Political scientists and economists, most American, met in San Francisco in January 1998 for the annual meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. They pondered how, in light of new democracies throughout the world over the previous decade, democratic institutions can be better crafted to avoid some of the disillusionment that invariably follows the initial flush of enthusiasm. The 12 papers that emerged cover deliberation, decision, and enforcement; democracy beyond the nation state; and whether there are (...) limits to institutional design. Annotation copyrighted by Book News Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

Care as a concept has long been central to the nursing discipline, and care ethics have consequently found their place in nursing ethics discussions. This paper briefly revisits how care and care ethics have been theorized and applied in the discipline of nursing, with an emphasis on Tronto’s political view of care. Adding to the works of other nurse scholars, we consider that Tronto’s care ethics is useful to understand caring practices in a sociopolitical context. We also contend that this (...) vision can be used specifically to politicize nurses, by encouraging them to think critically about the context in which they work and how they can participate to change the status quo, notably by prompting the democratization of care in institutional settings. We illustrate this by demonstrating how moral distress that can occur with aggressive or futile treatments in the intensive care unit can be reduced if nurses are systematically included in the decision-making process. By showing some ways in which nursing political actions can begin to change the status quo as it pertains to futile treatments at the end of life, we can help empower nurses to strive to be included in political spaces and voice their concerns to have their professional needs met. (shrink)

This paper draws from two central intuitions that characterize modern western societies. The first is the normative claim that our identities should be recognized in an authentic way. The second intuition is that our common matters are best organized through democratic decision-making and democratic institutions. It is argued here that while deliberative democracy is a promising candidate for just organization of recognition relationships, it cannot fulfil its promise if recognition is understood either as recognition of ‘authentic’ collective identities (...) or as recognition of too atomistic or individualized subjects. If deliberative democracy is to be understood as successfully providing authentic recognition of individual identities, it requires a specific understanding of how individuals’ recognition needs and desires are collectively and institutionally constituted. Furthermore, it is argued that even if deliberative democracy can provide the necessary circumstances for individual self-realization, it comes with homogenizing tendencies and cannot fully avoid the problems of multiculturalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe manuscript offers a theoretical reflection on the concept of direct democratic institutions with the aim of shedding light on their institutional grammar. Specifically, it addresses the...

This article contributes to the debate concerning the identification of politically relevant cases of corruption in a democracy by sketching the basic traits of an original liberal theory of institutional corruption. We define this form of corruption as a deviation with respect to the role entrusted to people occupying certain institutional positions, which are crucial for the implementation of public rules, for private gain. In order to illustrate the damages that corrupt behaviour makes to liberal democratic institutions, we discuss (...) the case of health care professionals’ abuse of their right to conscientious objection to abortion services. We show that the conscience clause can be instrumentally abused to sabotage democratically established public rules and thus exert undue private influence on their implementation. In this sense, from a liberal democratic perspective, institutional corruption is problematic because it is disruptive of such fundamental liberal ideals as the impartiality of public institutions and citizens’ political equality. (shrink)

This is a book of applied political theory; one that attempts to span the gap between political philosophy and political science. Divided into three parts, the book focuses on several questions involving the identification, design, and implementation of those political institutions that will promote democratic values and practices and encourage the development of democratic societies.

Health-care goods are goods with peculiar properties, and where they are scarce, societies face potentially explosive distributional conflicts. Animated public and academic debates on the necessity and possible justice of limit-setting in health care have taken place in the last decades and have recently taken a turn toward procedural rather than substantial criteria for justice. This article argues that the most influential account of procedural justice in health-care rationing, presented by Daniels and Sabin, is indeterminate where concrete properties of rationing (...) institutions are concerned. Such properties inscribe substantial norms into institutions. These norms can derive validity only from democratic majority decisions, which must be seen as an instance of pure procedural justice. We therefore have to move the discussion to a meta-level and ask how concrete properties of institutions are being chosen. I suggest four criteria for sufficiently democratic institutional design choice and conclude that as institutional properties are likely to have effects on the resulting distribution of health care, design choices should be empirically informed and taken both democratically and deliberately. (shrink)

Professors Murphy and Choi use postmodern philosophy to expose an important source of racism and cultural domination. The metaphysics of domination is examined, along with institutions based on this foundation which they regard as repressive. Postmodernism is shown to be useful in conceptualizing and implementing a pluralistic polity.

This essay examines some of the institutional arrangements that underlie corruption in democracy. It begins with a discussion of institutions as such, elaborating and extending some of John Searle’s remarks on the topic. It then turns to an examination of specifically democratic institutions; it draws here on Joshua Cohen’s recent Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals. One of the central concerns of Cohen’s Rousseau is how to arrange civic institutions so that they are able to perform their public functions (...) without being easily abused by their members for individual gain. The view that Cohen sketches on behalf of Rousseau offers a clear framework for articulating institutional corruption in democracy. With this account of democratic institutions in place, the essay turns the discussion to the role of transparency in deterring institutional corruption. The basic thought here is perhaps unsurprising: to ensure that a democratic institution is serving its public function and not being manipulated for self-interested gain, its activities must be subject to public scrutiny, and so these activities must be transparent to the public. Saying this makes the role of transparency in a well-functioning democracy clear, but it does not settle how transparency is to be realized. The essay argues that transparency can be realized in a democracy only by an extra-governmental institution that has several of the familiar features of the press. If this is correct, it follows that in its design and in many, though not all, of its activities, WikiLeaks provides a contemporary example of such an institution. (shrink)

Each chapter of this dissertation develops a standard with which to evaluate and guide the improvement of a different node of a democratic system. In the first chapter, I consider the relationship between citizens, their environment, and the formal infrastructure of democracy. The standard for this node is democratic health, which is a feature of the social epistemic environment in which citizens operate. I argue that a democratically healthy environment is one that is conducive to the development of (...) citizens’ epistemic capacities to reason and communicate about their interests. I then demonstrate how political phenomena such as polarization pose social epistemic challenges to democratic health and argue that an epistemic conception of civic virtue can guide efforts to improve it. In the second chapter, I consider the relationship between representatives and their constituents under non-ideal conditions. The key standard for this node is systemic interest-responsiveness. I argue that observed public opinion and citizens’ values, commitments, and goals can stand in tension, and that representative democracies must be responsive to both factors. On this basis, I argue in favor of pairing independent administrative agencies with expanded forms of public input. In the third chapter, I consider how civic education can promote epistemic civic virtue. The key standard I develop here is the social epistemic public good. I argue that civic education can provide social epistemic benefits through its civic exchange function, which enables citizens to learn about the views and traditions of other citizens, and prepares them to effectively communicate with diverse others. Furthermore, I argue that this function can be pursued in the absence of widespread agreement about which values civic education should promote. (shrink)

Strict separation of church from a presumed ‘religion-blind’and strictly ‘neutral’state still is the preferred model in liberal, democratic, feminist, and socialist political theory. Focusing on the full, reciprocal relationships between society-culture-politics-nation-state and religions, this article makes a case in favor of ‘nonconstitutional pluralism’ in general, associative democracy in particular. Associative democracy recognizes religious diversity both individually and organizationally; it stimulates legitimate religious diversity; it prevents a hidden majority bias; and it provides a legitimate role for organized religions in the (...) provision of a wide range of services, including education, on one hand, and in the political process, on the other hand. That organized religions should be informed, heard, and consulted in contested issues should be a crucial component of democratic participation. This also might help prevent the development of religious fundamentalism. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to analyze the possibility of social justice as fair maximal utility starting from two different perspectives about justice – justice as fairness and justice as social choice or mutual advantage. The thesis I defend and reconstruct here is that a co-operative solution can be implemented only in a democratic society where a certain kind of justice principles is applied. This solution, however, is not a solution, if we do not really understand the principles which (...) are being involved in it or if we do not use a proper concept of justice. My proposal here could bring some light both upon this issue and on the logical clarification. In order to realize this, I take into account at least two problems: 1) the problem of compatibility between the announced concept and the existence of social inequalities; 2) Nozick’s objection concerning the compensation of inequalities involved by this kind of justice. I intend to analyze Rawls’ solution of compensatory beneficial in order to test whether it could be considered dangerous for the preservation of equidistance of the rules and, hence, for the justice as impartiality, as Nozick claims in his work Anarchy, State and Utopia, the concept of reasonability which is used here as being complementary to the concept of rationality and useful for this matter. (shrink)

This article examines the political crisis that has appeared in the constitutions of 28 democratic states. The units of analysis have been chosen using the criterion of a modern and formal constitution. Using the systemic paradigm, the article proposes an institutionalist ap- proach. After explaining the role of the main institutions, the article focuses itself on identifying the mechanisms of crisis as they are provided by constitutions (i.e. the vote of no-confidence, the motion of censure, the vacancy etc.). We (...) have observed that the correlation between the institutional arrangement and the number of crisis mechanisms is not very strong one. The article concludes that in order to explain the reaction of a political system towards a crisis situation it is not sufficient to draw on the constitution, an understanding of the political tradition and of the recent political experiences being absolutely necessary. (shrink)

Although democratic innovations are spread all over the world, there is little research on the institutional outcomes of implementing such innovations in governmental organisations. To remedy this, it is important to focus on cases where DIs have been implemented and formally connected to the policymaking process over a longer period. Reykjavik provides such a case. Drawing on observations and interviews with key stakeholders over a period of three years, this study analyses how the institutional logic of DIs influenced the (...) local government in Reykjavik. The study presents two conclusions: First, it is clear that one equilibrium has not been replaced by another. Second, there is no peaceful co-existence between the two, but instead the outcome is an organisation in ‘a state of flux’. There are several factors contributing to this outcome, but three stand out: a populist power-shift, dissatisfaction with theworking of the implemented DIs and deliberative ambiguity. In the final part of the article, the institutional outcome is discussed in relation to overall consequences for the political system. (shrink)

Steffen Ganghof’s Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism can improve existing typologies in comparative government and has great potential for discussions about democratic innovation and reform. So far, democratic innovations like deliberative mini-publics have remained mostly additive, leaving the underlying decision-making logics of representative political systems unchanged. Ganghof’s ideas can move debates about how deliberative democracy is to be institutionalized forward. Semi-parliamentary government constitutes an intriguing option to meet both demands for legislative flexibility and responsiveness to citizens’ concerns and demands (...) for stability and accountability. At the same time, I identify a limitation of the book in the fact that Ganghof’s normative theory of democracy remains thin. To appeal to citizens in constitutional reform processes, proposals for semi-parliamentary reform need to do more than reconcile conflicting visions of majority rule. They need to speak to democracy’s central promises of equal autonomy and rationality. (shrink)

This paper develops a normative framework for both conceptualizing and assessing various institutional possibilities for democratic modes of constitutional change, with special attention to the recent ferment of constitutional experimentation. The paper’s basic methodological orientation is interdisciplinary, combining research in comparative constitutionalism, political science and normative political philosophy. In particular, it employs a form of normative reconstruction: attempting to glean out of recent institutional innovations the deep political ideals such institutions embody or attempt to realize. Starting from the assumption (...) that contemporary constitutional democracies are attempting to realize the broader ideals of deliberative democratic constitution (ideals outlined briefly in the first section), the paper proposes an evaluative framework, comprised of six criteria, for assessing various mechanisms of constitutional change. It argues that democratic forms of constitutional change embody six distinct ideals—operationalizability, structural independence, democratic co-authorship, political equality, inclusive sensitivity, and reasons-responsiveness—and that these ideals can be used to gauge the normative worth of different mechanisms for carrying out such change. The framework is developed with reference to recent constitutional developments (e.g., in Venezuela, South Africa, Columbia, Bolivia, and Iceland) highlighting distinct criteria and showing how they appear to capture the general direction of institutional innovation. The paper conjectures that the set of six criteria yield the best normative reconstruction of the crucial ideals embodied in the constitutional change mechanisms of contemporary constitutional democracies, and so, ought to be used for purposes of evaluating institutional design proposals. (shrink)

Democratic institutions and practice depend on trust, in two ways. Citizens must trust each other to abide by shared rules and norms that together govern a political community; it is a feature of democratic states that they direct their resources not to enforcement of rule abidingness, but rather towards providing collective and public goods. Instead, states rely on the semi-voluntary compliance of citizens with these shared norms and laws. Citizens must also trust their political representatives, who via their (...) election are granted discretion to make decisions that will have significant impact on the lives of those they represent. Yet, according to many scholars across many disciplines, this trust is at risk of being undermined, if it hasn’t yet been so. The possible reasons for weakened and broken trust are many, ranging from escalating wealth inequalities, to increasing cultural and ethnic diversity, to political incompetence of both voters and political representatives, to corruption among political representatives. In this article, I examine the trust that underpins the discretion accorded to elected representatives, to identify when the improper use of this discretion may reasonably be thought to be a source of distrust. In particular, I argue that where discretion is used arbitrarily, it may threaten to undermine the trust relations between citizens and their representatives, and therefore the efficient and effective running of democratic states. (shrink)

Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People. by Josiah Ober Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. by Mogens Herman Hansen The Classical Athenian Democracy. by David Stockton The Greek Discovery of Politics. by Chistian Meier Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles. by Charles W. Fornara; Loren J. Samons II Freedom: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture. by Orlando Patterson.

Abstract In 1995, the constitution of the Mexican state of Oaxaca was reformed to recognise indigenous usages and customs for the election of municipal governments. This recognition is problematic from a normative perspective, as women, new?comers and dwellers in municipal sub?units are disenfranchised in a good number of indigenous municipalities of the state. Nevertheless, this article argues against a summary assessment of the (presumably illiberal) consequences of this recognition policy. Following James Tully, it advocates an intercultural, dialogical and inclusive procedure (...) to tackle the perils of the politics of recognition in Oaxaca and Mexico. However, this procedure?based approach raises problems of its own related to the issues of representation and intra?communal divisions. As a result, the ultimate role of substantive commitments, in particular to individual rights, needs to be recognised. Despite these shortcomings, though, an approach based on an intercultural, dialogical and inclusive conflict?solving procedure is the best option to deliver more just answers to indigenous demands for recognition. (shrink)

Theorists of affect and radical democracy have largely overlooked the importance of intentionally cultivating affective dynamics in the process of changing institutions. We address that lack by introducing the concept of musical groove as an intercorporeal feel for improvisational co-creation. Groove in a political context involves specific practices of modulating dynamics, receptivity, and affects in relationship to specific contexts, people, and practices to powerful effect. We explore how early democratic movements during the American Revolution sought to craft institutional forms (...) capacious enough for such democratic groove despite the fact that key intellectual leaders of the time, such as the Federalists and Benjamin Rush, feared the power of intercorporeal affective flows of democratic enthusiasm and popular improvisation. We read Rush’s critique and his efforts to diminish and control these emergences by harmonizing them in the order as a “negative image” of a radical democratic alternative that would foster improvisation and build enthusiasm for catalysing change today. We discuss how improvisation can, as Pierre Bourdieu perceived, simply function to reproduce the limits of a given socio-political game, which is deeply embedded within us as a “feel for the game” or set of affective dispositions. However, we turn Bourdieu’s own critique against itself to find openings for a habitus of political groove and democratic improvisation that he considered foreclosed. We conclude by fleshing out these insights in relation to affective dynamics among political organizing practices and modest institutional changes during a period of rich local transformation in which we participated in Durham, North Carolina. (shrink)

Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allowing participation by all citizens, democracy can accommodate diversity among citizens, and by considering the perspectives of all, via ballots or debate, democratic results can approximate what the balance of reasons favors. I consider whether, and under what conditions, democratic institutions might reliably make publicly justified social decisions. I argue that conventional accounts of democracy, constituted by voting or deliberation, are unlikely to be effective public (...) justification mechanisms. I conclude that the limitations of conventional mechanisms can be ameliorated through the use of lotteries instead of elections. (shrink)

Democracy establishes relationships of political equality, ones in which citizens equally share authority over what they do together and respect one another as equals. But in today's divided public square, democracy is challenged by political thinkers who disagree about how democratic institutions should be organized, and by antidemocratic politicians who exploit uncertainties about what democracy requires and why it matters. Democratic Equality mounts a bold and persuasive defense of democracy as a way of making collective decisions, showing how (...) equality of authority is essential to relating equally as citizens. James Lindley Wilson explains why the US Senate and Electoral College are urgently in need of reform, why proportional representation is not a universal requirement of democracy, how to identify racial vote dilution and gerrymandering in electoral districting, how to respond to threats to democracy posed by wealth inequality, and how judicial review could be more compatible with the democratic ideal. What emerges is an emphatic call to action to reinvigorate our ailing democracies, and a road map for widespread institutional reform. Democratic Equality highlights the importance of diverse forms of authority in democratic deliberation and electoral and representative processes—and demonstrates how that authority rests equally with each citizen in a democracy. (shrink)

This article critically reconstructs militant democracy’s ‘institutional conservatism’, a theoretical preference for institutions that restrain transformation. It offers two arguments, one historical and one normative. Firstly, it traces a historical development from a substantive to a procedural version of institutional conservatism from the traditional militant democratic thought of Schmitt, Loewenstein and Popper to the contemporary militant democratic theories of Kirshner and Rijpkema. Substantive institutional conservatisms theorize institutions that hinder transformation of the existing order; procedural conservatisms encourage transformation but (...) contain and limit it within the boundaries of existing institutions. Secondly, the article uses resources internal to this historical reconstruction to make the normative case that even the procedural version of institutional conservatism, which characterizes contemporary theories of militant democracy, is problematic from a democratic perspective. The reason for this is that it unjustifiably restricts fundamental democratic change to existing institutions. In conclusion, the article calls for further engagement with modes of democratic defence that do not limit the possibility of radical democratic change but nevertheless enable the protection of democratic institutions against authoritarian regression. (shrink)

This essay seeks to provide a justification for the ‘egalitarian authority claim’, according to which citizens of democratic states have a moral duty to obey (at least some) democratically made laws because they are the outcome of an egalitarian procedure. It begins by considering two prominent arguments that link democratic authority to a concern for equality. Both are ultimately unsuccessful; but their failures are instructive, and help identify the conditions that a plausible defense of the egalitarian authority claim (...) must meet. The first argument (discussed in Section II, after Section I clarifies what authority and democracy are taken to consist in) appeals to the simple idea that fairness disallows granting ourselves special privileges that we deny to others; and it suggests that fairness thus requires obeying democratic decisions rather than acting on our own judgment of the right policy. I show that this argument fails; and its failure indicates that we must invoke a less formal, more substantive understanding of equality to justify democratic authority. The second argument, recently suggested by Thomas Christiano, does just that. Democratic authority is, on this account, not justified by the formal demand for equal treatment but by the distinctive value of showing public equal respect to our fellow citizens. Such public equal respect requires treating as authoritative the democratic decisions in which citizens had an equal say. This argument does not, however, succeed in its goal either. While it plausibly establishes the value of democratic institutions, it does not provide grounds for a duty to obey democratic decisions (Section III). This essay thus develops an alternative argument, according to which egalitarian procedures have authority because, by obeying them, we can avoid acting on certain considerations that must be excluded from our intrinsically valuable egalitarian relationships. The authority of democratic decisions rests on the egalitarian fact that none of us has more of a say than any other, not on the further fact (crucial to the previous argument) that each of us has a positive say (Sections IV and V). The argument in turn helps us understand the limits of democratic authority: it is constrained not only by a demand for equality, and by considerations of justice, but also by a requirement of mutual concern without which our egalitarian relationships lack their distinctive value (Section VI). (shrink)

In the last few decades, the democratic credentials of global governance institutions have been extensively debated in the fields of international relations and political philosophy. However, despite their prominent role in the architecture of global governance, club governance institutions like the Group of Seven (G7) or the Group of Twenty (G20) have rarely been considered from the perspective of democratic theory. Focussing on the G20, this paper analyses its functions in international political practice and discusses whether, in exercising (...) these functions, the G20 exhibits a democratic deficit. As a standard of democracy, the analysis uses the all-affected principle, according to which all those who are affected by a policy decision should be given the opportunity to participate in decision-making. This paper identifies several democratic shortcomings of the G20, for instance related to the exclusion of citizens of non-member states and a lack of parliamentary and public control. By describing realisable reforms that could to some degree alleviate these shortcomings, it is shown that more democratic institutional alternatives are feasible. Thus, the ascription of a democratic deficit to the G20 is warranted. (shrink)

I agree with the critique of rationalism proposed by Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus in ?Disclosing New Worlds?. Today the defence of democracy requires us to understand that allegiance to democratic institutions can only rest on identification with the practices, the language?games, and the discourses which are constitutive of the democratic ?form of life?, and that it is not a question of providing them with a rational justification. My comments are developed in two directions. First, as a development of (...) their thesis concerning the centrality of practices, I suggest that in order to grasp the present crisis of democratic forms of individuality we can learn a lot from Nietzsche's analysis of ?nihilism?. Second, I point to a dimension which I consider to be missing in the perspective put forward in the article. It fails to take account of the fact that the constitution of a ?we? always requires the determination of a ?them?. This, in my view, has important consequences for the relation between solidarity and politics. I conclude by arguing for the need to introduce an agonistic element in the view of solidarity, and for the crucial role of the category of the adversary in a pluralist democracy whose aim is to transform antagonism into agonism. (shrink)

Endorsing Bill Readings’ argument that there is an intimate relationship between the dissolution of the nation-State, the undermining of the Humboldtian ideal of the university and economic globalization, this paper defends both the nation-State and the Humboldtian university as core institutions of democracy. However, such an argument only has force, it is suggested, if we can revive an appreciation of the real meaning of democracy. Endorsing Cornelius Castoriadis’ argument that democracy has been betrayed in the modern world but disagreeing with (...) his analysis of modernity, it is argued that the tradition of modern democratic thought can only be properly comprehended in relation to the ‘radical enlightenment’ originating in the Renaissance, efforts to subvert this by the ‘moderate enlightenment’, and the revival and reformulation of the radical enlightenment in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. It is shown that subsequent political thought only becomes fully intelligible in relation to the on-going struggle between the radical and the moderate enlightenments, and that it is necessary to appreciate that the moderate enlightenment, manifesting itself in neo-liberal thought, is profoundly anti-democratic. While the radical enlightenment was developed in the nineteenth century by philosophical idealists, it is suggested that the achievements of the idealists can be successfully defended now only on naturalistic foundations through process metaphysics. Process metaphysics, it is shown, provides the basis for reviving the Humboldtian model of the university, the democratic nation-State, and a vision of the future as ‘communities of communities’ to counter the dissolution of all communities into the global market promoted by neo-liberals. (shrink)

The notion that if democracy is to flourish in East Asia it must be realized in ways that are compatible with East Asian’s Confucian norms or values is a staple conviction of Confucian scholarship. I suggest two reasons why it is unlikely and even undesirable for such a Confucianized democracy to emerge. First, 19th- and 20th-century modernization swept away or weakened the institutions which had transmitted Confucian practices in the past, undermining claims that there is an enduring Confucian communitarian or (...) cultural heritage today that democratic institutions have to adapt themselves to—or that a Confucian cultural spirit can be revived. Second, 20th-century East Asian statist regimes rationalized Confucianism for national ideologies meant to bind their citizens’ loyalties to developmentalist goals. Memories of this now delegitimized, statist Confucianism have contributed to the further marginalization of Confucian norms, and to their dissociation from democratic values, in today’s pluralistic democracies in East Asia. This essay argues that a Confucian conviction politics developed within the frame of East Asia’s actually existing liberal democracies provides a better course for advocates of Confucianism in democratic politics. (shrink)

In this essay I defend an institutional approach to democratic legitimacy against proceduralist approaches that are commonly endorsed by deliberative democrats. Although deliberative democrats defend a complex view of democratic legitimacy that aims to account for both the procedural and substantive dimensions of legitimacy, most accounts of the relationship between these dimensions currently on offer are too proceduralist to be plausible (I). By contrast, I argue that adopting an institutional approach helps provide a more convincing account of the (...) interplay between procedural and substantive aspects of democratic legitimacy which in turn illuminates the intricate relationship between public deliberation and decision-making procedures such as voting (II). This account also enables us to see what is wrong with interpreting the legitimacy of majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions in terms of an alleged conflict between popular sovereignty and rights protections. In opposition to this view, I argue that the proper standard for judging the democratic legitimacy of both majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions is whether they enable an ongoing recursive process of deliberative contestation or whether they generate antidemocratic shortcuts instead (III). (shrink)