consult a nurse in the decision-making process. The majority of the nurses stated that preparing euthanatics (62.9%) and inserting an infusion needle to administer the euthanatics (54.1%) should not be accepted as nursing tasks. The findings are discussed in the context of common practices and policies in the Netherlands, and a recommendation is made not to include these three issues in new regulations on the role of nurses in euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. (shrink)

Following a Canadian Supreme Court ruling invalidating an absolute prohibition on physician assisted dying, two reports and several commentators have recommended that the Canadian criminal law allow medical assistance in dying (MAID) for persons with a diagnosis of mental disorder. A key element in this process is that the person requesting MAID be deemed to have the ‘mental capacity’ or ‘mental competence’ to consent to that option. In this context, mental capacity and mental competence refer to ‘decision- (...) class='Hi'>making capacity’, which is a distinct area of clinical study and research in the theory of informed consent. The purpose of this discussion is to bring several controversial but insufficiently acknowledged problems associated with decision-making capacity to the forefront of the proposed extension of MAID to persons diagnosed with mental disorders. Open-ended access to MAID by persons who suffer from mental health conditions already exists in Belgium and the Netherlands, where the issues raised here are equally relevant. In this paper, we highlight the serious limitations of relying on capacity assessments to allow access to MAID/Euthanasia. (shrink)

In many countries the debate over the role that physicians may play in ending life has been limited to the judiciary and other law making institutions, professional medical organizations; and academics. Because of their multidisciplinary and diverse membership, ethics committees may be a particularly appropriate venue through which these discussions can be expanded to include a much larger community. In addition, ethics committees generally act in only advisory capacities because they do not actually make decisions, so they may provide (...) a forum for open discussions in ways that the court and the medical boards cannot. (shrink)

Background: Debates over legalisation of physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia often warn of a “slippery slope”, predicting abuse of people in vulnerable groups. To assess this concern, the authors examined data from Oregon and the Netherlands, the two principal jurisdictions in which physician-assisted dying is legal and data have been collected over a substantial period.Methods: The data from Oregon comprised all annual and cumulative Department of Human Services reports 1998–2006 and three independent studies; the data from (...) the Netherlands comprised all four government-commissioned nationwide studies of end-of-life decision making and specialised studies. Evidence of any disproportionate impact on 10 groups of potentially vulnerable patients was sought.Results: Rates of assisted dying in Oregon and in the Netherlands showed no evidence of heightened risk for the elderly, women, the uninsured , people with low educational status, the poor, the physically disabled or chronically ill, minors, people with psychiatric illnesses including depression, or racial or ethnic minorities, compared with background populations. The only group with a heightened risk was people with AIDS. While extralegal cases were not the focus of this study, none have been uncovered in Oregon; among extralegal cases in the Netherlands, there was no evidence of higher rates in vulnerable groups.Conclusions: Where assisted dying is already legal, there is no current evidence for the claim that legalised PAS or euthanasia will have disproportionate impact on patients in vulnerable groups. Those who received physician-assisted dying in the jurisdictions studied appeared to enjoy comparative social, economic, educational, professional and other privileges. (shrink)

In 2017, Italy passed a law that provides for a systematic discipline on informed consent, advance directives, and advance care planning. It ranges from decisions contextual to clinical necessity through the tool of consent/refusal to decisions anticipating future events through the tools of shared care planning and advance directives. Nothing is said in the law regarding the issue of physician assisted suicide. Following the DJ Fabo case, the Italian Constitutional Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy of article 580 (...) of the criminal code in the part in which it does not exclude the punishment of those who facilitate the suicide when the decision has been freely and autonomously made by a person kept alive by life-support treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology, the source of physical or psychological suffering that he/she considers intolerable, but fully capable of making free and conscious decisions. Such conditions and methods of execution must be verified by a public structure of the national health service, after consulting the territorially competent ethics committee. This statement admits, within strict and regulated bounds, physician assisted suicide, so widening the range of end-of-life decisions for Italian patients. Future application and critical topics will be called into question by the Italian legislator. (shrink)

To describe the content of practice guidelines on euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) and to compare differences between settings and guidelines developed before or after enactment of the euthanasia law in 2002 by means of a content analysis. Most guidelines stated that the attending physician is responsible for the decision to grant or refuse an EAS request. Due care criteria were described in the majority of guidelines, but aspects relevant for assessing these criteria were not always (...) described. Half of the guidelines described the role of the nurse in the performance of euthanasia. Compared with hospital guidelines, nursing home guidelines were more often stricter than the law in excluding patients with dementia (30% vs 4%) and incompetent patients (25% vs 4%). As from 2002, the guidelines were less strict in categorically excluding patients groups (32% vs 64%) and in particular incompetent patients (10% vs 29%). Healthcare institutions should accurately state the boundaries of the law, also when they prefer to set stricter boundaries for their own institution. Only then can guidelines provide adequate support for physicians and nurses in the difficult EAS decision-making process. (shrink)

Whether anorexic patients should be able to refuse treatment when this potentially has a fatal outcome is a vexed topic. A recent proposal for a new category of ‘terminal anorexia’ suggests criteria when a move to palliative care or even physician assisted suicide might be justified. I argue that this proposed diagnosis presents a false sense of certainty of the illness trajectory by conceptualizing anorexia in analogy with physical disorders and stressing the effects of starvation. Furthermore, this (...) conceptualization is in conflict with the claim that individuals who meet the diagnostic criteria for terminal anorexia have decision making capacity. It should therefore be rejected. (shrink)

Euthanasia and assisted suicide was openly permitted but not technically legal in the Netherlands for decades. In 2002, it was formally legalised through the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Review Procedures Act, subject to two main criteria: the patient had to be capable of making voluntary decisions and the patient had to experience unbearable suffering without prospect of improvement. Within the Netherlands, EAS has wide acceptance, and the public in general seems to (...) favour a liberal interpretation of both of these requirements. Physicians are expected to use ‘their own moral compass’ to decide about personal participation, and it is generally possible and permissible to find a substitute physician if the patient meets the legally required criteria but the physician is not comfortable assisting. Over the years, multiple quantitative and qualitative studies have explored the Dutch practice of EAS,1–3 but relatively little is known about the edges of what counts as meeting these criteria and how acceptable the practice is for physicians who participate. The study by Snijdewind et al gives a glimpse of these boundaries and suggests that at least sometimes the criteria are being stretched and adapted to meet the perceived needs of patients, and some participating physicians are relatively uncomfortable with some of the requests with which they are faced.4 Just how rare or common these ‘edgy’ cases are within the larger practice of EAS in the Netherlands cannot be answered by …. (shrink)

Background Care-dependency constitutes an important issue with regard to the approval of end-of-life decisions, yet attitudes towards assisted suicide and euthanasia are understudied among care-dependent older adults. We assessed attitudes towards assisted suicide and euthanasia and tested empirical correlates, including socio-demographics, religiosity, physical illness, psychological distress and social isolation. Methods A nationwide cross-sectional survey among older care allowance recipients in private households in Austria was conducted in 2016. In computer-assisted personal interviews, 493 respondents were asked (...) whether or not they approved of the availability of assisted suicide and euthanasia in case of long-term care dependency and whether or not they would consider using assisted suicide or euthanasia for themselves. Multiple logistic regression analysis was used to assess the impact of potential determinants of attitudes towards assisted suicide and euthanasia. Results About a quarter of the sampled care-dependent older adults approved of the availability of assisted suicide and euthanasia respectively indicated the will to make use of assisted suicide or euthanasia. Attitudes towards assisted suicide were most favourable among care-dependent older adults living in urban areas, those who did not trust physicians, those who reported active suicide ideation, and individuals with a strong fear of dying. With regard to euthanasia, living alone, religiosity and fear of dying were the central determinants of acceptance. Conclusions Positive attitudes towards and will to use assisted suicide and euthanasia were expressed by a substantial minority of care-dependent older adults in Austria and are driven by current psychological suffering and fear of the process of dying in the future. Community-based psychosocial care should be expanded to address psychological distress and fears about end-of-life issues among care-dependent older adults. (shrink)

Euthanasia and assisted suicide have been legally possible in the Netherlands since 2001, provided that statutory due care criteria are met, including: voluntary and well-considered request; unbearable suffering without prospect of improvement; informing the patient; lack of a reasonable alternative; independent second physician’s opinion. ‘Unbearable suffering’ must have a medical basis, either somatic or psychiatric, but there is no requirement of limited life expectancy. All EAS cases must be reported and are scrutinised by regional review committees. The (...) purpose of this study was to investigate whether any particular difficulties arise when the EAS due care criteria are applied to patients with an intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorder. The 416 case summaries available on the RTE website were searched for intellectual disability and autism spectrum disorder. Direct content analysis was used on these nine cases. Assessment of decisional capacity was mentioned in eight cases, but few details given; in two cases, there had been uncertainty or disagreement about capacity. Two patients had progressive somatic conditions. For most, suffering was due to an inability to cope with changing circumstances or increasing dependency; in several cases, suffering was described in terms of characteristics of living with an autism spectrum disorder, rather than an acquired medical condition. Some physicians struggled to understand the patient’s perspective. Treatment refusal was a common theme, leading physicians to conclude that EAS was the only remaining option. There was a lack of detail on social circumstances and how patients were informed about their prognosis. Autonomy and decisional capacity are highly complex for patients with intellectual disabilities and difficult to assess; capacity tests in these cases did not appear sufficiently stringent. Assessment of suffering is particularly difficult for patients who have experienced life-long disability. The sometimes brief time frames and limited number of physician-patient meetings may not be sufficient to make a decision as serious as EAS. The Dutch EAS due care criteria are not easily applied to people with intellectual disabilities and/or autism spectrum disorder, and do not appear to act as adequate safeguards. (shrink)

In the Netherlands, euthanasia and assisted suicide are formally forbidden by criminal law, but, under certain strictly formulated conditions, physicians are excused for administering these to patients on the basis of necessity. These conditions are bound up with a long process of criteria development. Therefore, physicians still live in uncertainty. Future court decisions may change the criteria. Apart from that, physicians can always be prosecuted. The position of nurses, however, is perfectly clear; they are never allowed to administer (...) euthanasia or assisted suicide. Nevertheless, they should be involved in the decision-making process because they are an important source of information and have consultation skills. The openness of the discussion about these issues in the Netherlands may prevent an escalation of medical or nursing responsibility and falling victim to the ‘slippery slope’. (shrink)

Next SectionBackground There is an established link between depression and interest in hastened death in patients who are seriously ill. Concern exists over the extent of depression in patients who actively request euthanasia/physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and those who have their requests granted. Objectives To estimate the prevalence of depression in refused and granted requests for euthanasia/PAS and discuss these findings. Methods A systematic review was performed in MEDLINE and PsycINFO in July 2010, identifying studies reporting rates of (...) depression in requests for and cases of euthanasia/PAS. One author critically appraised the strength of the data using published criteria. Results 21 studies were included covering four countries. There was considerable heterogeneity in methods of assessing depression and selecting patients. In the highest quality studies, in the Netherlands and Oregon, 8–47% of patients requesting euthanasia/PAS had depressive symptoms and 2–17% of completed euthanasia/PAS cases had depressive symptoms. In the Netherlands, depression was significantly higher in refused than granted requests, and there was no significant difference in the rate of depression between euthanasia cases and similar patients who had not made a request for euthanasia. Conclusion It is unclear whether depression increases the probability of making a request for euthanasia/PAS, but in the Netherlands most requests in depressed patients are rejected, leaving a depression rate in cases that is similar to the surrounding population. Less evidence is available elsewhere, but some level of depression has been identified in patients undergoing euthanasia/PAS in all the countries studied. Whether the presence of depression is ever compatible with an ethical decision on euthanasia/PAS is discussed. (shrink)

The traditional Christian focus concerning dying is on repentance, not dignity. The goal of a traditional Christian death is not a pleasing, final chapter to life, but union with God: holiness. The pursuit of holiness requires putting on Christ and accepting His cross. In contrast, post-traditional Christian and secular concerns with self-determination, control, dignity, and self-esteem make physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia plausible moral choices. Such is not the case within the context of the traditional Christian (...) experience of God, which throughout its 2000 years has sternly condemned suicide and assisted suicide. The wrongness of such actions cannot adequately be appreciated outside the experience of that Christian life. Traditional Christian appreciations of death involve an epistemology and metaphysics of values in discordance with those of secular morality. This difference in the appreciation of the meaning of dying and death, as well as in the appreciation of the moral significance of suicide, discloses a new battle in the culture wars separating traditional Christian morality from that of the surrounding society. (shrink)

Objectives: to assess physicians’ and patients’ views in Saudi Arabia towards involving the patient versus the family in the process of diagnosis disclosure and decision-making, and to compare them with views from the USA and Japan.Design: A self-completion questionnaire was translated to Arabic and validated.Participants: Physicians from different specialties and ranks and patients in a hospital or attending outpatient clinics from 6 different regions in KSA.Results: In the case of a patient with incurable cancer, 67% of doctors and (...) 51% of patients indicated that they would inform the patient in preference to the family of the diagnosis . Assuming the family already knew, 56% of doctors and 49% of patients would tell the patient even if family objected . However, in the case of HIV infection, 59% of physicians and 81% of patients would inform the family about HIV status without the patient’s consent . With regards to withholding ventilatory support, about 50% of doctors and over 60% of patients supported the use of mechanical ventilation in a patient with advanced cancer, regardless of the wishes of the patient or the family. Finally, the majority of doctors and patients were against assisted suicide.Conclusions: Although there was more recognition for a patient’s autonomy amongst physicians, most patients preferred a family centred model of care. Views towards information disclosure were midway between those of the USA and Japan. Distinctively, however, decisions regarding life prolonging therapy and assisted suicide were not influenced to a great extent by wishes of the patient or family, but more likely by religious beliefs. (shrink)

Introduction: The Dutch Euthanasia Act states that euthanasia is not punishable if the attending physician acts in accordance with the statutory due care criteria. These criteria hold that: there should be a voluntary and well-considered request, the patient’s suffering should be unbearable and hopeless, the patient should be informed about their situation, there are no reasonable alternatives, an independent physician should be consulted, and the method should be medically and technically appropriate. This study investigates whether physicians experience problems (...) with these criteria in medical practice.Methods: In 2006, questionnaires were sent to a random, stratified sample of 2100 Dutch physicians . Physicians were asked about problems in their decision-making related to requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide after enforcement of the 2002 Euthanasia Act.Results: Of all physicians who had received a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide , 25% had experienced problems in the decision-making with regard to at least one of the criteria of due care. Physicians who had experienced problems mostly indicated to have had problems related to evaluating whether or not the patient’s suffering was unbearable and hopeless and whether or not the patient’s request was voluntary or well considered .Discussion: Physicians in The Netherlands most frequently reported problems related to aspects in which they have to evaluate the patient’s subjective perspective. However, it can be questioned whether placing emphasis on these subjective aspects is an adequate fulfilment of the duties imposed on physicians, as laid down in the Dutch Euthanasia Act. (shrink)

Until recently, physician assisted suicide was dealt with on the same basis as active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. Over the last years, several cases relating to assistance in suicide of mental patients did raise specific issues, not addressed so far in the debate on euthanasia. One of these cases resulted in a Supreme Court decision. The paper summarizes this decision and comments on it from a legal point of view.

In an age of rapid advances inlife-prolonging treatment, patients and caregivers areincreasingly facing tensions in making end-of-lifedecisions. An examination of the history of healthcare in the United States reveals technological,economic, and medical factors that have contributed tothe problems of terminal care and consequently to themovement of assisted suicide. The movement has itsroots in at least two fundamental perceptions andexpectations. In the age of technological medicineenergized by the profit motive, dying comes at a highprice in suffering and in (...) personal economic loss. Thefailure to provide affordable resources for terminalcare is the result of the marketplace in health care. The medical profession has been painfully slow inresponding to the challenges of terminal care, mainlybecause of the pressures of the marketplace and lackof adequate training. This has occurred at a time ofrapid advances in life-sustaining treatment and ofexpanding public awareness of personal rights underthe law. Overly aggressive treatment in the finalstages of terminal illness has enhanced anxieties overa painfully prolonged and expensive dying. Thesefactors have promoted the movement to assistedsuicide. In the U.S. debate of the issues, ethiciststend to argue abstractly without examiningadequately the context of terminal care that is thehealth care system. It is a system in dire need of areform that will remove it from the marketplace. (shrink)

Many bioethicists have recently shifted from using “physician-assisted suicide” (PAS) to “medical aid-in-dying” (MAID) to refer to the act of voluntarily hastening one’s death with the assistance of a medical provider. This shift was made to obscure the practice’s connection to “suicide.” However, as the charge of “suicide” is fundamental to arguments against the practice, “MAID” can only be used by its proponents. The result has been the fragmentation of the bioethical debate. By highlighting the (...) role of human agency—as opposed to natural processes—in causing death, the term “PAS” makes it easier both to perceive potential risks to vulnerable populations and to affirm suicide as a potentially autonomous choice. As such, “PAS” thus more transparently expresses the arguments of both supporters and opponents of the “right to die,” while avoiding the unnecessary stigmatization of suicide and suicidal people which is a result of the usage of “MAID.”. (shrink)

Some disability rights (DR) advocates oppose physician-assisted suicide (PAS) laws like Oregon’s on the grounds that they reflect ableist prejudice: how else can their limit on PAS eligibility to the terminally ill be explained? The paper answers this DR objection. It concedes that the limit in question cannot be defended on soft paternalist grounds, and offers a hard paternalist defense of it. The DR objection makes two mistakes: it overlooks the possibility of a hard paternalist defense of (...) the limit, and it confuses terminal illness, which is at best one type of disability, with disability itself. (shrink)

Background: Legislation on physician-assisted suicide is being considered in a number of states since the passage of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act in 1994. Opinion assessment surveys have historically assessed particular subsets of physicians.Objective: To determine variables predictive of physicians’ opinions on PAS in a rural state, Vermont, USA.Design: Cross-sectional mailing survey.Participants: 1052 physicians licensed by the state of Vermont.Results: Of the respondents, 38.2% believed PAS should be legalised, 16.0% believed it should be prohibited and 26.0% (...) believed it should not be legislated. 15.7% were undecided. Males were more likely than females to favour legalisation . Physicians who did not care for patients through the end of life were significantly more likely to favour legalisation of PAS than physicians who do care for patients with terminal illness . 30% of the respondents had experienced a request for assistance with suicide.Conclusions: Vermont physicians’ opinions on the legalisation of PAS is sharply polarised. Patient autonomy was a factor strongly associated with opinions in favour of legalisation, whereas the sanctity of the doctor–patient relationship was strongly associated with opinions in favour of not legislating PAS. Those in favour of making PAS illegal overwhelmingly cited moral and ethical beliefs as factors in their opinion. Although opinions on legalisation appear to be based on firmly held beliefs, approximately half of Vermont physicians who responded to the survey agree that there is a need for more education in palliative care and pain management. (shrink)

Although in Italy there is currently no effective law on physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, Decision No. 242 issued by the Italian Constitutional Court on September 25, 2019 established that an individual who, under specific circumstances, has facilitated the implementation of an independent and freely-formed resolve to commit suicide by another individual is exempt from criminal liability. Following this ruling, some citizens have submitted requests for assisted suicide to the public health system, generating a (...) situation of great uncertainty in the application processes. As a matter of fact, shared and defined procedures are lacking as Decision 242/2019 merely added some principles on which the legislature will have to base its future intervention. This paper analyses the advisory role that the Decision attributes to territorial ethics committees with the aim of stimulating discussions on their role in oversight mechanisms. The proposed conclusion is that the envisaged role does not appear consistent with the functions of these bodies and is ultimately substantially undefined and unjustified. (shrink)

There is a growing trend among some physicians, psychiatrists, bioethicists, and other mental health professionals not to treat physician-assisted suicide (PAS) as suicide. The grounds for doing so are that PAS fundamentally differs from other suicides. Perhaps most notably, in 2017 the American Association of Suicidology argued that PAS is distinct from the behavior that their organization seeks to prevent. This paper compares and contrasts suicide and PAS in order to see how much overlap there (...) is. Contrary to the emerging view that emphasizes their differences, I argue that there is significant overlap such that we ought not to separate PAS into its own category, making it diverge from how we think about and address suicide more generally. I start by examining several prominent theories of suicide and argue that PAS fits squarely within them. I then examine several apparent differences between PAS and other kinds of suicide and argue that these differences are merely apparent or they do not justify treating PAS as a fundamentally different kind of thing from suicide. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze the legal situation regarding physician-assisted suicide in the world. Our hypothesis is that the prohibitive stance on physician-assisted suicide in most societies in the world today seems to be related to our moral attitudes toward suicide. This brings us to a discussion about life itself. We claim that the total lack of legal protection for physician-assisted suicide from international organizations and most countries in the world (...) lies in a philosophical assumption that supports much of our common beliefs about what life really is. This assumption states that life must be thought of as not belonging exclusively to the individual. We argue that this assumption is a misconception that can be heard in the debate on suicide. Consequently we endorse a different conception of life which tends to favor a pro-choice stance towards suicide and assisted death in general. This position takes the patient’s decision about when to die more seriously. We conclude that there is no reason why physician-assisted suicide does not deserve legal protection as an individual right to die under international law. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel relational view of autonomy designed to overcome the inadequacies of procedural and substantive views of autonomy as they relate to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) requests for individuals with diminished cognitive functioning. Traditional and other relational views of autonomy regard a patient as an “isolated monad,” ignore patients with limited personal autonomy, and overlook the contexts in which decisions like PAS are made. However, these weaknesses become the strengths of a synthesized relational view of (...) autonomy, which enhances the personal autonomy of those with limited personal autonomy so that their PAS requests can be granted. (shrink)

I sometimes wonder whether some proponents of physician-assisted suicide or physician-assisted death think they own the copyright to such catchy phrases as “death with dignity” and “a good death” so that if you are against PAS or PAD, thenyou must be againsta dignified death or a good death. If one removes the quotation marks around phrases like “aid-in-dying” or “compassionate care for the dying,” I am not opposed to such end-of-life care either. Indeed, how couldanybodybe (...) against this type of care?I do not want to abandon dying patients anymore than Dr. Timothy Quill does. Although, unfortunately, it will not always be easy to achieve the desired result, I agree with him that it ought to be a goal of medicine “to help people die well, to help them receive a good death” — or at least “the best possible” death under the circumstances. I part company with Professor Quill, however, when he urges us to change the law in the majority of our states so that in some circumstances patients may achieve a “good death” or a “dignified” one by means of lethal drugs. (shrink)

Assisted suicide, many argue, honors self‐determination in returning control of their dying to patients themselves. But physician assistance and measures proposed to safeguard patients from coercion in fact return ultimate authority over this “private and deeply personal” decision to medicine and society.

As I write, I hear that Dr. Jack Kevorluan has delivered another victim to the emergency room of his local Michigan hospital. Why do physicians and terminally ill patients feel we need to change the law with respect to assisted suicide when a rogue pathologist, who has been stripped of his medical license, is allowed to pursue his appetite for providing his clients with inhalation treatments of carbon monoxide gas? If no court will convict this outlaw, what makes (...) the physicians and patients who brought Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington and Quill v. Vacco fear that any court would ever convict a licensed physician of assisting in a suicide when he/she writes one of her established patients a prescription for a short-acting barbiturate? Moreover, it is not even clear that laws against assisted suicide in most jurisdictions were ever intended to apply to the actions of licensed physicians. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs in the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals were clearly seeking some kind of redress, some kind of protection from potential legal claims they feared might be made against them. (shrink)

For more than two decades euthanasia and assisted suicide have been openly debated in the Netherlands. This development started in 1973 when the Regional Court in Leeuwarden decided a case in which a physician had administered a deadly dose of morphine to her terminally ill mother on the mother's serious and persistent request. In this case the court concluded that the average Dutch physician no longer considered it his or her duty to prolong a patient's life (...) under all circumstances. The court accepted that in specific cases a physician is allowed to prevent serious and irreversible suffering, even if the patient's life is short ened. This case was the first in which a legal opening for euthanasia or assisted suicide was created. In this specific case the physician was formally declared guilty, but the court gave her a suspended sentence of one week imprisonment. This decision started a debate on euthanasia and assisted suicide throughout all levels of Dutch society. (shrink)

Under other circumstances, I would have written an academic paper rehearsing the arguments for and against legalization of physician-assisted suicide: autonomy and the avoidance of pain and suffering on the pro side, the wrongness of killing, the integrity of the medical profession, and the risk of abuse, the “slippery slope,” on the con side. I’ve always supported the pro side. What this paper is, however, is a highly personal account of the challenges to my thinking about right-to-die (...) issues. In November 2008, my husband suffered a C2/C3 spinal cord injury in a bicycle collision, leaving him ventilator-dependent, almost completely paralyzed, and in the hospital—but fully alert and profoundly self-reflective. What if he wanted to die? This paper draws from two multimedia presentations—file:///Users/margaretbattin/Documents/BROOKE’S%20ACCIDENT/The%20Salt%20Lake%20Tribune %20%7C%20Multimedia:%20Metamorphosis.webarchive and file:///Users/margaretbattin/Documents/BROOKE’S%20ACCIDENT/The%20Salt%20Lake%20Tribune%20%7C%20Multi media:%20Learning%20to%20live%20again.webarchive—and personal material concerning quality of life (he’d rank at the bottom on the SF-36 and similar scales) and concerning autonomy (his own accounts, verbatim). This is a detailed portrait of a man whose life involves extraordinary suffering but also luminous experience some of the time. It only makes the question harder: What if he wanted to die? (shrink)

The euthanasia literature typically discusses the difference between “active” and “passive” means of ending a patient’s life. Physician-assisted suicide differs from both active and passive forms of euthanasia insofar as the physician does not administer the means of suicide to the patient. Instead, she merely prescribes and dispenses them to the patient and lets the patient “do the rest” – if and when the patient chooses. One supposed advantage of this process is that it maximizes (...) the patient’s autonomy with respect to both her decision to die and the dying process itself. Still, despite this supposed advantage, Oregon is the only state to have legalized physician-assisted suicide. After summarizing the most important Supreme Court opinions on euthanasia (namely, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health; Vacco v. Quill; Washington v. Glucksberg; and Gonzales v. Oregon), this paper argues that while there are no strong ethical reasons against legalizing physician-assisted suicide, there are some very strong policy reasons for keeping it criminal in the other forty-nine states. (shrink)

Respect for autonomy is typically considered a key reason for allowing physician assisted suicide and euthanasia. However, several recent papers have claimed this to be grounded in a misconception of the normative relevance of autonomy. It has been argued that autonomy is properly conceived of as a value, and that this makes assisted suicide as well as euthanasia wrong, since they destroy the autonomy of the patient. This paper evaluates this line of reasoning by investigating (...) the conception of valuable autonomy. Starting off from the current debate in end-of-life care, two different interpretations of how autonomy is valuable is discussed. According to one interpretation, autonomy is a personal prudential value, which may provide a reason why euthanasia and assisted suicide might be against a patient’s best interests. According to a second interpretation, inspired by Kantian ethics, being autonomous is unconditionally valuable, which may imply a duty to preserve autonomy. We argue that both lines of reasoning have limitations when it comes to situations relevant for end-of life care. It is concluded that neither way of reasoning can be used to show that assisted suicide or euthanasia always is impermissible. (shrink)

BackgroundThis research explores how the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the ways doctors make end-of-life decisions, particularly around Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR), treatment escalation and doctors’ views on the legalisation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.MethodsThe research was conducted between May and August 2021, during which COVID-19 hospital cases were relatively low and pressures on NHS resources were near normal levels. Data were collected via online survey sent to doctors of all levels and specialties, who have worked (...) in the NHS during the pandemic.Results231 participants completed the survey. The research found that over half of participants reported making more patients DNACPR than prepandemic, and this was due, at least in part, to an increased focus on factors including patient age, Clinical Frailty Scores and resource limitations. In addition, a sizeable minority of participants reported that they now had a higher threshold for escalating patients to ITU and a lower threshold for palliating patients, with many attributing these changes to formative experiences gained during the pandemic. Finally, our study found that there has not been a statistically significant change in the views of clinicians on the legalisation of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide since the start of the pandemic.ConclusionThe COVID-19 pandemic appears to have altered several aspects of end-of-life decision making, and many of these changes have remained even as COVID-19 hospital cases have declined. (shrink)

End-of-life decision making is fraught with ethical challenges. Withholding or withdrawing life support therapy is widely considered ethical in patients with high treatment burden, poor premorbid status, or significant projected disability even when such treatment is not ?futile.? Whether such withdrawal of therapy in the aftermath of attempted suicide is ethical is not well established in the literature. We provide a clinical vignette and propose criteria under which such withdrawal would be ethical. We suggest that it is (...) appropriate to withdraw life support, regardless of the cause of the critical illness or disability, when the following criteria are met: (1) Surrogates request withdrawal of care and the adequacy of surrogates is confirmed, (2) an external reasonability standard is met, (3) passage of time, perhaps 72 hours, to allow certainty regarding the patient's wishes, and (4) psychiatric morbidity should be considered as grounds for withdrawal only in truly treatment-refractory cases. Fundamentally, we believe the question to ask is, ?If this were not an attempted suicide, would a request to withdraw care be reasonable?? We believe that under these circumstances, such withdrawal of life support, even in an individual who has attempted suicide, does not constitute physician assistance with suicide and is distinct from physician aid-in-dying in several important respects. (shrink)

Objectives: To discover what factors affect lay people’s judgments of the acceptability of physician assisted suicide and euthanasia and how these factors interact.Design: Participants rated the acceptability of either physician assisted suicide or euthanasia for 72 patient vignettes with a five factor design—that is, all combinations of patient’s age ; curability of illness ; degree of suffering ; patient’s mental status , and extent of patient’s requests for the procedure .Participants: Convenience sample of 66 (...) young adults, 62 middle aged adults, and 66 older adults living in western France.Main measurements: In accordance with the functional theory of cognition of N H Anderson, main effects, and interactions among patient factors and participants’ characteristics were investigated by means of both graphs and ANOVA.Results: Patient requests were the most potent determinant of acceptability. Euthanasia was generally less acceptable than physician assisted suicide, but this difference disappeared when requests were repetitive. As their own age increased, participants placed more weight on patient age as a criterion of acceptability.Conclusions: People’s judgments concur with legislation to require a repetition of patients’ requests for a life ending act. Younger people, who frequently are decision makers for elderly relatives, place less emphasis on patient’s age itself than do older people. (shrink)

Survival is obviously important, but sometimes, under particular circumstances, life can become miserable, difficult, or intolerable; at that point, survival can seem like a punishment or misfortune. A patient who is in a vegetative state, unable to sustain life with dignity, and who is suffering from a terminal illness, has freedom to choose between life and death. The practice of "mercy killing," or euthanasia is an ongoing debate in the discussion of medical ethics. When it comes to making euthanasia (...) decisions for their incompetent patients, medical practitioners are faced with a problem. The moral dilemma of whether something is morally acceptable or not is moral in nature. The "end of life" issue is related to euthanasia should be legally acceptable under specific circumstances, such as when a patient is terminally sick, death is imminent, and treatment is unsuitable and ineffective. It is morally acceptable when a patient makes the autonomous decision to end his life or asks someone else to help him. In order to make an informed decision, the patient needs to be thoroughly informed about the diagnosis and prognosis of an incurable, deadly condition. However, in the context of a Muslim-majority population, where any argument for the legality of suicide (and, by extension, physician-assisted suicide) would be automatically rejected as contrary to Islamic moral and jurisprudential principles, this is an extraordinary request for the health service authorities of a developing country to consider. This paper discusses mainly non-voluntary active euthanasia. The discussion is conducted by giving a case study from Bangladesh. The situation in Bangladesh will also be examined in the paper's last section with regard to the permissibility of active euthanasia, specifically whether it can be done in our state given the socio-cultural-religious practices that are now in place. (shrink)